







C128 S

ANNALS OF CÆSAR

A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY
WITH A SURVEY OF THE SOURCES

FOR MORE ADVANCED STUDENTS OF ANCIENT HISTORY
AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE USE AND SERVICE
OF INSTRUCTORS IN CÆSAR

BY

E. G. SIHLER, PH.D.

(JOHNS HOPKINS, 1878)

5072

PROFESSOR OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE
IN NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, SOMETIME FELLOW IN
GREEK IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

*incorruptam fidem professis neque
amore quisquam et sine odio dicen-
dus est*

TACITUS

Concordia Library
BRonxville, N. Y

NEW YORK
G. E. STECHERT & CO.
LONDON, LEIPZIG, AND PARIS

1911

~~214~~ 3356

COPYRIGHT, 1910,
BY E. G. SIHLER.

Set up and electrotyped. Published December, 1910.

B
C 128s

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

To

BERNADOTTE PERRIN

OF YALE UNIVERSITY

A DISTINGUISHED STUDENT OF CLASSICAL
HISTORIOGRAPHY

larger movement, are easily distinguished from the ancient tradition itself with its nebulosities or luminosities,¹ the problems of direct and indirect relation, the evidences of copying, of confusion, of partisanship, the personal elements, and other pertinent outcome of close vision and rigorous examination. Thus, then, I entertain some hopes that directors and students in classical and historical *seminars* may find the book useful.

Coming now to the larger aspects of these lectures, I hope to interest a wider public also. I have never allowed myself to assume any fixed emotional attitude towards the central figure of these studies. I have kept my mind free from any preconceived or predetermined conception of Cæsar and the larger figures of his generation. Better to let acts and action, utterance and judgments of the actors,— better to permit events, results, and issues by their own sequence, and by an intrinsic force of their own, comparable to a kind of induction, to do their own work and gradually draw their own lineaments, and beget in the reader a certain definite and substantial body of political, moral, psychological insight and information, where the relating historian himself keeps in the background as much as the rhapsode who chanted an epic created before.

A valuation of Mommsen and of Froude, from whom the author differs *toto cœlo*, has been placed in an appendix.

Two things, I believe, constitute the substance of historiography. Of these, one is more necessary than the other, but often difficult and generally unwelcome to many readers; viz. the exact determination of what happened, what we know and do not know. Here too belongs the approach, often necessary, to the gray atmosphere of conjecture and mere probability or possibility. The other one of these two things is valuation, estimation,

¹ These largely furnished by Cicero's letters.

and characterization. It is this latter element which the general public chiefly if not exclusively regards, which it quotes and praises, in which it delights, by which often it is enthralled; the most personal side in the historian's self-revelation. But I am much impressed with a normative aphorism of *Ranke's*: "Naked truth without any adornment. Thorough investigation of detail: leave the rest to God. By all means let us have no inventing, not even in the smallest matters, by all means let us have no mere figment of the brain" ("nur kein Hirngespinnt"). "The historian's quest in history must not be for beauty only and striking lineaments, but exact truth."

No lengthy bibliographical list, no heavy drafts upon *Bursian's* "Jahresbericht," are here to be appended. The collections of *Peter*, the introductions to the authors of classic historiography by *Schaefer* and *Wachsmuth*, are familiar. Ever must the earnest student return to that splendid repertory, *Fischer's* "Zeittafeln," Altona, 1846. I said *repertory*: after all, that is the irreducible minimum of value even in the most eminent antiquarian books, such as Mommsen's ultra-systematic treatises on the Roman government. Mommsen, Kiepert, Droysen, Ludwig Lange,—I heard and saw them all in my vernal time, when one admires but does not judge as yet.

Repertories: hence Madvig's deliberate self-limitation to the definite state of actual tradition impresses me as admirable.

Of recent books the heavy volume of *T. Rice Holmes* of London ("Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul," 1899) and *Botsford's* "Roman Assemblies" (1910) are very noteworthy productions, and the latter is not unworthy of a place near Ludwig Lange.

My work could hardly have been accomplished at all without *Tyrrell's* monumental arrangement of Cicero's

letters.—Many references to books and treatises will be found in the notes or index.—As for the author of the present volume, a large part of his professional life has been devoted to first-hand study of classical history and civilization, as in the Essays of his “*Testimonium Animæ*,” 1908: in ch. 14, “*Roman Spirit and Roman Character*”; ch. 15, “*Ritual and Worship among Roman Institutions*”; ch. 16, “*Cicero of Arpinum, Cato of Utica*.”

But even more specifically (in the wider range of this entire domain) I may be permitted to refer to some of my former things, such as “*Character and Career of Tiberius*” (1880), “*The Tradition of Cæsar’s Gallic Wars from Cicero to Orosius*” (1887), “*Studies in Cæsar*” (1890), “*A Concordance of Cæsar’s Seven Books*” (out of print, 1891), “*Census Lists in Livy*” (1891), “*A Study of Velleius*” (1894), “*St. Paul and the Roman Law*” (1894), the Introduction to my edition of “*Cicero’s Second Philippic*” (1901, now published by D. C. Heath & Co.), and “*Augustus Princeps*” (1902).

In conclusion may I not express a hope (not oversanguine, it is true) that our British and Continental fellow-classicists may begin at least to realize that first-hand classical study on this side of the Atlantic has reached a point of earnestness, a stage of exact and sustained effort which may deserve some attention from them, too, and some return for the European pupilage which among us is rapidly coming to an end.

E. G. SIHLER.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS,
October 28, 1910.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD, EARLY YOUTH	2
II. POLITICAL RETROSPECT: FROM THE GRACCHI TO SULLA. THE FIRST GREAT TEST OF YOUNG CÆSAR	8
III. YOUNG CÆSAR IN THE FIELD AND ON THE FORUM .	34
IV. CÆSAR'S PUBLIC ADVANCEMENT BEFORE 63 B.C. .	44
V. 63 B.C.—A CRITICAL YEAR	67
VI. CÆSAR AS PRÆTOR AND IN HIS FIRST <i>Imperium</i> .	72
VII. THE TRIUMVIRATE AND CÆSAR'S CONSULATE . .	79
VIII. CÆSAR IN 58 B.C.	91
IX. CÆSAR IN 57 B.C.	101
X. CÆSAR IN 56 B.C.	109
XI. CÆSAR IN 55 B.C.	119
XII. CÆSAR IN 54 B.C.	127
XIII. CÆSAR IN 53 B.C.	139
XIV. VERCINGETORIX THE ARVERNIAN, 52 B.C. . .	152
XV. CÆSAR IN 51 B.C.	169
XVI. CÆSAR IN 50 B.C.	185
XVII. CÆSAR IN 49 B.C.	190
XVIII. CÆSAR IN 48 B.C.	205
XIX. CÆSAR IN 47 B.C.	214
XX. CÆSAR IN 46 B.C.	226
XXI. THE LAST YEAR BUT ONE, 45 B.C.	239
XXII. THE LAST MONTHS OF CÆSAR'S LIFE	251
XXIII. THE WRITINGS OF CÆSAR	263
XXIV. THE SUPPLEMENTARY ACCOUNTS	279
XXV. THE OTHER SOURCES	289
APPENDIX: MOMMSEN AND FROUDE	309
INDEX	321

ANNALS OF CÆSAR

“Wie es denn eigentlich gewesen ist.” — RANKE.

“ὅτι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἥδη μοναρχίας ἔδει διὰ τὴν κακοπολιτείαν” (that the situation of affairs now required the rule of a single person on account of the vicious character of the actual government). — *The philosopher Kratippos to Pompey, after Pharsalos, 48 b.c.* PLUT. POMP. 75.

I DESIRE to begin this book with the utterance of a caution and the presentation of an image.

First, the caution, intended both for myself and for my readers: — Biography in a way is a justification of the action portrayed; everything seems much more plausible than in historiography at large. As we gain a closer vision of causes, motives, temperaments, situations, sequences, almost all our valuations *seem* to be truer and fairer. But with all this there is a positive danger of our drifting into a certain emotional prejudice or partisanship. This is so because there is apt to be engendered in us an ever strengthening inclination to identify ourselves, for the time being, with the subject and to assume his concerns as our own. And then the image: A politician, however extraordinary and epochal he may be, at one time rides the billows and dominates public life, as Neptune ruled the flood, uttering a quasi-sovereign “*quos ego!*” to hostile forces cowering before him and turning to flight. At another time he resembles an anxious pilot, furling sails and straining his eyes as they sweep a prospect of foam-crested and storm-whipped gray seas: and again that mighty politician resembles a mariner suddenly engulfed and no more seen, swallowed up by the very element which bore him on its back, and which he even seemed to dominate before.

CHAPTER I

ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD, EARLY YOUTH

THE biography by Suetonius is now truncated at the beginning. If this initial portion were not lost we would have a complete survey of the Julian family, its pedigree, its political and military honors, its curule and other offices, and the like. Alban, nay Trojan, ancestry was the pride of that house. The *Iulii* were transferred to Rome from the venerable acropolis of the Latin name by the third king of Rome, as were the *Servilii*, *Geganii*, *Metilii*, *Curiatii*, *Quinctilii*, and *Clælii*. Varro, the greatest antiquarian of Rome, and the greatest authority in the generation of Cæsar and Cicero, wrote a monograph dealing with the “Trojan Families” of Rome.

Iulus is a derivative of *Iullus*¹ or *Iulus*. Of course the legends of Æneas and his son Ascanius-Iulus flourished long before Vergil wrote his epic, in which the *Venus Genetrix* of the Julian legends rules and shelters the first fates of the imperial commonwealth, as in “Æneid,” 1, 288.

In the first generations of the Republic the family occupied a prominent rank. In 489, when Coriolanus was in exile, Gaius Iulius Iulus was consul (Dionys., “Antiqq. Rom.” 8, 1). Again we meet the name of *Iulus Iulus* in the consular *Fasti* of 482, 473, 447, 435. But later on, in the consolidation of the Latin communities and the slow conquest of the peninsula, they seem to disappear from among the dominant families of the commonwealth.

For more than a hundred years the Julian house seems to have lived in a kind of political obscurity, and when

¹ Mommsen, “Hermes,” 1889, p. 155 sq. It does not seem necessary to assume with Mommsen that Vergil deliberately transformed *Iullus* to *Iulus*. Dionys., “Antiqq. Rom.” 8, 1, writes Ιοῦλος.

they resumed political prominence the surname (*cognomen*) of *Cæsar* had been adopted by the entire family, with no further subdivision of distinguished branches, which subdivision was the case, *e.g.*, with the *Claudii*, *Æmili**i*, *Cornelii*, *Licinii*, and other houses of the Roman nobility.

In the latter part of the Hannibalian war (208 B.C., Liv., 27, 22) Sextius Iulius Cæsar governed Sicily as his prætorian province. The meaning of the name *Cæsar* is quite uncertain: 1) Elephant, a Punic war association, 2) cut from his mother's womb, 3) blue-eyed, 4) born with a shock of hair. The latter is in full accord with the general drift of Roman nomenclature. Also it is vouched for by the distinguished antiquarian and domestic tutor of the grandsons of Cæsar Augustus himself, viz. by Verrius Flaccus.¹ With the exception of Sex. Iulius Cæsar, consul of 157 B.C., the further Cæsars down to the dictator did not achieve anything higher than prætorian honors. So, too, his own father, Gaius Iulius Cæsar. Cæsar was born on the twelfth day of the month Quinc-tillis, 100 B.C., at Cæsar's death named *July*. The most prominent figure in public life at that time was Gaius Marius, the great captain and plebeian leader, who in middle life had married Iulia, Cæsar's aunt; thus this aristocratic house had allied itself, quite deliberately, we may say, with the politics of the plebs, for *all* marriages of the aristocracy were, as a rule, arranged by the heads of houses. At Cæsar's birth both Pompey and Cicero were six years old; Varro, the scholar and writer, and later a lieutenant of Pompey, Varro, who survived them all, was sixteen; Hortensius, fourteen. Through his mother Aurelia, young Cæsar was connected with a distinguished family whose principal members in public life sided with the conservatives, but maintained clear vision in dealing with necessary reforms.

¹ 'Cæsar, quod est cognomen Iuliorum, a cæsarie dictus est, qui scilicet cum cæsarie natus est.'

As to the body and substance of young Cæsar's instruction, it was, primarily, Greek. And the preponderance of Greek had really been well understood from the beginnings—late beginnings—of literary culture in a community whose earliest literary men were either of Greek birth, or at least of Greek culture. Likewise the earliest teachers. They taught literature, and by ultimate reproduction of Greek literary forms and species in Latin, they maintained Greek, as we clearly see, as the prototype for every form of cultured or finished expression.

And the finished faculty of a certain mastery did not lose itself in vague dictations of æsthetical or psychological analyses which are often inflicted on young people in our modern ways, but in imitation and reproduction: essentially the manner revived in the renaissance of the Italian Humanists. All of it, however, had a preparatory relation to the study of rhetoric. And this was, if possible, even more distinctly a Greek professional thing.

When young Cæsar was eight years of age, in 92, the censors then in office, of whom L. Licinius Crassus, foremost orator of his day, was one, closed the Latin rhetoricians' schools¹: which merely benefited the Greek professional teachers. Therefore, whereas the practical and ultimate fruition of this Græco-Roman culture was Latin oratory on the forum, or before juries, or by and by in the senate,² Greek made that deep impression on the mind which so perfect a literature, acquired hand in hand with the faculty of easy Greek speech, was bound to make on a gifted boy between eight and fifteen or so. Cicero's Philhellenism³ is familiar to the world, and as for Cæsar (when Athens herself surrendered in 48, not long after Pharsa-

¹ Suet., "de Rhetoribus," 1.

² Sententiam dicere.

³ It had, by the bye, a continuous practical side; e.g., "Cicero ad præturam usque etiam *Græce* declamavit," Sueton., "Rhet.," 1. Cicero had the power of addressing the city council of Syracuse in Greek. Cf. also "Orator," 12.

los, to his lieutenant, Fufius Calenus), he spared the people of Athens absolutely (*μηδὲν μνησικακήσας ἀθώους ἀφήκε*, Dio Cass., 42, 14), merely adding that, while they had committed great misdemeanors, “*they were saved by their dead.*” Here is a worthy manifestation of classicist regard. We know through Suetonius (“*De Grammaticis*,” 7) the name of one at least of young Cæsar’s literary teachers, viz. Antonius Gniphō; he “is said to have been of great native ability, of an extraordinary faculty of memory, and not less learned in Greek than in Latin. . . .” The literary valuation of Terence, the translator of Menander,¹ I am inclined to assign to *young Cæsar*, not to his maturer years: versification on standard themes, possibly produced and recited under the auspices of Gniphō or some other *grammaticus* in the *collegium poetarum*, the only place in Rome at that time where technical faculty of versification could be exhibited on stated occasions before experts.²

Of Cæsar’s father we know one thing only, but that a matter of vast importance. Young Cæsar was in his sixteenth year: the elder Cæsar was at Pisæ, on the Tuscan coast: probably a Marian, he had not accompanied Sulla in the latter’s eastern campaigns. One morning, as he was engaged in putting on his shoes (the tying of a gentleman’s shoes was an elaborate affair), he died (Plin., “*N. H.*,” 7, 181), in middle life, probably from the bursting of some blood-vessel in the brain. Here, too, was a physical *diathesis* due to heredity, for his own father had died in exactly the same way, at about the same stage of life.

Now young Cæsar had completed his fifteenth year at the time of this domestic catastrophe. Under the civil law the completion of the fourteenth year made a male

¹ In the “*Vita*,” by Suetonius.

² See my paper on “*The Collegium Poetarum at Rome*,” *Amer. Journal of Philology*, 1905.

ward free from guardianship. Under *tutela*, therefore, young Cæsar never passed. When his father suddenly expired, the youth became at one stroke civilly independent, *sui iuris*. Moreover, in the first days of 86 his uncle Marius and the latter's colleague, the popular leader Cinna, had appointed the lad priest of Jupiter (*flamen dialis*), that is, nominated him, as it seems, for the next vacancy¹; this during his father's lifetime, and of course with the latter's approval. It was an early identification of the lad with the popular party.

When did Cæsar receive the *toga virilis*? This act, which concerned not only the family, but the roster of citizenship as well, was often, though not necessarily, celebrated on March 15, the *Liberalia*.² We must be content, in young Cæsar's case, with assuming that this important first step towards maturity and manhood was gone through with before his sixteenth year, possibly in March, 84. Even before this time, the youth, who had no brother, had been (Suet., "Cæs.", 1) betrothed to Cosutia, destined to be a great heiress, though of a family merely equestrian, not senatorial. But, sometime after January, 84, perhaps after January 1, 83, young Cæsar married Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, four times consul: whether before or after the death of that leader of the democratic or popular party, so called, we cannot determine. At all events it was his own act, and a curious and puzzling act: it is not likely that Sulla had yet landed at Brundisium: many things were yet coming and therefore indefinite. We are startled by an almost uncanny faculty in the mere youth to determine for himself, and to determine with a view to politics. To a sober reflection that marriage might have seemed both extremely unwise, hazardous, and unprofitable. If ever there was a political union, this seems to have been such a one.

¹ Velleius, 2, 43, 1.

² Marquardt, "Privatleben der Roemer," 1886, p. 124.

Was it that the budding youth wished to identify himself in some striking way with the (late?) head of the popular party, who, however, had ruled the peninsula and the western part of the empire entirely as an autocrat? Did young Cæsar make this match with the approval or against the advice of his mother Aurelia? Her brother or brothers were then in Sulla's headquarters beyond seas.

Clearly, here was no cautious timeserver nor character who would put his ear to the ground to measure the weight and impact of the tread of coming events. The politics of Rome, however great and broadening the empire, were still the politics of a single city, and the trend of latter events had more and more assumed a character of decisive persons and personalities. But the names of Marius, Cinna, and Sulla urge upon me and my readers the necessity of gaining a fair basis for following the earliest acts of young Cæsar's public life. The entire political life of the imperial city was then a movement on an inclined plane and breeding a series of crises. Let us make our second chapter a political retrospect.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL RETROSPECT: FROM THE GRACCHI TO SULLA. THE FIRST GREAT TEST OF YOUNG CÆSAR

ROME never was a republic in our American sense; we may truly say, as I have said elsewhere,¹ that “the battles of Rome were won, her administration determined, her children begotten, and her blood shed, for the interests of a small number of great families.” But for a long time the sense of economic suffering and injustice had not assumed a political or decisive importance. Soon, however, after Rome seemed to have no more foreign foe worthy of her concern, this new movement of domestic unrest pressed to the front.

The Romans, in the course of their peninsular conquests, had from the beginning appropriated much land. This state domain, or *ager publicus*, was let thus (Appian, “B. C.” 1, 7): the tenants were to pay the state one tithe of crops ($\tauῶν σπειρομένων$), one fifth of fruit ($\tauῶν φυτευομένων$), and a certain quota of flocks. And whereas they did this with a view to the growth of the Italian (so Appian, better say *Latin*) population, preëminently hardy as it was, the very opposite resulted. The rich in time got hold of this undivided land or domain, extending their own tenure by purchase, by wheedling, and by violence, thus creating enormous grazing districts instead of farms,²

¹ “*Testimonium Animæ*,” 1908, p. 329.

² While I am writing, the movement for *conservation*, as opposed to exploitation, stands in the forefront of our common concerns. The parallels of Rome afford at least a few points of analogy. Grave are the much-quoted words of the elder Pliny: “And to tell the truth, the *Broad Estates (latifundia)* have ruined Italy, now indeed even the provinces also.” (“*N. H.*,” 18, 35.) The presentation of Appian, which I have

slaves of course being more profitable as laborers and herdsmen. Further, the interest of these great landlords was that the slaves should multiply as much as possible, because the wars did not decimate them at all. Thus the free yeomen were crowded out, the slaves abounding: Italy was overtaken by a positive stoppage in the increase of population as well as by a deterioration of her men, physically and socially, being ground under poverty and taxes (after 168 B.C.?) and military service.

Thus Rome as a political power was grievously injured in this stunting of the very personnel of her "allies." Still people shrank from reviewing tenure and title; the right of long possession seemed a bar also. The laws of Licinius and Sextius (367 B.C.) had limited tenure of the public domain to 500 *iugera*,¹ grazing being confined to 100 head of cattle or 500 sheep or swine. For stewards and surveyors they were to employ free persons.

No genuine betterment, however, followed: the interests caused transfer of lands by sham civil process to persons who stood close to them.

Most of the great landholders treated the ancient statute with contempt until Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus in 133 B.C. *renewed* (ἀνεκαίνιζε, Appian, "B. C.", 1, 9) and for the first time enforced the ancient Licinian laws. An actual commission of three surveyed the land and took practical steps towards expropriation. It was this commission which prevented the landlords from treating this law with contempt, as the old law of 367 had been treated.

Also the sale of land allotments was forbidden by a provision of the Sempronian statute.

Now the landlords assumed the tone of injured benefactors: they also pointed to ancestral tombs which even

made my own, may be deduced from a political speech of Tiberius Gracchus himself. Plutarch, "Tib. Gracchus," c. 15, cites definitely certain points (ἐπιχειρήματα) from a concrete political speech of the latter.

¹ A *iugerum* is almost $\frac{5}{8}$ of an acre.

under the civil law were *loci sacri*: others pleaded that they had invested their wives' dowries in this way, or made settlements upon their daughters. Others had mortgaged such lands: the money lenders foresaw great trouble in the task of coming to their own, and "altogether (Appian, 1, 10) the lamenting and expression of indignation was unseemly."

I have no space here even to trace the further political troubles of Tiberius, nor the far more trenchant and radical legislation of his remarkable younger brother Gaius through the mechanism of tribunician power stretched to the utmost. Nor must I dwell upon the death of Cornelia's great sons in riotous procedures for which the landlord party was directly and conspicuously responsible.

It will be clear later on that in a measure the politician Cæsar entered into the inheritance of these wonderful brothers, and in his agrarian law (or laws) gained the good will of the many. Further, we shall see how he was able (leaving out of consideration his sword and treasure) to rely upon and to consider as his personal clients numberless Romans, Latins, Italians, who with some reason looked upon him as a champion and benefactor of the poor and of the many, as over against the special interests represented in the perpetual executive council of the empire, the senate.

Now it cannot be denied that the authors of agrarian laws were held up, in the older and simpler days of the republic, as traitors who strove and schemed for autocratic power, and under guise of benefactions, or even of personal sacrifices, plotted to overthrow the common freedom and the rights of all. Thus had perished Mælius and Manlius in the olden time.

As for Tiberius and Gaius, the landlords of course, who had by a quasi-governmental authority slain the brothers, attempted to justify these acts as beneficial to the commonwealth at large, as wholesome removals of fire-

brands, disturbers of vested rights, prospective autocrats or tyrants.

The earliest historical record here quotable was written by Asellio,¹ a contemporary of the elder Gracchus. He served under Scipio Æmilianus in Spain, a man who strove to quicken the moral and political sense of his readers, not a mere annalist and chronicler. Unfortunately, but few shreds are preserved for us, the chief ones by Gellius. Still, they are the pencillings of a witness : “For whenever Gracchus (the elder) set out from his house, a body of never less than three or four thousand persons was wont to follow him.” The most impressive condemnation, however, of the elder Gracchus was pronounced by his own brother-in-law, the foremost man of his time, Scipio Æmilianus himself ; the Homeric verse rose to his lips :

“Thus perish e'en another who would such things perform !”

Now the Pontifex Nasica, the chief slayer of Tiberius, was by no means reputed a saviour of the state by the people at large, but hooted on the streets. The Senate, indeed, sent this champion to the East under guise of some political mission, and he died in quasi-exile at Pergamum.

The splendid achievements and the lofty character of Scipio Æmilianus himself did not spare him the necessity of giving utterance in public to his opinion of the martyr of the people’s cause. And it was not merely the desire of the popular politicians to embarrass him before the people, but they knew that the pulse-beat of the plebs of Rome impatiently demanded to know what the eminent gentleman thought of that death. The political assassination of Scipio (129 B.C.) was shrouded in mystery at that time — he had indeed defied the surging masses on the forum as a mob “to whom Italy was but a stepmother.” (Vell., 2, 41.)

¹ Peter, “Hist. Rom. Fragmenta,” p. 108.

As for Opimius the consul (121), slayer, or, if you prefer, executioner of Gaius Gracchus, he too failed to be prosperous later on. Opimius, mind you, had been in a way sheltered by the declaration of martial law, the noted *Senatus consultum ultimum* : “ Let the consuls see to it that the state suffer no impairment ”!

Later on we shall see that the adroit politician Cæsar (in 63, case of Rabirius) with fair success attempted to demolish that ancient bulwark of the powers that were.

For a long time, indeed, the Roman senate had been in truth the repository of delegated power wielded for the state at large. But this beneficial and representative character it had lost.

The second great matter in this retrospect is the vast change, nay, metamorphosis, in the position of the *tribuni plebis*. Gaius, in an incisive manner, had both weakened and isolated the senatorial class by removing from them, nay, by setting over against them, the influential body of the equestrian citizens. The power to absolve and to condemn, the privilege of jury service, was taken from the senate and given to the knights ; it remained law for some forty years.

During the Jugurthine war some of the chief corruptionists in the senate (whose palms were tainted with Jugurtha's gold) were found guilty by a jury whose bias Cicero readily charges to the fact that they were “ *Gracchian jurors*. ”

Thus the cleavage in the very structure of Rome's political household went on apace, for the maintenance of a conservative wrong is no less a disintegrating force than the assertion of bold innovation by reckless radicals.

This disintegration was mightily accelerated by the domestic history of the poor peasant's son of Arpinum, Gaius Marius. One of the five or six great captains of

Rome, he rose to eminence in despite and in defiance of the intrenched aristocracy. He bore the consciousness of his specific worth in a peculiar way. Clearly there was a chronic soreness at the aristocracy in the hearts and lives of the common people, and the evil times had come when it was easy to increase that soreness, and when men rose to power through that process. Sallust himself, who gained distinction and great wealth from his membership in the popular party and his loyalty to the leader thereof,—that keen-visaged historian himself (“*Jug.*,” 85 sqq.), presents Marius in the latter’s first brief canvass for consular honors as anything but humble, indeed as defiant, insolent, ostentatious in his contempt for the aristocracy. Here was a man of humble birth, without achievements of ancestors, without clientships, who boasted of it that he could not speak Greek. And on the morrow the tremendous emergency of the Cimbrian and Teuton invasion of Gaul and Spain and Italy proved that the governing aristocracy were absolutely in need of this passionate and defiant plebeian.

And here the necessities of empire, nay, of self-preservation, broke through and broke down all previous tradition, the very limitations¹ of the republican government and supremacy.

The first six consulates, then, of Marius occurred in these years: the first in 107; the next five were continuous, in 104, 103, 102, 101, and 100 B.C., when Cæsar was born.

But we must not overlook the incessant efforts of the privileged class to undo the work of the Gracchi. Not long (Appian, “*B. C.*,” 1, 27) after the death of Gaius a statute was passed,² a plebiscitum, put forward, too, not

¹ For details of the *Lex Villia Annalis* of 180 B.C., *v. Mommsen, “Staatsrecht,”* 3d ed., I, p. 523 sqq.

² Botsford, “The Roman Assemblies.” Mommsen, “*C. I. Lat.*,” Vol. I, pp. 75 sqq.

by a consul, but by a tribune of the people, Spurius Thorius, probably in 111 B.C., entirely in the interest of the occupiers (possessors) as over against the state. Thus holdings were confirmed and (according to Appian, *l.c.*) certain rent charges were established, and thus a fund was to be made which was to be distributed, pauperizing the poorer folk in town still more. These rent moneys, however, were abolished after a short time by "another tribunus plebis," and thus, as Appian observes, the plebs was utterly deprived of all betterment.

Many tribunes of the people were descended from the office-holding aristocracy, and merely passed through this "honor" in their political ascent, compelled often to play a double rôle. An honest effort was made by a young nobleman as tribunus plebis in 104, L. Marcius Philippus, to help the plebs. In 104 or thereabouts he proposed a new plebiscitum for agrarian reform; but he soon allowed the matter to lapse, because the pressure of his own class was stronger than the brief flash of a political enthusiasm. In his temporary advocacy of his own bill he made the remark which startled his generation profoundly, viz., that there were not two thousand¹ persons in the commonwealth who possessed property, viz., the overwhelming mass was essentially proletarian.

But to return to Marius. In the coterie of demagogues who clustered about the great captain, the saviour of Italy, the most prominent was Appuleius Saturninus. He, too, strove to step into the shoes of the Gracchi. The lands in question were near the mouth of the Rhone, where Marius had won his greatest victory. He, by the bye, in a somewhat new and peculiar manner had come to be—had perhaps deliberately made himself—the patron and protector of the lowest class of citizens, the *capite*

¹ Cic. "Off.," 2, 73. Cicero keenly disliked the utterance, but does not disprove it.

censi,¹ who had no property rating at all. But they had the powerful claim of *stipendia*, of service, of years of campaigning. The loot of the slain myriads of northern barbarians was no compensation to them. As for the money gathered from the sale of prisoners of war, it went to the treasury.

Now, then, as Gaius Gracchus in Africa, so Saturninus proposed to assign lands to establish colonies in southern Gaul.

This agrarian law at that particular juncture of affairs the senators did not dare to antagonize. Cicero ("Sest.," 37) called it later on "a statute passed by force." Incidentally, through the oath which the haughty Metellus refused to take, Marius accomplished the latter's banishment.

In the end, however, after the assassination of the worthy Memmius (whose consulate would have checkmated Saturninus), that people's man was disavowed by his own leader, who had to consent to his destruction.

To Marius there had been married Julia, the sister of Cæsar's father. While thus this *ultra-aristocratic* house had connected itself with the party of the *populares*, we must not neglect to observe that these democratic leaders were not socially democratic. Marius himself became immensely wealthy. As for the aspiring Cæsar, when he had barely entered the senate (in 68 B.C.), he said, in the funeral eulogy of his aunt Julia, widow of Marius: "The maternal descent of my aunt Julia came from the kings, the paternal is associated with the immortal gods. For from Ancus Marcius are the Marcii Reges, of which name was her mother; from Venus are the Iulii, of which stock is our family. There is therefore in our pedigree both the august eminence of kings who have the greatest power among men and the religious solemnity of gods, in whose power the kings themselves are." (Suet., "Cæs.," 6.) An aristocrat, then, as regards his person and social con-

¹ Sall., "Jug.," 86.

sciousness, no matter what line of political advancement he chose. The very profusion of his later bounties made him a veritable demigod in the eyes of the multitude. The 'democratic' movement in Rome was indeed *sui generis*.

But to return: When Cæsar was about ten years old, all Italy was shaken to its very foundations by that crisis which is known as the 'war of the Allies' (*bellum sociale*), or Marsian war, or Italian war.

In 125 the Latin 'allies' had held hopes for the Roman franchise, when the consul Fulvius Flaccus strove for it; again the matter was stirred in the second tribunate of the great Gaius. It was with the aid of the Latins that Saturinus had carried his Agrarian Law. The decline of business and prosperity in many country towns of Italy had induced many Latins to settle in Rome and probably to act as citizens. As for the *burdens*, they had had them for a long time.

Latins, I say, for it seems obvious that a man whose dialect placed him in Apulia or Bruttium or Umbria, whose speech betrayed him, could not safely demean himself as a Roman citizen in Rome.

The ablest and purest statesmen in the Aristocratic party, Crassus and Scævola, as consuls in 95 had procured the enactment of a law¹ to check and severely punish the practical assumption by these (technical) aliens of Roman citizenship. "However (Asconius, ib.), so estranged were the feelings of the chief peoples of Italy by this law, that this proved the very greatest cause of the Italian war which broke out three years (really five) later."

In 91 came forward a tribune of the people who seems worthy of the great title of statesman, and clearly was no mere agent of a big politician.

The status of the exclusively equestrian juries had become intolerable, as is always the case when a compact

¹ In Asconius, Corneliana, p. 67, Orelli, I would read 'legem . . . de redigundis in sua(m) civitate(m) sociis.'

class has the monopoly of an important governmental power. The scandalous condemnation of the pure and noble-minded P. Rutilius Rufus (93 B.C.) had emphasized this. M. Livius Drusus now proposed an equal partition between the senatorial and equestrian class. To this end, some three hundred of the most worthy¹ knights were to receive seats in the senate, and from this body, so constituted and reinforced, the juries were to be selected.

Further, the allies in Italy were to receive the Roman citizenship. He also proposed an agrarian law so thorough that, as he himself said, he had omitted nothing from partition but the mud of the highways and the sky overhead. We see the spirits of the Gracchi—while their bodies had long perished—would indeed “go marching on” somehow. Their reforms could not be gotten out of the world.

The capitalists whose corrupt jurors Livius had sought to bring to the bar were bitterly hostile to the great reformer: *their* mouthpiece or representative, it seems, was the consul Philippus. On September 13 Livius had summoned a senate: the feud between him and the consul just named was then intense. A great crisis was clearly on. On that day the foremost orator of that generation, young Cicero’s beloved and immortalized exemplar, Crassus, spoke in the senate for the last time. Drusus was charged, it seems, by the consul Philippus² with the organization of a sworn secret society to support the tribune with blood and fortune in his effort to gain the Roman franchise for the Italian allies. On September 20, Crassus, the foremost debater of the senate, died. It was *after*

¹ ἀριστίνδην προσκαταλεγῆναι, App., “B. C.” 1, 35.

² The so-called *δρκός Φιλίππου*, now preserved in Diodorus, fragments of book 37, c. 11. Ludwig Lange considers it a forgery of Philippus. Livy (“Periocha,” 71) seems to have been very unfriendly to Drusus. A charge of wide-spread secret movement must have been current. Th. Mommsen, indeed, operates with the “Geheimbund” as an historical fact.

this date that the tribune forced a vote on his various laws, coupled together in a single bill (*per saturam*), all but that of the franchise.

The senate vainly declared the *leges Liviae* unconstitutional. The tribune did not even block this *senatus-consultum* by *intercessio*. October went by. Now Livius had to keep his promise to the Italian allies. At this point it seems, as Appian transcribed, that both senate and knights had come to be as one in their hatred of Drusus. The plebeians alone rejoiced in the prospect of colonies. (App., 1, 36.)

Soon after, this statesman was stabbed to death while walking up and down amid hundreds of clients, visitors, supporters, petitioners, in the atrium of his mansion, clearly still young and so enthusiastically optimistic in his vision of future achievement.

He stands to-day, a truncated and broken shaft of splendid base and noble design, in the museum of Roman worthies, greater by far as a noble public man than Marius or Sulla. A greater Rome would he have had. Had the day gone by when argument and debate, when, indeed, parliamentary methods could better anything in the political fabric?

Beginning with the persecution of corrupt jurors, he had in less than one civil year advanced to the possible limits of radical reforms. Who hired the assassin? Was it not the gold of the banking and financial class? On the other hand, neither people nor senate ever decreed any investigation.

Their champion foully stricken to the ground, the Italians now drew the sword to claim political equality. The war broke out late in 91, and filled with pregnant events the years 90 and 89. So much was there, that the recital of this brief period filled not less than five complete books of Livy: 72, 73, 74, 75, 76.

Gross acts of tyranny and brutal perversion of elemen-

tary rights had been suffered¹ by the 'Italici,' and there was no provision of appeal.

The terrible scenes of Asculum Picenum (Ascoli) were probably enacted in the winter of 91-90. Corfinium, characteristically renamed "Italica," the capital of the new Confederation, had a central position between north and south. Of the two "consuls," G. Pompædius Silo, a Marsian, represented the more moderate element in this revolution, viz., those Italians who sincerely desired genuine political equalization with Rome. On the other hand, Mutilus, a Samnite, had as his military province Samnium, Apulia, Lucania: these southerly men were more deeply embittered, and aimed at nothing less than the actual overthrow of Rome. Each consul had six "prætors."

In surveying this desperate struggle one is reminded of a game of chess with players equally matched, where pawn for pawn, rook for rook, bishop for bishop, there is merely an exchange of pieces, and no onlooker would dare even to surmise as to which one was at the end to checkmate the other. In 90 B.C. the consul L. Julius Cæsar was defeated by the Samnites. They captured Nola (not far from Naples and Pompeii) and put to the sword there the Roman prætor in command.

The other consul of Rome, P. Rutilius Rufus, was defeated by the Marsi and died himself. With better success old Marius, the latter's legate, fought them with his separate corps. A state of siege (*saga sumere*) had actually been ordained at the capital. But later on (Liv., "Per.," 73) Julius Cæsar fought with better success against the Samnites. While their side, again, captured the Roman colony of Æsernia (northwest of Bovianum),

¹ Mommsen (II, 219) compared the acts of England which alienated the American colonies: a weak parallel. *Marsicum Bellum* in Pauly gives an orderly and exact relation of the events.

Marius in his northerly section routed the Marsians, a commander of the Marrucini being slain.

In 89 Cn. Pompeius Strabo (father of the great Pompey) defeated the Picentes, and the capital (Liv., 74) was greatly cheered. Marius had a drawn battle with the Marsians. Then, for the first time, freedmen were enrolled at Rome as soldiers. The movement begun by Marius therefore went forward: more and more there came to be a class of professional soldiers: mercenaries, not citizens in arms.

Meanwhile, both in Etruria and in Umbria the Italian confederation gained new members. But here the eagles of Rome were immediately successful.

Sulla, legate probably of Pompey's, defeated the Samnites and took two of their camps.

At the capital the bankers and money lenders, still in possession of the exclusive power of sitting as jurors, suffered of course, during the war, in their business. At the very beginning of the great contest, they succeeded even by intimidation (Appian, "B. C.", 1, 37) in having passed a plebiscitum (*Lex Varia*), which provided for an investigation of persons responsible (on the Roman side) for the revolution; we must assume, of persons whose acts had furnished provocation. The victims proved to be, indeed, prominent members of the senatorial class. Bestia, Cotta, Mummius,¹ went into exile. We see these things as symptoms of the bitter antagonism of the two classes: we would gladly see further into the underlying causes if we could. Later in the war, when credit sank, the civil chief justice (*prætor urbanus*), a senator of course, Sempronius Asellio, came to the support of debtors by renewing (Appian, 1, 54) an ancient but of course obsolete law which forbade all usury whatsoever, not merely excess. The capitalists of the forum thereupon conspired and slew

¹ Shall we make Appian personally responsible for the grotesque specification Μούμμιος δ' ὁ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλών (146 B.C.)?

him when he was in the act of worshipping (sacrificing) before the temple of Castor and Pollux on the forum. It was about seven in the morning. — Indeed, Gaius had sown dragons' teeth in his reform of the courts. The perpetrators were never brought to trial.

On the whole, in the latter part of 89 B.C. and in the earlier part of 88, the military fortune of Rome began to improve. The insurgents gradually withdrew to the south; abandoning Corfinium, they made Bovianum their second capital.

In the end, or, to speak precisely, much before the end, the senate determined to meet the situation by new enactments.

The first concession,¹ probably after the campaign of 90, was introduced by the consul Julius himself: the essential provision was that communities must accept the Roman franchise by an act of their own. Naples and Heraclea declined, probably by a specific vote of their electorate. In the second year (89) came the Lex Plautia et Papiria, a statute put forward by tribunes. Its main provisions were that aspirants for Roman citizenship were taken in rather as individuals than collectively by communities. They must have been regularly enrolled in an allied community, must further have had a residence in Italy when the law was adopted, must have entered their name with a *prætor* (*i.e.*, physically present in Rome itself) *within sixty days*. (Cic., "Arch.," 7.)

The stubborn unwillingness of the Roman people to be fair or moderately just towards their Italian quondam subjects had cost them dear and had proved futile in the end. The lowest estimates of ancient historians places

¹ L. Lange, 3, 110-111; Botsford, 401; Gellius, 16, 13, 6. The editors (as Long) of Cic. "Balb.," 21, fail to give a lucid logical explanation of "fundum fieri."

the joint total loss of Italy and in Italy at 100,000–150,000 men: others estimated as high as 300,000. Lucania and Samnium for the present maintained a sullen attitude, neither joyous nor loyal nor fraternal, towards their ancient oppressors.

At this point it seems wise to give some survey of the later census figures. The official returns, as available now, were as follows (according to Hertz's text):

In 142 B.C. (Livy, "Per.," 54) . . .	328,442 (<i>civium capita</i>)
136 B.C. (Liv., 56)	377,923
131 B.C. (Liv., 59)	318,823
125 B.C. (Liv., 60)	394,726
115 B.C. (Liv., 63)	394,336

No official enumeration was accomplished in 109, 102, 97, 92 B.C. In 86, during Cinna's virtual reign, Marcius Philippus (consul of 91), the champion of the anti-Livian movement of 91 B.C., was one of the censors. According to Jerome the figures for this, the first census after the tremendous struggle of Italy, were but 463,000. But the soldiers of Sulla, and the major part of the nobility at his headquarters, were certainly not counted.

To return to the settlement of the Italian war: Clearly only the fairly well-to-do probably would have taken steps, before the expiration of the sixty days, to have themselves enrolled. It was a serious matter personally to travel to Rome and there file one's name. In a grudging and niggardly fashion, then, did the city of the seven hills extend the franchise. Would an Italian dread the lictors of a Roman magistrate as before? Would a citizen of distant domicile have a reasonable opportunity to be a candidate for Roman honors? Surely not, if the forum knew him not, neither him nor his purse.

Advance we now to the year 88. Sulla was consul, and to him the task of the Mithridatic war was assigned,

instead of to old Marius, in whose shaggy breast political passion flamed with unabated intensity. Sulla was compelled to return from Campania to extinguish the political fires kindled in his rear. First of all Roman politicians, he entered the capital with an army equipped to strike swiftly. Marius' managing tribune Sulpicius perished.

If the legions had been purely citizens in arms, all these things could not have come to pass. But at that time this Eastern war, and wars in general, were conceived as huge jobs, easy and replete with gold for the commander and staff, and looked upon by the rank and file as opportunities for enrichment by loot and bounties. We observe (App., "B. C.", 1, 56) that the motives which Sulla operated with in working upon his troops in Campania dealt exclusively with these things, such as move mercenaries, not political or moral appeals, such as move citizens.

In the Esquiline quarter, then, there transpired not a mere riot of civil factions, but an onset with trumpets and standards,—civil war indeed. In vain Marius took the one radical step as yet untaken: he summoned the slaves to freedom, shaking the very foundations of the social fabric. The popular leaders fled, Marius and his young son being among the twelve declared public enemies. Even then Sulla appeared not as a compromising statesman, but as the champion of the principle that no statute whatever must reach the *comitia tributa* unless it had first been approved by the senate.¹

But we cannot follow Sulla to Greece in his task of recovering there Rome's Eastern provinces.

In the latter part of 87 Marius returned from his adventurous exile, attended and indeed coached and directed by a more resourceful politician, the expelled consul, L. Cornelius Cinna, whose daughter later on young Cæsar married. Expelled had Cinna been by his colleague Oc-

¹ μηδὲν ἔτι ἀπροβούλευτον ἐσ τὸν δῆμον ἐσφέρεσθαι, App., "B. C.", 1, 59. Cf. Botsford, "Assemblies," p. 407.

tavius, for he had broken his pledge to Sulla and taken steps to have the new citizens enrolled in *all* the thirty-five tribes, and not vote *after* these, as the conservative policy had prescribed.

Recalled, Marius joined Cinna with six thousand Etruscans. More effectively than before he again promised freedom, on landing at Telamon on the Tuscan coast, to those slaves who would follow him.

The saviour of Italy was then past seventy. With deliberate design (Plut., "Mar.," 51) he assumed the rôle of the miserable and pitiable exile, appearing in mean garb, and refusing the insignia of power. Immediately it was seen that military measures were directed by a master hand: Marius promptly controlled the grain supply of the capital by holding Ostia with a squadron and by sweeping the coast. Soon he held the heights of the Janiculum. On the other side the consul Octavius, representing the conservative interest in this crisis, firmly refused to appeal to the slaves. Meanwhile Metellus Pius arrived from his operations against the Samnites. For these had not yet been completely pacified, nor satisfied with the political offerings of the Lex Plautia et Papiria.

Now the forces of Octavius (they, too, *soldiers* rather than *citizens*) called upon Metellus Pius, a much more experienced commander, to lead them. But when Metellus, a loyal conservative, bade them return to their military allegiance, they joined Marius. Poor Octavius was entirely under thrall of soothsayers, Chaldaeans, Sibyllists. These told him to abide there and all would be well. He was dragged from the tribunal (*ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος*, Plut., "Mar.," 42) even before the entry of Marius in person, and put to the sword. Cinna thus regained his own consular office in a quasi-legal way, and Marius, mute, but seething with resolutions of revenge, stood by the curulian chair of the consul. Gloomy was his countenance and truculent his glance, as of one who soon was to fill the

imperial city with the corpses of his victims. In that anarchy of revenge all the splendid services of Julia's husband were extinguished. A certain class hatred filled his breast. His mad fury seems to have designated as unworthy to live all prominent or eminent members of the conservative party, with little or no concern as to personal relations to himself.

Thus perished the great orator, M. Antonius, and his own associate of the bloody day of the Raudian Plains (101 B.C.), Lutatius Catulus: "*Moriendum est!*" So died C. Iulus Cæsar, so L. Julius Cæsar Strabo, the orator and man of letters.¹ Their heads were placed on spikes on the rostra. I know of no ancient historian who attempts to palliate these things or to find some kind of an excuse for the husband of Julia. That lady was still living, probably some twenty years younger than her consort. She had not accompanied Marius into exile: her brother Gaius was still living. Indeed, she could not have attended Marius into exile, for his flight at first had been entirely like that of a hunted wild beast.

In December, 87, when Rome was in the fangs of Marius and Cinna, the nephew of Julia was about thirteen and a half years old, while the brilliant Arpinate Cicero had almost completed his twentieth year. About thirty years later² he referred to that reign of terror thus: "In his return (from exile) he (Marius) *almost destroyed* the entire senate."

86

Not long did the old campaigner enjoy his seventh and last consulate.

Without the formality³ of an election, he and Cinna had simply had themselves declared consuls for 86. Even

¹ Clearly there was a deep chasm in the Julian *gens*: the majority were still conservative.

² *Post Reditum, ad Quirites*, 7.

³ *Citra ulla comitia*, Liv. 80.

in the thirteen days of the new political year still more senators perished by the decree of the consul Marius; what would have happened, says Florus, if he had been permitted to live out his consular year?

As Plutarch ("Mar.," 45), admirable always in psychological presentation, speaks of these last days, curious floods of reminiscence as well as ominous presentiments (as to Sulla) surged and flowed restlessly in the soul of the old man. But seven days before his end he discoursed, amid friends, on the curious and marvellous vicissitudes in his life and career. Soon after — so Poseidonios¹ related — Marius fell into a pleuritis and died on January 13. That Greek himself conversed with Marius, officially, about some public matters which had brought him to Rome from Rhodes.

As for Julia's nephew, Cæsar later on in many ways referred to Marius, but never in any but the most honorable and splendid terms; the leader of the *populares* presented only the partisan view of things whenever partisanship was involved, and none other.

As for young Cæsar, he, as we have seen, lost his father some time between July 12, 85, and July 12, 84.

As for Cinna, who entered upon the political inheritance of Marius and was, somehow, consul in 87, 86, 85, 84, — Cinna, I say, presents a curious antinomy of political features: On the one hand, he was the leader of the '*populares*,' and the defender, ostensibly, of the new citizens; and no less was he a veritable prince or autocrat, who ruled Rome and Italy entirely by his own pleasure and discretion.

84

On January first of this year Cinna became consul for the fourth and last time. In this year, too, Sulla granted a peace to Mithridates in Asia Minor, at Dardanum in

¹ Clearly cited by Plutarch directly from the work (then extant) of the Stoic scholar.

the Troad. (Liv., 83.) “*Asia*” (the Roman province) was mulcted 20,000 talents for her revolt.

Sulla, by the by, returning westwards, tarried in Athens and had himself initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. Also (Plut., “*Sulla*,” 26) he acquired the library of Apellikon: this collection embraced most of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastos not yet familiar to the wider public. Thus Sulla: but such acquisitions were more of the order of modern great collectors: not many aristocrats of that generation held and used these things as a wellspring of personal culture and noble monition. This man particularly was one who held his Greek culture much lower than cups and lust.

Meanwhile the miserable Cinna was endeavoring to weather the coming storm. For Sulla’s army was victorious, perfectly equipped, and had received splendid bounties from their fortune-favored commander.

So Cinna levied troops, gathered supplies and funds. To the new citizens particularly did he appeal, claiming to be their benefactor and one who had incurred grave dangers for their sake. (App., “*B. C.*,” 1, 75.)

The senate, under leadership of C. Valerius Flaccus, re-established relations with Sulla at Athens. The conservative champion in his turn enumerated the splendid series of his public services and achievements, and urged how those in power at home had had him declared a public enemy, had razed his house to the ground, and how his wife and children had barely escaped with their lives.

These foes he certainly would adequately requite for their misdeeds. Citizens, however, both old and young, would not be held accountable.

In Italy the prevailing spirit of the troops enrolled by Cinna’s orders was not far from mutiny. His attempt was to make a naval base (against Sulla) on the coast of Liburnia. Fleets were despatched to this coast by relays, but the crews promptly scattered and returned to their

various homes. The result was that those who had not yet crossed became mutinous. It seemed all so futile. An incident fanned their suppressed rage into the flames of open revolt. A lictor of Cinna's beat a private soldier who was in his way. Then another soldier beat the lictor in turn: the arrest of this soldier was then ordered by Cinna. There arose a universal outcry of fury, and in a moment many swords slew the hated autocrat.

83

Early in the next year did Sulla leave Greece, twelve hundred transports (Plut., "Sulla," 27) landing his forces at Brundisium.¹ By the letter of the law Sulla had no right to go on keeping his army: his *imperium* was concluded. On the other hand, his opponents, the consuls Norbanus and L. Cornel. Scipio, had a title quite defective at best, a title which Sulla would have been quite foolish to recognize or respect. Both "consuls" were Marians, and had been chosen through Papirius Carbo (cos. 84), the legatee of Cinna's residuary political estate.

Norbanus, then, was defeated near Mount Tifata, a little east of the site of desolate Capua. Metellus Pius, who somehow had withdrawn to Liguria, joined Sulla with all the forces under his command. From his retirement in Spain came M. Licinius Crassus, and likewise attached himself to Sulla. As for the other consul, Scipio, Sulla contrived to gain the good-will of the consul's troops²: these finally ranged themselves under Sulla's eagles, and their commander was permitted to retire to Massilia. Thus Sulla, employing twenty cohorts of his own, gained forty new ones. In him indeed, as Carbo truly said, there dwelt both fox and lion.

¹ Plut. says from Dyrrachium; Appian, 1, 79, says from Patrai.

² Plut. ("Sulla," 28) condemns the transaction: *τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ στρατιώταις, ἡσκημένοις πρὸς ἀπάτην καὶ γοντελαν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ ἡγεμών.* And still, in composing the Marius' "Vita," Plut. was influenced by the bitterness of Sulla's "Memoirs."

Meanwhile young Marius had been made consul in the prevalent manner. Sulla then moving northward into the hill country of *Signia* (Segni), about thirty miles southeast of Rome, routed the eighty-five cohorts of Cæsar's cousin, encouraged as he was by a dream; and this he did when his troops were quite tired at the end of a day consumed in marching and skirmishing and road-building.

Young Marius with fifteen thousand men fled into the rocky stronghold of Præneste. Sulla now believed more than ever in his star, and told litigating parties to shift their bail-bonds to Rome. Young Pompey, twenty-three years old (son of Pompeius Strabo, cos. 88), now came to Sulla with a corps of three legions, organized and equipped by himself. This is the first appearance of Cæsar's great rival on the larger stage of affairs.

That generation praised the energy and close application of his military deportment, his endurance and bearing of hardships, his simple life and avoidance of current luxuries, his need of sleep small beyond the needs of human nature. And even on his couch he planned improvements of things pertaining to the art of war.

Sulla himself, while maintaining a close siege of Præneste, recovered Rome itself easily enough from his private enemies, for in that crisis private enmity and political partisanship were in a hundred ways and intricately bound up together. Neutrality was impossible, and many a man had become an adept in the histrionic art, posing now as partisan of the aristocracy and at another time as a well-wisher of the popular party.

There followed a drawn battle with Carbo at Clusium (Chiusi), but soon that heir of Cinna was decisively defeated at Faventia (Faenza, not far from Ravenna) and quit the soil of Italy. Even at his first entry into Rome, while his eagles gleamed in his camp on the field of Mars,

Sulla alone passed within the gates (App., 1, 89) and confiscated all the property of his private enemies. Sertorius, the best of all the Marians, had fled to Spain.

But one great and black storm-cloud swept on from the south: the army of the coalition of Samnites and Lucanians: seventy thousand men (it is said) under Pontius Telesinus the Samnite were they. Being too late to raise the siege of Præneste, they swept on to Rome itself, the 'lair of the wolves,' hoping to surprise the hated capital.

'At the *porta Collina* ensued the desperate conflict, on November 1, the hardest won by far of all of Sulla's

Soon after, Sulla ordered that eight thousand Samnites, herded together, be speared to death.

When the news reached Præneste, Cæsar's cousin, young Marius, abandoned hope and slew himself. His head was sent to Rome, where S. ^{was} spiked before the rostra, sarcastically taunting the immaturity of his consular victim. One must first become an oarsman before handling the rudder."

At Præneste all senators captured there were executed, some at once, some later on. Of the common defenders, the Romans were pardoned, but the Prænestians and the Samnites were speared to death. At last all Italy lay at Sulla's feet. To finish the work young Pompey was sent to Sicily and to Africa.

The dullest Roman (Plut., "Sulla," 30) could understand that it was mainly a substitution of one autocrat for another: and whereas Marius was always the same, as for Sulla, our psychologist of Chæronea remarks, he was greatly changed for the worse by the achievement of supreme power: perhaps a revelation of underlying characteristics.

¹ Appian is clearly confused (1, 93), telling of a struggle lasting all night; Velleius, 2, 27: post primam demum horam noctis et Romana acies respiravit et hostium cessit.

Sulla stands out in Roman history as a conservative doctrinaire whose watchword was "Thorough!" With a belief in his own star bordering upon superstition he coupled no moral ideals, no moral convictions whatever. Radical conservative as he was, in the consummation of his political victory he ceased to concern himself (as Dio, *Fragn. of earlier books*, 108, truly says) about the coöperation of worthier men of his own class, and used creatures who could never say him nay.

How large still loomed the name of Marius may be gathered from the fact that *long after* the death of young Marius (Vell., 2, 27) *the Senate* assumed the *surname* of *Felix*. All ancient historians agree that up to Nov. 1, 82 B.C., Sulla maintained a certain moderation, but now he outdid Marius himself. And still, I believe the relentless doctrinaire conception of a kind of policy or statesmanship was the underlying cause of Sulla's destruction of the adherents of other parties or class interests for these were well-nigh the same. Theory and policy say, for his natural temperament¹ was emotional and mobile: to pity he was readily moved.

The demand for some definiteness as to who should be destroyed and who preserved had been made of Sulla in the senate by a younger aristocrat, Gaius Metellus. Then came the lists: public lists, which have endowed the harmless term of *Proscriptio* with a sinister meaning for all time. The first list of eighty names was Sulla's personal one. It must have contained whatever of the blood and race of Marius and Cinna could possibly be inculpated. Next day one hundred twenty names were added, the following day a number not smaller; in an address on the forum Sulla said that the names so far posted were those of persons whom he could remember: others would be added as their names occurred to him. For sheltering a fugitive, death was the penalty. Two talents were paid

¹ Plut., "Sulla," 30. Is there here perhaps a trace of Poseidonios?

for a head of those proscribed. The children, too, were disfranchised, the very blood and ancestry made accursed in a measure. This was the most ruthless, perhaps, of all Sulla's acts, but it was consistent. Appian (1, 95) gives summaries of the proscriptions (which were similarly enacted in all cities of Italy): forty senators perished immediately: of the equestrian class sixteen hundred men.

As for the great Marius, Sulla did not permit even his ashes to remain in repose. The tomb situated on the Anio was opened by the dictator's command, and the ashes scattered in that river. (Cic., "Legg.," 2, 56.)

Whether young Cæsar drew Sulla's attention more on account of his young wife or on account of his father's sister, who would determine?

Julia, it seems, had been even then born to Cæsar. And now to the young Julius came a crisis,¹ terrible enough in itself, awful then, and testing the youth in his nineteenth year as with fire. Sulla demanded that he put away his wife because she was Cinna's daughter. The stripling refused. Whatever the motives, this act revealed an uncommonly deep and an uncommonly strong character. For Pompey promptly heeded Sulla's request and divorced Antistia² (Plut., "Pomp.," 9), accepting Sulla's stepdaughter Æmilia instead. (So, too, M. Calpurnius Piso promptly divorced Annia, the widow of Cinna.) Cæsar lost his priesthood, his wife's dowry was confiscated and certain legacies (which had come to him from the Cinna or Marius connection): one great result was "that he was held to belong to the other party." Should we not believe that this was his aim? The political world noted the young aristocrat's partisan place. —

¹ Vell., 2, 41; Sueton., "Cæs.," 1; Plut., "Cæs.," 1.

² Plut. prob. got this from Oppius, who clearly (cf. Plut., "Pomp.," 10) wrote his monograph on Cæsar with continuous depreciation of Pompey whenever feasible.

He was troubled, too, with quartan fever; every night, wandering in the Sabine Apennines, he changed his sleeping place.

[The anecdote as given in Plutarch, "Cæs.," 1, is full of difficulty: "When some said it was not reasonable to kill a youth of such tender years, Sulla said, *they* had no sense (*νοῦς*) if they did not perceive that many Mariuses were (contained) in that boy. And when *this* utterance reached young Cæsar, *then* he fled and wandered in the Sabine mountains." Plutarch constructed the anecdote in a somewhat pragmatical way of his own. Clearly Suetonius, as to the facts, is much more precise and much more reliable than Plutarch. It was this way: Young Cæsar received some formal amnesty or pardon from Sulla, after the youth had fled, when foremost members of the Roman aristocracy, such as his kinsmen Marcus Æmilius and Aurelius Cotta, as well as the Vestal Virgins themselves, interceded in his behalf. And it was *after* this veritable siege (Suet.) that Sulla gave way and uttered the famous epigram (sive divinitus sive aliqua coniectura) that many Mariuses were in Cæsar, and some day the present recipient of their good-will would destroy the very Optimates whom the petitioning friends of young Cæsar had defended jointly with Sulla. Dio (43, 43) adduces a similar scene of intercession in connection with young Cæsar's ostentatious neglect in the manner of wearing his toga.]

CHAPTER III

YOUNG CÆSAR IN THE FIELD AND ON THE FORUM

81

LATE in 82 (probably before Dec. 10, 82, as Botsford properly infers) the dictator Sulla, in his task of recasting the government, had stripped the tribunes no less than the popular assemblies of Rome of that power of initiative and independent legislation which had so greatly troubled the Optimates in the preceding half century. The popular party for the time being was prostrate. Young Cæsar, who had so emphatically and so conspicuously identified himself with that party, determined to go abroad and begin to make a name for himself in the field. He went to the Ægean to serve on the staff (*contubernio*, Suet. 2) of the prætor Minucius Thermus. Mitylēnē, the capital city of Lesbos, still held out, having first revolted against Rome in the terrible vendetta of 88 organized by Mithridates. A fleet was needed by Thermus to accomplish the investment of Mitylene, and so Cæsar was despatched to Nikomedes of Bithynia, whose throne had been restored by Sulla. The fleet was sent. In all, Cæsar was sent to Nikomedes twice. Or did he go the second time on his own affairs?

[At this point we come upon the first traces of that furious bitterness which filled the partisan historiography of Rome substantially in the entire last century of the Republic, from Tiberius Gracchus to the Principate of Octavianus Cæsar. The consular year of Cæsar himself (58) saw, through his colleague Bibulus, the foulest charges made against him. (Cf. Suet., 9.) The versified *Annales* of Tanusius Geminus began to appear during the Gallic war. The civil war greatly added to the ferocity of these attacks, in which, on the side of Cæsar's enemies, T. Ampius Balbus and M. Actotius Naso were preëminent. Octavianus was very sensitive even about

the preservation of his adoptive father Cæsar's youthful verse, which he eventually kept out of the Apollinian and the other libraries. (Suet., 56.) Now this second stay with Nikomedes gave rise to charges of the vilest kind, charges afterwards even openly uttered in political debate, even in published orations, as by the elder Curio, probably in that same consular year 58. (V. Suet., 49.) They were iterated and became current property, in a way comparable to certain charges of intemperance quoted of some of our public men in our civil war. The verse of the day, nay the marching songs of his own triumphant legions, cited the same charges.

Even the first time he was sent to Bithynia he did not return promptly: he tarried unnecessarily, he *loafed* (*desēdit*, cites Suet., 2): it is clear that we are dealing with a transcription by Suetonius.—This ulcer of pagan Greece was unfortunately no longer rare among the Romans, particularly of the corrupt aristocracy, in spite of the *Lex Scantinia de nefanda Venere*, the date of which cannot be definitely established. Roman students of their own civilization, such as the annalist and statesman L. Piso Frugi, noted that the first official record of this evil in Rome occurred in the official acts of the censors Valerius Messala and Cassius Longinus, in the year 154, or in the records which led up to the *lustrum* of that year.¹ The vain opposition which old Cato made to Greek culture for Romans becomes more luminous when we conceive of that period. As for our own segment of Roman history, the deep connection of political decline with economic things, the interdependence of luxury and immorality and the relation of both to the coming subversal, was urged by Livy at the beginning of his recital of the civil war. To return to the date of our own relation. I must limit myself to saying that whenever the physical and mechanical circumstances rendered even possible such an imputation, it was regularly made. The mere verisimilitude of it belongs to the characteristic features of the later paganism of the classical world. In Cæsar's favor must be stated the fact that in some plea for Bithynians, in Rome probably, when he was already *pontifex maximus*, he referred to his relations with Nikomedes in a frank and candid way as a reason for making this plea. He could hardly have done so with an evil conscience. (Gell., 5, 13, 6.)]

However, as to time: it was in 80 B.C. that Mitylene fell at last. (Liv., 89.) We note that Cinna's son-in-law did indeed serve on the staff of a Sullan commander: no matter what the political trend of the period, young Cæsar was an aspirant for public life; this was the only avenue available at the time. Indeed, he thus gained the good word of influential men of the opposite party

¹ Plin., "N. H.," 17, 244. M. Messalæ C. Cassi censorum lustro, *a quo tempore* pudicitiam subversam Piso gravis auctor prodidit.

without joining that party at all. In the final storming of the Lesbian stronghold so conspicuous was the gallantry of the young staff-officer that the commander Thermus presented him with the citizen's crown (*corona civica*), the highest of such distinctions. While merely plaited of oak leaves, it outranked the *corona muralis* and *vallaris*, although these were of much greater material value. (Gellius, "N. A.," 5, 6.) At Lesbos the operations were concluded by the utter destruction of the rebellious town, without any regard for the names of Pittakos or of Alkaios and Sappho. (Liv., 89.) Clearly the young man would not return to Sulla's Rome, but rather continue serving in the field.

How Cæsar spent the year 79 we know not. His next service was under P. Servilius, one of Sulla's clients, who had been consul in 79. His operations were in Lycia and Cilicia—a prelude, in effect, of Pompey's naval war eleven years later. But Cæsar had no intention of attending these campaigns to the end. For they lasted three years. That event which called Cæsar home was the death of Sulla.

78¹

Clearly Cinna's son-in-law had gone away from his wife and little daughter Julia largely on account of Sulla. Now the dictator, whose power had been settled upon him with no limitation as to time, had in 79 resigned, quite from his own resolution or whim. In the next year, 78, he died in Campania, having but entered upon his sixtieth year. His voluntary retirement had greatly puzzled the political world, puzzled likewise the historians, such as Appian, who strove to understand his acts. Clearly he had held the greatest power, or sum of power, then known to the Mediterranean world. Had not more than one hundred thousand fighting men perished in the Italian wars he had

¹ Sallust's "Historiæ" began with that year.

waged? Who could tell the number of the kindred and connection of the notable men whom he had but recently deprived of life and fortune? And still he stepped back into private life. So bold was he, so great his trust in his Fortune. Never had the multitude on the forum so stared at him as when he sent away lictors and axes, and, surrounded by a small band of personal friends, moved about freely and fearlessly as a private person.¹ Fated, I say, he considered himself. But he sought felicity in the crude things of the flesh,—wine, actresses, and the like, carousings begun before evening had come.²

Apparently indifferent as to the opinion of his own generation, he was still deeply concerned about the judgment of history, and was writing the twenty-second book of his memoirs (Plut., 37) when the end came: a work naïvely self-laudatory and consistent in the effort to strip Marius of worth and merit.

How futile are the political settlements achieved through blood and force and fear! Hardly had Sulla closed his eyes when the very consuls of that year, Lepidus and Catulus, quarrelled about his burial. But Lepidus was defeated here: too great and impressive was the prestige of Sulla's veterans, of whom some hundred and twenty thousand were said then to be in Italy. It is startling to see how quickly there was found an aristocrat who had become consul with Sulla's permission, an aristocrat who was impatiently eager to raise once more the banner of Marius and Cinna.

Among the most essential things requisite for statesmanship is a certain tact and delicate sense for determining what is feasible, what in a given situation may be, should be, undertaken. If we ponder with care the terse

¹ When Cæsar's opportunity came, some thirty-three years later, he did not imitate this dictator in this respect, as he did fairly not in any point or feature of the earlier autocrat's career.

² *ἀφ' ἡμέρας*, says Plut., "Sulla," 36, translating literally as often the Latin phrase before him, *de die*.

data (in Suet., 3), we see that, even while abroad, young Cæsar kept in touch with the course of affairs, with the plans of the *populares* at the capital. He knew of the political projects of Lepidus. These, and not the death of the autocrat only, induced him to return to the capital. But when he came and saw for himself, then (although but twenty-two years old) he decided to withhold¹ his active coöperation from this new agitation. Large had been the terms offered to Cinna's son-in-law and to the nephew of Julia, but neither did the personality of Æmilius Lepidus appeal to him, nor did he consider the situation at all suitable. His wonderful equipoise of judgment, even at that stage of his life, was not to be deceived. Young Cæsar soon found other and better opportunities for injuring the dominant party in public opinion and commanding himself to the *populares*.

77

The proconsul Cn. Dolabella had governed Macedon and had celebrated a triumph *out of* that province, as the Romans were wont to say. Him young Cæsar prosecuted for *extortion* practised in the province (*Repetundarum*) in that specific perpetual court established in Sulla's system. For now the old jury system of Gaius Graechus was no more: the power of acquitting and declaring guilty had been by Sulla made an exclusive prerogative of the senate. It would have been a marvel, nay a miracle, if the young aspirant for political fame had secured a verdict from such a jury. Once more *one* class both ruled and judged alone,—the compromise of Livius Drusus (91 B.C.) had never been tried,—and the government was carried on by and for that one class. The speeches composed in connection with this case were elaborate: there were sev-

¹ Of course these things were not noted at the time. Cæsar later on told them to his devoted followers, Balbus or Oppius, who set them down. So I interpret the slender tradition.

eral *actiones*:¹ either Cæsar merely published a second set of discourses dealing with the case (as Cicero did in his "Verrines" seven years later), or the presiding prætor granted a new trial. Quintilian (12, 6, 1) clearly refers in part to this state trial, commending the early maturity of the young pleader, and Suetonius claims (c. 55) that Cæsar through this case at once attained eminence at the Roman bar. Encouragement certainly came to Cæsar to pursue this line of public life by his prosecution of Gaius Antonius, Cicero's consular colleague fourteen years later. Antonius had obtained from Sulla² some squadrons of cavalry: perhaps to quarter them on people who refused to submit to extortion. "The Greeks who had been robbed (it was in Achaia) summoned Antonius to trial" before the prætor peregrinus, then Marcus Lucullus (a younger brother of the famous Lucius Lucullus). "The pleader for the Greeks was Gaius Cæsar, even then still quite a young person" (*adulescentulus*). Lucullus gave a decree in accordance with the demands of the Greek complainants, whereupon Antonius appealed to the tribunes of the people, making affidavit under oath that impartial jurisdiction was denied him in that court. Was it due to the force and point of the young pleader? Or was there some bias for the Greeks? The Luculli then were preëminent for Greek culture.³

74

Whatever the outcome, Cæsar was not satisfied as yet with his forensic powers, and so determined to withdraw to Rhodes and devote himself for a while to further training in oratory under the guidance of Apollonius. Cicero,

¹ The text was still extant in 160 A.D.: Gellius, 4, 16, 8, cites a passage.

² The whole case related by Asconius in *Orationem in Toga Candida*, p. 84, Orelli. — καὶ τοσοῦτον ἰσχυσεν ὥστε τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἐπικαλέσασθαι δημάρχους, Plut., "Cæs.," 4.

³ Suetonius passes this case over entirely.

by the by, although six years older and wonderfully trained and always in training, undertook no political case whatever until after the completion of his thirty-sixth year. The brilliant Arpinate himself, when returning from his eastern sojourn not long before, sought the instruction of the same eminent teacher. He credited Apollonius with three distinct forms of excellence. He was, says Cicero,¹ an efficient pleader in actual and real cases, an eminent author, an expert teacher. Clearly a very eminent man, who, by the bye, repeatedly was sent to Rome by the Rhodians on public affairs, for the government had clung to Rome in the Greek vendetta of 88 B.C. So eminent was this naturalized Rhodian that he was permitted to speak on the floor of the senate, using Greek, without the mediation of an interpreter.² And so in teaching, too, he required perfect mastery of Greek from his students.³ The Rhodian *rhetor* laid great stress on actual delivery and on practical declamation, and was at the very head of the so-called Rhodian school.

Cæsar undertook this voyage in the inclement season. He was not far from the end, when his ship was captured by Cilician corsairs near the island of Pharmakūssa, about eight miles southwest of Miletus. For nearly forty days he had to wait for the return of his friends and attendants, whom he had sent to the coast to raise ransom in his behalf. But his physician and two body-servants remained with him during this time. The ransom actually paid to the pirates was fifty talents. The outlaws had first placed hostages in Miletus for their good faith. But the Roman nobleman, barely freed, when he had reached the mainland, immediately, with almost fabulous energy, organized a fleet and overtook and captured many of the unsuspecting malefactors: it was all accomplished at night, says

¹ "Brutus," 316.

² Valer. Max., 2, 2, 3.

³ Plut., "Cic.," 4.

Velleius. The captured pirates were imprisoned. Meanwhile Cæsar immediately set out to obtain from the Roman governor of 'Asia,' who then was in Bithynia, permission to have the freebooters executed. When the latter, Junius (Juncus?), said he would consider the matter (for there was much money to be made), Cæsar returned and had them crucified on his own responsibility.

[This curious adventure is related by Velleius, 2, 42, Plutarch, 2, and Suetonius, 4, most concisely by the latter. We see, then, that in the time of Tiberius, of Trajan, and of Hadrian there was available a biographical book teeming with curious and exact detail. Also the version in Velleius and in Plutarch manifestly shows that this biographical book was essentially a eulogy: here there are emphasized the admirable qualities of extraordinary coolness and self-possession in the most trying and critical situations; further, a wonderful capacity of swift determination and action; and finally an independence of personal choice or whim, defying even the highest authorities. The original book used by all three independently of one another was undoubtedly the book of *Oppius*, written or published immediately or very soon after Cæsar's death, I believe. Plutarch blundered in the occasion, assigning it to Cæsar's going out to serve under Minucius Thermus. Drumann (3, p. 136, note 10) correctly observes that Plutarch probably was confused by coming upon Bithynia in the relation. As for the name of the governor of the province of *Asia*, Plutarch calls him *Ιοῦγκος*. I have weighed the arguments of Nipperdey ("Philologus," 6, p. 377) for maintaining this reading, but am not at all convinced: it seems more rational to correct Plutarch by Velleius than Velleius by Plutarch. Plutarch often blundered in proper nouns in his transcriptions, — I mean non-Greek proper nouns.]

But the technique of oratory could not hold Cæsar long at Rhodes. Why not? The activities of Mithridates were the reason. To go on studying rhetoric at such a time would have been, to the Roman consciousness, *loafing*.¹ So Cæsar cut short his work under the professor Apollonius, crossed over to the mainland, gathered forces, drove from the province the commander of the king, and held to their allegiance to Rome such communities as were yielding or vacillating. It seems a great deal to achieve for a

¹ *Ne desidere in discrimine sociorum videretur.* Suet., 4.

young man, and to undertake for one who had no mandate from Rome. Soon after he hastened back to Italy.

His mother's brother, M. Aurelius Cotta, consul in 74 and proconsul of Gaul in the following year, had died in his province, and Cæsar, about twenty-seven years of age, had been chosen *pontifex* in the place of his uncle. The social influence of the Aurelian *gens* was stronger than any remnants of political ill-will directed at the son-in-law of Cinna. — He knew that his fate would be terrible if he fell into the hands of the pirates. He therefore provided a vessel which had *four* rows of oars (which could be propelled faster than a trireme or bireme), and, attended (Vell., 2, 43) by two friends and ten slaves, crossed Ægean and Ionic and Adriatic seas back to Italy. Should he have met the pirates,—at one time they seemed to loom up on the horizon,—he was resolved not to fall into their hands alive.

As a rising politician Cæsar believed that it was the best way not to affront any one, not merely to steer between men and partisans with cool neutrality. His policy was to make and hold friends and to please and serve the greatest possible number. His (Plut., 4) was the charm of a winsome personality. He excelled in the art—for it is an art—of doing favors and removing the possibility of friction: at the bottom of this must have lain the faculty of discriminating between spirits and temperaments,—in a word, the power to conceive individual character keenly and correctly. He had the “faculty far beyond his time of life¹ of cultivating others,” a pregnant summarization: he had the rare endowment, the *genius*, to manage and manipulate and incidentally to increase the

¹ Plut., 4. θεραπευτικὸς παρ' ἡλικίαν.

number of those on whose support he would soon begin to count. Early he knew the efficiency of lavish hospitality and of those culinary joys which in that age of Rome—the age of Lucullus, Catiline, Mamurra—began to loom up very large in the first society of the imperial city. Here young Cæsar was profuse and a splendid entertainer. His political adversaries, indeed, contemplated this trait of the aspiring *popularis* politician with much satisfaction. They were quite sure that it was but a question of time, brief time, when he would be a ruined man, when bankruptcy, that unpardonable sin of the Roman code, would automatically drive him from the arena of public life.

CHAPTER IV

CÆSAR'S PUBLIC ADVANCEMENT BEFORE 63 B.C.

His first appearance as a candidate for the suffrage of the Roman electorate was when he was chosen military tribune over Gaius Popilius. (Plut., 5; Suet., 5.) The most attractive office for a younger politician, until Sulla became dictator, had been the office of *tribunus plebis*. Sulla had done his best to ruin it. He had ordained that these tribunes must hold no further office later on. Thus actually all those who aspired to a career, certainly those of the aristocracy, avoided this degraded and emasculated 'honor.' Cæsar did, even after the restoration of that office. And the legislative initiative also pruned away, what, indeed, was left?

Abroad, there was the Marian general Sertorius defying the home government (78-72) in Spain.

What Cæsar did in 73-71 we know not. His biographers and eulogists (Balbus, Oppius) do not seem to have set down anything for these years. We may, however, safely assume that he was far from doing nothing simply because he did nothing in public, nothing destined for publicity. Ever grew his knowledge of men, and we are compelled to add, of women, who often manage men; ever grew his knowledge of men's strength or weakness, of their likes and dislikes. You cannot use those of whose more deeply graven characteristics you have no correct conception. His aspirations were high; faith in any re-pristination of Scipionic conditions of laws and government he had none; such ideals the Greekling M. Tullius Cicero might pursue. We may assume that his plans and studies ever proceeded; it is very unlikely that they moved

by fits and starts, or that they were sometimes dormant, sometimes passionately pursued.

71

Even as a legate of Sulla, young Pompey had maintained a very large measure of personal and military independence. Even before he was a senator he had enjoyed a triumph *out of Africa*. The dictator had called him *Great*, although the will of Sulla revealed the testator's secret distrust and displeasure. Mandatary of an unwilling senate, Pompey had been intrusted with the task of wresting the Iberian peninsula from the Marian Sertorius. After a struggle of seven years, in which Pompey had invested all his personal fortune, Sertorius fell, not indeed through the strategy of Pompey, but by an assassin's dagger, his legate, Perperna, desiring to supplant him. But the oligarchy in no wise desired to rear and raise a new leader of their own, who, supported by legions trained by himself alone, might reënact the rôle of Sulla. With the consent of the senators, indeed, there was to be no further autocrat, whether he appeared in the conservative interest or in any other.

One of the great arguments *for* a thing considered evil by faction or party in the political affairs of men, is the *precedent*, the thing actually done and accomplished: and this is much more potent and potential than all the speculation and argumentation of the mere doctrinaire.

In 74 B.C., L. Lucullus, then consul, profoundly distrustful of the ambition and prestige of *Magnus*, had seen to it that proper funds were sent for Pompey's military chest, for Lucullus was full of apprehension that the young generalissimo, even without any mandate of the Great Council, might seize that prize of prizes, the new war to be waged with the king of Pontus.

In 72 B.C., when Sertorius was murdered at Osca, in the foothills of the Pyrenees, his slayer, Perperna, had (Plut.,

“Pomp.,” 20) possessed himself of a peculiar and ill-boding inheritance, for among the papers of Sertorius were found letters,—private letters,—profoundly incriminating notable men in Rome, men who desired to change the government, to have a revolution, if need be, and who, for this end, invited Sertorius to come to Italy with his army.

Now Pompey, in aspiration and temperament, was conservative; he shrank from sedition and revolution, from any continuation or rekindling of civil wars, nay, of civil broils even. He therefore, with a kind of patriotic deliberation, executed Perperna, who knew too much, and furthermore burned the incriminating letters without having read them.

Meanwhile, nearer at home, southern Italy had been in the throes of a fearful convulsion, the slave war of Spartacus and Crixus.

The rising of some seventy thousand bondsmen naturally meant a struggle unknown to the usages of international law: where quarter was not given. These slaves, among whom were many gladiators, had been victorious in no less than three great engagements.

Finally Crixus (App., “B. C.,” 1, 117) perished near Mt. Garganus (coast of Apulia), and Spartacus abandoned his efforts to cut his way through northwards and reach the Alps.

Still he dealt mighty blows to each consul in turn, and in Picenum he defeated them both with great disaster. Thence he moved to the extreme south, to Thurii, without being able to capture any of the great cities other than the port named. Here, we are told, he admitted importation of arms only, and iron, and dealt not unfairly with merchants bringing such cargoes; but gold he barred out.

The military talents furnished by the ruling oligarchy were clearly incapable of extinguishing this conflagration which, at first, they had treated with scorn and contempt.

It was in this combination of circumstances that M. Licinius Crassus came into prominence. The Licinii were an Old Family in Rome. In his youth Crassus had long lived at his father's table amid frugal and simple surroundings. Early in his career he became a speculator (Plut., "Crass.," 1) in Roman real estate. He had a kinswoman, Licinia, a Vestal Virgin. This lady possessed a splendid suburban villa, which Crassus strove to purchase at a small price; and so incessant was his urging that the reputation of the vestal suffered from his endless visits, nay, was brought into court. This radical trait of covetousness (which some of our own folk would, no doubt, extol as "splendid business ability") dominated his soul and overshadowed many positive virtues. His rise to fabulous wealth became a stock subject of concern among his contemporaries. Before he issued forth to his catastrophe in the Euphrates country (late in 55 B.C.), he made a survey of his fortune: he found that he was worth 7100 talents, having begun with a patrimony of 300 talents.

Out of the common subversal and distress of the Sulla period, he prospered, accepting free gifts from the dictator, no less than buying in precious properties at the auctions of the proscriptions, often at nominal figures. In conflagrations he regularly purchased such plots, as well as the adjacent real estate. Of building itself, however, he would have nothing (Plut., "Crass.," 2): he was a chronic bargain-hunter of houses built by others. Those fond of building, he was wont to say, accomplished their own ruin with abundant certainty, and needed no competitors in such folly. Further, he was an investor in silver mines; but it was as a slave-trader that he particularly excelled. Slaves he furnished for every form of labor or craft, personally attending to their teaching and training. His saying, that a really *rich* man must be able to organize and keep an army—*keep* it, mind you, from

his income—is familiar; also it is full of meaning in that particular period of the political history of Rome. (Cic., "Off.," 1, 125.) Though as Plutarch sagaciously observes, that is not a sound saying: for the voracious potentiality of war is quite indefinite, and, indeed, infinite. "War feeds not on fixed portions," said the Spartan Archidamos. —To his friends Crassus loaned freely without interest, but was inexorably rigid in calling for his capital when it fell due. An earnest and industrious advocate was he, also, shrinking from no case; a devoted wooer of the goodwill of the humblest citizens, striving to be able to name them all whenever he met them. After the return of Marius (December, 87), and in that reign of terror, his father perished, but he made good his escape to Spain, where his father once had governed, and where he himself had many friends. Here he abode a long time in a cave on the coast, curiously dependent upon the bounty and goodwill of a Roman resident.¹

To sum up: Crassus with unvarying devotion pursued wealth: A very "successful" man in the calendar of plutocratic saints, and not very scrupulous in the cult. But apart from this he, too, was quite sure that the political fabric of Rome was like a ship whose seams are beginning to yield; he, too, was wide-awake in anticipating and, as it seems, later on accelerating a situation breeding a crisis where resolute ambition might blaze the way to monarchy.

To Crassus, then, the home government in 71 gave the mandate to conclude the slave war. Gauls they were, and Germans (says Livy, 97). The new commander went south, having enlisted six new legions. He was veritably a volunteer in undertaking this desperate campaign. Having arrived on the theatre of operations, he decimated the two legions awaiting him there.² At all

¹ Plut., 5 fin., follows the antiquarian Fenestella (51 B.C.-19 A.D.).

² Though here the authorities differ, as Appian, "B. C.," 1, 118, intimates.

events, he restored the stern discipline of Roman tradition. He operated with consummate energy and defeated the famous gladiator, though Spartacus personally escaped and kept troubling the camp of the Romans.

At this point, Pompey arrived from Spain and was given authority to share in the conclusion of the campaign. So Spartacus, with the energy born of despair, broke through the circumvallations of Crassus,¹ late in the autumn. At first he made Brundisium his objective point, but soon turned on Crassus. In that struggle the famous slave himself perished, and his corpse was never discovered. Six thousand captives were crucified on the road between Capua and Rome, a Roman ending of it all.

Here, then, there were two dynasts, two rival politicians also, both from the political household of Sulla, but jealous of each other, whose political experience could not well have inculcated any lesson of patriotism in that day and in that world. To make the situation more acute, they were elected consuls for the next year.

Pompey, then, was a mere Roman knight who had never sat down in the senate yet, a man of arms accustomed to have his own way, but not a new Sulla; in a way no politician at all, and, therefore, ill at ease among them, and needing politicians of his own. In his unwillingness to submit to the oligarchy, he soon revealed his willingness to undo much of the work of Sulla. Pompey received a triumph *out of* Spain, but Crassus had to be content with the second-rate glory of an *ovatio*.² In this connection, however, the eminent financier displayed quite conspicuously his personal ambition, for he rendered a great sacrifice to Hercules for his defeat of the brawny men from Gaul and Germany, and combined therewith a feasting of

¹ Viz., across the neck of the peninsula of Rhegium, some thirty-five miles in length. Plut., "Cr.," 10.

² Plut., "Cr.," 11, transliterates *ovationem* as *δοναν*: is this another mark of hurried transcription?

the common people at ten thousand tables. Also, he had measured out to them food for three months. It was not for sentiment that he did anything ; he was an investor ; this bounty, too, was meant to be an investment, the political fruits, or income, from which he confidently expected to gather at some future time. He desired in this way, if he could, to balance the prestige of the perpetual commander.

70

This year (in which Cæsar completed his thirtieth year) makes a deep incision in the political history of the imperial commonwealth. First, there was the unique circumstance that consular colleagues were the two men who, among their fellows then, were marked as aspirants for greater power and as rivals. Remarkable, further, was this, that a man became consul exclusively in consequence of military prestige, a man who, as we observed above, had never sat in the senate, nor spoken there ; and still, so mighty was that commander, that Crassus (Plut., "Pomp.," 22) had not *dared* to be a candidate for the consular honor before he had begged Pompey's permission. Politicians, as we see every day here in our American Commonwealth, have to practise continually many forms of humiliation, or self-suppression, and endless are the forms of lowly things to which they are forced to stoop in their striving for power. Both men had still kept their legions together : if the senators had seriously opposed their candidacy it would have been a vain endeavor. But these things were not in consonance with the republican forms of the state. For the men of the toga and curia it was a somewhat anxious time.¹

After the inauguration, however, and the customary solemnities of Capitoline ritual, it was quite manifest that the new consuls chimed but ill together. In the senate

¹ Appian, "B. C.," 1, 121; Plut., "Pomp.," 21. (Zonaras, 10, 2, copies Plut. almost verbally.)

Crassus was influential: clearly Pompey was not: but his '*dignitas*,' his public position, was to him the first thing in the scale of all his valuations. As for the prestige which the commander had brought into the *curia*, the oligarchy of the Great Council were not interested in nourishing and fostering it. Thus, then, both from deep pride and the constraint of circumstances (the forces within and without), Pompey was driven to seek support with the plebs and with its leaders. And they had at heart, above all other things in their political world, the restoration of the full and real power formerly inherent in the tribunes of the people.¹ Would Pompey accomplish that? The details somehow escape us. Cicero, however ("Verrin.," 1, 44-45), not more than ten months or so afterwards, wrote that Pompey virtually pledged himself to the people, to the plebs, in a popular address (*contio*) which he delivered outside of the walls as consul-elect. And further, in this restoration of the Tribunician legislation, Pompey, as presiding consul, had the senate debate, had made a *relatio* of it.² It certainly went through by adoption of the *Comitia Centuriata*: for there was then no other avenue of enactment. Clearly the senate was not in a strong position to block this restoration.

[Cicero in his maturity ("Legg.," 3, 19-22) on the whole reprobated the legislative privilege of the trib. pl. He, in his life history, had some reason. Think of Clodius. In the passage cited he expresses his profuse admiration for Pompey, excepting this one matter: *de tribunicia potestate taceo*: 'I am not inclined to censure it, and praise it I cannot.' But actually Cicero held it was better that the plebs should have leaders: better that there be a visible and, to a fair degree, a *responsible* head for the plebs: the merely inarticulate seething and boiling emotions of the masses were apt to calm and cool, when there was such an actual and palpable leader.]

But to return to this portentous year 70. There is little doubt but that the restoration of the legislative

¹ Plutarch, whose political concern is always subordinated to his moral and psychological interest, barely touches upon this great subject.

² Botsford, "Assembl.," p. 425 sq.

power of that order would have come, or come about, anyhow. Whoever fathered or furthered it was quite sure to lay up for himself, and for his further public career, a goodly share of what the Romans called *gratia popularis*. So shortlived was the work of Sulla, however enduring the infamy of his measures.

Closely bound up with this restoration was the other incisive change wrought in the same year. The great state trial of Verres, and the setting forth of his three years' spoliation of Sicily, engaged public attention in August. On August 5 Cicero pleaded against that malefactor of great spoils, at a time when the Sullan monopoly of senatorial juries was still in force. The case of Verres itself had much to do with the reform of the courts of justice. Something of the compromise once proposed by M. Livius Drusus in 91 was now enacted in the bill drawn by L. Aurelius Cotta (an uncle of Cæsar's), himself a presiding justice (*prætor*) in this year. Henceforward all juries were to be composed of three elements in equal allotments: one third were to be senators, one third knights, one third *tribuni aerarii*.¹ It seems that the last-named class had a property rating not much below the equestrian. Thereafter every year a regular panel (*iudices lecti*) was drawn by the supreme annual dignitary of the Roman bench, viz., by the *prætor urbanus*: it was a *prima facie* evidence of civil excellence so to be chosen.

What of Cæsar in this important year?² But of the restoration of the power of the tribunes, Suet., 5, says: (‘*actores*³ (auctores?) restituendæ tribuniciae potestatis

¹ On these v. Botsford, “Assembl.,” p. 64, n. 3.

² Drumann makes too much of the fact that Aurelius Cotta was an uncle of Cæsar's.

³ There are various reasons for reading *auctores*. Probably some of the trib. pl. are meant, such as M. Lollius Palicanus, who enlisted Pompey's support.

cuius vim Sulla deminuerat, enixissime iuvit") 'he assisted with supreme effort the men engaged in putting through the restoration of the power of tribunes, the force of which Sulla had cut short.'

Also Cæsar was active for a plebiscitum (*rogatio Plotia*) which permitted partisans of Lepidus, who (in 78-77 B.C.) had fled to Sertorius in Spain, to return and to resume their civic rights. Amongst these exiles was his wife's brother. The speech which Cipolla's son-in-law then held¹ was a *contio*: Cæsar perhaps for the first time addressed the plebs from the rostra on the forum, speaking probably through introduction and permission given by the tribune Plotius, whose name this *rogatio* bore. To infer that the matter never passed beyond the *rogatio* stage would be rash.

This year 70 B.C. in many ways marks the humiliation of the oligarchy. The better we become acquainted with it, the less do we, as students of Roman history, feel inclined to simply appropriate (with Cicero) the political principle of senatorial primacy in the current administration of city and of empire as the ideal form or as an unmixed blessing. There were censors then, Cornelius Scipio Lentulus and L. Gellius. They struck from the roster of the senate (Liv., 98) not less than sixty-four members of the Great Council.²

In the 'survey of knights' Pompey himself appeared, leading his horse, in a somewhat spectacular manner, which added to his prestige of a personal power; parades were dear to the Roman spirit.

The senate certainly, as the quasi-exclusive holder of power and privilege in Rome, at the end of 70 B.C. was a pretty sorry spectacle.

¹ Cæsar prepared it with literary care: it seems to have been immediately published. It existed still in the time of Gellius, 13, 3.

² "Wohl zum Teil solche die durch Sulla begünstigt hineingeschlüpft waren." Madvig, "Verfassung," etc., 1, 410.

Cæsar enters the Senate

In 68,¹ on January 1, Cæsar began his *cursus honorum* as quæstor, *i.e.*, as one of the commissioners of the treasury, in the larger aspect of their operations, mandataries of the Great Council, in which by the fact of their election they received membership. In this first official year of his life, although the quæstorship belonged to the minor magistracies, Cæsar at once availed himself of an opportunity to remind the Roman people as to where he stood in public life, remind them that he was a nephew of Julia, wife of Marius, that he was a son-in-law of Cornelius Cinna. Both his aunt Julia and his wife Cornelia died in this year. So Cæsar delivered eulogies in honor of both, as was customary, on the forum. He seems to have prepared these addresses to be available for publication. Suetonius, at least (c. 6), in the time of Hadrian, was able to cite from one of them. We at once realize the comparative impotence of the oligarchy to check or intimidate him, or to cause him discomfiture later on. Indeed, after we have resolved to have the political events of 70 B.C. settle well in our understanding, we are far from being astonished at that which, looked at by itself alone, might impress us as marvelous audacity. He *dared* (says Plut., "Cæs.", 5) to exhibit images of Marius at the funeral of the latter's widow, ignoring the fact that, some thirteen or fourteen years before, the very name of the great plebeian had been officially accursed. And the common people received this sensational manifesto with shouts of approval and clapping of hands.

After a while he married a very young lady of the aristocracy, Pompeia, a granddaughter, through her mother, of Sulla. At the end of his year in the treasury, the lot sent him, attached to the quæstor Antistius Vetus, to Further Spain, a province to be important in his further

¹ Drumann computes 68, Fischer 67 B.C.

and latter career. His superior, the governor *Vetus*, assigned to him the task of holding court, and so, passing on in his circuit, he came to the old Phenician port of *Gades* (Cadiz). Suetonius was a Roman of the old order, a profound believer in dreams and portents. So he assigns to this first sojourn in Gades (a veritable *Finisterre*, too, to the Mediterranean consciousness) the occurrence of a dream,¹ a vision of embracing his own mother: but the interpreters of dreams (*coniectores*) told him that his *mother* meant the Earth, which was destined to become subject to him.

Such anecdotes always abound when a man has risen to towering eminence. The other anecdote of Gades is somewhat absurd and shows that, no matter how painstaking an antiquarian and *grammaticus* Suetonius was, still he was not competent to weigh the nicer things, the *imponderabilia* of history. We are told, then, that when Cæsar, near the Phenician temple of *Melkart* (Hercules) in Gades, beheld a statue of Alexander, he felt a pang of profound disgust with himself; for he realized then that he had now (at thirty-three) reached the same age which the Macedonian had attained when he had accomplished the conquest of the Eastern world. So the scion of Æneas and Venus Genetrix heaved a deep sigh and — promptly requested of his superior his discharge, so that he might go to Rome and make some beginning of an Alexandrian career. What nonsense!

[Particularly absurd is the phrase *quasi pertæsus ignaviam suam* (as though utterly disgusted with his own lack of energy). We may rather be absolutely convinced that the deep ambition and the preternatural and almost uncanny sagacity of this extraordinary politician did not allow any grass to grow under his feet. Perhaps a Greek *rhetor* or *grammaticus* invented this anecdote. Plutarch puts the Alexander matter in Cæsar's later sojourn in Spain, when he governed in Further Spain as *proprætor*. There, having some leisure (*sic*), he read something of Alexander's achieve-

¹ Dio, too, 37, 52, fixes such a dream as occurring in Gades in connection with Cæsar's *quæstorship*.

ments, and after a long period of silent and deep reflection, tears (Plut., "Cæs.," 11) began to course down his cheeks; and when his friends wondered, he said: "Do you not think it is worthy of grieving if Alexander, being of such an age (as I am now), was king over so many beings, and I have achieved nothing brilliant as yet?" — But, putting everything aside, a certain trait of Cæsar stands out in the tradition of antiquity: he was charming and rarely winsome in his own circle. His friends worshipped him when he had become eminent, not, however, for his achieved eminence; for this never wins the hearts of men. No, in him there was a blending of traits and qualities which held the loyalty and deeper affection of his inner circle (Hirtius, Balbus, Matius, Oppius, Pollio) in a rare and unique manner. Among these friends, who indeed were more or less dependents also, Cæsar seems to have conversed with great unrestraint. Many a personal anecdote thus was heard by Balbus and Oppius and others. But exact notation and precise assignment to a particular point in his career — this was quite another matter: perhaps it was not even intended by Cæsar. And as for his friends, such precision, after his death, proved quite impossible.]

But to return to our annals:¹ "Withdrawing, therefore, before the time (*i.e.* when the imperium of his superior, *Vetus*, expired), he visited Latin colonies which were in unrest about seeking the Roman franchise, and he would have stirred them up to some act of daring, had not the consuls, for this very reason, for a short period kept (there) the legions which *had been enrolled* for the purpose of serving in Cilicia."² An unfriendly note: for Cæsar is charged with the *intention* of doing something disturbing peace.

67

Now there was, indeed, at this time an unrest and agitation among the communities beyond the Po, such, *e.g.*, as Cremona, Verona, Comum, Mediolanum. These sought equality with the 'allies' further south, who had, as we have seen, received the franchise in 89-88.

To these districts Pompey's father, Strabo, had given the *Ius Latii*,³ *i.e.*, that who held a local office would thus

¹ Suet., "C.," 8.

² App., "Bell. Mithr.," 94. συνέπεμψαν (*scil.* the Romans) δὲ καὶ παρὰ σφῶν στρατὸν πολὺν ἐκ καταλόγου.

³ Asconius, p. 3, Orelli.

step into full Roman franchise. Now Cæsar, both then and ever afterwards, always constituted himself a kind of patron and defender of these subalpine communities. There, indeed, as it proved and had proved before, was the very latchkey of the entire peninsula. Should we go so far, however, as to infer that even then Cæsar held in his restless brain a deep-laid scheme to begin to secure that gate against the contingencies of future actions?

Service in Cilicia, Suetonius said: this points to the Pirate-war of 67. This war was due to a crying necessity: still, it was organized and specially designed to give to Pompey a command even more extraordinary and vast than the quite extraordinary ones of the past which had made him famous. But the actual campaign, too, proved quite extraordinary, because it was concluded in three months. The conservatives in the senate were disgusted. For this vast power had been given to the perpetual commander through a plebiscitum. Incidentally, we learn that the three resources for the grain supply of Rome were the three provinces of Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. ("De Imper. Cn. Pompei," 34.)

Appian says ("Mithr.," 92) that the Pontic sovereign personally had stimulated the depredations of the pirates. The rocky coast line of Western Cilicia afforded them a great abundance of lairs, magazines, starting-points for their operations. This was the reason that, collectively, they were generally dubbed Cilicians. Associated with them were bands from Pontus and Syria, from Cyprus and Pamphylia, flocking to the sea, as Lucullus and the legions of Rome had been more and more gaining control of *terra firma*.

Rome had begun to suffer severely, as the price of grain had gradually risen to starvation figures. The very coasts of Italy had become insecure.

Not the senate, I said above, gave to Pompey this extraordinary command, but a plebiscitum proposed by the tribune Gabinius: Pompey himself reaped the fruits, sweet and juicy, of the restoration of the power of tribunes, of 70 B.C. This command was to be for three years. To his military chest were assigned six thousand talents Attic; subject to his sway was to be the Mediterranean from end to end, with two hundred seventy war galleys, a hundred and twenty thousand infantry (a curious specification looking more to the continuation of war on the mainland, accomplished a little later on), and twenty-five lieutenants. Among these were Tib. Nero, Terentius Varro, L. Sisenna, L. Lollius, Metellus Nepos, with specific assignments of coast line. The Cilicians proper, who were rounded up last of all, on the whole preferred submission to a genuine test of strength or lengthy blockade or siege.

They had to surrender not only themselves but supplies and ships, both those on the stocks and those floating on their own keels: further, great stores of copper and iron, canvas, cables, timber, and — captives. Of these there were two kinds: those held for toil and those held for ransom. All these were sent home. There many of them found their own names engraved on cenotaphs, as dead to their dear ones.

The name of Pompey had not been written in the bill, but its provisions had been adapted for the One alone. The senate, indeed (Dio, 36, 6-7), would willingly have gone on letting the world suffer from the evils and troubles of the corsairs rather than bestow so vast a power upon one person. Gabinius was almost slain in open senate. To emphasize my point: the democratic politicians actively promoted these vast commands, while the oligarchy abominated them. Cæsar probably was still in Spain then, but we may rest assured that his sympathies and support were actively enlisted in the policy of

yast provincial power. His own imperium was bound to come in the *cursus honorum*.

Returned to Rome and to his young consort Pompeia, Cæsar resumed his policy of lavish entertaining. Before he received any office at all (Plut., "Cæs.", 5) his debts amounted to thirteen hundred talents. He was appointed curator of the Appian Way; in this service he expended greater sums than those allowed him from the treasury, paying the excess out of his own pocket. In the next year

66

Cæsar and Bibulus were chosen ædiles. In this year, too, Pompey succeeded to Lucullus, receiving that bottomless source of profit and power, the continuation of the campaigns against Mithridates.

This *plebiscitum Manilianum* was another heavy blow of the Only One against the senatorial oligarchy; also it appeared to cool observers decidedly more as a palpable job, because the war was virtually over: its definite termination could not be far away. Dio Cassius (36, 42) expressly names Cæsar and Cicero as those who wrought upon the plebs to accept this measure.

[Here, then, we come upon the imperial historian Dio, and deal henceforward with a pen and purpose more personally acute, let me say, than the transcriptions of Appian or than the psychological and moralizing electivism of Plutarch.]

"For these" (Cicero and Cæsar) "coöperated with them, not because they also were convinced that it was advantageous to the commonwealth, nor because they wished to gratify Pompey personally, but inasmuch as it was bound to come to pass anyhow, Cæsar at once cultivated the plebeians because he perceived how much more powerful than the senate they were, and made preparation that

something similar should some day be voted for himself, and therein to render Pompey more envied and more odious in consequence of the grants made to him; Cicero, on his side, a man without a pedigree and a hard-working and brilliant pleader — then *prætor-elect* — deemed it the proper thing to enter upon a public career,¹ and he was engaged in making a demonstration, both to the plebs and to the oligarchy, that whichever of the two he would attach himself, he would decisively enhance their interest."

Is the pen of Livy behind the voice of Dio? Clearly Cæsar desired to widen the breach between Pompey and the senate as much as possible.

But to return to the *Ædile-elect*, Cæsar. January 1 was the regular date of inauguration. But in the last days of the expiring year 66, a few days before entering upon this 'honor' (Suet., 9), there fell upon his name the shadow of a very serious suspicion or imputation. As consuls for 65 there had originally been elected P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Pætus. But these politicians had been found guilty of corrupt practices (*ambitus*), being prosecuted by their competitors, and under the law these latter were made consuls in their stead. The guilty men, not discredited merely, but suffering from enormous expenditures, with ruin staring them in the face, now entered upon a conspiracy² to seize the government by a *coup d'état*, *i.e.*, by a sudden display of force, and trust their fortunes to the pregnant lap of the goddess Futurity. Embraced in their programme, however, was a dictatorship for Crassus, with Cæsar as his Master of the Horse.

¹ τὴν πολιτελαν ἀγειν ἡξεῖν, Dio, ib. This historian is personally severe towards Cicero, as he is later on towards Seneca, resolute in declining to be swayed by any cultural eminence of certain men in public life.

² The ancient tradition is reviewed with great care in a recent monograph by Professor H. B. Nutting, of the University of California.

[We may observe that Suetonius, in questions of literary authority or evidence, can be quite critical: here he passes entirely the two most convenient writers, convenient to the *grammaticus*, viz., Sallust ("Historiæ" and "Cat.") and Livy: he cites instead contemporary proofs or allegations, viz., Tanusius Geminus, the Edicts of Bibulus of 59 B.C., C. Curio the elder in *Orations*.]

"This, too, viz., this conspiracy, Cicero seems to refer to, relating in a certain letter to Axius" (a man of the bankers' class and a friend of Varro's also) "that Cæsar in his consulate had definitely established the autocratic power which as ædile he had planned: that Crassus, from remorse or fear, had not kept the date fixed for the slaughter (*i.e.*, of the consuls legally inducted, *i.e.*, probably January 1, 65), and that therefore Cæsar had not given the signal which had been agreed upon:" that the matter had then been postponed to a later date, because Catiline, who meanwhile, it seems, was admitted as an accomplice, was premature in giving the signal.—We must not thresh over what *might* have been, nor dwell on the flimsy wall that stood between the quiet course of the constitutional government and the chronic potentiality of revolution: we content ourselves here with a simple but impressive observation. Crassus, politically influential among his aristocratic *confrères* and personally the most eminent representative of property, this Crassus definitely and secretly leagued with Cæsar, the latter then politically hated and distrusted by his aristocratic *confrères*, and far from being a representative of the classes of property, because his debts then exceeded greatly a million in gold in our standard of money;—it is a puzzle; but in public life, with Pompey in Asia, these two probably were the most influential men of the day; be we ever so sceptical as to the charges later made, clearly Cæsar and Crassus were in a *receptive* frame: receptive to be at the head of affairs if a revolution were attempted, or to step into supreme power through a revolution. But the pear was not yet ripe.

Cæsar's ædileship came in his thirty-fifth to thirty-sixth year. Let us note the public acts of the aspiring politician. As ædile, Cæsar produced three hundred twenty pairs of gladiators : he "washed away," as Plutarch (c. 5) aptly puts it, the memory of the measure of the utmost gratifications furnished to the Roman people by his predecessors. The Roman and Megalensian games were celebrated with a splendor unheard of. His father's memory was also brought into play so as to add to the opportunities of the prescribed shows. Some of these expenditures were undertaken jointly with his colleague Bibulus ; but the cream of popularity was somehow skimmed for himself by Julius. It was like the temple of the Dioscuri on the forum, formally, indeed, the temple of Castor and Pollux, but public usage limited itself to the former name. So Bibulus bitterly jested about himself.¹ But apart from this investment for the future, Cæsar would not omit the opportunity, even more plainly than before, of appearing as the political heir of Marius and of Cinna. So, one morning the Romans discovered (Plut. 6) that, overnight, statues of Marius, with attendant geniuses of victory, had been quietly placed on the capitol, blazing in gilded surface : and the inscriptions recalled the Cimbrian and Teutonic achievements. For great was still the name of Marius, and there survived veterans from whose deepest feelings welled up tears of joy. While the oligarchy impetrated the deed, and talked of Cæsar as of one who was plotting for a throne, the Marians, surging in the open spaces amid the great temples on that august hill, discovered how numerous they really were, and cheered one another. The aspiring politician scored again. He de-

¹ Dio, 37, 8, seems to have transcribed from Suet., 10, directly : "Ut communium quoque impensarum solus gratiam caperet": ὥστε καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις δόξαν σφετερίσασθαι.

served his kinship with Marius, they said. This incident of defiance resulted in a special session of the senate.

The oligarchy was astounded. Old Lutatius Catulus, leader of the senate, voiced their common sentiment: "No longer with mines, but with battering-rams and catapults and ballists is Cæsar grasping the government." But the ædile was neither timid nor dumb: so adroitly did he make rejoinder to these insinuations and satisfied the Great Council. What man, indeed, then in public life, surviving from Sulla's generation, or which one *now* pressing to the front, could rival the ædile as undoubted leader of the *popularis* party? We know nothing further of Cæsar's self-defence in that senate, nor was his positive eloquence, often attested since his prosecution of Dolabella, then a new thing. One incisive trait he had, and we discover it everywhere in his writings and in the further acts of his public career: viz., a wonderful faculty of putting his adversaries in the wrong; so to present a given situation as to have equity and good sense bound up with *his* position and with *his* measures, while intemperateness and heat, and all things unreasonable and indefensible, appeared as lodged with his adversaries. Just then his chief aim was to discredit and to humiliate the oligarchy. Neither at home, indeed, nor abroad, were they, in 65 B.C., favored by the trend of public affairs.

64

In this year Pompey abandoned the pursuit of the ruined Pontic tyrant in the direction of the Crimea, and turned southward. A certain charm and romantic vision possessed his soul to push on and add the unknown to the Empire.¹ In Africa, in his youthful manhood, he had advanced to the tides of the Atlantic, and now, moving through Syria, he hoped to arrive at the Persian Gulf, and reach that margin where, to the poets of old, flowed

¹ Plut., "Pomp." 38. From Theophanes?

the deep circular currents of Okeanos. Clearly he belonged to the class which, after Cortez, Pizarro, and De Soto, we often call the *conquistadores*. He had come near to the Caspian. Syria, then (Plut.), had no longer any genuine or legitimate monarch. So Pompey designed it a province and property of Rome. Lebanon he traversed, and subdued the fierce and warlike archers who dwelled there, the *Ityræi* (Druses).

In this year, Cicero was a candidate for the consulate, and was actually elected, too, *new man* though he was. Whose candidate was he? *Per se*, by no means that of the oligarchy. For, to cite but two things: nothing for a long time had so injured and disgraced the pretensions of the privileged class as the trial of Verres, which Cicero had won so brilliantly against Hortensius, spreading abroad the deep corruption and wickedness of their provincial government by his incidental publication. Further, Cicero had thrown the weight of his splendid eloquence into the scales wherein lay the ambition of the Only One, to receive the Eastern command, in defiance of the senate and of the conservatives.

Whose candidate, then, was the self-made pleader from Arpinum?¹ Through his profession of *patronus* he had attached to himself the bankers and financial men, pretty nearly the entire equestrian class, many municipal towns, some guilds and corporations, also many talented younger men of the nobility, who warmly admired Cicero's genius and eloquence.

Now Cicero had to gain the good-will of the oligarchy: he had to argue that his support of Pompey had been his chief motive for assuming for a season the rôle of *popularis*; viz. that he might gain either the support, or at least the neutrality, of the great captain.

Catiline, too, was a competitor. His reputation, both public and private, was bad. That candidacy in itself

¹ Cf. also Quintus Tullius Cicero's monograph, *De Petitione Consulatus*.

remains a curious symptom of the diseased condition of the body politic, and, as matter of actual polities, his aspirations for the highest elective office were by no means without fair chance of actual success ; and he, too, had been a veritable tiger and fratricide in Proscription times.

Now Catiline and another candidate, Antonius (an unworthy son of the great orator), had made a combination (*coitio*) to defeat the Arpinate lawyer at the polls.¹ The funds at their disposal were ample and were used without stint for corruption of the electorate. And they were supported by the same two big politicians whose names were involved in the futile plot related above. If Cæsar and Crassus desired the defeat of Cicero, they certainly worked also for the consular honors of Catiline. A crisis, if you like, or anything that would make for disintegration.

[Asconius thinks Cæsar and Crassus were hostile to Cicero's further advancement, "because they observed that his rank in civil affairs was growing day by day" : they desired no newcomer in the field who was sure to wield considerable influence and who was looming up too large to be made an asset in the further political ambition of both or either of them. They rated him higher than Mommsen did later on.]

In this same year, 64, Cæsar for the first time was a presiding and directing justice in a Roman court : not prætor as yet, but as ex-aedile, he was chosen a kind of deputy-prætor, or supplementary one, called by the Romans *iudex quæstionis*² (or quæsitor). His court was that entrusted with cases of murder. (Suet., 11.) Now Cæsar, with impressive consistency, made responsible and treated as murderers those men who, for turning in heads of the

¹ Asconius, "Cic. Oratio in Toga Candida," p. 82. Coierant enim ambo, ut Ciceronem consulatu deicerent, *adiutoribus usi firmissimis M. Crasso et C. Cæsare*. Cicero said that Antony and Catiline met in the night before this speech, in the house of a certain nobleman marked and known "in hoc largitionis quæstu," quasi-notorious for that kind of work. Asconius says that either Cæsar or Crassus was meant.

² Cf. Madvig, "Verf.," I, p. 389 ; Mommsen, "Staatsrecht," I, 3d ed., p. 384.

proscribed, had received the bounties of Sulla out of the public treasury, and he refused to consider as a defence the immunity specifically granted to such executioners by a certain paragraph of the Cornelian Laws.

It was politics, though, rather than striving for justice, for Cæsar specifically selected the case of the man who slew Lucretius Ofella by order of the dictator, and he received the penalty. (Dio, 37, 11.)

But Catiline, similarly prosecuted, was acquitted. The public marvelled at both results. A commentary will readily suggest itself to the intelligence of my readers. Catiline was among the assets of the future.

On Dec. 10 the newly chosen tribunes regularly began their year, twenty-one days before Jan. 1, when the curulian magistrates were inducted. In those December days, then, of 64, one of the new tribunes promulgated an agrarian law. Indeed, since the autumn of 91, twenty-seven years before, when the noble Drusus perished, there had been none. The new Gracchus was called **Servilius Rullus.**

CHAPTER V

63 B.C.

A CRITICAL YEAR

THE effort had been made to keep the bill from the new consul Cicero as long as possible. It was a sweeping measure, this *Lex Agraria Rulliana*, but Cicero's eloquence caused it to fail without being actually submitted to the electorate of the *Comitia Tributa*.

Rullus, Cicero said (§ 27), wants to be *popularis*. We see now much more clearly why Cæsar was opposed to any consulate for the debater from Arpinum. Cicero plainly avowed himself champion of senatorial primacy and initiative in public life. Also he made much of it that Pompey, being absent, was excluded from the land commission. We see that early in 63, in spite of Cæsar's efforts and bounties and declarations and measures, Pompey still was the people's man *par excellence*. Here, then, Cæsar (who stood behind Rullus) and Cicero came into a political conflict, in which the orator defeated the politician.¹

Still another conflict arose between them when Cicero undertook the defence of old C. Rabirius,² who was charged with high treason (*perduellio*). It was Cæsar who *secretly equipped* (*subornavit*, Suet., 12) his future lieutenant, T. Labienus, to prosecute for the killing of the tribune Saturninus — thirty-seven years before ! Our

¹ Drumann curiously argues that Cæsar was not sincere in his support of this agrarian law, but Lange, 3, 209, says: "Die demokratische Partie rechnete übrigens ernstlich auf Annahme des Gesetzes."

² Mommsen, "Strafrecht," p. 582. Dio, 37, 26, is incisive, as often. Suetonius, 12, is critical and unfriendly.

Cæsar and Lucius Cæsar were drawn by lot — curious lot — *after* the indictment had been made. Really the plan was deeper: Cæsar, as a democratic politician, undertook nothing less than to undermine one of the great bulwarks of senatorial power; viz., the so-called Final Resolution of the Great Council (*Senatus Consultum Ultimum*): “that the consuls should see to it that the state suffer no impairment”; it was something like martial law, declaration of a state of siege, or the modern suspension of *Habeas Corpus*. An assault this on the constitutional prerogatives of the Great Council, a phase of the old struggle between the plebs and the oligarchy, which had gone on since Tiberius Gracchus, with many a truce but with no lasting peace.

In this year died G. Metellus Pius, *pontifex maximus*. Cæsar, with complete indifference to seniority among his colleagues, at the comparatively youthful age of thirty-seven at once became an active candidate for the vacancy. Servilius Isauricus, his old commander, as well as the elderly and dignified Lutatius Catulus, also sought this high honor. The senate itself seemed to compete with Cæsar. Catulus even (Plut., 7) privately offered him large sums if he would desist. It seems, as far as the electorate was concerned, to have been a question of the organized distribution of money. Cæsar was induced by the advances of Catulus to increase his liabilities even more. The figures named by the *princeps senatus* indeed seem to have given the keen politician¹ some base for his own computation. In all problems of *larginio* he was an expert. The issue was his victory. The personal immunity of the supreme pontifex, coupled with the official residence in the *Regia* on the *Via Sacra*, were almost indispensable to him at that stage of his affairs. But the comitia of

¹ Plut., 7, δὲ καὶ πλεῖς προσδανεισάμενος.

the field of Mars in that year gave him also a *prætorship*. The long-needed governorship abroad, then, was at last in sight, and with it the first substantial opportunity of satisfying his bankers.

It was as *prætor-elect* that Cæsar in that critical year shared in the debate of December 5, when the punishment was determined which the Catilinarian conspirators were to suffer. Now these men, indeed, were to suffer not as *populares*. The danger to the conservatives was not from any possible martyrdom of these wretched men,—no, it was from the procedure itself: it was in the usurpation and disregard of constitutional safeguards.

When Cicero on that day called upon the *prætor-elect*, Gaius Julius Cæsar, the latter alone voted to imprison them for life and confiscate their estates. Sallust has preserved for us the speech ("Cat.," 51), which we must esteem a close representation of what he actually said, not less than the counterspeech of Cato on that day. Even eighteen years later, Cicero ("Att.," 12, 21, 1) designated Cæsar's motion as a *stern* one (*severa*). The speech leading up to it is a great speech. It is permeated with psychological tact and with that dispassionate appeal to judgment and understanding which is always admirable, but is particularly difficult to maintain in any great crisis. Cæsar here also (51, 20) revealed his conception of death: "As to the penalty, I indeed may state what is implied: that in grief and miseries death is a repose from troubles, not a torture; that it is a dissolution of all things concerning human beings, that beyond it there is no place for either care or joy." As for the penalty, he urged that the choice of exile was ordinarily permitted to convicted Romans. Now these Catilinarians had *deserved* the severest fate imaginable, but their extraordinary guilt should not goad the senate to resort to any action sure to create an evil and unwise precedent.

He goes on to cite the Thirty Tyrants from Xenophon's

“Hellenica.” Sulla, too, began by chastising the wicked: but he had not stopped there, but advanced to summary and illegal procedure. But of course no Sullanian measures were to be apprehended from a chief magistrate such as Cicero was. But some other time and with a different consul at the helm, the acts now proposed might be cited for precedent or might be repeated in a manner sure to plague those who now were advocates of summary procedure. Now he (Cæsar) would not even grant to the culprits the alternative of exile, which the *Lex Porcia* permitted to convicted citizens; but he moved “that their estates be confiscated, they themselves be imprisoned in a series of municipal towns such as were particularly rich (so as to hold them responsible by bonds?), and that no one hereafter should have the senate debate about them nor make propositions to the plebs (*i.e.*, to legislate them out): and that the senate was resolved that whoever acted otherwise would act against the state and the general welfare.”—Again Cæsar failed, and Cato’s fearless and radical resolution prevailed.

[At this point it may interest the reader to observe that the three Greek writers, Plutarch, Appian, Dio, are curiously inexact in reporting this famous debate. Plut., c. 7: *ει δὲ φρουροῦντο δεθέντες ἐν πόλεσι τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀν αὐτὸς ἔληγται Κικέρων, μέχρι οὐ καταπολεμηθῆ Κατιλίνας, ὑστερον ἐν ειρήνῃ καὶ κατ’ ἡσυχίαν περὶ ἐκάστου τῇ βουλῇ γνῶναι παρέξει: i.e.*, this imprisonment in the towns to be merely temporary until Catiline (then in the field at Fæsulæ) be defeated, when a quiet and orderly trial by the senate would be feasible. Plutarch’s hurried inference. Elsewhere (“Cat. Min.,” 22) Plutarch seems to have transcribed from an authority positively unfriendly to Cæsar, possibly Livy: “But Cæsar arose, since he was both a powerful speaker and rather wished to increase every change and dislodgment (*κίνησιν*) in the government as material for the designs which he himself entertained, rather than to allow it to be extinguished. . . .”]

Appian (“B. C.,” 2, 5) adds a motion of the senator Nero: “To keep them guarded until they destroy Catiline by war and gain the most accurate information. . . .” He also adds that Cæsar was not clean from the suspicion that he was himself an accomplice of the conspirators. Cæsar’s own motion Appian presents thus: “That Cicero should separately place (*διαθέσθαι*) the men in those towns of Italy which he himself

approved, *until*, after the defeat of Catiline in the field, they be brought into court." A substantial agreement with Plutarch.

Dio, who here and there writes in pragmatizing inferences of his own (e.g., that the senate expelled Catiline from Rome by an express resolution, 37, 33), presents at least (37, 36) the motion of Cæsar with complete precision.]

Plutarch, by the bye ("Cat. Min.," 24), reports a curious incident which happened on that day of tremendous tension: while the debate was going on, a small *billet* was passed in to Cæsar. At once Cato's attention was arrested, and he demanded to know the contents. But what was his shame and disgust when Cæsar let him read it. It was a private note of an amatory nature, written by Cato's half-sister Servilia, mother of Brutus.¹

A word or nod from the consul, Cicero, might have cost Cæsar his life when this momentous session ended: the swords of the equestrian youth were ready to strike him down. Catulus (bitterly disappointed on account of the Pontifex Maximus matter) and Piso were foremost in the effort to have Cæsar named among the conspirators. The latter had been made to suffer at the hands of Cæsar: for Piso had unjustly imposed a penalty upon a Transpadane.

¹ Cf. Suet., "Cæs.," 50, *Sed ante alias dilexit Marci Bruti matrem Serviliam, cui et primo suo consulatu (in 59) sexagiens sestertio margaritam mercatus est.*" Bought for her indeed a pearl of great price, for it cost six million sesterces = \$264,000. Perhaps we should read *margaritas*. All myths, says the flighty Froude.

CHAPTER VI

62, 61, 60 B.C.

CÆSAR AS PRÆTOR AND IN HIS FIRST *IMPERIUM*

ON January 1 he ignored the inauguration of the new consuls, Silanus and Murena. Instead of attending that function, he proposed (Suet., 15) that old Catulus, curator for the rebuilding of the temples on the Capitol, should give an account and be deprived of this honorable charge. Thus, not the name of Catulus should appear in the inscription on the new temple of the Capitoline Father of Light, but (Dio, 37, 44) that of Pompey, to whom the completion was to be entrusted. Clearly, Pompey's name was still among the assets of Cæsar's party. The conqueror of the East was back on the *Æ*gean, and awaiting the clement season.

Cæsar was prætor. In what court did he preside? When his life came to be written and traced, so greatly the politician outshone all else, that this simple and important civic fact was entirely passed over. We know not, quite definitely, in which *quæstio* he presided.

Clearly planning and plotting for position was the foremost thing in his mind. So he supported the tribune, Q. Caecilius Metellus, when the latter, a political servitor of the Perpetual Commander, proposed a novel plebiscitum.

Catiline was still holding the field in the north: this situation furnished the excuse for the bill of Metellus; viz., that Pompey was to be called to Rome with his troops, promptly, and secure the capital against Catiline. It was from the steps of the temple of Castor, amid gladiators, with Cæsar by his side, that Metellus proposed to

put this, essentially a measure of current governmental policy, to a vote. But Cato, too, was then a tribune, young but fearless: "his tongue has always been unfettered against extraordinary powers." (Cic., "Sest.," 60.) Cato, at the risk of his own life, blocked these subversive measures. (Plut., "Cat. Min.," 27.) In the end, Cæsar was compelled to see that even this pear, which he seemed to (somewhat ostentatiously) assist in plucking for the people's favorite, was not yet ripe. The senate passed a resolution forbidding both politicians to exercise their magistracies for the time being. In the end (or soon) Cæsar made his peace with the *sénate*, probably by withdrawing the bill for the humiliation of Catulus. For once, at least, Cæsar's avidity to contribute to the further discomfiture of the senate had overshot its mark. Metellus fled across the *Ægean* to Pompey: just as though he held his mandate, not from the Roman people, but from the Only One.

Not long after this time, Catiline expired on the battlefield of Pistoria in the foothills of the Apennines. At Rome, of course, the billows¹ of excitement against all men even remotely indictable, seethed for some time longer. Thus, Curius (lover of Fulvia, Cicero's secret agent), accomplice of Catiline at one time, Curius who had been pardoned for turning state's evidence, sought to entangle Cæsar himself in these supplementary prosecutions. (Suet., "Cæs.," 17.) But Cicero himself bore witness that Cæsar had *voluntarily* made to Cicero certain communications concerning the plot. Vettius, the informer, was even thrown into prison, where he perished. As for the *quæsitor*² (or extraordinary judge) Cæsar dealt harshly with him, but in strict conformity with the public law. For Novius, though holding an inferior public power, had accepted an indictment against one who held a greater or higher office than he himself.

¹ Cf. Cic., "pro Sulla."

² So we should read for *quæstorem*, in Suet., 17.

In December of this year, the nocturnal annual solemnity of the official religion of Rome, viz. in honor of the *Good Goddess* (probably Fauna, goddess of propagation), was held. At that time it was held in the Regia, the official residence of Cæsar as pontifex maximus. This annual celebration where all males, and indeed everything masculine, were banned,¹ was gone through with in the presence of the Vestal Virgins.

Here P. Clodius (Claudius) Pulcher, brother of the then notorious Clodia, an accepted lover of Cæsar's young wife, Pompeia, entered (in the pursuit of his intrigue), disguised as a music-girl. He escaped, indeed ("Att.," 1, 12, 3), but not before his identity had been revealed. Not the dis-honor of Cæsar's house and family, but the bold desecration of the state religion, was the concern which made of this occurrence a *cause célèbre* with portentous political consequences. If it had been merely one case more of marital trouble, it would have made no ripple in that corrupt society. So Pompey, too, at this time had been compelled to send a letter of divorce to his consort, the Lady Mucia, before he himself appeared in the capital. ("Att.," 1, 12, 3.)

61 B.C.

Nothing official about it was done, it seems, before the new year. Officially, indeed, as pontifex, Cæsar took no action, and still he did demean himself in a way which we must call the politician's way. He did, indeed, divorce his wife; he could not do less. But, at the same time, as it seems from the record, he sheltered the corrupt young nobleman against the political consequences; sheltered, I

¹ Wissowa in Pauly. Wissowa reviews the data of tradition. The core or essence of the matter, however, remains distinctly as before, *i.e.*, nebulous and distant. Cf. the *θεσμοφόρια* of Athens. The relation of Plut., 10, is replete with curious detail. (Livy?) Even in the "Periocha" of Livy, 103, the matter finds a place: without any room for doubt as to Pompeia's guilt.

say, the very man who had covered Cæsar's house with infamy. These political consequences, indeed, turned out to be portentous: they became a part of Cicero's life, and further on, drove him into exile. To Cæsar's epicurean convictions the 'gods' and the official rites were a matter for official publicity and routine merely. As for Clodius himself, charges of incest with one of his sisters were freely bandied about in Rome. As regards Cæsar himself, public opinion was divided. (Plut., 16.) Some credited him with delicacy merely, others charged him with the desire of gratifying the plebeians among whom the young libertine was popular.

Clodius, indeed, was to Cæsar's mind an *asset of the future*, as Catiline had been. A state trial followed. The true conservatives, indeed, the sincere believers in a ritual under which the commonwealth seemed to them to have flourished, had reason to desire the humiliation and exile of the young debauchee.

Among the newcomers, Cicero (cf. "Att.," 1, 16) out-did himself in his intensity of aversion, perhaps even went out of his way in his zeal of strong conviction. Clodius, however, was acquitted by a jury which voted thirty-one against twenty-five in his favor—"spotted senators, poverty-stricken knights, tribunes not copper-plated (brazen) so much as with itching palms for copper" (money). ("Att.," 1, 16, 3.) Who paid them?

About this time, probably early in 61, the conqueror of the East and the idol of the starveling mob of the Forum, a mob truly, 'the leach of the treasury,'¹ reentered the imperial city. How did he come? He landed in Brundisium and, then—he dismissed his legions, indeed, his own legions. It was not in him to be a Sulla. Even Dio

¹ "Att.," 1, 16, 11: *accedit illud, quod illa contionalis hirudo ærarii, misera ac iejuna plebecula, me ab hoc Magno unice diligere putat.*

Cassius (37, 20) marvelled at it, but he did not scold him for this continence of civic virtue,¹ but conceived it as Pompey's greatest achievement: "for, having the greatest power both on sea and land, and the amplest funds gained from the prisoners of war, and being in close relations to numerous princes and kings, and having gained possession of the various populations over which he established rule, by acts of kindness resulting in this devotion, and having been able (if he chose), through the same, to gain entire control of the Romans, most of whom would voluntarily have accepted him (even if some few would have opposed him), but from weakness would have entirely agreed in this—he was not willing to do so, but at once, the moment he had crossed over to Brundisium, dismissed all his forces on his own initiative, neither the senate nor the people having voted anything about them, he having no concern to use them, not even for the purposes of his triumph. For since he knew that the record of Marius and that of Sulla were odious to men, he was not willing to cause them any apprehension (not even for a small number of days) that they were going to suffer anything similar."²

While still in Asia, Pompey had, indeed, distributed bounties to his troops with so generous a hand, that he could well expect that any future situation, or crisis, would find him with a superb body of veterans eager and ready to flock to his standards whenever he would summon them. He believed so then, he believed so with absolute conviction eleven years later, on the eve of the Civil War.

And Cæsar? He was to go to the province assigned him; viz., Bætica and Lusitania ('Further Spain,' roughly

¹ As Mommsen did, later on.

² App. *Mithr.* 116, puts it briefly: by the dismissal of his troops, he astounded ($\epsilon\epsilon\pi\lambda\eta\xi\epsilon\nu$) the Romans, as though by a popular act ($\delta\eta\mu\omega\tau\iota\kappa\hat{\omega}$).

identical with Andalusia and Portugal). But there were those who would not let him go, the bankers. His liabilities, then, exceeded his assets by much more than one million dollars in our standard (twenty-five million sesterces?), says Appian. Cæsar resorted to the richest man in Rome, with whom he had, more than once, had joint operations behind the scenes. Crassus, indeed, guaranteed Cæsar's debts to the extent of eight hundred and thirty talents, held by the most impatient of the creditors (Plut., 11), for he stood in need of Cæsar's keenness and fire for his impending anti-Pompeian policy. Cæsar, indeed, set out for his province without awaiting the usual votes of the senate, which equipped the new governor with funds and other allowances.

[The anecdote of his preferring to be first in a wretched hamlet of the mountains rather than being second at Rome, is assigned by Plut., 11, to this tour, though somewhat tentatively (*λέγεται*). If true, the incident occurred later; Cæsar had not yet figured at all in any 'struggles for primacy' (*περὶ πρωτείων ἀμιλλαῖ*): these had not yet fairly begun. If at this period Cæsar, with open vizor, had entered the lists against the Only One, it would have struck his political contemporaries as ridiculous, or grotesque. Drumann (p. 187) says aptly: "Der Urheber dieses Märchens hat in seiner Seels gelesen, aber falsch." Dio, 37 (52-53), assigns the dreams of mother and Alexander to this sojourn of Cæsar as governor while at Gades.]

This province was suffering, *i.e.* the civilized and settled portions, from robbers and bandits. These alone he could have easily disposed of. But for claiming a triumph in Rome, a *bellum iustum* was requisite.

But, notice carefully, dear reader, how was he to *have* a war? Dio (37, 52, Livy?) distinctly says that Cæsar found a pretext; viz., he made a demand of the mountaineers of the Herminius range (*Serra Estrella* in N. Portugal) to abandon their old homes and move down into the plains, knowing full well that they would refuse.

And when some of their northern neighbors removed their women and children across the Durius (*Duero*), he

laid his hands upon their towns. In a second campaign against the mountaineers, he pursued them to the Atlantic. Here, really beyond the confines of his own province (in *Gallicia?*), so Dio relates (Livy?), Cæsar had trouble with pontoons devised to pursue them to an island near the coast; P. Scævius distinguished himself, a new Horatius Cocles.

These military operations in the main occurred in 61.

60 B.C.

The earlier part of this year probably was devoted, in a measure, to internal betterment. Cæsar regulated the ever recurring difficulties of creditors and debtors,¹ acting as a kind of umpire between them: clearly, allowing them both to present their case (*ἐθράβενε*): The debtors, from their income, should annually give up two-thirds to their creditors until the obligations were cancelled. It strikes us as a bit severe: but it gave him the good-will of the provincials. So he quit his province, but not before he had become rich himself, and enriched the three legions which had served under him. Apart from imposts, and fees, and confiscations, there was the sale of captives, always to be put into the category of quick assets, for the traders in slaves seem to have followed the Roman camps as regularly as vultures hover over fields of carnage when battles are done.

¹ This is related by Plut., 12, in a friendly, almost genial, way: did he transcribe Oppius here? or Balbus?

CHAPTER VII

THE TRIUMVIRATE AND CÆSAR'S CONSULATE

60–59 B.C.

CÆSAR hastened to Rome (Suet., 18), just as he had hastened to his province. For his successor he did not wait. Triumph and consulate were the next prizes. He knew that he had arrived at the threshold of greater things. When he arrived, the day had already been published by the consuls, on which their successors (the chief magistrates for 59 B.C.) were to be voted for. Cæsar's return to Rome occurred in the month of June ("Att.," 2, 1, 9).

Cæsar could not be voted for (*ratio eius haberi*) unless he entered the city as a private citizen. Here, again, he was compelled to yield to the opposition, in the senate, of Cato, whom, as the years went by, he probably hated more than any other man in public life. In vain did Cæsar, through his own servitors in the senate, manœuvre for a special immunity.¹ Constrained to choose, he selected the consulate. Cæsar had arranged his plans for the canvass even in December, 61, though personally absent. ("Att.," 1, 17, 11.) Lucceius, a very rich senator and amateur historian, was induced — we know not by what arguments — to form a combination with Cæsar (*coire*), *i.e.*, to *appear* as a candidate in the electioneering, but throw all his influence into the scales of Cæsar's candidacy. And this coöperation was of a very palpable nature; Lucceius, through his agents, gave out the promise of bribe money in all the electoral units (*centuriæ*)

¹ Ut legibus solveretur (Suet., 18).

as funds coming from Cæsar and Lucceius conjointly. The leaders of the Optimates did not, indeed, harbor any hope of preventing Cæsar's election. They were troubled by the fear that Lucceius, too, might pull through, and then, in the impending consular year of their most consistent and resourceful foe—they would have to contend, not with *one* hostile chief magistrate, but with *two*. Therefore, they joined together and guaranteed to Bibulus a corruption fund not smaller than that of Cæsar and Lucceius. Most of them put their hands into their pockets, and even the rigid Stoic Cato consented to contribute, for, as he viewed the matter, it was a case of having the end justify the means; it was a case of bribery (Suet., 19) in the interest of the state (*e republi-
ca*). Cæsar and Bibulus were chosen. The latter had been cozened by his shrewder colleague in their ædilician year, and was most probably still sore, if not positively truculent even.

[Did the great pact of the three most powerful politicians precede or follow upon Cæsar's election? Did it come before Cæsar's consular inauguration?

First, we must not fail to see that both Asinius Pollio and Livy, deliberate historians of the next generation (in composing), marked the year 60 b.c. (Metellus and Afranius consss.) as the beginning of the great crisis. The year *must* have been so conceived on account of this very thing; viz., of the Triumvirate. As for the Patavian, a lover of the past and, in setting down the civil war, a positive partisan of Pompey, Livy, in relating this very year (60 b.c.), seems to have been positively unfriendly to Cæsar. For even the summary of Livy, 103, seems still to breathe the bitter spirit of the original: “*eoque consulatus candidato et captante rempubli-
cam invadere* (to usurp), *conspiratio inter tres principes civitatis facta* est, Cn. Pompeium, M. Crassum, C. Cæsarem.” Livy thus presented the great contract as a settlement coincident with, and of course intrinsically bound up with, Cæsar's canvass.

Livy, indeed, set it down in his text, somewhere, perhaps at this point of his relation, that it was uncertain whether it was more advantageous to the state that Cæsar came into the world, or whether it would have been better for Rome if he had never been born. In Seneca's time, with Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero, added to the list of Cæsar's success-

ors, this was a current saying.¹ And this, too, is the spirit of Suetonius (120 A.D.), under Hadrian, in the main. Augustus called Livy a Pompeian.

Suetonius (19) relates that *after* the election (but before Jan. 1, 59) Cæsar, angry because in the allotment of future consular "provinces" he had been treated with contempt by the senate, formed the famous combination. But Livy was closer to the times.

Plutarch ("Crass.," 14) relates things thus: the initiative in the great pact was Cæsar's. He did it all as a part of the work necessary to make sure of his consular election. He desired no opposition from either: but if he lacked the support of *both*, then he had no hope of his election at all.

These considerations moved him to effect the reconciliation of Crassus and Pompey; if they were in harmony, then men like Cicero, *Catulus*,² Cato would be negligible political quantities.

The political result, too (this quite in Livy's spirit), is aptly put: the strength of this combination was truly impregnable (*ἰσχὺς ἀμάχος*), by which he (eventually) dissolved senate and people.

In "Pomp.," 47, Plutarch puts it similarly: Cæsar as *candidate* could not afford to have the opposition of either of the other two, and so he reconciled them to each other, a thing praiseworthy in itself, *but the motives were bad* (Livy ?): this certainly is not due to Asinius Pollio. The ability (*δεινότης*) which Cæsar therein revealed was astounding, *but at the base was deep intrigue*. The result—the first result—was Cæsar's election. In "Cæs.," 13: Cæsar reconciles Pompey and Crassus, combines the political strength of both and transfers it upon himself; by a transaction which was dubbed a kindly one, he, without being observed in doing so, accomplished a political revolution. Cato alone from the beginning foresaw and foretold the political results.

Appian ("B. C.," 2, 9) puts forward the resentment of Pompey because the senatorial majority had been *holding up*, as we say in the United States, the acts and settlements of his Eastern campaigns. The envy and bitterness of his predecessor, L. Lucullus, here was influential.³ Deeply annoyed—for the matter had hung fire since January, 61—Pompey secured Cæsar's partisan support (*προσταυρίζεται*), giving him his sworn pledge that he would coöperate with him for the consular dignity. And then Cæsar immediately reconciled Crassus with him. And these three having the greatest power over all "contributed their services to one another" (*τὰς χρεὰς ἀλλήλοις συνηράντιον*: as those joining in a picnic).⁴

¹ Teuffel, "Hist. of Rom. Lit.," 256, n. 3.

² Plutarch here seems to pragmatize for himself: Catulus had died in 61 B.C. (Cic., "Att.," 1, 20, 3.) Cicero had a fair idea of being the leading man in the senate at this time, replacing Catulus, in fact.

³ Not to omit Metellus Creticus.

⁴ App., ib. Varro wrote a political treatise dealing with their agreement, which treatise he entitled *Τρικάρπανος*. The designation of Varro

Dio Cassius (37, 54-58) also makes the Triumvirate not only a shrewd political achievement of Cæsar's, but also a matter *preceding* the Consular Comitia of 60: Cæsar was brilliant in seizing the emergency. Dio sums up his own estimate of Cæsar's motives thus: For he knew full well that he would acquire mastery over the others immediately through the friendship with those men (the two), but *over them* not much later, one through the other. Dio then goes on to elucidate the motives of Pompey and of Crassus. As for the latter, Dio says, he never, in a whole-souled manner, identified himself with the interests either of senate or plebs, but rather pursued a distinctly personal policy, purely to enhance his private power and prestige. Dio says also (c. 57) that they pledged themselves for this Great Pact of give and take by an oath. Cato was fairly alone in his opposition, practically isolated. All the others pursued private rather than public ends. He alone acted from deep conviction and from his inborn manner of being. And further, Dio adds, the Three for the present kept the Great Pact concealed from the general public as much as possible.]

59 B.C.

Cæsar's Consular Policy

As to this momentous year it is altogether the wisest plan first to enumerate and survey the public acts of the consul Cæsar, and then to examine their purpose and design. And first of all we may present what Cæsar had most at heart, and which the men of his day expected him to propose, both those who looked to him as well as those who were opposed and who eagerly, nay passionately, desired that he and it might fail.

And this central point of his coming measures was fairly well known even before Jan. 1, 59. Cæsar's political agents were active, even before the publication of the bills, as Cicero ("Att.," 2, 3, 3) intimates. On him, probably in December, 60, called Cæsar's intimate friend, Cornelius Balbus, the Phenician Spaniard. "He assured

by Appian as *συγγραφεύς τις* marks the Alexandrine as a mere transcriber here. Perhaps he found it in Asinius Pollio. The date of the "Three-headed Monster" probably of the next year 59 only. Cf. Hesiod, "Th.," 287, where Geryoneus may be meant. Clearly *Tyrrell*, too, is wrong, "Corresp. of Cicero," vol. I, 270, when he assigns the Triumvirate to 59 instead of 60.

me that *he* (Cæsar) in all things would avail himself of my advice and that of Pompey, and would endeavor to bring Crassus into association with Pompey." Flattering the first part, and somewhat disingenuous the second, as though the triumvirate had not yet been established: clearly kept under cover yet.

January is close at hand ("Att.," ib.): every one knows that the agrarian bill of Julius Caesar will be up. 'Either,' said Cicero, in the letter to his bosom friend, 'either I must make stout opposition, in which there is a certain swordsmanship of debate but full of applause, or say nothing, which amounts to withdrawing to one of my country-places; or I must even support it, which, they say, Cæsar expects of me, in such a manner as not to entertain any doubt on the subject.' Cicero leaned rather heavily on Pompey at the time; Cæsar's expectation, therefore, was not oversanguine.

January 1 has come and gone. Perhaps even February 1. For, as Bibulus had the lictors in January, *L. Lange*¹ assumes that Cæsar brought out his agrarian law in February only; *i.e.* put it before the senate for debate.

Clearly, when Cicero wrote to Att., 2, 4, 2, the bill was before the senate and before the political world: also Crassus had come out for it. Cicero intimates that the great capitalist has been derelict in upholding his own class. The orator himself is sorely depressed. He would like to make a tour to the classic land of Egypt ("Att.," 2, 5, 1), if only he did not fear being called a deserter by public opinion. And Cæsar had taken steps that the debates of the senate should be regularly published.² Cicero fears the one man, Cato. 'What will history say of me? What will be said six hundred years hence?' Are there any optimates left?

¹ "R. Alt.," 3, 279.

² Ut diurna acta confierent et publicarentur. Suet., "Cæs.," 20.

But now, as for the provisions of the First Agrarian Law of Cæsar.¹ He strove to have the bill be positively fair to every interest.

In the latter part of April a second and supplementary bill² was published, submitting for assignment that crown jewel in the tiara of the imperial city, the district of Campania, that splendidly fertile country about desolate Capua,³ and the *Campus Stellas* to the north of Casilinum. This second bill seems to have created somewhat of a sensation. There were to be twenty commissioners: Cæsar himself not to be among them. There was to be no forced expropriation. The prices were to conform to the official ratings of the census. Pompey's veterans were to be provided for. The commissioners were men of distinguished fitness. The receivers of assignments were to be those householders who had three children.

All very well—said the optimates, but an agrarian law proposed, not by a tribune, but by a consul! He cannot be sincere about it! It is simply political *bribery*⁴ on a large scale. It was not the assignment, so Cato declared, that he feared, but the political rewards that the legislator would gather later on.

It was, indeed, a somewhat elemental struggle: the optimates stubbornly stood out against any vote in the senate. They were fully convinced that the bill, if approved by the senate and subsequently adopted by the *comitia centuriata*, would advance both the power and the ambition of the very man who was the most consistent foe of senatorial privilege then in public life. This sullen *non possumus*, maintained under leadership of Cato, finally

¹ For details, v. Kübler, "Fragmenta," pp. 169-171.

² L. Lange, "R. A.," 3, 279-280; Botsford, "Assemblies," 438-439.

³ Kept desolate, as a warning example since its defection in the Hannibalian war.

⁴ *Omnis expectatio largitionis agrariæ*, wrote Cic., about May 1, to Att., 2, 16, 1.

enraged Cæsar so that he placed Cato under arrest: but soon the shrewd politician realized the unwisdom of this step, for he was making a martyr of Cato.

Cæsar, therefore, felt that he had arrived at the parting of the ways, and he determined that both this and all his further measures should go through by way of the Plebeian assemblies, as *Plebiscita*, turning his back upon the senate forever. Bibulus vainly resorted to all forms of obstruction known to the past, including that of *watching the skies*. In vain Cæsar had appealed to his colleague on the forum, addressing himself not only to his sense but also to his pride.

Pompey, himself, came forward on the rostra to support the law. The public treasury, he could well claim, was now overflowing, thanks to his campaigns: no reason, therefore, for opposing the bill. Pompey, indeed, then held no public office: the more to be observed is the psychological skill of the astute politician who knew best when and how to gratify the pride of the Only One. Crassus also commended the bill before the people.

On the day of the voting, Pompey's veterans were very numerous in the comitia tributa; Bibulus was jostled and treated with rather foul indignities: his three tribunes were somehow removed out of action.¹

Pompey's marriage with Julia, who had reached the somewhat ripe age of twenty-three or so, probably opened the eyes of many as to the political league. In Cicero's eyes the great commander (his own mighty bulwark of former days) had ruined his reputation forever. ("Att.," 2, 17, 2.) It means autocratic power for Rome, he said. A dynastic match, indeed. But this, he thought, cannot be the end. The thing must unfold itself further. These

¹ Plutarch's chap. 14 ("Cæsar"), is a transcription from some very bitter original, probably Livy.

are merely steps toward ends which the contracting parties know well, but which, wisely, they withhold from the general public. We cannot budge in any direction, we cannot refuse to be slaves. ("Att.," 2, 18.) Every one sighs, no one formulates his discontent into distinct utterance. Young Curio is an exception. Compared with the average senator, I maintain my dignity well enough, but when I ponder my achievements of my consular year, then I feel small. Even in May, by the bye, Cæsar had offered Cicero a legateship under himself, even before the province had been publicly determined. Was Cæsar quite sure about it in May?

The ratification, long delayed, of Pompey's Eastern settlements with kings, princes, commonwealths, was now, too, effected by Cæsar, through a plebiscitum. Pompey's pride had been deeply wounded, a personal pride, curiously bound up with absolute lack of finesse in political manipulation. 'I have found *Asia* the furthermost of our provinces: as the central one do I give it back to the state.' So he had spoken, at his triumph, on the forum, in the autumn of 61. (Plin., "N. H.," 7, 26.)

Incisive and far-reaching was Cæsar's law for the general reform of provincial government. While it had more than one hundred chapters, it was designated from the most common form of wrong, viz., *extortion*, as *Lex Iulia Repetundarum*.¹ And the legislator was he whose Gallic gold within a few years was to flood the electioneering canvasses of Rome.

The questions of funds and fees were defined with great precision. The governor must not receive money for giving, or for not giving, a verdict. He shall not accept money for enrolling and directing troops to a certain point: he shall not receive money for making a speech

¹ Kübler, "Fragmenta," pp. 172-174.

in the senate, or on committees; even the stray fragments of the law that reach us afford a curious mirror of that corruption, which, like a weaver's shuttle, moved incessantly and generally noiselessly, to and fro between the provinces and Rome. Money was paid to the governors or their confidential agents for the appointment of judges, or referees, for imprisoning some one, or discharging him from prison, for acquitting or condemning, for awarding damages, nay, for sending innocent men to execution. Money was paid, also, for the approval of public works that were faulty or incomplete.

As regards the subject of this biography, it must interest us very much to learn that two copies (in duplicate) of the governor's financial account were to be left in each of two different communities of the province, and that a third copy (identical in form) must be deposited in the treasury at Rome. It was prohibited in this Julian law, further, to pass beyond the province, to lead the army out of the province, to wage war on one's own initiative, to approach the frontiers of a kingdom without the mandate of people or senate.¹

Cæsar himself had endeavored in the past to be entrusted with the task of annexing the Egyptian kingdom. He had failed: it was considered the most gigantic job in public life as to financial possibilities. Cæsar and Pompey now put through a plebiscitum, which recognized Auletes as legitimate king. Cæsar was charged with having accepted six thousand talents from the exiled king, jointly with Pompey (Suet., "Cæs.", 54),² perhaps notes, or claims to that amount. As a matter of fact, this penultimate Ptolemy oppressed his subjects so severely, that within a year he was compelled to quit Alexandria.

¹ Cic., "Pison.", 50; cf. also Sulla's "Lex Cornelia Maiestatis."

² Confirmed by Plut., "Cæs.", 48.

Which was the province to be? Probably even in May, 59, as we have observed, Cæsar's own mind was set. Here, too, he dispensed with the senate: for even before Jan. 1, 59, they had voted him the *care of country roads and forests* as his proconsular *imperium*. (Suet., 19.) That is to say, they foolishly insulted him to the best of their ability. Cæsar's creature and henchman, G. Vatinius, had the people adopt a plebiscitum giving to Cæsar the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, while Bibulus watched the skies once more. The term was to be five years, the forces three legions. The senate added Transalpine Gaul (the province) and one more legion.¹ Perhaps they had some lurking hope in the greater possibilities of war and death there. It seems mysterious on the surface. Well might the wits of the forum say that it had been the consular year of Julius and Cæsar.

Why did Cæsar take *these* provinces? We will try to answer. Of all provinces, Cisalpine Gaul alone was contiguous to Italy proper, was the very threshold of Rome. No fleet necessary. Again, Cæsar had with remarkable consistency, ever since he had entered the senate, acted as the patron of the communities in the Transpadane district. Furthermore, beyond the Alps, just then, in or near the Roman province, there was ample fuel for a war, or a rising. The Allobroges had suffered much from the extortions of Roman governors, such as Fonteius and his successors. Badly treated at Rome (63-62) in spite of their services against Catiline, they had risen in war and been defeated by Pomptinus, but were now but ill-subdued and of doubtful loyalty. Now all the Kelts were people of warm and strong feelings, and even in the year 52 ("Bell. Gall.," 7, 64) the Allobroges were believed to be still sore. These, then, were within the confines of *Gallia*.

¹ Dio Cass., 38, 8.

Narbonensis. But outside of it, too, but fairly contiguous, there was a sore spot. This was the old feud between the *Ædui* and the *Sequani*. Even in 61 B.C. there had been adopted a *Senatus Consultum*¹ at Rome, that whoever was governor of the *Narbonensis* should defend the *Ædui* and the other friends of the Roman people. *Divitiacus*,² one of the great druids of his people and a leader of the *Æduan* aristocracy, had been in Rome, previous to that S. C., where Cicero himself ("Divin.," 1, 90) had become acquainted with him.

In 60 B.C. there was in Rome, among the well-informed, a serious fear of a Gallic war, *i.e.*, fear of a war waged between different Gallic tribes. Cicero wrote ("Att.," 1, 19, 2) : "For the *Ædui*, our brothers, are fighting; the *Sequani* have fought (with *Ariovistus*, I believe), and have gotten decidedly the worst of it; and the *Helvetians* no doubt are in arms, and are making forays into the province (a mere rumor of what was actually apprehended along the upper Rhone). The senate resolved that the *consulars*³ should draw lots for the two Gauls, that a levy of troops be made, that excuses shall be invalid, that plenipotentiaries be sent who should visit the commonwealths of Gaul (*Ariovistus* is not named) and exert themselves that these should not join the *Helvetii*." Curiously, Cicero's name came out first, but the senate voted that he remain at home.—All of which rendered it quite certain that, in a short time, at the northwesterly frontier of the empire the Roman eagles would have to interpose.

Returning once more to Cæsar's consular year 59, we see with delightful lucidity why the consul himself (and

¹ Hereafter we shall abbreviate S. C.

² Dr. T. Rice Holmes, "Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul," 1899, p. 19, thinks that *Divitiacus* begged aid against *Ariovistus*.

³ For *consules* we must read *consulares*: the context farther on demands this change; Cicero drew. The matter escaped Tyrrell.

probably expectant governor of Gaul in the near future) caused a S. C. to pass ("B. G.," 1, 35) by which Ariovist, the powerful chieftain of the Suebi, was called "king, and friend of the R. P." I reason thus: Ariovist was formidable: he had utterly beaten down both the *Ædui* and the state which had invited Ariovist across the Rhine, the Sequani. The S. C. of 59 was intended to soothe the truculent German for the time being. For Cæsar was not prepared in 59 to leave the capital, before he had set in order his domestic policy and arranged for support during his absence. — It was manifest in 59 that in the near future the proconsul of the Narbonensis would have to assume—if necessary, at the head of a strong army—arbitration, first among the Gauls themselves and then between Gauls and their German oppressor.

CHAPTER VIII

CÆSAR IN 58 B.C.

HARDLY had January, 58, come, when Cæsar's foes strove to undo his legislation: one of the managers was the prætor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a brother-in-law of Cato. Technicalities there were in abundance, but Cæsar defied them to let the senate review: in the senate the Three probably could either command a majority, or Cæsar's tribunes had their Intercession ready. *One* charge against an alleged act of his consulate is cited in that summary of his money-grasping (Suet., 54); viz., that he filched three thousand pounds of gold from the capitol, replacing it with gilded ingots of copper.¹

There remain two matters to be noticed by us before we can accompany him in his swift tour to the lake of Geneva. First, the affair of Cicero, whom, early in 58, Cæsar left to his fate; viz., to the exile brought upon him by the new 'Plebeian' Clodius. Even in May, 59, Cæsar had offered Cicero a legateship, a psychological and professional impossibility for the scholar and pleader. — The other matter we must hold firmly before us at all times henceforward, if we desire to understand the politics of the next nine years. It is stated with that pregnant precision which renders Suetonius so weighty (c. 23): "Towards his security for the future, he made it a great point always to keep attached the annual magistrates, and, of the candidates, to assist, or permit to reach the offices, no others than those who would pledge themselves to be champions of his absence; of which agreement he did not hesitate to demand an oath and even a bond in writing."

¹ Perhaps from pamphlets published after March 15, 44.

[Of the notable books concerning Cæsar's Gallic Wars, we may say that those of Napoleon III and Goeler have been antiquated by the large volume of Dr. T. Rice Holmes. An enormous part of this book is given up to the tasks and conjectures of topographical verification. In weighing and valuing a library of local monographs, Dr. Holmes has not only essayed, but really accomplished, a Herculean labor. His mere criticism and survey covers in fine print pp. 335-514. Even Hirtius Oppius or Balbus could not trust Cæsar more absolutely than Holmes does. I cannot agree that the official acceptance by the senate of Cæsar's despatches, as they came in from time to time, disposes of all serious reasons for distrust. The swift composition of this military relation must not divert our attention from the overwhelming probability that it was composed on the verge of the civil war, and is an utterance made in the very death struggle of partisan bitterness. Holmes' aversion to the Keltic spirit is quite unconcealed. But with the valuation, both ancient and modern, of the so-called *Commentarii*, we shall deal in the proper place later on.]

The Helvetii

As for these, they were Kelts no less than those farther west. Their military prowess Cæsar, in a mode of reasoning repeated elsewhere, makes dependent upon their border wars carried on with their German neighbors. As to Aquitania, a non-Keltic part of Gaul, he errs enormously as to its area.

Orgetorix was the man most prominent among the Helvetii, which means among their aristocrats. The sworn agreement which he had effected, called upon the knightly class alone. His motives for a tribal migration, we are told, were partly ambition, partly the impossibility of expansion. Of the geographical barriers, Cæsar leaves unnamed the strongest of all, the Alps, as though Italy were, at all events, beyond their computations.

Their planning and measures must have covered at least two years, and Cæsar's account agrees well with Cicero's relation above ("Att.," 1, 19, 2). Orgetorix is to us an impressive exemplar of the Keltic nobleman, and of the *feudal* character of that society and politics. He gives a daughter to the Æduan nobleman *Dumnorix*; in fact, he

makes private alliances with aspiring leaders elsewhere, he makes promises contingent upon his own advancement: but all these pacts (a Keltic triumvirate) were secret. Their uncovering cost Orgetorix his life, although he could muster ten thousand retainers. The plans of tribal migration meanwhile even so go forward. The resolution to burn all dwellings reveals the decisive character of a movement long entertained. With them migrate contiguous populations of upper Rhine. Clearly they did not desire to pass westward by any route farther north than *Geneva*, because these regions farther north then rested under the shadow, at least, of dread Ariovist. They relied to some extent, also, upon the soreness of the Allobroges on the upper Rhone. Geneva then was entirely on the *left* bank of the impetuous Rhone, which river constituted the frontier at that point.

Cæsar arrived in Geneva in spring. On April 13,¹ he hoped his new levies would be at his disposal, and so procrastinated in his reply to the Helvetii. In the meantime he constructed defences at certain points on the left bank of the Rhone (downstream), and these proved strong enough to defeat all efforts of the Helvetii to pass to the left bank. Therefore, with the mediation of Dumnorix, the Helvetii made an agreement with the Sequani (in later Burgundy), peaceably to pass northwest through their territory. Cæsar now (1, 10) heard (for the first time?) that the Helvetii intended ultimately to settle in Saintonge, north of Bordeaux, and thus (*sic*) threaten the security of the Roman frontier. Here we are fairly aghast at the speed of his movements. He journeys back across the Alps (he says *in Italiam*) to Aquileia, on the upper Adriatic. In this region there were three legions:² in his Cisalpine province he enrolled two legions. Now the three of Aquileia and the *one* in

¹ Then identical with May 2 of the solar year.

² Probably Nos. VII, VIII, IX.

Provence are the four legions given him by the Lex Vatinia. To these he added¹ two others, XI and XII. And the one he found ready in the Transalpine was probably X, afterwards so famous. Cæsar himself probably began this numbering, and thus created, in a way, a certain personality, type, identity, and perpetuity; but this innovation, I believe, much more served the imperial aspirations of Cæsar himself. Factors were gradually wrought, more and more proof against mere civic sentiments.

Cæsar, hastening back the whole length of North Italy from Adriatic to Mt. Cenis, crossed the Alps somewhere west of Turin and marched toward Lyon, thus leaving his province of Narbonensis, certainly *iniussu populi Romani aut senatus*. The Helvetii meanwhile had reached the commonwealth of the Aedui (the country of *Autun*), the 'brothers'² of the Roman people. The understanding with Dumnorix did not shelter their country from the ravages of the migrating nation. Cæsar now saw his opportunity, when the Helvetii were crossing the *Saone* (*Sauconna* displaced the earlier name *Arar*). He pounced upon the last quarter of the host, the Tigurini (Zurich), before noon, early in the day, when they were off their guard. Then Cæsar in *one* day, with all his forces, crossed to the west bank of the *Saone*, an operation in which the moving Kelts had used twenty.

Then came envoys from the Helvetii, headed by the old chieftain Divico (Divine), who, in 107 B.C., before Marius' command even, had been at the head of the Tigurini, in the vast migration of Cimbri and Teutons.³ This discomfiture of nearly half a century before Cæsar brings out to stir Roman feelings. Divico in 58 must have been about

¹ 'Privato sumptu' (?), Suet., 24.

² They were "allies" of Rome as early as 121 B.C. Liv., 61.

³ When the consul L. Cassius "in finibus Allobrogum cum exercitu cæsus est." Liv., 65.

eighty. Cæsar's citation of the immortal gods, with the ancient lesson of their envy and of their temporary nurture of human pride—should *we* take it all quite seriously? These are the basic chants in Aeschylus and Herodotus, essential parts of Cæsar's youthful culture.

Now follows the decisive part of the Helvetian relation. Cæsar moved behind the Helvetii for fifteen days, so closely that they could not forage freely, he maintaining a distance of five to six miles. Meanwhile he himself suffered from lack of grain: even fodder was scant. His own supplies were on the Saone, but he had left that river. Finally, he charged two of the leaders of the Ædui, one of them being Liscus, then chief magistrate (or *vergobret*), with bad faith. Here he learns, probably for the first time, of the deep fissure in the commonwealth of the Ædui; viz., of the Proromanists and the Antiromanists. The latter, while actually in Cæsar's camp, gave the Helvetian host every information and moral support. Thereupon, in a private conference with the *vergobret*, Cæsar learned more exactly the actual domestic situation among the Ædui, particularly of the feud among the brothers, the Druid Divitiacus and the aspirant for monarchy, *Dumnorix*.¹ One learns (1, 18) how ambitious noblemen rose, or planned to rise, among the Kelts. Also that they had customs taxes, or a tariff, at the frontiers. The coming of the Romans had enhanced, of course, the prestige of the Druid. But for the latter, Cæsar would have put to death or severely checked his younger brother—perhaps half-brother. Dumnorix is warned, and thereafter surrounded with spies.

Soon after this conference, Cæsar planned to strike the migratory host in front and rear; but this design was defeated by an elderly subofficer, who blundered through

¹ On coins: “*Dubnoreix*” (“Great King”). It is characteristic of Holmes that he calls him “the Æduan demagogue.” What would he call, e.g., Queen Bucidca?

nervousness and poor eyesight. There were no field-glasses then.

Now Cæsar quit the Helvetii, and marched toward the chief town of the *Ædui*, situated on Mt. Beauvray (two thousand feet above sea), *Bibracte* (Beavertown). At this point the Helvetii, in their turn, changed their line of march and moved on behind Cæsar's army. Cæsar gave them battle, having covered a slope with his successive lines. Personally he staked his life on the issue. Omitting the details of strategical points (for which technical treatment would be requisite), we observe that at the critical point the first and second line wheeled and made a frontal attack, while his third line, at a different angle, charged upon the Boi and Tulingi, who had attacked them upon the (shieldless) right flank.

The battle (probably in May–June) lasted from one to seven, afternoon. All night there was fighting at the bulwark of carts. One hundred eighty thousand souls escaped northward to the Lingones (*Langres*). After a necessary delay of three days, Cæsar marched after them, when they surrendered at discretion, all excepting six thousand men, the clan *Verbigenus*.

Cæsar treated the survivors of the Helvetii gently enough and placed them in their former territory, which he did not wish to be occupied by the Germans. These, viz., the Alemanni, *did* come in, but much later. Out of the entire migration but one hundred and ten thousand souls, about thirty per cent of the original number, survived. The original lists of the Helvetii were written in Greek characters.

An ordinary commander might have considered these successes enough for one summer, but Cæsar determined to settle in this very first year, also, the problem of German power on the left bank of the Rhine.

Ariovist

The relations of this Suebian leader to the *Ædui* whom he had defeated, and to the *Sequani* who had called him over, Cæsar must have known, even before he was informed by the leaders of the *Ædui* and by the gestures or the profound silence of the *Sequani*. Commanders like Pyrrhus generally rule there where they have vanquished. To the Roman consciousness the *Cimbri* and *Teutons* would recur readily enough. *Ariovistus* appears, in Cæsar's relation, as haughty and defiant, as not very greatly impressed by Cæsar's defeat of the *Helvetii*. Twice Cæsar communicated with him: the first time Cæsar asked for a conference; at the last he sent *Keltic* envoys with his demands. Now Cæsar did not at all begin the negotiations with the request that *Ariovistus* should retreat across the Rhine, but merely that further migration should cease. Also, he insisted that positive autonomy be restored to the two *Keltic* states, whose rivalry had brought the German *Herzog* across the Rhine.

The rejoinder of *Ariovistus* was based on those military and political axioms which Rome herself, at this very time, held and pursued.

The further news (1, 37) that a hundred clans of *Suebi*¹ had assembled on the eastern bank of the Rhine and were actually attempting to cross (somewhere about Coblenz), was very disquieting to Cæsar. Next, both forces moved upon *Vesontio*, on the *Doubs* (*Besançon*), in the territory of the unwilling clients of the German leader, much nearer to the Rhine. Cæsar, however, outmarched the *Suebi*, for he pushed on by night and day. And now followed a demoralization of the legions from fear and dread of the Germans. Cæsar hesitated not, when he composed his relation, to place the responsibility upon the young aristocrats who attended his headquarters. We note that the com-

¹ = *Schweifer* (Rovers), as Mommsen suggests.

mander accomplished the moral rehabilitation of the *esprit du corps* not at all by a general appeal¹ to the rank and file in an address (*contio*), but in a council of war to which all the *centurions* were invited. The Cimbri and Teutons, no less than the recent wars of Spartacus, did admirable service in his exposition and appeal, terminating in the adroit reference to the X legion. The resultant revolution in the spirit of all the troops betokens the genius of a great commander.

Now Ariovist himself asked for a conference. At this, Cæsar repeated his demands. The German retorted with a general glorification of his own career. He refused, however, quite definitely, to submit to any impairment of the tribute money (from Sequani), such as would follow if he heeded the Roman demands. On the whole, he was not less defiant and contumacious than before. It sounds odd, also, that Ariovistus should have been virtually tampered with² by Cæsar's political enemies at Rome: bluntly: if Ariovistus were to slay Cæsar, he (1, 44) would do a favor 'to many aristocrats and leading men of the Roman people' — Cæsar does *not* say, of the senate, or of the optimates.

The German chieftain as well as the Roman dynast were perfectly aware that *they*, too, were engaged in a momentous struggle, of which Gaul was the prize.

After two days, Ariovist, somewhat sobered, perhaps, asked for a further conference. This time Cæsar declined, but compromised by sending two Romanized Gauls as his envoys. The situation had been completely reversed.

In extreme southern Alsace was fought the decisive

¹ Dio Cassius (38, 35) reproduces and incidentally elucidates Cæsar's account: "with the body of the troops he held no intercourse." Dio, as often, essays a psychological pragmatism. As for the *speech*, in Dio, it is Dionesque, *i.e.*, a study in Thucydides, with all that apparatus of factitious antitheses and balanced periods.

² This heavy charge against the Optimates would hardly have been published before 51 B.C.

battle which seems for several centuries to have determined the overlordship of northwestern Europe, as between the Germans and the Romans: eventually the Franks and Anglo-Saxons won that suzerainty.

The long delay of Ariovist in his accepting battle from Cæsar was due to a Germanic superstition: their *wise women* declared that it would not do to have a battle before the new moon.

The reserve, or third line of Cæsar, led by young Crassus (husband of Cæcilia Metella), decided the desperate struggle,—restored it and turned it into a rout, until stopped by a stream: what Cæsar calls the Rhine perhaps was the Ill.

The pulse-beat of politics in the capital in this year escapes us: Cicero was in exile, and so could not write any letters from Rome.

Clodius triumphed there to some extent. He appeared as the plebs' own statesman, making grain distribution subject no longer even to a nominal payment; destroying the abodes which had known Cicero in town and country; giving, further, freer play to the political clubs in Rome, which in effect we might better call "gangs," great and well-organized powers these at elections and electioneering. Furthermore, as one who had triumphed over social and moral law, he formally legislated out of Roman life that stern force of old, the mark of the censors, virtually pruning the great office away from the body politic.

To the naked eye, *he* was ruler of Rome. As a matter of fact, he had made trades for a free hand with the two consuls of the year. Of these, Calpurnius Piso had recently become Cæsar's father-in-law: he had been put in by the latter. Aulus Gabinius, the other consul, was a henchman and a creature of Pompey's, his noted servitor of the bill granting the Pirate campaign. Cato was

removed from Rome in this year, not indeed into exile, but to settle the finances of the new domain of the day, the island of Cyprus.

Here, I believe, we detect the hand of Cæsar behind the scenes. Clodius here was merely the agent of that dynast. For it was Cato (Plut., "Cat. Min.," 33), who had prophesied, probably in the senate, in 59, when Cæsar's *imperium* was given him, that 'with their own votes they would place Cæsar in an impregnable position.' And no matter what one's sympathies or antipathies may be as regards Cæsar present and future, Cato was not merely stubborn, but keen and profound in the correctness of his political penetration and prevision.

CHAPTER IX

CÆSAR IN 57 B.C.

THE campaigns of 58 had clearly shown Cæsar's will and policy in two very important matters. In the first place, he would not permit any shifting or rearing of new power of Gauls among Gauls. And also his acute mind had clearly perceived the necessity of keeping the Germans, the most formidable of the barbarous races of northern Europe, on the easterly bank of the Rhine.

Cæsar now took the field, certainly without any justification of real provocation or danger to the Roman empire, — took the field, I say, to add the north to his own domain.

First, Cæsar increased his forces (without consent of home government) by enrolling two new legions in the Po country. He then had eight in all, a measure causing keen displeasure to all men in public life who looked to Cato for guidance. The Belgæ¹ were the objective point of his new campaign. In his preparations he calmly assumed that the northerly communities of Gaul proper would accept and perform his orders, that the *Senones*, e.g. (Sens), would keep him informed of the movements of their northerly neighbors. The *Remi*, between upper Marne and Aisne (Rheims), soon got into, or were manipulated into, that position through which the Romans accomplished so much in the extension of their empire; the Remi became favored subjects, favored above the others, the dominant among the obedient because first to obey.

In the main the Belgæ were the communities between Seine and lower Rhine. Was it Cæsar or the Remi who

¹ *Belgæ = Tumentes* (Holder): The ‘*Swollen*,’ i.e., The Proud; cf. Bulge, Billow.

designated the movement for a Belgian coalition as insanity (*furor*)? Again we observe that valor and reputation in northwestern Europe was computed and rated from association with, or identity with, the Germanic stock.— But to return. Soon Cæsar himself was called upon to 'save' a town of the Belgæ, *Bibrax*.¹

Cæsar at first was cautious, and kept his legionaries from these famous warriors: meanwhile he resorted to engineering defences, putting the *Axona* (Aisne) in his rear. The Belgæ soon were tired of joint operations, after having made a vain effort to dislodge Cæsar by gaining a position south of the river in his rear. After this discomfiture, they scattered to their various homes and cantons. As for the proud and warlike *Bellovaci* (Beauvais), Cæsar had isolated them by sending the *Ædui* against them. *Ædui* and *Remi* were used by him precisely in the same way in which one of his most brilliant pupils, Napoleon, used the 'Rheinbund' against his German foes.

When Cæsar realized that the departure of the general levies of the coalition was also a dissolution of the coalition, he pressed after them and inflicted heavy losses all day long. Now Cæsar took in hand one canton at a time. First, the *Suessiones* (Soissons). He arrived before their town of *Noviodunum* (Newton), and during the next night the contingent of the tribe arrived from the dissolution on the Aisne.

A regular siege was now undertaken by Cæsar, but the townspeople, deeply impressed by the rapid execution of Cæsar's siege-works, made their submission. That was one canton. Next, Cæsar moved upon the town of the *Bellovaci*, *Bratuspantium*,² some twenty miles to the west. Here one could see how the exhibition of power conquers men. The inhabitants did not even await the operation of the Romans' siege-works, but immediately pleaded for

¹ 'Beaverton' (Zeuss). Vieux Laon, east of Rheims.

² = 'Valley of judgment,' Pictet.

mercy. Here they were supported by the good offices of the powerful Druid: incidentally we learn that the leaders for independence, whose wickedness is not very clear to us, had fled across the channel to Britain. So these Bellovaci were spared (ch. 15), not for their own sake, nor that of international law, nor humanity, nor religion, but for the sake of the *Æduans*. Six hundred hostages were taken away, the chief device of pacification. The third canton was that of the Ambiani (Amiens), who surrendered at once and completely.

Not so the *Nervii*, to the northeast, on the *Sabis* (Sambre), whose warlike prowess, as usual, is derived and deduced from the fact that they kept themselves immune from the traders and from the allurements of southern luxuries, such as wine. They were angry at the other Belgæ for abandoning the cause of freedom. Never before, and rarely afterward, was Cæsar so completely taken by surprise, as on the southerly bank of the Sambre,¹ by the hawk-like swoop upon his troops, when these were on the point of breaking ranks to build the Roman camp for that night, nay, when some had actually begun to work at it. The efficacy (almost automatic) of Roman drill and tactics, no less than the presence of the various subcommanders, with their several legions, were of incalculable importance in saving the Roman army. No time for stripping the leather cases from the shields, none even to put on helmets, no systematic battle lines, no unity of legions even in some cases, no survey of the ground as a whole, a confused image of wild forces: Cæsar's own camp taken, while others of his own troops drove some of the *Nervii* into the Sambre; here vigorous advance, there a rout of grooms and camp followers.

Every centurion perished in the fourth cohort of legion XII (centurions were masters and exemplars of swordsmanship, personal valor, and tactics). Of the other cen-

¹ Somewhere between Charleroi and Namur.

turions, few had any more strength left to fight on, while dense masses of ever new warriors were darting to the top of the sloping bank. At this critical point the *imperator* personally took charge. He cheered and fired the front, called on the centurions name for name, and promptly widened the front of the maniples, to provide elbow-room for Roman swordsmanship. To fight in *his* sight was, for the common legionaries, the supreme incentive. Meanwhile the two legions who had brought up the rear of the moving army on that day, came upon the scene on the double-quick. The Xth legion returned across the Sambre from the capture of the enemies' camp, and materially helped not only to restore the battle, but to give it a decisive turn toward victory. The last stand for freedom on that evening of the Nervii (c. 27) is related by Cæsar with expressions of high admiration. As for the result of that desperate conflict, Cæsar says that the race and name of the Nervii were all but extinguished. We may readily perceive that an orderly retreat, with a substantial salvation of strength, was unknown to that warfare. Then the older men and the women and children surrendered. Figures are here given: From sixty they were reduced to three "senators," from sixty thousand fighting men to five hundred! This was the statement with which the Nervii accompanied their petition for mercy.

For once, as a matter of deliberate policy in this case, Cæsar puts forward the matter of *mercy*.

Cæsar next took in hand the town of the *Aduatuci*, the fifth community of the Belgæ to surrender. But these (c. 29) were descendants of the Cimbri and Teutons, filled with that curious Germanic consciousness which in that time rendered haughty and defiant the non-Keltic cantons of northwestern Europe. The gradual rearing of Roman siege-works at first filled them with scornful amusement: the smaller stature of the Italians, too, they judged wrongly. But when the towers began to move,

they changed their tone. They submitted, retaining one-third of their arms, and then, after midnight, assaulted the Roman siege lines. But even for such a contingency Cæsar had made provision. Beacons promptly indicated the critical spots. The Aduatuci fought with desperate bravery, but it was a hopeless struggle; four thousand were slain, the rest driven back into the town. The next day all the survivors were sold into slavery: the slave merchants, always at hand, returned the figures as fifty-three thousand. The funds so gained, and their ultimate destiny, were, indeed, as we saw above, hedged about by the very precise specifications of Cæsar's own *Lex Iulia Repetundarum*. But Cæsar never accounted, as he would have been compelled to, had he become a private person. From despatches of young Crassus, Cæsar learned that the Atlantic cantons, from the mouth of the Loire northwest, had submitted 'to the Roman people.' What wrong had *they* done to bring upon themselves this fate? Was the *Lex Iulia Repetundarum* so much waste paper?

[The first words of "B. G." 2, 35, are curious. 'His rebus *omni Gallia pacata*': (1) did Cæsar believe it at the time? Had he so reported to the senate? That appears improbable from Cicero's support of the next year in *De Provinciis Consularibus*. (2) Had Cæsar formally received the submission of *all* the Gallic states at that time? (3) If Cæsar wrote the whole account consecutively somewhere in 51, or thereabouts, would he have written in this way? This is one problem. The other, concerning the Nervii, resembles it. Three years later, in 54-53, during the autumn and winter, the Nervii made a new rising: they appear there as powerful enough to send commands to five vassal tribes ("B. G." 5, 39, 1): "Qui omnes sub eorum imperio sunt": why not *erant*? Before the end of winter, early in 53 b.c., he compelled the Nervii (or some of them) to give him hostages. In the national levy of 52, their contingent is fixed by Vercingetorix as six thousand men. (7, 75, 3.)

The way in which Dio (39, 3) reports the battle on the *Sabis* is quite instructive. Did he use Cæsar's relation, or Livy's (104) much briefer report? At all events, Cæsar's fourteen chapters are greatly compressed by Dio, or in Dio: "then, when even then they charged *down* (*sic*) upon him unexpectedly, at the point where Cæsar himself was, they turned about and fled; but with the greater part of their army they proved

stronger, and took the Roman camp on the first charge (*αὐτοβοεῖ*). But he, having perceived this, for he had already advanced some distance pursuing the routed ones, turned back (all this was really done by Labienus) and, seizing them in the stockade while they were making loot, surrounded them and cut them to pieces. And having done this, he had no great further task in subduing the Nervii." Book 1 (or the campaigns of Bk. 1), Dio relates much more fully, but also he slips in everywhere explanations of his own.

Livy's "Epitome," 104, is inaccurate in relating that Cæsar checked the panic at the beginning of the Ariovistus campaign *adlocutione exercitus*. Dio here was very precise, and consciously so.

As for the Nervian episode, it duly stands out even in the compression of Livy's "Epitome": "contra Nervios, unam ex his civitatibus *cum magno discrimine pugnavit eamque gentem delevit": Cæsar's figures follow, except that for the five hundred of his text we have three hundred.*

Plutarch's account ("Cæs.," 20, 3) is odd: as though the Belgæ *had been* subjected before, but *had revolted*: *ἔπειτα δὲ Βέλγας ἤκουσε . . . ἀφεστάνας*. Otherwise, it appears as a hurried summary of Cæsar's own relation.— His detail is greatest precisely where his interest is greatest; viz., in the Nervian battle, he giving the *figures* of the survivors with the utmost exactness.

When Plutarch indulges in pragmatizing reflections, one is not positively certain whether Livy colors here, or whether they are the children of his own deeper valuation: but whatever that may be, we take notice that moral condemnation prevails over the admiration of success, and of strength and power—no Mommsen, nor Hegel: "and in the course of all the rest of his campaigns he escaped the perception of Pompey, at one time in turn subduing the enemy with arms furnished by his fellow-citizens, at another time with the money which came from the enemy, capturing his fellow-citizens and subduing them to his power."]

At Rome, Pompey's friends and servitors became active that something as a balancing of power be done for the Only One. The Equilibrium was in danger. Something must be done for Pompey. Wars there were none for him this time. In September, too, the achievements of Cæsar's northern campaign had probably been officially communicated to the senate. And it was early in September, a few days after the jubilant reëntry of Rome by the recalled exile Cicero, when the Pompeian faction demanded that the entire care of the grain supply¹ be given to Pompey for five years, 'in the whole world.' Grain was high,

¹ 'Cura annonæ,' "Att.," 4, 1, 6; Dio, 39, 9.

and there was a general outcry in the capital.—Notice the five years' period for Pompey. Cicero made the motion in the senate. One of the servitors, indeed, of Pompey had actually proposed, for this new power, control of all public moneys, and authority in all the provinces greater than that of the actual provincial governors. Pompey was one of those figures in history who like to have greatness thrust on themselves. Of course, there was no objection from Cæsar's servitors. The fifteen days' thanksgiving for Cæsar's northern victories was likewise moved in the senate by Cicero, somewhat later in that autumn.¹

When Cæsar set out for Italy, *i.e.*, for his Cisalpine province, he determined to clear permanently, for trade and traders, certain routes over the Alps, particularly where now the Arve rushes northward toward Geneva. *Octodurus* is near the present site of Martigny in the Valais. The attack by the mountaineers upon the garrison of Galba ("B. G.", 3, 2), not a full legion, seemed to the natives a plausible enterprise. The feeling of Rome's power and resources had not yet sunk very deeply into the Keltic consciousness at large. They hoped, also, to recover their children. How desperate their resolution, when they risked even the death of these hostages!

As long as the legion was on the defensive in the stockade, strength and endurance were wearing steadily away. The last resource, a sally, curiously enough, came not from the plans of the *legatus* and commander of legion XII, but from a centurion and a military tribune. Complete success crowned this change of strategy. More than ten thousand Kelts were slain, and the rest disappeared in the Alpine valleys. But Galba thought it wiser to march

¹ Cic., "De Provin. Consular.," 26, 'supplicationem quindecim dierum decrevi sententia *mea*.' (For Pompey's honor, when the death of Mithridates was reported in 63 b.c., but *ten* days had been voted.) Att., "B. G.," 2, 35.

down to Geneva, and take his winter quarters within the Roman province.

[All this happened in the later autumn of 57 B.C. Why does not Cæsar make it a part of the second *commentarius*? But this was his manner. He threw into the next *commentarius* all the events which were subsequent to the larger operations (of the open season).]

The last item of this year for our Annals occurred in Rome, in the senate, in December, near the holiday season of the Saturnalia. Riots everywhere, *i.e.*, artificially organized so that some men in public life shunned going to senate, even: Clodius, using his organizations to intimidate and inhibit things or men he disliked, checked by Annius Milo, champion of the Conservatives, with exactly the same weapons.¹ Pompey was away on his grain-commission. A senator attacked Cæsar's Campanian land assignment.² (One sees that the triumvirate was, indeed, powerful but not omnipotent.) Evidently the assignments there had not yet been executed. Cicero rather enjoyed the attack. Deep silence accompanied the long discourse. Formerly this topic was accompanied by abusive exchange of angry words. Now silence of the tomb. No vote taken.

¹ Cf. "Att.," 4, 3.

² Quint., "Fratr.," 2, 1, 1.

CHAPTER X

CÆSAR IN 56 B.C.

PTOLEMY AULETES had been compelled to flee from his capital of Alexandria. His agents in Rome were active with money and notes. Who will get this job of jobs? What loot! How was the king to be restored to his loving subjects?¹ What does Pompey want? Every one studied his servitors: for *he* was mute or mysterious. Cicero dined with him: no suggestion of an itching palm. ‘But when I see his close friends, senators or knights, I see clearly, a matter manifest to every one, that that whole job has been long ago bought and sold by definite individuals, not against the will of the king himself, and his councillors.’ Was it at this time that Pompey and Cæsar acquired the enormous claims on the king’s purse, still due when Cæsar appeared on the sands of Egypt in 48?

Further on, in February, Pompey’s life at Rome was made wretched by the organized insults heaped upon him in public by Clodius. Pompey again was bitterly attacked in the senate by the man who was as scrupulously honorable and conscientious as Clodius was recklessly wicked and shamelessly brave, viz., by Cato. And Pompey was supremely dignified, keenly sensitive, but no debater. Pompey, in that spring, was positively alarmed;² so Cicero inferred, although Pompey’s secretiveness and reserve were well known: in fact, Pompey was as one who had no palpable support. The Campanian land matter, too, was discussed again early in April.³ At this point, and

¹ Cic., “Fam.,” 1, 1; 1, 2.

² Cic., “Fam.,” 1, 5 b, 1.

³ Cic., “Fam.,” 1, 9, 8.

in the pressure of that situation, Pompey determined to meet Cæsar, while he (Pompey) was on his way to Sardinia. And so came about the portentous political conference, due, in the main, not so much to Cæsar, least of all to any genuine apprehension on the part of Cæsar directed at Cicero.¹

Luca, not far from Pisæ, is just north of the political boundary of Italy as then constituted, but in Cæsar's province; the letter of the law was preserved. There then was held in this same month of April a private or secret conference,² as the ancient historians call it. In one way it was very far from private: there were so many magistrates or other men in public life (*cum imperio*) present, that there were one hundred and twenty lictors on the ground. It was the sensation of the political world. But secret, no doubt, were the discussions, and secret for the present were the stipulations entered into at the time, but revealed, by and by, in the next consular elections and various *senatus consulta*.

L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (brother-in-law of Cato), then, and to the end of his life,³ one of the bitterest enemies of Cæsar, was a consular candidate for 55 B.C., and,⁴ foolishly enough, threatened openly that, as consul, *he would deprive Cæsar of his armies*. Cato, and all who believed in Cato, saw that here was the very sinew of his power. And so it was. Why should any one (becoming ecstatic with Mommsen about some fancied cultural mission of the towering proconsul) fail to see it?

To defeat Domitius and his supporters, the three members of the Great Pact settled the immediate future of Roman politics in this way: Pompey and Crassus to be

¹ See "Att.," 4, 5. Seriously speaking, Cæsar always considered Cicero *facilis*.

² L. Lange, 3, 328. Plut., "Cæs.," 21.

³ At Pharsalos, June, 48.

⁴ Suet., "Cæs.," 24.

chosen consuls for 55 B.C.; Cæsar's provincial power to be extended by another period of five years, with incidental immunities and advantages. At Luca there were more than two hundred senators (Plut., "Cæs.", 21): looking for crumbs or for clews, or what? or getting their orders? And Cicero's coöperation was pledged through his brother Quintus.

In private, indeed, and before the mirror of his deeper sentiments, poor Cicero made a somewhat wry face¹ at this new alliance (*nova coniunctio*): but it was exile, and a frame of mind not far removed from self-destruction, out of which he had returned less than a year before. Home once more, he had bitterly felt the political impotence, nay, the indifference and envy, of his aristocratic false friends. 'But since,'—so he wrote to his bosom friend,—'since those men who have no power, do not wish to love me, *let us strive to be esteemed by those who have power* (viz., Cæsar and the other two). You will say: "I wish you had done so long ago." I know you desired it, and that I have been a genuine donkey. But it is time now that I be loved by myself, since I cannot in any wise be loved by those people . . .' (the optimates). Soon after May 15, 56, a S. C. was passed, which gave to Cæsar pay from the public treasury for the four legions which, on his own responsibility, the proconsul had levied among his old clients, the Transpadanes.² Thus Cæsar got back with interest the money which he had spent at Luca (Plut., "Cæs.", 21): and now the presence there of the more than two hundred members of the Great Council becomes very much more luminous to the readers of this biography.

As for the *ten legati* voted to Cæsar at the same time, there was a peculiar significance in that measure. There

¹ "Att.," 4, 5.

² This grant does not invalidate the phrase, *privato sumptu*, of Suet., 24.

was in this the definite conception of a conquest consummated, of a new province ranged in the empire.¹

And so even Cicero appeared as one who helped to carry into execution the private agreements of Luca. His noted speech in the senate ('on the Consular Provinces') was probably held early in June, 56 B.C. The consul, L. Marcius Philippus, presided. (Cf. § 21.) The older I grow the less I am inclined to accept at their face value the public utterances of politicians, even when their name is Cicero. Was he really converted in his heart to genuine admiration of, and trust in, the governor of the north-west?

Is the following sincere? "Or can I (§ 22) be a personal enemy of this man, through whose *bulletins*,² reputation, messengers, my ears, day by day, ring again with unheard of names of peoples, tribes, and places?" — Poor Cicero! Once more the scholar in politics, the cultural enthusiast, tied to the chariot of the politicians. But we must select a few passages which, in a manner, reflect the year 56 B.C.

"Therefore³ he fought decisively and with consummate fortune with the most intrepid and greatest tribes of the Germans and Helvetians (odd summary of 58-57), the rest he has thoroughly frightened, constrained, tamed, trained them to obey the commands of the Roman people, and territories and nationalities which hitherto no books, no human utterance, no rumor, had brought within our ken, these our generalissimo and our army and the weapons of the Roman people have traversed. A footpath, merely, to Gaul was held before, gentlemen of the senate: the other

¹ Cic., "Phil.," 12, 28: "bellis *confectis* decem legatis permitti solet more maiorum." Cf. "Fam.," 1, 70, 10.

² "litteris": Should we not here conceive of that to which Suetonius ("Cæs.," 56) refers: "Epistulæ quoque eius ad senatum extant, quas primus videtur ad paginas et formam memorialis libelli convertisse, cum antea consules et duces nonnisi transversa charta scriptas mitterent."

³ "De Provin. Consular.," § 33.

parts were held by nationalities either disloyal to our government, or unknown to it, or assuredly terrible and uncivilized and warlike: nationalities which everybody (in Rome) eagerly desired to see crushed and tamed; no one reflected profoundly about our own commonwealth, but held that Gaul was most deserving of apprehension on the part of our own government, but on account of the power and great number of those nationalities, no struggle was ever had with them collectively. We always turned on them only when they challenged us. Now, at last, we have accomplished it, that both our own domains and the world had the same uttermost point . . . for (§ 34) there is nothing beyond the lofty ridge of those mountains (the Alps) up to the Atlantic, which Italy will have to dread. But still,¹ one or two summers (= campaigns), either through apprehension, or hope, or chastisement, or rewards, or arms, or statutes, can fetter Gaul entire with bonds enduring forever: but if their state of sentiment be left raw and sore, although their power be materially impaired, they will rise some day, and their strength become fresh once more for renewing the war."

But we, too, must now turn once more from Cæsar's politics in 56 to Cæsar's campaigns of the same year.

Was the naval campaign now following on the Bay of Biscay really a surprise to Cæsar? Did he (*officially*) in the autumn of 57 really believe that the work was done? The brief report of P. Crassus ("B. G.", 2, 34) merely mentions the actual submission of seven maritime cantons: submission made to the youngest of Cæsar's lieutenants, who had under him one legion and no more, legion VII. Did Cæsar really trust the moral results, the consequences in the souls of men, of the tremendous blows dealt in the east and in the north? As a matter

¹ *Tamen . . .* that is: A man might say, why not then terminate Cæsar's proconsulate? Why even extend it?

of fact, the communities of the Atlantic border had 'accepted' the sway of the Roman people.

As for the form or mode of this submission, it had been the giving of *hostages*. Now the retention by the Veneti and their neighbors of the Roman envoys sent to demand tribute of grain was to be the means of enforcing that which (3, 8, 2) these somewhat new and raw subjects of the 'Roman People' had most at heart; viz., the restoring of their own children then held as hostages. Cæsar's belief that Gallia was *pacata* manifestly had rested on the possession of these hostages.

Inasmuch as all these things came about during the inclement season (57-56), indeed *before* a goodly supply of grain for the winter quarters had been laid in, then Cæsar's 'surprise' was to be dated even before the opening of the civic year 56 B.C.

A considerable part of that winter 57-56 was consumed by the building of a fleet on the Loire. The oarsmen were drafted from the province, by no means from the new or newest subjects. The proconsul (3, 9) throws up his hands in horror at this fearful breach of International Law — this arresting and detaining of the proconsular messengers.

As a matter of fact, the task of subduing the Atlantic communities proved difficult and severe. The *Veneti* (Vendée) trusted in their commanding knowledge of tides and headlands, of winds and weather. As a matter of fact, Rome never had had any serious naval operations outside of the Mediterranean. Besides, the Veneti had attached to their league the cantons of the seaboard north-eastwards, inclusive of the Menapii, south of the delta of the Rhine. At one thing we marvel: in this list we find the *Ambiani* (*Amiens*).

Cæsar's motives for this campaign we find in c. 10, and in examining them we find *four* considerations of fact and *one* element of policy and design for the future. Would

had Cato have dared to attack this campaign? Could *any* adversary of Cæsar have charged him with breach of his own *Lex Iulia Repetundarum*? He clearly was no longer (3, 11) convinced that all Gaul was *pacata*. So he provided for three other operations to be simultaneous with his own naval campaign. He sent Labienus into the region of the *Moselle* to keep the Germans on the right bank of the Rhine and to discourage any Keltic risings in that quarter. Next he sent young Crassus, with twelve cohorts and some cavalry, into Aquitania, to prevent any reinforcements for the Atlantic cantons from the south. Finally, Titurius Sabinus, with *three legions*, was to look after the Atlantic tribes to the northeast.

As for himself, he wanted to make sure of the Veneti. His admiral was Decimus Brutus, one of his own assassins twelve years later. The operations began as soon (3, 12) as the season permitted. Cæsar laid siege to one town at a time; but he accomplished nothing. For when he had reduced one, the inhabitants were found to have flown by sea. Their towns lay on points, and at high tide they were impregnable by land. Thus a great part of the summer went by. Their vessels were adapted to the Atlantic; the galleys of the Romans were not. Cæsar's description, as all his setting forth of the actualities of a given situation, is admirably lucid.

At last (c. 14) he realized that it was all a question of sea power: their *fleet* must be captured and destroyed, or all would be vain. It was the conceit of the *scythes* which enabled the men of Decimus to destroy the tackle of the enemy, which fell down with the sails upon the decks of the Venetan fleet.

Thus ended the naval campaign. The fleet had concentrated not only the very spirit of resistance, but, on the two hundred and twenty vessels, the very flower of the national defence. It was over. They now submitted at discretion. But the proconsul was not content to receive

them as subjects. Their councillors were beheaded and the people at large sold into slavery. Cæsar posed (for Cato and others) as defender of the *rights of envoys*.¹ This had been the year in which Cæsar had hoped to take up the administrative organization of the entire new province.

The separate campaign of Sabinus among the Unelli is related in chs. 17-19. The legate won by keeping within his stockade and simulating fear. To this ruse, he added a further stratagem.

He had a native Gaul pass over to the patriots and demean himself among them as a deserter, filling their ears with stories of the hopeless and desperate state of things within the Roman stockade,—it was all before the Venetian catastrophe. Sabinus, he said, was anxious to escape by night, to come to Cæsar's aid. The common Kelts were at once carried away by impatience, not to allow so certain a success to be neglected. Up the long slope they charged,—it was a mile,—armed with brushwood, to fill the Roman trench. When they had arrived, still burdened and winded, the Roman legions suddenly darted out and at them. It was an overwhelming disaster.

The *Aquitani*, during the same summer, were subdued by young Crassus, who added to his twelve cohorts, by special enrolments, troops from Carcassonne, Toulouse, and Narbonne, providing also for such supplies as would allow him to operate without drawing upon a hostile region. According to Strabo, Aquitania proper, ethnically taken, was inhabited by more than twenty minor cantons. They were not Kelts but Iberians, and they differed from the Gauls proper both in physical characteristics as well

¹ Dr. Rice Holmes, like Mommsen and Froude, not so much an historian of Cæsar as a partisan, says (p. 66): "As the Venetian senate were responsible for the *outrage* which had led to the war, every man of them was put to death," etc.

as in speech. First the *Sotiates* (Lot et Garonne) were defeated. These were a people conversant with mines and mining. An institution of theirs were the *soldurii*, sworn brothers in arms. The fall of the town of the *Sotiates* roused the *Aquitani* to more united efforts. They summoned aid even from the southern slope of the Pyrenees (2, 23, 3), with good results. For leaders were chosen men who had served at home in Spain under *Sertorius* (78-72), and so were familiar, not only with Roman tactics, but also with Roman strategy: to select good positions, to build strong camps, to cut off supplies.

Crassus had forces too small to extend them, his grain supply, too, would not last much longer, and so he determined to gain his campaign by a pitched battle, which the natives, however, declined. No other alternative, therefore, was left to the young subcommander but to assault the camp of the *Aquitani* and *Cantabri*. With choice troops he made a detour and executed an attack on their badly guarded rear, gaining an overwhelming victory. To-day on the monument of the consort of Crassus, *Cæcilia Metella*, in the frieze, on the Appian Way, there are still memorials of these achievements.

Cæsar names eleven individual cantons which surrendered to Crassus. — Again Cæsar uses (c. 28) the phrase 'omni *Gallia pacata*', excepting but the *Morini* and the *Menapii*. Against these he himself, in the latter part of the summer, took the field. But they withdrew deeper and deeper into dense forests, and the commander-in-chief was actually stopped in the middle of his operations by the beginning of the inclement season. It was impossible to keep the troops under tents any longer amid the driving rainstorms of the autumn.

[Dio (39, 5) presents the struggle of Galba on the Arve in a fashion entirely fanciful, with elucidations likewise fanciful. — He resumes the military relation at 39, 40, starting with a positive blunder as to the envoys sent to the *Veneti*: Cæsar, he says, wasted the greater part of the

open season ($\tauὴν ὥραταν$). He goes on to describe the topographical advantages of the Venetan towns. He relates Cæsar's c. 14 with blunders of his own: "Decimus Brutus came to him with swift ships from the Inner Sea" (the Mediterranean). Dio goes on to endow Brutus with motives and concerns which Dio had no genuine data to fashion from. The details of Brutus' operations seem to be borrowed from Thucydides, Dio's chief exemplar (c. 42). The scythes ($\deltaορυδρέπανατ$) are lugged in, in somewhat lame fashion, toward the end of this sketch. Then Cæsar's stern dealing with the Veneti: *καὶ αὐτῶν τοὺς λογιμωτάτους* (why not *βουλευτάς*?) ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀποσφάξας τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπώλησε. Of the Menapii and Morini withdrawing into the forests, he reproduces *ἐς τὰ λασιώτατα τῶν δρῶν*: why not *τῶν ὑλῶν*? The country is among the flattest in Europe. The Titurius Sabinus campaign is told much more precisely. Still he *will* insert his own pragmatizing elucidations: the natives took along the bundles of sticks with the hope of burning the Romans up. Also he puts the campaign with the Morini before this. In relating the campaign in Aquitania he calls the *Sotiates* Ἀπιάται; sheer haste, it seems. The matter of taking the camp of the Aquitani from the rear, he relates in a fanciful way, as though Crassus had resorted to it only as a last device: when he had failed to make any headway in front.

As for Plutarch, his twenty-first chapter relates the conference of Luca: the treatment of Cæsar is not merely censorious, but almost cynical and contemptuous. Is it not the pencilling of Livy which we see here transcribed? The sage of Chæronea here seems to take his stand with Cato. — The campaigns of 56 B.C. are entirely passed over by Plutarch.]

CHAPTER XI

CÆSAR IN 55 B.C.

ON January 1 the results of the Luca agreement were made even more manifest in the inauguration of Pompey and Crassus. Cæsar's bitter enemy, Domitius, had failed at the polls. In the currents of politics in the capital Pompey once more seemed to dominate. Once more Cicero's senatorial and republican consciousness is in torments. As for future lists of consuls, Pompey has them checked off in advance in his private note-book ("Att.," 4, 8 b, 2). The real plums for the dynasts were these (for the consular office was important chiefly for its sequence of proconsular government abroad): for Pompey, *all* Spain: clearly again a balance against Cæsar's growing power, and that for five years; and for Crassus, Syria and the adjoining countries, with soldiers as many as they chose. This was put through as a plebiscitum by the tribune Trebonius, perhaps even soon after December 10, 56. (Dio, 39, 33.) Cato, returned from Cyprus, stoutly opposed this bill, but was temporarily arrested by the tribune himself. (Liv., "Per.," 105.)

In the winter of 56-55 the *Usipetes* crossed to the left bank of the Rhine, which then more and more began to pass into the clear light of a great historical frontier. On the right bank, the Suebi were all-powerful, a veritable hive, from which ever new swarms of warriors issued forth, pressing to the westward. The *Usipetes* and *Teneri* sought an asylum from this pressure.

To the nationality of the Suebi and to their institutions, Cæsar devotes three chapters (4, 1-3). On middle and lower Rhine the older communities were perpetually

in apprehension or positive terror on account of the Suebi.

A curious institution of theirs is that of the *Hundred Clans*, for it was certainly not a growth, but a deliberate creation, as all decimal things among men are apt to be. So it would seem to have been. Thus, too, the annual levy of a hundred thousand men is more easily understood. Of course, not a hundred thousand *new* warriors; but here was a system of rotation in husbandry and warfare. The land was held in common: cattle raising prevailed over grain crops. Quite extraordinary was their endurance. Their horses, used without saddles, were of great endurance, though small and ugly. Wine was not allowed.

They affected creating a zone of solitude engirdling their own domain, to impress their neighbors. Towards the north (opposite Cologne) their neighbors were the Ubii. These were more advanced in material civilization, having intercourse with traders from the south. The Suebi, while they could not dislodge them, made them tributary, and greatly reduced their strength and spirit. In the same category were the *Usipetes* and *Teneteri*. These, perpetually troubled by the Suebi, after three years moving about, reached the Rhine, the country of the Menapii (southern Holland), who failed in preventing the crossing of the German migrants. As for the Gauls, Cæsar did not trust *them* to repel the Germans. In fact, the proconsul feared the fickleness of his new subjects: could he, indeed, consider his new province an accomplished fact?

The Gauls, says he, are very inconstant and curiously propense to radical or revolutionary action, on the strength often of mere rumor or talk, so impulsively emotional are they. They believe, like children, that which they would like to have come to pass. In short, Cæsar excuses his annihilation of the two migratory and homeless tribes by his apprehension that they might have been enlisted as

mercenaries to fight, for the new provincials of his own, new wars of freedom.

He found¹ that his anticipations were confirmed by the newest events: Gallic cantons had invited the Germans to leave the Rhine, and to move toward the southwest and formulate their demands.

The Germans had entered what is now southeast Belgium. Their envoys laid their requests before the pro-consul, but *of course* Cæsar could not listen to any settlement which allowed them to remain, or find any domicile whatsoever, on the left bank of the Rhine. He suggested to them a closer association with the Ubii.— After telling of Meuse (Mosa) and Rhine, of which none of his Roman readers, not even Cicero, had any exact conception before, Cæsar goes on to tell as plausibly as possible how he came to destroy the German interlopers. They had been moving northward in the valley of the Meuse, striving to escape from before Cæsar to the north. Of course it was, from the outset, quite impossible that they should outmarch, or even keep their distance from, the Roman legions, for they moved with women and children and all their possessions.

Besides, they now professed a willingness to heed his suggestion; viz., to find a domicile on the right bank of the Rhine, near the Ubii: they asked for a suspension of hostilities, or for a cessation of Cæsar's northward movement in their rear—for three days. Their own cavalry (says *Cæsar*) had crossed the Meuse. Now followed that by which Cæsar *tries* to justify his subsequent action; viz., the attack by the eight hundred German cavalry still remaining with the main German body—on Cæsar's five thousand cavalry. More curious still: the eight hundred routed the entire five thousand and only abandoned the pursuit when they sighted the moving column of the

¹ This whole section is a reply to Cato and to those who followed Cato in public life.

Roman legions. Hereby, so *Cæsar claims*, he was relieved from all regard for any previous promise, or from any obligation incurred under such international law as was then currently observed. He claims that, as they had broken the truce, it would have been the height of folly to wait until their main body of cavalry were returned from the north. Even more, he now feared the fickleness of the Gauls, of whom, by the bye, the bulk of his own 'cavalry' was made up.

But the Germans had no evil conscience. Early the next day their chieftains and elders came into Cæsar's headquarters to explain the untoward events of the day before. Cæsar's judgment of their action, morally and psychologically speaking, is about the flimsiest passage in the famous relation. Most *opportune*, indeed, was for him this arrival, for it enabled him to carry out his bloody project with absolute certainty of success. Keeping the chiefs in arrest, he hastened after the headless host of the migrant tribes. This *suddenness* was the essence of his favorite strategy: the rest was butchery in the main. As for the enraged or outraged spirits of his own troops on account of the 'perfidy' of the preceding day, I am not so sure. For we have never heard the other side. The story of this awful slaughter makes us shudder. Reflect ever so little: there had been four hundred and thirty thousand souls: how many of the women and children could even maintain their flight to the point where the Meuse enters the Rhine? — These unfortunates at least, whose blood cried to heaven, would never interfere any more with the imposition of *sempiterna vincula Galliæ!*¹

[Clearly Livy, so severe a judge of Cæsar in slighter matters, could not have passed this episode so as not to make a condign arraignment of the latter. Does Plutarch (c. 22) transcribe him? The sage of Chæronea, whose moral sense (unlike that of Mommsen and the Mommsenians) never accepts any soporific from the contemplation of genius and power,

¹ Cicero's phrase; "De Provin. Consular.," 34.

weighs Cæsar's own account with more care than he is wont to bestow upon the *commentarii*¹ of the great captain. . . . All this in the oratio obliqua relation of Cæsar's own account: "but Tanusius Geminus says that Cato, when the senate was voting on the strength of the victory to have festivals and sacrifices, made a formal motion² that Cæsar ought to be surrendered to the barbarians, (the senators) thus atoning for the breach of the armistice, and turning the curse upon him who was responsible." Plutarch gives the sum of those cut to pieces as four hundred thousand, and adds that the few who succeeded in crossing were received by the *Sugambri*, a German tribe, which act furnished to Cæsar a pretext for crossing the Rhine. Plutarch's *Οὐσίας* and *Τευκτεπτίας* seems to betoken his hurry of transcription.

Dio, cool and sane (39, 47), explains and mitigates the alleged breach of truce on the part of the Germans, saying (48 *initio*) that the Elders of the Germans condemned, and so, as far as they could, disavowed the action of their younger men who were responsible for the cavalry engagement. Dio, even if you refuse to read between the lines, condemns Cæsar.]

First Crossing of Rhine

In this Cæsar essayed no conquest. He desired to impress upon the Germans the wisdom of confining themselves to the east bank. Besides, an asylum had been given to the cavalry of the slaughtered Usipetes, and Tencteri, by the Sugambri. His demand that this cavalry be surrendered was probably not attended by any expectation of compliance. Further, the Ubii asked aid against the Suebi: we learn with some surprise that the former had actually given hostages to Cæsar. The Ubii promised ships for Cæsar's use. But he, without naming his chief engineer at all,³ preferred a bridge, which he describes very lucidly indeed. The point of crossing was on

¹ Plutarch evidently attempts to translate *commentarii* by ἐφημερίδες. Symmachus, about 390 A.D., by the bye, uses 'Ephemerides,' too. Clearly, Cæsar, immediately after the catastrophe, sent a special despatch to the senate.

² Plutarch's *τὴν γνώμην ἀποφήνασθαι* seems to be a somewhat mechanical translation of *sententiam dicere*. Appian, "Κελτική," 18, has this Cato matter likewise as drawn from Tanusius. Both Plutarch and Appian seem to have used Livy, not Tanusius, directly. Add Suet., 24.

³ Possibly *Mamurra*, whom Cæsar loaded with wealth. Cf. Catullus, 29.

the lower Rhine, not so very far from the German-Dutch frontier ; according to some, north of the mouth of the *Lippe* river. The bridge was done in ten days, but the Sugambri wisely withdrew into the heart of Westphalia, and toward Hannover. Cæsar did not long remain on the right bank, soon moving into the territory of the Ubii, who preferred the sovereignty of Rome to being troubled by the Suebi. In all, Cæsar stayed eighteen days in Germany.

First Crossing into Britain

This enterprise (4, 20) Cæsar held as a reconnoitring expedition. Besides, he *claims* that the Britons had aided their Keltic brethren in all (*sic*) the wars which the proconsul had yet waged with the latter. Curious that the Gauls knew nothing of the topography of the Britons' coast. Nor did the traders give any information. They had reasons. Cæsar himself moved into the country of the *Morini* (Pas de Calais). The ignorant traders promptly informed the Britons of Cæsar's plans. Cæsar approached Britain near the chalk cliffs of Dover, but kept in the offing, for the brow of the cliff was teeming with the foe. Therefore he landed seven miles away. He disembarked with difficulty, being compelled to resort to devices suggested by the situation. The eagle-bearer of legion X was the first to leap into the surf. Cæsar's success was hampered by the fact that he was without cavalry : the latter (c. 28), in fact, came on only three days after the landing, and when they hove in sight were scattered by a storm, some even driven back to France. Of these, even those who had been driven to the southwest never made the shore of Britain, but, having maintained themselves during one stormy night tugging at anchors, likewise steered back across the channel. And soon Cæsar, with his legionaries, realized on British soil the vicissitudes of natural conditions as affecting such an

enterprise. The heavier and higher tides of the north Atlantic half ruined his entire armada. At first blush (4, 29), they were satisfied that they needs must winter in Britain. Whereby the native chieftains took new courage: Cæsar could not have a new fleet, he had no cavalry, the camp of the Romans was small. Why not prolong the whole matter to the winter? Perhaps this might prove to be the *last* expedition of any Roman conqueror across the channel. So the chieftains made a new sworn agreement. But the proconsul prepared himself for every emergency, gathering grain and repairing his galleys with the tackle and timber and plates taken from those ships which were beyond repair. In the end but twelve ships were stricken from the original list.

The Britons then watched their chance and fell upon the men of a legion sent out to cut grain; this was the last considerable tract left uncut; it was probably so left for a bait. Cæsar in person saved this detachment from certain destruction. Soon afterwards the rainstorms of the autumn began. One movement of the Britons was made towards Cæsar's camp: these natives were routed. — Their readiness to treat, and their equal readiness to turn about and try the arbitrament of arms, stamps the British Kelts as even more vacillating and creatures of the moment and swayed by impulse than their Keltic kin beyond the channel. For them, then, Cæsar doubled the number of hostages. They were not so situated that they could resolutely withdraw into the interior, as the Sugambri and Suebi had done in the same year. On the very midnight after receiving these hostages, Cæsar sailed back to Gaul, arriving safely, with every vessel in good condition.

[Plutarch ("Cæs.", 23) notes the importance, in a large historical way, of this crossing, marking both the geographical and the imperial aspects of the enterprise. Dio (39, 50) likewise refers to the geographical features, but his estimate of the width of the straits of Dover (450 stadia

= 56 miles) is much too large. There are some strong resemblances between Plutarch and Dio: do they point to Livy? Otherwise Dio reads his "Commentarii" pretty closely, except in this: *He does not believe Cæsar quite fully*, and again and again injects his own interpretation into Cæsar's narrative: *e.g.*, as though Cæsar had held back a full and frank account of his losses in the British grain-fields. He boldly says (39, 2): *αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν διλγων ἔφθειραν*: against which put Cæsar ("B. G.", 4, 32, 5): "tum dispersos depositis armis in metendo occupatos subito adorti paucis imperfectis reliquos incertis ordinibus perturbaverant." Also Dio notes (after Livy?) that Cæsar got no solid advantage from this expedition, either for himself or for Rome. Dio also (53) says that Cæsar himself *boasted* of the achievement (*αὐτὸς λαχυρῶς ἐσεμνύνετο*): was this in his despatches to the senate?]

At home we observe that Crassus was passionately impatient to be off to his eastern province and theatre of belated achievements, setting aside governmental customs: he left Rome even before November 15. ("Att.", 4, 13.)

But Pompey made no preparation whatever for setting out to *his* provinces, viz., the entire peninsula of Spain, affecting a kind of indifference, as though he held it cheap.¹

¹ *Syriam spernens, Hispaniam iactans*: I follow the exegesis of Tyrrell on "Att.", 4, 9, 1. What, indeed, was provincial administration to the Only One? He was now fifty-two years of age: what was a province or two to him, who in the east had added so many provinces to the empire! His real motive for *not* going did not escape the keen penetration of Cæsar's political judgment: cf. "Comm. de Bello Civili," 1, 85, 8.

CHAPTER XII

CÆSAR IN 54 B.C.

WAS the political machine of the three dynasts really out of gear? or was it not so overwhelmingly strong? For Cæsar's arch-enemy, Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cato's brother-in-law, on January 1, was inaugurated consul on the capitol. He indeed scorned all compromise and pacification. Did the dynasts hold that they could neutralize his influence by his colleague? Also, Cato had been chosen prætor and was inaugurated at the same time.

Crassus had gone, even then looking forward to achievements that would stamp him a new Alexander; people did not recognize the cool and collected man any more. Cæsar had written to him, adding fuel to the flame. Crassus in Mesopotamia was a good card for the proconsul of Gaul. Events were beginning to break up the great pact.

But to return to our biographical concerns. Somewhere in March, 54, after the circuit courts of winter had been held, occurred the incident of the raid of the Pirustæ on the frontier of Illyricum. "Why does Cæsar even tell it?

The Second Expedition to Britain

This in a sense was a corollary of the first one, which latter had almost ended in failure, had left no true sense of consummation or success in either belligerent. The public opinion of the fickle Kelts was a force which the shrewd conqueror always had before his mind.

Before sailing, he in person with four legions made a demonstration into the territory of the *Treveri* (Treves), who had not attended the conferences and otherwise ignored his orders. Their eastern frontier was the Rhine. There was here a situation full of Germanic possibilities. Cæsar shrewdly undertook to support the faction of *Cingetorix* against the high-spirited *Indutiomarus*, who had to furnish two hundred hostages. The private enmity of the last-named chieftain rose accordingly. — As to Cæsar's topographical information we marvel at the vagueness of his outlining the range of the Ardennes: from the Rhine (*sic*) to Rheims.

Cæsar sailed for Britain from the port called *Itius*, where the channel, he says, was thirty miles wide.

[Dr. Holmes devotes nine pages of small print to the question of the site of Portus *Itius*, passing in review of ancient authorities Ptolemy, Pliny, Pomponius Mela; of modern, Drumann, Long, Schneider, Napoleon III, Desjardins (who argues for Boulogne), Guest, General Creuly, Heller, Camden, Lewin, Ridgeway. He himself decides for *Wissant*. These things concern us Americans but slightly: whereas to British and French, they are matters of lively interest, being items in the very earliest chronicles of their national histories. We cannot discern nor determine amid the variations and controversies of their different findings.]

Before Cæsar (who was accompanied by Cicero's brother Quintus) actually sailed, there came the end of the Nationalist nobleman, *Dumnorix*. ("B. G.," 5, 6-7.) Evidently the latter had not been in the first expedition, and his boasts had reached Cæsar's ears. Cæsar could not well leave in his own rear a force as dangerous as the personality of *Dumnorix*, eager to aid in undermining or undoing the work of the Roman proconsul. Of Cæsar's motives and allegations of motives I shall expect to treat later on. So we pass on to Britain. His base in Gaul was guarded by *Labienus*. We marvel that Cæsar had learned so little of the vicissitudes of an open beach on the Atlantic, whence resulted new damage. Forty vessels were destroyed, mostly through collision.

The loss was to be supplied by Labienus. Now, at last, Cæsar beached all the ships and surrounded them with a stockade. Ten days were thus consumed, and the earlier part of August had come. The Kelts of southern Britain had intrusted the chief command to *Cassivellanus*,¹ who ruled north of the Themse (*Tamesis*). At this point Cæsar inserts a sketch of the British Kelts (5, 12-14). He was struck by the identity of certain tribal names, such as *Belgæ*, *Atrebates*, on both sides of the channel. His somewhat crude geographical conceptions need not detain us. Most highly civilized was *Cantium* (Kent). In the interior, agriculture was not yet fully developed. The knowledge of the historical fact of immigration had already given place to that unerring symbol² of narrow retrospect, the notion of autochthonous ancestry. Tattooing and polyandry seem to point to a somewhat low stage of civilization. In Britain the war chariots still flourished, and they could readily retreat and defy any serious pursuit on the part of the Roman legionaries or cavalry, either, the latter being, in the main, Keltic. The entire campaign was more a series of skirmishes. But at last (c. 17) they became bolder, and clung more steadily to the Romans, when three legions, attended by cavalry, had been sent foraging. On this occasion, the cavalry of continental Kelts was well supported by the legionaries, and for once a positive defeat was inflicted upon the Britains; they were routed, leaving many slain behind. Cæsar then marched north (5, 18) until he reached the Thames. He says nothing of intermediate stages or camps. The impetuous crossing of the Thames *reads* very wonderful, obviously upper Thames.³

Cadwallon now began to limit his operations to *guerilla*

¹ *Cadwallon* (Welsh), 'Supremely Good.' Cf. Cadwallader.

² Cf. *passim* in the Greek Periegete Pausanias.

³ The inherent difficulties of the relation have been made much of by critics, but are defended by Dr. Holmes.

warfare, the 'little war' of the Spanish phrase, checking, observing, annoying, surprising. And Cæsar, in turn, was limited to the task of crippling the natives as much as possible by pillaging and burning. We seem to read between the lines that it was not so very much: also, it seems that the Keltic cavalry was not intrusted with any share in these operations.

Now if Cæsar had achieved nothing further, it would not at all have repaid the chance and treasure involved in the second invasion: also, Time and the waning season were on the side of the British Kelts.

At this point, the submission of the *Trinobantes* occurred, or was made to occur, as a matter of some felicity or consolation for Cæsar's prestige. This tribe, dwelling in Essex and Suffolk (to use the more familiar nomenclature of later Britain), sought Cæsar's support against Cadwallon, their powerful neighbor on their west. If the expelled aspirant for the chieftainship (*Mandubracius*) had crossed to the continent and besought Cæsar's support, and obviously had served Cæsar in order to accomplish his own restoration, then the proconsul was in possession of such a wedge or lever as elsewhere he had used with good results, among the continental Kelts. Thus Cæsar 'defended' the *Trinobantes*, who gave him hostages and grain. Now a larger number of minor tribes (c. 21) followed this example and surrendered.

From this he learned the whereabouts of the 'town' or stockade of Cadwallon. He marched upon it and assaulted it, but the Kelts escaped. And here we learn that Cadwallon was a kind of national leader among the Britons, for, while Cæsar was north of the Thames, Cadwallon created a diversion in the south: four chieftains of Kent attacked Cæsar's naval stockade, but were beaten off with loss.

Now Cadwallon had¹ exhausted his resources: one would almost prefer to believe that a few more weeks of the Fabian policy successfully begun would have allowed him to see Cæsar's vessels returning across the channel. Perhaps he thought Cæsar intended to winter in Britain; at all events, if we may believe Cæsar's account, Cadwallon (22) submitted. That is to say, the proconsul levied hostages, and determined *what amount of tribute* Britain was annually to pay to the Roman people. These are very big and very brave words. Britannia as a whole? Pay? No, indeed. There was absolutely no base for this sort of thing. What he had accomplished was no conquest of Britain, not even a shadow thereof. Even Cæsar's own relation, leading up to this consummation, impresses one as not much more than proconsular bravado or pretence. Perhaps some acts of Briton chieftains occurred, which allowed him to return across the channel with a straight face.

It is true he returned in two relays of transportation, because there were prisoners, and forty ships had been destroyed. "A great number of prisoners": but had the submission of Cadwallon accomplished nothing for his compatriots? The sixty vessels despatched by Labienus met bad weather, and in the end failed to take any part in the work of transportation.

[Through his brother Quintus' legateship, Cicero was brought into closer relation with Cæsar's headquarters. But it stands out as doubly remarkable that now only, in the fifth year of these conquests, the letters of this lively and eminent public man should exhibit genuine interest in, and information concerning, these important events. The Roman politicians, excepting Cato and his followers, did not realize the momentous importance of those northwestern campaigns. The references, then, in Cicero's letters, are doubly noteworthy, because they most likely antedate the actual composition of the *Commentarii* by several years. Balbus, the most trusted of Cæsar's confidential agents, was then in the capital. A

¹ Really? The axiom of *Perfer et obdura!* had little support in the Keltic ingenium. Far more difficult was the subjugation of the Saxons by Charles the Great, later on.

bundle of letters in which were missives, both of the orator and of the Spaniard, reached Cæsar in Britain, wet, and quite illegible, except a few words from Balbus, so wet, in fact,¹ that the very name of Cicero was blurred or blotted out. Cicero, consequently, copied his letter 'eodem exemplo,' which shows that he, through his secretary, Tiro, kept copies. It was known in Rome as early as February, 54, that Cæsar was going to invade Britain once more. Later on, in August, probably, Cicero writes to his friend and protégée, the expert in civil law, *Trebatius Testa* ("Fam.," 7, 7), who had joined Cæsar's headquarters on the orator's recommendation; in the settlement of the civil administration of Gaul such a man was useful. "I am wont to marvel that I do not receive letters from you as often as they are brought me from my brother Quintus." Trebatius, as it turned out, had been left behind by Cæsar, probably in the region of Amiens. During this time, Cæsar's *stabellarii* carried the orator's letter to the latter's brother. Cæsar had offered to Trebatius a military tribuneship, which the jurist declined. One could then have the perquisites of such a post, *without* the hardships of actual service,² so wrote the man of letters at a comfortable distance, in one of his villas: but I greatly doubt whether such was feasible, in the actual campaigns, and under an *imperator* such as Gaius Julius Cæsar was, the veritable incarnation of vigor and efficiency. Later in the season, Cicero wrote to Atticus (4, 16, 7): "The termination of the Britannic war is looked forward to. For it is a well-established fact that the approaches of the island are fortified with wondrous piles (cliffs?). That, too, has now been ascertained, that there is neither a tiny particle of silver at all in that island, nor any hope of booty except from captives." — After the campaign was well over, on October 23, Cicero ("Att.," 4, 17, 3) received a letter from Cæsar and one from brother Quintus: *confecta (sic) Britannia, obsidibus acceptis, nulla præda, imperata tamen pecunia* (a confirmation of the *Commentarii*), etc., etc., the return being made on September 26; it took twenty-seven days from Britain to central Italy for a letter.

Plutarch's summary agrees closely with Cæsar's relation ("Cæs.," 23): *καὶ μάχαις πολλαῖς (vague) κακώσας τὸν πολεμόν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν ἰδίους ὥφελήσας* (e.g. Quintus Cicero), *οὐδὲν γὰρ δὲ τι καὶ λαβεῖν ἦν ἀξιον ἀπὸ άνθρώπων κακοβίων καὶ πενήτων, οὐχ οἶον ἐβούλετο τῷ πολέμῳ τέλος ἐπέθηκεν, ἀλλ' ὁμήρους λαβών παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ ταξάμενος φόρους, ἀπῆρεν ἐκ τῆς νήσου.*

Livy (105): "aliquam partem insulæ in potestatem redigit." Dio (40, 1 sq.) discriminates between pretexts and actual motives for the second Britannic expedition. Otherwise Dio reproduces Cæsar's account with considerable care and generally with a fair degree of accuracy, which he does not at all always do: his work in this respect is very uneven. But after the crossing of the Thames he condenses all into a few lines.]

¹ "Quint. fr.," 2, 10.

² "Fam.," 7, 8, *dempto labore militiae*.

About this time occurred certain events which tended to weaken the great pact. And first among these was the death in childbirth of Julia. To this matter Cicero refers in a letter to his brother (3, 1, 25): “From Britain, Cæsar dated a letter to me on the first of September, which I received on Sept. 30, a letter of quite comfortable tone as to the affairs of Britain; in which, lest I marvel that I received none from you, he writes that he was without you when he came to the sea. To this letter I have written no reply, not even to congratulate him,—no reply, *on account of his bereavement.*” Julia was Cæsar’s only child, and her infant son¹ soon followed the mother to the grave. The powerful personal tie between the two public men was now broken.—Julia, through some spontaneous act of popular enthusiasm, was buried, not on the Alban estate of her husband, but on the Campus Martius. And this was done, although the consul, Domitius, made opposition and said it was not religiously permissible that she be buried (*i.e.*, cremated) there without some governmental action.

The *anarchy*, now more and more seizing upon the current affairs of the capital, had as one of its chief symptoms the chronic postponement of elections. A tribune, Hirrus, seriously contemplated some ordinance to have Pompey named dictator.

‘We have lost,’ so wrote Cicero about this time, ‘not only all sap and blood, but even the complexion and physiognomy of the old-time commonwealth.’ More and more he withdrew from public life, such as it was: his profession and his art of eloquence, his villas, his literary pursuits engaged him. The very faculty of anger, he declares somewhat pessimistically, he has eliminated, or lost somehow, from his psychological equipment. (“Att.,” 4, 16, 10.)

¹ So Liv. 106, and Suet., “Cæs.,” 26. Dio, 39, 64, θυγάτριον τι τεκοῦσα. Plutarch, in relating the resultant breach between the dynasts (“Pomp.,” 53), writes: ἡ οἰκεῖοτης ἀνήργηται . . . a curious *perfect*.—As though he were transcribing from some contemporary Latin relation . . . perhaps some letter, or other direct utterance.

Winter Quarters of 54-53, and the Catastrophe of Aduatuca

It was the difficulty of the grain supply in the autumn of 54 B.C., which induced Cæsar to resort to a considerable dislodgment of his forces for winter quarters. First, however, a *concilium* of Gauls was held at *Samarobriva* (Amiens). This must have been in October, 54. It was here, it seems, that Cæsar first began to use the services of the Roman civil lawyer, Trebatius. ("Fam.," 7, "Epp.," 11-12.) Matius, too, perhaps the finest soul in the coterie that surrounded the proconsul, is noted as being with him at this time. ("Fam.," 15, 2.) Cicero had learned that the Treveri were a dangerous tribe. ("Fam.," 7, 13, 2.)

For the first time during his proconsulate Cæsar determined to spend the winter not at once in the shadow of Apennine or view of Adriatic, but among his conquered subjects,—*his*, indeed, although officially of course subjects of the Roman people. Cæsar, I say, resolved to stay there in northern Gaul *until* he was informed of the definite execution of his plans for winter quarters. These were indeed novel, and perhaps also he had received intimations of unrest in certain quarters. For these 'councils' obviously served the designs of the administrator no less than of the conqueror; they were not instituted for the sake of the Kelts and of their national interests. Cæsar was well advised to tarry; for the inclement season had barely set in, when at three different points insurrection broke out. The chief of the *Carnutes* (Orleans) was slain—openly so—by his private enemies. He was a creature of Cæsar's. The deed was instigated by many citizens of that community. It was open defiance and revolt.

Again, among the Treveri, Indutiomarus (5, 3) took active steps to recover his authority there and to extinguish the memory of the humiliation to which he had been subjected by Cæsar. He further stirred to revolt

the *Eburones*, under Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, even *after* they had made delivery of their quota of grain at the Roman winter quarters of Sabinus and Cotta.

The desire to throw off the newly imposed Roman yoke seems to have been fairly universal at that time, and the spirit of a patriotic rising may have been stimulated by the very dislocation and wider distribution of the Roman forces for that winter. They hoped to destroy them or overwhelm them in detail, simultaneously, so that mutual succor should prove impossible.

The story of the divided counsels of the two¹ commanders at Aduatuca, and how Sabinus prevailed in the council of war, and how the fifteen cohorts perished, is told by Cæsar with much detail, and, we may add, with a peculiar fairness, which we may describe as born from psychological discrimination. The temperament and the *ingenium* of Cotta and Sabinus are set forth in a luminous manner, as leading up to—as predetermining, in fact—the actual results, the catastrophe near Lieges, never so famous as that of the *Teutoburger Wald*, sixty-three years later, but mightily impressive then for the national spirit of the Kelts. Out of the six thousand men but few (c. 27) escaped to Labienus, who was then wintering among the favored Remi.

There followed an attack upon the winter quarters of the younger Cicero. It was incited by the exultant and now doubly sanguine Ambiorix. The attacking patriots were much more numerous, while Quintus had but *one* legion, and himself at this time was in poor health (c. 10).

The native levies grew constantly, and what could be devised to alarm and shake the resolution of the solitary post and its commander, they devised. Their chief aim, as before, was to draw the invaders out of their stockade. Cicero, however, was cool and firm. Now the Belgæ established a zone of investment of ten miles in circumfer-

¹ Why *two*?

ence (resorting to many devices of siege operations in which they imitated the Romans), with a stockade ten feet high and a trench fifteen feet wide.

Balls of red-hot burnt clay hurled by the Belgian besiegers set on fire the thatches of some huts in Cicero's stockade; while flames and smoke arose (c. 43), the Romans had to sustain a desperate assault. Upon the intrepid garrison Cæsar bestows very high praise. It was a critical day, but for the foe, too, most serious, for the Belgæ were packed close to the Roman stockade and their losses were in proportion. One tower was moved close by the besiegers, but none of them dared to accept the taunting challenge of the Romans, represented at this critical juncture by the centurions of the third cohort. Much space—and this is in consonance with the general plan of the *Commentarii*—is given to the relation of the prowess of *Pulio* (*Pullo*?) and *Vorenus*, rivals for promotion. This narrative is composed with almost dramatic liveliness, although Cæsar himself did not witness any part of it. We have before us the deliberate policy of the aspiring conqueror: the loyalty of his own legions, loyalty to himself primarily, was to him positively the most important thing in the entire sphere of his concerns and plans.

By the barest chance through a Belgic nobleman *Vertico* the proconsul at last learned of Cicero's critical situation. Cæsar got this despatch, and about 5 P.M. sent orders to M. Crassus (Beauvais) and to Fabius and Labienus. At 9 the next forenoon the troops of Fabius were coming. The same day, these very troops added twenty miles to their march of the preceding night. As I read the account, these legionaries in not more than twenty-four hours covered about forty-five miles, in the latter part of November or so. Fabius joined his chief commander.

Cæsar, now with two legions, instead of three, pushed into the territory of the Nervii in forced marches. The

Kelts, duly informed, now abandoned the siege of Cicero's stockade, and with their force of sixty thousand men turned away to intercept Cæsar. The latter now relaxed the extreme speed of his forward movement and established himself in a camp more narrowly designed than would have been normally requisite for his seven thousand infantry. Thus he drew the natives on to fight where *he* desired it. Having filled them with absolute confidence to assault his camp as though nothing was left but the taking of it, he darted forth upon them like a thunder-bolt. On the same day, before sunset, he joined Quintus Cicero, not having lost a man.

With the greatest possible publicity of praise and commendation he honored his legate and the tribunes and centurions. From Keltic prisoners he ascertained more definitely the catastrophe of the two legates. The *morale* of his own troops he re-established by a cheering address.

The news of Cæsar's rout of the Nervii reached Labienus before *midnight*: the proconsul himself had arrived at Cicero's stockade after 3 p.m. In less than nine hours, therefore, the news somehow reached Labienus, about sixty miles away. So Indutiomarus hastened away, and let Cæsar's chief legate alone. The proconsul himself now determined to remain in northern Gaul during the whole winter. His headquarters he made at Samarobriva (Amiens). Why? Because the destruction of the fifteen cohorts had inflamed the Kelts. Why did the Gauls hold their patriotic conferences (c. 53) in solitary places? Because, no doubt, in popular and frequented localities the chance of being spied upon by Cæsar's agents was too great. It was an anxious winter for Cæsar. Much he accomplished by keeping the chieftains in apprehension, still the *Senones* (Sens) drove out the supreme administrators established over them by Cæsar. The Remi alone and the Aedui—Dumnorix was dead—enjoyed the complete confidence of Cæsar.

All winter long, the Treveri strove to bring some German host across the Rhine. But to the Germans, the twofold record of Ariovistus and of the Usipetes sufficed: they declined to come over. But Indutiomarus had made himself the centre of the nationalist plans and aspirations. His own faction succeeded in outlawing his rival and son-in-law, Cingetorix, the Romanist, and confiscating the latter's estate. Further, he moved upon the winter quarters of Labienus, but he fell himself a victim to the dangerously conspicuous position which he had attained among the nationalists. For these there was no room in the Roman Empire, least of all in the province of the pro-consul Cæsar. The death of the fiery Treverian temporarily benumbed and checked the national movement for freedom; the coals were for a short time hidden under the treacherous ashes.

[These grave troubles of Cæsar are related quite summarily by Plutarch (c. 24): *πάντα μὲν αὖθις ἀνερρήγνυτο τὰ τῶν Γαλατῶν*. After Cæsar had already turned to go to Italy, the 'council' of Amiens had so far deceived the determined and wily conqueror. The citation of sixty thousand natives surrounding Cicero's stockade, and of the seven thousand in Cæsar's relief corps, may point to direct use by Plutarch of Cæsar's "Ephémérides." Chapter 50, Plutarch has read carefully, blundering only in one item: *κακεῖνος ἔξαπατῶν ὑπέφυγεν δεῖ*: Cæsar merely: 'consulto equites cedere seque in castra recipere iubet.' Dio (40, 6) adds a curious incident to the death of Sabinus, viz., that Ambiorix added a certain utterance: *ἐπιλέγων δὲλλα τε καὶ δτι "τοιοῖδε μέντοι δύτες πῶς τηλικούτων ἡμῶν δυτῶν δρχειν ἐθέλετε"*; a pragmatizing dramatic incident conceived by Dio. Otherwise we have his ratiocinative and analytical rewriting of Cæsar's account. Also Dio has detail of the Greek script (40, 9) in Cæsar's private despatch to Quintus Cicero: it is instructive for a deeper understanding of Dio's manner (*scil.*, in elucidating Cæsar's motives). Dio also introduces the detail of Cæsar's cryptogram on this; cf. Suet., 56, in quibus siqua occultius *perferenda*¹ errant, per *notas* scripsit, id est, sic structo litterarum ordine, ut nullum verbum effici posset; quæ siquis investigare et persequi volet, quartam elementorum, id est D pro A et proinde reliquas convertet.]

¹ *Perferre* clearly pertains to despatches.

CHAPTER XIII

CÆSAR IN 53 B.C.

AND now Cæsar's task underwent great stress and strain. He had many reasons for anticipating a 'greater movement' of unrest, and for independence among his new subjects. His first need was to repair the loss of fifteen cohorts. The steps for these reinforcements the author of the *Commentarii* puts forward as a necessary and patriotic rehabilitation of the prestige of Rome and of Italy. One legion levied by Pompey in the Po country, and still stationed there, and not yet in Spain, Pompey yielded to Cæsar, "*both for public reasons and from personal friendship.*" (6, 1.) Through his own military agents there, Cæsar levied two further legions; the result being that he had one and a half legions more than he commanded before the catastrophe of the two legates.

In the waning winter preceding the spring of 53, the *Treveri* were the sorest point among his Keltic subjects. Not at all cowed by the death of Indutiomarus, the *Treveri* maintained his policy of insurrection. They united with themselves patriotic leaders, like Ambiorix, and, as before, strove to bring German tribes to the westerly bank of the great frontier stream. Clearly the movement for national independence was spreading.

Cæsar, therefore, without waiting for the clement season, with *four* legions invaded the country of the *Nervii*, ravaged their lands, and compelled them to give hostages. The winter was not even gone by when this task was completed.

On the very threshold of spring Cæsar held one of his 'councils,' or assemblies of Gaul, *i.e.*, of the aristocracy.

Perhaps it was at Samarobriva. But when he saw that the Senones, Carnutes, Treveri did *not* attend it, he transferred the diet to *Lutetia* (Parisiorum)—this being the first mention in Roman letters, such as we have, of the city of Paris. Upon announcing this transfer, he at once moved into the country of the recalcitrant Senones, and surprised them before they could flee into their fortified towns. So they, using the intercession of the *Ædui*, begged for clemency. He agreed to pardon them, placing in the keeping of the *Ædui* the hundred hostages he demanded.

Similarly the Carnutes anticipated the proconsul's extreme measures; for them interceded the Remi. Then, (6, 5), with supreme energy and concentration of his rare faculties, the proconsul entered upon the task of dealing with the Treveri, and with Ambiorix, chieftain of the Eburones.

The latter was the chief object of his concern. To isolate him, Cæsar invaded southern Holland, and the Menapii, for the first time, made their submission in the usual manner, *i.e.*, by giving hostages. Meanwhile, the Treveri were moving upon the single legion of Labienus, which had been wintering among them. But when they learned that Cæsar had directed two legions to reinforce his chief legate, they stopped fifteen miles away. Labienus now, with twenty-five cohorts, moved upon the patriots, and built his stockade one mile away, separated from the Treveri by a river with very steep banks.¹ Across this stream, with cunning strategy, Labienus allured the natives, after which he turned upon their irregular bands with a splendid and irresistible charge, and routed them so utterly that, in a few days, the entire community of the Treveri made their submission. The Germans, who had been advancing to the Rhine from the east, retired, and were accompanied by the kinsmen of Indutiomarus. Cingotorix, the Romanist, resumed sway among the Treveri.

¹ Moselle? Sour? Alzette? Ourt? See Rice Holmes.

Cæsar, himself, now came down from southern Holland into the Moselle country. Being there, he determined once more to cross to the right bank of the frontier stream, "a little above"¹ the point where he had gone over two years before. His aim was to make an impressive demonstration against his rivals, the Germans, and definitely to eliminate these restless and dangerous hosts as a perpetual possibility of interference with his conquest and subjugation of the continental Kelts. The point of crossing, probably, was not far from Coblenz. The Ubii (Nassau) were the inhabitants of the right bank at this point. From these Cæsar learned that it was the ever-adventurous and war-loving *Suebi* who had been advancing to help the Treveri, and that, therefore, the lessons of Ariovist's defeat, and of the annihilation of the Usipetes and Tencuteri, had lost, for the Suebi at least, what terrors they may have had. The proconsul, then (6, 10), informed of the massing of the Suebi as then going on, entered upon a policy which was to draw the Suebi into a general battle. But this they would not risk, but withdrew northeastward toward the *Bacenis* range, *i.e.*, the Thuringian forest, a veritable wall between the *Cherusci* and Suebi, a bar which made much for peace between these high-spirited and war-like tribes.

[It is somewhat speculative to try to determine why, at this point, Cæsar inserts his general sketch of Gauls and Germans. Drumann suggests that he wished to weaken the sense of the resultlessness of this expedition. But why not assume that, in spite of the absence of all attempts at fine writing — why not assume that Cæsar ever carried in his consciousness the design of giving out things of abiding value and authority, and of adding, in a material and impressive way, to the learning and information of the world. He knew with detailed knowledge what Alexandrine erudition (*e.g.*, Eratosthenes, 6, 24, 2) could tell him.

And so we may, perhaps, summarize his ethnographical delineation at this point of the relation, adding some additional illumination from such stray notices as may be found elsewhere.

¹ Really very considerably so.

The first feature which Cæsar lays before us is (c. 10) the universal prevalence of factions and factionalism: everywhere a cleavage, but no more divisions than two. And this feature of adhering to one of these, and supporting its aspirations, entered not only into individual states, but into homes and households. Now the bodies of adherents are not democratic equals of their leader, but they are dependents, vassals, clients, and derive from him shelter and defence in many concerns of life. So too, in a large and national way, the *Ædui* and the *Sequani* were struggling for primacy and leadership. It was this contention which brought mighty alien forces into Gaul: the *Sequani* were responsible for the coming over of Ariovist, as we saw before ("B. G.", 1, 31). As there were personal clients, so there were collective, tribal ones. It was this distress of the *Ædui* which had brought the druid *Divitiacus* to Rome in 61 B.C. He returned without immediate relief, and, even in 59 B.C., Cæsar's keen vision had kept the truculent German in good humor. But the events of 58 brought about a profound change. The *Ædui*, under Cæsar's protection, recovered, or seemed to recover, their primacy among the Kelts. The *Remi*, by Cæsar's shrewd policy, were endowed with a similar leadership and preëminence among the communities of the North.

Socially, there were two aristocratic classes among the Kelts: one is fairly compelled here to notice the groundwork of mediæval institutions; for the druids and knights stand out as later on the clergy and the chivalry. As for the nobles, to them, in great part, had become dependent the common people, and this dependency reminded Cæsar of slavery. This change of status came about and was accomplished amid certain forms, or formularies, which were fixed and solemn (*dicant*, 6, 13, 2).

The druids appear not only as a kind of national clergy, but endowed also with a power fully commensurate to the excommunication of the later mediæval church. And the druids resemble this mighty corporation in still another way. They are a court of last appeal in public and private contentions. Disobedience is punished with exclusion from any share in the religion of the Kelts: a ban which, like a dark shadow, falls across all the further lives and the whole range of social contact, for those who have been contumacious to the druids' verdict. The Chief Druid is chosen for life. There is an annual synod, or consistory, of druids held in a central town in the country of the *Bituriges* (Bourges), a court of appeals.

The purest and most authentic form of druidical doctrine was maintained in Britain. Immunity was granted the druids from all taxes, or other civil burdens, as well as from military service. The druidic theology, or philosophy, had a distinctly esoteric character. It was transmitted orally and still in rigid identity of formulation. Endless lines were learned by heart but never reduced to writing, while in the ordinary transactions of life they used Greek script. Thus it would seem that Massilia was the fountain of that particular form of civilization. One great dogma was that of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls: the

doctrine of the ancient Egyptians, as well as of Pythagoras and Plato. Further, their system dealt with astronomy, the universe, and gods.

The article *Druidæ* in *Pauly Wissowa*, by *Ihm*, has full account of bibliography: the same references of ancient writers are given in *Holder*, 'Altkeltischer Sprachschatz.' He gives the etymology as *dru-vids* (High-wise). The chief classic references are: Diodorus, 5, 31, 4; Strabo, 4, 198 . . . έθνον δὲ οὐκ ἀνεύ δρυιδῶν . . . ; Lucan, 1, 453 sqq.; Plin., "N. H.," 16, 249; 30, 13. Tacit., "Ann.," 14, 30. Their human sacrifices are noted by Cicero in an oration of 69 B.C.: "quis enim ignorat eos usque ad hanc diem retinere illam immanem ac barbaram consuetudinem hominum immolandorum!" ("pro Fonteio," 31). — Mela, 3, 19; Cic., "Divinat.," 1, 90. Mantics, also, and magic were practised by them (Plin., "N. H.," 29, 52-54), as well as medicine. Mistletoe was gathered. Twenty years were often devoted to the acquisition of druidical lore, Mela, 3, 19: "docent multa noblissimos gentis, *clam et diu*, vicensis annis, aut in specu, aut in abditis saltibus."

Tiberius and Claudius were active in doing away with the medical and mantic profession in druidism. British druidism endured much longer than continental: Strabo (1, 197) notes particularly that all judicature of capital crimes was once entrusted to them: they taught that an abundance of executions would presage an abundance of crops. The world they held was indestructible, with periodical catastrophes of fire or water. They had no temples, but used groves, just as the Germans did. Horses, slaves, equipment, were often burned with the corpses of the deceased.¹

So much for this branch of the Keltic aristocracy. The *knights* (c. 15) had really but one sphere of excellence, viz., war. Their rank, quite like the feudal system later on, was determined by the number of clients attached to their service.²

Further on, Cæsar takes up the religion of the Gauls. Here *life for life* was conceived as a divine obligation, and human sacrifices were maintained. Here, often, the victims were burned alive while bound to huge structures of wickerwork. In Strabo's time (Augustus-Tiberius), these customs were forbidden.

The Gauls, like the Britons, conceived their race as autochthonous, the usual symbol of the entire absence of wider historical horizon, or retrospect. They counted time by night, not days.

Passing over some of the social customs, such as the adjustment of property in marriage, or the peculiar usage of not acknowledging paternity, we come to the control of public news (6, 20): the fact that this was supervised by the magistrates with jealous care, reflects, for us, the extreme mobility of the Gallic *ingenium*.

¹ Dr. Holmes, 532-536, is mainly controversial, giving less positive information than *Ihm* and *Holder*.

² 'Ambactus apud Ennium lingua Gallica *servus* appellatur,' "Festus," p. 4.

There was a time (6, 24, 1), when the Kelts surpassed the Germans when they crossed into what is now southwest Germany. So the Boii. But the growth of material civilization, so Cæsar argues, gradually deprived them of this preëminence. And now, he adds (6, 24, 6), not even the Gauls themselves compare themselves with the Germans.

On the whole, the political condition of the Gauls then exhibited this ever-recurrent feature, that some one nobleman incessantly endeavored to advance to something like monarchy within his own class or commonwealth. This was sometimes achieved by nobles here and there, but they seem rarely, or never, to have succeeded in establishing a dynasty, or succession.¹ We think of Dumnorix and Orgetorix.]

[As for the Germans, they impressed Cæsar as a nationality of simpler life and more robust than the Kelts. Of their legends, or worship, he knows but little, mainly this, that in their prayers they address themselves particularly to such forces as are directly and palpably beneficent, viz., Sun, Moon, Fire.

He praises, significantly enough, the continence and chastity of their youth. Their land they hold in common, and shift about in a regulated manner. Their chief motive is that thus they maintain in the highest possible degree a warlike spirit and a prestige amongst men: also, they hold that thus the rise of an aristocracy may be more effectively checked, and as for the luxury of a finer domicile, it would be impossible and the hardy fibre of the ancestors endure undiminished. The main body of their people, too, would thus remain content in this vigorous and true sense of genuine equality.

War is the emergency which induces them to endow their leaders, then specifically chosen, with powers denied them, or any one else, in the time of peace, viz., the power of life and death. As among the Spartiates, looting is not forbidden, provided it be done among aliens or tribal neighbors. Such raids may be instituted off-hand, at any time, provided the self-professed leader be one whose name and fame readily wins followers.]

In returning to the left, or Roman bank of the Rhine, Cæsar left standing the greater part of the western end of the bridge and fortified it with a *tête du pont*, a permanent warning for the restless German invaders. As for the rest of the summer, his chief design was twofold. He desired to capture Ambiorix and in some signal manner to avenge the destruction of the fifteen cohorts, and, incident-

¹ Regnum obtinuerat, 4, 12, 4; 5, 25, 1. On the attempt to advance from *principatus* to *regnum*, cf. "B. G.," 7, 4.

ally, to ruin the tribe of the *Eburones*. He even went so far as to proclaim to all men that the lands and chattels of that tribe were forfeited to any taker. The method which he had devised, and the measures which he had put upon his programme, seemed to insure complete success. No loophole, apparently, was left to any slip of fortune or other miscarriage in the proconsul's scheme of impressive revenge. These operations began in the latter part of July.¹ First, he ordered his entire cavalry under Basilus to make a swift dash through these regions, without warning, and without any campfires at night. But Ambiorix escaped on his fleet horse, having almost been captured in a solitary homestead in a dense forest. Old King Cadvolk took his own life by poison, helpless as he was in beholding the misery of his people.

So far, Cæsar had failed, but he persevered. He selected as his base and as the central point of the simultaneous operations proposed, *Aduatuca*, the very locality made memorable by the destruction of the fifteen cohorts. The stockade and redoubts (6, 32,) were in perfect condition. Here was stored all the baggage, and here were placed all the sick and convalescents. Legion XIV, with Quintus Cicero as post-commander, was here established as garrison, and two hundred mounted men were detailed to serve as scouts.

This seems a good point for surveying the military resources of Cæsar as they were in the summer of 53 B.C. One legion, then, was under Cicero at Aduatuca: therefore, *Cæsar actually commanded eleven legions and two cohorts*, not counting the cavalry, the majority of whom were Kelts.

Nine legions were divided as follows: Labienus, with three, to sweep towards the northwest and the German Ocean: Trebonius,² likewise with three legions, was to

¹ 'Cum maturescere frumenta inciperent,' "B. G.," 6, 29, 4.

² Political servitor of the Triumvirate as tribunus plebis, Dec. 10, 56, to Dec. 10, 55. He was now beginning to reap his reward.

ravage the country adjacent to the Aduatuca; Cæsar in person to move through the country of the upper Scheldt and the extreme northwest end of the Ardennes: three mighty brooms — what could escape them? After seven days, all three corps were to return to Aduatuca. These were punitive expeditions; at the same time, it would seem that those who were to suffer from the wide-spread misery of Cæsar's revenge would have been eager to seize the person of Ambiorix and offer him up to the angry proconsul. But this did not happen. Nay, fortune brought about a curious and, for Cicero, quite serious turn of events. The latter's *castellum* on the seventh day quite suddenly was attacked by a roving band of marauding Sygambrians. These had heard of Cæsar's proclamation, making the Eburones the prey of any invader. While picking up sheep and swine and placing them in the forests in care of some of their comrades, it suddenly occurred to them that the *castellum* at Aduatuca held loot of vastly greater value, and suddenly they appeared in swarms before it. Cicero's situation was critical, for five of his cohorts had gone forth to forage. Of these the greater parts were raw recruits. In the end, Cicero escaped with slight loss. At the same time, the credit for cool and intrepid action seems to be given by Cæsar, not to Quintus Cicero (the latter is not named in the entire account of the defence), but to the veteran centurion Baculus and to other centurions.

At night, Cæsar's cavalry heralded his return. He complained of the one thing (6, 32), that the cohorts had been despatched away from their garrison-service: there must be left absolutely no place to chance.

The proconsul repeated his punitive expedition. The Eburones were deprived of everything by which life may be sustained, but the greatest prize of all, Ambiorix, did not fall into Cæsar's hands. With four well-mounted attendants, the haunted chieftain again and again disap-

peared in the thickets of the Ardennes. After this campaign, he held one of his councils at Durocorturum (Rheims), and Acco, the author of the rising of the Senones, was sent to the block. Others fled, and whoever should give them shelter became equally guilty to the proconsul.

For the first time in some years, Cæsar placed some of his winter quarters farther south, among the Lingones (Langres).

[Dio takes up these matters after the Parthian expedition of Crassus (40, 31.) The deceptive statement of Labienus ("B. G.", 6, 8, 3) he cites with the somewhat heavy introductory word *ἐδημηγόρησε τοιάδε*. Dio makes much of the design and stratagem of the chief legate, and even expands it beyond Cæsar's relation, as he often does when he is particularly interested.

Dio's report (40, 32) on the second crossing of the Rhine is not quite fairly made, for he writes as if a genuine invasion of conquest had been desirable or feasible. He does not take time to examine Cæsar's real policy. His saying that Cæsar quickly retired to the left bank from fear of the Suebi, is not well put.

He censures Cæsar for ruining the country of the Eburones—*κατροι μηδὲν νεωτερίσασαν*: which, however, is not at all exact. Ambiorix had been supported by his people. The surprise by the Sygambri is briefly told; the splendid organization of the punitive and scouting expeditions is passed over in silence. "He himself (40, 32, 5), on account of the winter and because the situation in Rome was one of anarchy, inflicted no revenge (*sic*), but, having dismissed his troops to their several winter-quarters, he himself went to Italy, by pretext indeed, on account of further Gaul, but in truth, that he might watch (*ἐφεδρεύη*) as to what was going on in the city."

Plutarch ("Cæs.", 25) reports the reinforcement, but otherwise simply passes over the important events of 53, as his interest runs ahead to the great rising of the following year coupled with the name of Vercingetorix.

What we glean from Cicero's letters is little. We learn ("Fam.", 7, 18, 3) that Balbus, the most trusted of all of Cæsar's representatives at the seat of government, was to go to Cæsar's headquarters, in April. The drift towards the rule of *one man* was becoming stronger.]

In this year, Crassus perished in Mesopotamia. He had invaded Parthia purely from ambition. The catastrophe came when he had crossed the Euphrates and was

moving upon Seleucia. The remnants of his army were saved by his quæstor, C. Cassius, afterwards one of the slayers of Cæsar. He also maintained Syria against the Parthians, who now became hereditary foes of Rome and the chief cloud on their eastern horizon.

Crassus had received Syria by the *lex Trebonia* for five years. Cicero, later on, writing with philosophical deliberation ("Fin.," 3, 75), ascribed the fatal expedition to the greed of the richest man in Rome. It was his dominant passion. Thus there remained but two dynasts in public life, and the great pact was in effect broken.

In the incessant movement of unrest and disintegration at the capital, one thing was quite clear: The *auctoritas* of Cæsar and Pompey combined, even when Cicero as pleader carried out their commissions, sometimes suffered defeat. Such had been the case in the previous year, when Pompey's servitor, Gabinius, the former proconsul of Syria, was brought to trial for leaving his province and restoring Ptolemy Auletes, the king at Alexandria. His condemnation was accomplished, let us mark it, under the *Lex Iulia de Repetundis*.¹ Not only had he perpetrated extortion in his own province, but he had moved beyond the confines thereof to wage a war not approved by the home government. He was condemned to pay a fine of 10,000 talents, which was beyond his power.

Cicero did not publish his defence of Gabinius. On Jan. 1, 53, no consuls were inaugurated. None had been chosen. *Interregna* were resorted to. It was not until July, 53, that Calvinius and Messalla became, for less than six months, the chief magistrates of the commonwealth. The orderly routine of the governmental machine was impeded, particularly by the tribuni plebis. Some of them were playing for a dictatorship of the proconsul of Spain, who would act the Sphinx about his own preference. The conservatives abominated the idea of another dicta-

¹ Lange, 3, 358.

torship. As between gigantic bribery and a system of organized riots, this may have appeared as the only way. The annual consuls, too, says Appian ("B. C.", 2, 19), abandoned all personal hopes of provincial preferment, having been for some time hemmed in by the great pact now in process of dissolution.

As for Pompey, whose perpetual ambition was to have every form of extraordinary power thrust upon him, he looked, supinely enough, upon the ever-growing disruption and disorganization of the forms of the older republican city-state.¹

To add to the tension of factional fury at Rome, Annius Milo, in 53, was making an active canvass for the consulate of 52 B.C. Cicero, one of the most grateful men in history, who recognized Milo's labors for his own restoration, and eager to repay these services, labored earnestly with all his political friends, such as he still had, to gain their interest for Milo.

The advocate in this year, whenever he touched upon current affairs, did so with unmistakable self-repression and restraint, as though he dreaded the miscarriage of these missives. He, himself, to fortify his personal security, not long before had accepted a legateship from his protector, Pompey, who, however, did not go to Spain at all. Nor did Cicero. As for brother Quintus in Belgium, Cicero had urged him to be doubly cautious as to any political passages which he, Quintus, might feel inclined to put into his epistles from Cæsar's army. For Quintus, in a way, was a hostage to Cæsar for the orator's tractable demeanor. It was quite well understood by all concerned. Consular candidates at Rome still rated Cæsar's support as a weighty matter. ("Quint. fr.", 3, 8, 3-4.) Cicero abhorred a dictatorship, while Cato had actually dispensed with a province in order to remain on the ground and

¹ τὴν ἀσυνταξίαν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀσυνταξίᾳ ἐκών οὐπερέωρα. App., "B.C.", 2, 20.

counteract that policy.¹ Everybody and everything seemed to be at cross-purposes.

In the autumn, and up to Jan. 1, 52 B.C., no consular elections were actually carried through. The consuls were unable to accomplish this, though on one occasion they actually laid aside their senatorial garb and appeared in the senate in equestrian garb—a symbol of public mourning. They did, indeed, secure the passage of a S. C., providing that no ex-consul or ex-prætor should receive a province until after the lapse of five years.² This, they hoped, might stem the ever-rising tide of those forms of electoral corruption now intricately bound up with all changes of magistrates. But this sound resolution was not enacted into law by any assemblies. Here, then, was a veritable agony of the body politic, as though the ancient city-republic could neither live nor die.

If it were possible to register the annual data of electoral purchase, and all the other trade and barter carried on between the greater and the minor politicians; if it were possible to gain a closer vision of the despicable electorate of the field of Mars, annually bought in all the tribes and precincts; if, further, one could view closely the hopeless degradation of manhood and economic independence intricately bound up with the substratum of all social things, to wit, slaves and slave trade; if, further, we could observe and feel in detail how the resources of the Mediterranean world in good part found their way to the imperial city by the Tiber, to help corrupt and purchase those who seemed to bestow office merely in order that this vicious circle might go on periodically revolving,—then, indeed, one may doubt whether that crazy machinery was worth preserving, and whether the so-called republic had not itself become a hollow mockery and an

¹ Sulla's career was too fresh in the memory of that generation. Dio, 40, 45, 5.

² Dio, 40, 46.

empty sound, hallowed though its traditional forms seemed to be by great memories, and rendered illustrious by noble names and stern trials of the past.

And we may add with unhesitating confidence, that of all the public men of that time and that day there was no one whose political vision grasped all these actualities, as well as their potentialities of sequence, more firmly, more coolly, and with deeper penetration than the proconsul of the northwest and visible head of the *popularis* party, so called, at home.

CHAPTER XIV

VERCINGETORIX THE ARVERNIAN, 52 B.C.

ON the first Kalends of the civic year 52, there was no Capitoline solemnity of new consuls, because there had not been any election. On Jan. 18, 52 (= Dec. 8 of solar year 53), Milo's gladiators dragged the wounded Clodius from a roadhouse near Bovillæ on the Appian Way, and despatched him.¹ The brawl which ended thus had been begun without any provocation but the long-nurtured sentiments of mutual hatred and factional fury, by a gladiator in the retinue of the travelling Milo. The painstaking relation of facts, as given by *Asconius*, permits us to see how materially the pleader's cunning of the famous Arpinate perverted and obscured what had actually happened.

The political consequences of that act were deep and far-reaching. As for Cæsar and his ambition, Pompey's elevation to be consul without a colleague, and the power granted to Pompey to choose his own colleague later on, at his own discretion, while Pompey still held on to his Spanish *imperium*, — to Cæsar all these sequences were momentous and, in a way, threatening.

At Rome all political parties, indeed, had been compelled to this elevation of the Only One, who thus appeared as the saviour of law and order. And here was the point where the two dynasts began to move on by different roads. There was now a new combination at Rome: Pompey and the Optimates. Bibulus² had made the

¹ On the political history of this year, *v. Asconius*, "in Milonianam"; "Att.," 5, 13, 1; 6, 7, 26; 7, 1, 4; 7, 6, 2; *Liv.*, "Perioch.," 107; *Dio*, 40, 48; *Appian*, "B. C.," 2, 20 sqq.; *Plut.*, "Pomp.," 54; *Suet.*, "Cæs.," 26, 27.

² *Plut.*, "Pomp.," 54.

first motion in the senate, and to the surprise of all it was Cato who had seconded it, saying that he would not, indeed, have made the motion himself on his own initiative, but as another had made it he deemed it proper to give it support, for any magistracy at all, no matter how extraordinary, was better than anarchy. What did Cæsar do? What we now hear reminds us once more that the republic was a shadow, and that the personal acts of the dynasts were, and properly were reputed to be, decisive. In order to maintain¹ close relations with Pompey, he proposed to the latter a new matrimonial match, viz., his own grand-niece Octavia, who had been married to Gaius Marcellus, and asked for himself the hand of Pompey's daughter, who had already been betrothed to Faustus Sulla. But Pompey chose Cæcilia Metella, the widow of young Crassus, an aristocratic lady of many graces and deeper culture. Cæsar could draw his own inferences. But in the new shuffling of the cards preceding Pompey's novel elevation, Cæsar had, through the joint action of all the ten tribunes, secured an important and far-reaching concession.² This was a plebiscitum, providing that Cæsar, *before* his ten years' proconsular power expired, *i.e.*, before March 1, 48 B.C., should, even while absent from Rome, have the privilege both of being a candidate and being voted for to obtain his second consulate.

[There is much confusion among historians and antiquarians as to the exact point when Cæsar's second *quinquennium* terminated. Time begins to run from the date of actual entry into a given province. So said Cicero ("Att.," 15, 1) of his province of Cilicia with adjacent districts: *Laodiceam veni pridie Kal. Sext.* (July 31). *Ex hoc die clavum anni movebis*; *i.e.*, my administrative year runs from July 31 to July 31, unless I am relieved before. Cf. "Fam.," 3, 6, 4; 15, 7, 2; 3, 8, 9; 3, 12, 4; "Att.," 6, 2, 6; 6, 5, 3.]

Clearly, Cæsar did not *wish* to be a mere private citizen: probably he *dared* not. In vain Cicero ("Fam.," 6, 6, 5)

¹ Suet., "Cæs.," 27.

² Suet., "Cæs.," 26.

dissuades Pompey against consenting to a privilege so unheard of, in vain urged Pompey to go to Spain. And still our literary friend yielded himself: before the expiration of the inclement season, at Ravenna, there was a conference between Cæsar and Cicero, in which the latter pledged his interest and support toward this very measure.

We cannot now know the exact time when Cæsar overwhelmed the *plebecula* of Rome with bounties, gifts, and games. Suetonius (c. 26) relates these things as subsequent to, and growing out of, the constitutional exemption which Cæsar had just secured; as though he was elated by sanguine expectations and eager to begin, even then, his canvass for his second consulate. We observe here that antiquarian precision so characteristic of Suetonius: Cæsar, furthermore, began the building of a forum,¹ the land alone costing one hundred million sesterces, or about \$4,400,000. Also, in honor of his deceased daughter, Julia, he provided feasts and gladiatorial shows, with an elegance of the former, and with preliminary training as to the latter, such as the capital had not known before. Suetonius himself² read letters of Cæsar from the field, or from winter quarters, in which the proconsul requested particular senators, or equestrian gentlemen as were expert swordsmen, to undertake the coaching of certain gladiators.

For his legions, he doubled their pay. The masses of the electorate, therefore, and his own legionaries were his chief concern, the more so as he saw that Pompey, his only rival, was consenting to be the leader of the few.

But we must turn again to the northwest. When Cæsar crossed the Alps to the plains of the Po, Clodius was still living. It was only when he arrived there, that he received the news of the political homicide of the

¹ The *Basilica Iulia*?

² He was imperial secretary under Hadrian.

Appian Way. Therefore, he must have left Transalpine Gaul late. He, too, now began a general conscription in the Po-country. The Kelts of the northwest, too, were promptly apprised of the grave disorders in Rome. They inferred that these would detain Cæsar. Soon the general ferment spread through conferences and through an almost universal agitation. Dumnorix had perished: now another nobleman, Acco, had been put to death much more deliberately by a verdict issued by the proconsul.

Cæsar's absence just then was a circumstance of splendid possibilities. If die they must, why not rather die on the field, or in open warfare, for freedom? ("B. G.", 7, 1, 8.) The *Carnutes* (Genabum, Orleans) undertake to begin the insurrection with an overt act. The Roman citizens residing at Genabum are suddenly slain, and their possessions looted. With incredible swiftness the news is carried to every part of Gaul. From Orleans to the confines of the Auvergne is a distance of some one hundred and sixty miles. The vendetta at Genabum occurred at daybreak: before nine in the evening of that day, the news of the massacre had travelled so far. Among the *Arverni*, then, the movement for freedom found for its leader the Hotspur of Keltic annals, Vercingetorix. His ancestors must have stood in the foreground of Gallic nobles. His father, Keltillus, had striven for central monarchy and perished in this ambition. Vercingetorix was temporarily expelled from Gergovia,¹ but soon, stirring up the common people and the serfs, he gained so irresistible a leadership among the *Arverni* that he was proclaimed their *king*. Embassies flew in all directions. From Paris to Cahors, and from the western slopes of the Cevennes to the Atlantic, flared up the flames of national insurrection. Vercingetorix was proclaimed generalissimo of all the Keltic levies. To wonderful energy he added stern and severe penalties for insubordination. Cæsar,

¹ Six kilometres south of Clermont.

indeed, suggests that the cruelty of his disciplinary measures enabled him so quickly to raise an army: this we may well doubt. Soon the *Bituriges* joined the national rising. The *Ædui* dared not cross the Loire, and constrain these neighbors in the interest of Cæsar. All these things were accomplished when Cæsar was still on the upper Adriatic, perhaps at Ravenna. Rome was now, however, safe: the *virtus* of Pompey had secured it from further demoralization.

[His leges *de ambitu* and *de vi* had been adopted. Cæsar could return to the Transalpine. He intimates that he could not have done so, if no settlement had been achieved at the capital. In the introductory words of "B. G.," 7, 1, the other dynast is treated with deliberate and diplomatic courtesy. *It is not likely that these words, and so the entire preceding relation of Cæsar, were penned after the beginning of the Civil War.*]

The insurrection in the northwest, meanwhile, spread fast. The *Ruteni* (Rodez) in the furthest south came in. And now the very Province was in jeopardy. Cæsar did not rest until he reached Narbo. There, indeed, he was in the capital of the old province. Looking northward, across a boiling ocean of national rising, he might, indeed, have felt as if all his work of six years had been undone in two short months.¹

Between Cevennes and lower Rhone were the Helvii, within the old province. It was still winter (c. 8) when Cæsar moved and began this long and critical campaign. He marched northeastward, crossing the Cevennes long before the snow had melted, amid great hardship. Clearly the Arverni were surprised: even a solitary single traveller was not expected to traverse the passes of the mountains in that forbidding season. For the first time the Arverni, as a community, were given a sharp taste of Roman devastation, and Vercingetorix moved south from Orleans. Cæsar had planned it so. Leaving Decimus Brutus in

¹ January and February: corrected calendar.

charge of this southern corps, and concealing his motive and design, he hastened to Vienne on the Rhone in forced marches. His immediate and urgent task was to take personal command of the ten legions which he had left in the preceding autumn, in three divisions, in the north, east, and northeast, viz., in the country of the Treveri, Senones, and Lingones. The two legions wintering in the plateau of Langres he reached first; they were nearest. From this point, swift despatches flew to those encamped on the Moselle and at Sens. Thus he concentrated these ten legions, splendid veteran corps, before the Arverni and the national leader himself were even aware of his personal movements. On learning of these things, they were compelled at once to abandon their threatening of the Roman province, and to move northward. They now proceeded to lay siege to *Gorgobina*,¹ town of the Boii, whom six years before Cæsar had spared, placing them in vassalage of the Ædui. Should the proconsul allow this place to fall? Would he not, then, alienate the Ædui and the Remi themselves? Leaving his base of Agedincum (Sens), he took Vellauno-dunum, and hastened in two days marches to Genabum. Here the torch of the national rising had been first kindled. In vain the people attempted to escape across the Loire, southward, by night. The town, for an example, was sacked and burned: "the loot given to the soldiers."

[Is this, perhaps, one of the cases of which Suetonius (c. 26) speaks: *singula interdum mancipia e præda viritim dedit*: each soldier could sell one prisoner to the *mercatores* who ever moved with Cæsar's headquarters, — and pocket the proceeds?]

Cæsar does not stop here to utter any note as of the vindication of justice on the doomed place, no appeal here, as in other books, to Roman pride at all. Thus Cæsar drew his young antagonist away from the siege of Gorgo-

¹ Site of which is a matter of great controversy among the French anti-quarians.

bina toward himself, too late, however, to save *Noviodunum*. Cæsar now turned to besiege *Avaricum*, the largest and best fortified town of the Bituriges, on the river *Avara* (*Evre*).

Vercingetorix, whose prestige had obviously suffered severely through this series of reverses, now attempted a new policy. Not yet was the grass or grain far enough advanced to furnish forage, it was probably some time in April; the Romans had to procure from hamlets and homesteads hay of the year 53 B.C. The son of Keltillus now proposed that the patriots burn homesteads and towns, and so deprive the Romans of subsistence, compelling them to move away through the potent argument of starvation. They heeded this stern counsel: soon more than twenty-five fortified towns of the Bituriges lay in ashes.

What of *Avaricum*? Against his own better judgment, the national leader consented to its preservation, yielding to the pitiful entreaties of the inhabitants. The proconsul now proceeded to a systematic assault upon this, one of the fairest towns of all the Kelts, he suffering not a little, meanwhile, from a lack of grain. As for the *Ædui*, brothers of the Roman people, they were not much in earnest.

The morale, however, of those seasoned veterans whom he had so long and so systematically attached to his person and to his fortunes, was fine. They clamored for signal retribution for what had happened at *Genabum*, in the waning winter. Meanwhile, the heroic Arvernian, suffering from the very desolation which he had himself caused, was compelled to move nearer to Cæsar. The Kelts, never good at long hardships, clamored for a general battle. Vercingetorix, however, although his own loyalty was impugned by their impatience, yielded not his better judgment to their importunities. To calm their passionate urging he even resorted to a ruse: he exhibited

to them some Roman prisoners, emaciated and miserable of countenance, by whom they could readily infer that Cæsar's troops were on the verge of starvation.

Meanwhile Cæsar's works were steadily carried forward ; on both sides consummate devotion was shown, and every resource brought into play of meeting device with device and mechanism with mechanism. The proconsul's own admiration was warmly roused (7, 25) at the sight of an occurrence of rare self-sacrifice, when a long series of defenders fell, man after man, at a critical point, while engaged in a desperate effort to nourish the fire that was to ruin the siege-works of the foreigners. An attempt of the defenders to withdraw quietly by night was betrayed to the Romans by loud lamentation of the women and children.

At last the Romans took the town by a general assault, and so embittered were the legionaries that they gave no quarter, sparing not even women and children. Out of forty thousand, but eight hundred made good their escape into the national camp. The leader could truthfully point to the notorious fact that the defence of Avaricum had been undertaken and persisted in against his own counsels. In engineering, indeed, the superiority of the Romans was well known. It was time now to imitate Roman methods in the regular construction of well-fortified camps. Soon he would bring into the national movement all the states still outstanding.

The fall of Avaricum indeed, as it proved, added much to the national reputation of the noble Arvernian. Still, the inclement season was barely over, *almost*¹ over, when all this had been accomplished. The tremendous energy, coupled with penetration of judgment, of the towering Julius, is once more impressed upon us. Would any other man in public life have accomplished so much ? One may frankly say that probably every other one would have failed in this desperate crisis.

¹ *Hieme prope confecta.*

Being on the point of beginning his regular summer campaign (7, 32), the governor of Gaul was for the moment interrupted by the necessity of settling disputed elections for *vergobret* among his own *Ædui*. This he did in strict conformity with law and precedent, as held in that important community. Also we observe, for once, precisely what advantage the proconsul derived from the resources of this Romanizing commonwealth: a contingent of ten thousand *Æduans*, in several details, was to guard his various grain depots, while their entire body of squires, or cavalry, was employed by Cæsar in the field.

Labienus, with four legions, was to maintain the middle and upper Seine, while he in person, with six legions, was to move upon the commonwealth which was the national leader's own, that of the Arverni. So quickly had this great captain wrought the great change from the defensive to the offensive.

For a while the Arvernian prevented Cæsar from crossing to the right bank of the Allier (*Elaver*), but Cæsar soon outwitted him. He had no time to bear with any Fabian strategy of his adversary. The trend of things at Rome, as well as his own temperament and the manifold necessities clustering around his advancing ambition, postulated speed and the uttermost measure of energy. But still, after Cæsar had begun a systematic siege of *Gergovia*,—investment alone seemed feasible, the idea of a storming assault appearing preposterous,—and after he furthermore had gained an isolated elevation which ultimately seemed to control the water supply, then, for the second time in his campaigns since 58 b.c., the execution of his plans was crossed by the wards of Rome, his own *Ædui*.—Was the *vergobret* Convictolitavis bribed by the Arverni? Cæsar, indeed, says so (7, 37); also that the *Æduan* magistrate shared this fund with several young noblemen; that to one of these, Litavicus, he entrusted the command of the *Æduan* contingent of ten thousand

infantry even then in process of mobilization. Further, that while on the march to Gergovia, Litavicus halted his troops and wrought them up to a pitch of excitement by telling them falsehoods¹ of fresh acts of sanguinary cruelty on the part of Cæsar towards noblemen of their own commonwealth. This halting and this mendacious appeal (if, indeed, we may trust Cæsar in every detail) took place some thirty miles from Gergovia.

It was a histrionic performance, according to Cæsar, but several Roman citizens, too, were slain in this fury.

[Did Cæsar's adversaries always put themselves in the wrong? But their own version of things has not been preserved.]

These same untruths were forthwith scattered broadcast throughout the commonwealth of the *Æduans*. Cæsar, informed of these things by an *Æduan* nobleman, marched twenty-five miles to intercept the *Æduan* contingent, which he spared, but Litaviceus had flown. Only a three hours' rest was granted to his troops: thus they marched fifty miles with a moderate pause midway. Meanwhile, Fabius with his two legions had defended the ample stockade (built for six legions) with extreme and desperate difficulty and endurance.

During this time the *Æduan* commonwealth and *vergobret* had thrown off the bonds of Rome, and Convictolitavis indeed had striven that those things should be done which would render impossible any restoration of the ancient relations. Still, they soon learned that ten thousand *Æduan* lives were at the proconsul's discretion, and the latter assumed a studied moderation in dealing with the envoys who hastened to his headquarters at Gergovia.

He indeed was now planning to abandon the siege of this town: even his stout and clear mind began to yield

¹ Dr. Holmes, p. 120, appropriates Cæsar's relation without qualification, adding even a contemptuous phrase of his own: "V. had offered him a bribe; and he promptly responded to that most potent spur of Gallic patriotism." *Bona verba, quæso!*

to the sense of an isolation, which was well-nigh complete. He seriously entertained a plan of summoning the four legions of Labienus, and then withdrawing leisurely, saving his prestige as far as possible. We cannot trace in detail the various vicissitudes of these operations: what resource his keen eye discovered, how the enthusiasm of his advancing troops went far beyond his orders and ignored the signals for retreat. The site of Gergovia¹ was lofty: Cæsar had merely intended taking the outer lines of defence. Clearly he decided not to overcome difficulties of topography (7, 52, 2) by any considerable sacrifice of his own infantry.

At this stage of current events, too, it would prove increasingly difficult to replace legions through the compliance of the home government as now modified. This he knew.

Even more than before, therefore, the situation seemed to postulate (7, 53) that retreat which then engaged the burden of his military reflections. For several days, therefore, he offered a pitched battle to the King of the Arvernians. This one, however, wisely persisted in his Fabian policy.

For once, then, Cæsar abandoned a great military enterprise, and moving eastward crossed the Allier and passed into the territory of the one-time brothers of the Roman people.

His strategical faculty and the elemental powers of his rare character had been tested as never before; it was well-nigh midsummer, and he apparently was as far as ever from mastering the great insurrection. And now, as if the very knell of his great plans were being rung, there fell upon him another blow, the most severe one almost in all this troublesome and critical year. It was in this wise: even those two young noblemen who had so promptly ad-

¹ On a spur of the mountains of Auvergne, about four miles south of Clermont Ferrand.

vised him of the plot of the *vergobret* and of the defection of the *Ædui*, even these now joined the mighty movement of the Keltic world. They seized Noviodunum (Nevers) on the Loire, a little above the confluence off Allier. Here Cæsar had placed his remounts, grain, the funds furnished by the home government, and, above all, *the entire hostages of Gaul*. All were lost to the proconsul by one fell stroke of fortune.

By this service, the two young *Æduan* noblemen *Eporedorix* and *Viridomarus* signalized their entry into the irresistible movement of the national union. For Cæsar, indeed, an unbroken chain of successes seemed an imperative necessity, and the abandonment of the siege of Gergovia had apparently removed the last prop of that tottering fabric: the loyalty, or fear, of the Kelts entertained for the dread name of Rome. It was generally believed that Cæsar would be compelled to move south and to seek supplies, as well as a base for new operations within the confines of the old province.

The first important matter was, that Labienus brought back, victoriously, across the Seine, his four legions and joined Cæsar (7, 62).

In the meantime, when the national enthusiasm had reached great intensity, the Arvernian, by request, visited the *Ædui*. But their desire to assume national leadership was denied by the universal voice of the Keltic world. A diet at Bibracte, by some kind of vote of national representatives, so decided: Vercingetorix was unanimously declared leader of all. This gifted and patriotic man determined to maintain his policy of avoiding a general battle and destroying all supplies about Cæsar's movements; also he planned to have minor invasions made into the old province. Momentarily (7, 65) the proconsul was cut off from the south, from the old province, and from Italy.

And now he himself, obedient to necessity, began mov-

ing towards the Sequani (Burgundy). His ultimate aim was a defensive position to bar the foe from the province. This seemed all that was left from this campaign. Vercingetorix kept near him, but now, at last, he resolved to stop and destroy the ever-returning invader, if he could. But Cæsar, attacked while marching, defeated Vercingetorix with heavy loss: Cæsar's new cavalry of German mercenaries contributed decisively to this result. His mounted men being completely scattered, the national leader marched to the neighborhood of *Alesia*,¹ a town on a plateau of exceptional strength for defence, the fateful trap of Keltic freedom.

Why did Vercingetorix not escape to the north? Cæsar surrounded at once, both the plateau-town, as well as the forces of Vercingetorix, with a circumvallation of eleven miles. Why did not the Arvernian burst through? Little doubt but that, after his first positive defeat in open battle, when that part of the forces on which he and the public opinion of the nation had relied with such confidence, — the mounted aristocracy of the Keltic people — had been utterly routed, little doubt but that then there came a reaction and a tremendous reversal of feeling, both in the actual army of Vercingetorix as well as elsewhere, throughout the land.

As for the foot-soldiers, they were accustomed to look for guidance and encouragement to their knights and barons. These had failed them. They would probably have been scattered and destroyed in detail, if the ridges of Mt. Auxois had not furnished a temporary haven of security and recuperation. — Still Vercingetorix succeeded, before the Roman investment was complete, in despatching to all parts of Gaul mounted messengers proclaiming a national levy.

The doles of daily rations were now carefully measured out, and the utmost economy practised until the nation

¹ *St. Reine d'Alise*; v. Holmes, 361-374.

should relieve Alesia. — The proconsul immediately constructed an outer ring of defences with exquisite and clearly thought-out features of engineering (7, 29 sq.), which must not be set down here in detail. For there were before his clear mind three matters: first, to hold an inner ring of investment; next, to maintain such a one against the coming forces of national relief; and thirdly, to man all lines with such numbers as he had, many portions being made inaccessible through engineering to balance his deficiencies of fighting men. The outer ring was one of fourteen miles.

The leaders of the cantons and commonwealths of Gaul meanwhile modified the general orders of their self-trapped captain general. They prescribed more moderate but specific contingents of the choicest forces for the various states, with their several vassal-communities attached. This list (7, 75) seems to afford a fair survey of the relative rank and importance of these ethnical and political subdivisions of the Keltic nation. In the first class were the *Edui* with their dependencies, and the *Arverni* with the same; in the next class, after a considerable interval, were the *Sequani*, *Senones*, *Bituriges*, *Santoni*, *Ruteni*, and *Carnutes*; next followed the *Bellovaci* and the *Lemovices*, and so on down the scale. Even the *Helvetii* were summoned. Local jealousies cropped out, as of the *Bellovaci*, who would lead, but on the whole the Kelts made a better showing, a far more unanimous showing, than did the Greeks in the Persian wars.

The marvellous rapidity with which thus a force of two hundred and fifty thousand infantry and eight thousand knights and barons were put into the field, commands our surprise and admiration. Again had the national feeling reached a high point of sanguine anticipations. But during this time the lives cooped up in Alesia were coming nearer and nearer to bitter famine, nay starvation. There were not lacking voices of des-

perate resolution which proposed that they subsist upon the bodies of those who, through age or weakness, must needs be non-combatants.

The townsfolk offered their submission, as slaves, to the Romans of the inner ring: but Cæsar compelled them to totter back. At last the national levies arrived: a flutter of joy and hope for the anxious hearts up on the plateau of Alesia. In vain, however, were the efforts both of those who were without, as well as of those who, pitifully enfeebled, tried to snap asunder the steel band of the inner ring. Catapults and engineering helped mightily in Cæsar's maintenance of his double lines; still more perhaps, by the fact that to each one, as though by rehearsal, his place and duty had been assigned in advance, the element of chance being very largely eliminated.¹

Finally, a supreme effort was made by the relief force to gain a critical point, but here too, after heroic efforts, the coolness and generalship of the proconsul prevailed. The national levies departed in disorder and Vercingetorix in person offered himself to the discretion of his victor.

The struggle of Gaul was over, in the main: Cæsar himself, at this point, laid down his own pen. It is impressively clear, even from the brief clauses and their rapid sequence in the last three chapters, that he was consciously hastening to conclude these “*Notes*” on the Gallic campaigns.

The two leading states of the *Ædui* and *Arverni* (as represented in the forces starving in the trap of Alesia) were exempted by him from the common sequence of captivity, viz., slavery, ‘*if through these*,’ *i.e.*, through this signal and magnanimous exception, ‘*he might recover their states*’; even here, we admit, this uncommon man forsook not that appeal to the sense of gratitude, which appeal, for his temperament and the very essence of his being, was the favored policy and mode of procedure.

¹ Cf. 6, 32.

[Dio reproduces this, the chief year of the Gallic War, in 40, 33 sqq. Here, too, his summaries are often permeated with high intelligence and with incessant attention to Cæsar's motives and designs. But in detail his work is often loose: *e.g.*, of the siege of Avaricum 40, 34: δὲ γὰρ χειμών ἐνειστήκει — is utterly faulty of spring: quite incorrect, too, is his relation as to the bridge over the Allier: cf. Dio, 40, 35, 3, with Cæs., "B. G.," 7, 35, 5. — The Gergovia episode is presented quite clearly. He even interprets Cæsar's failure there more plausibly (this is rare) than Cæsar himself, *viz.*, as due to the advantages of site (40, 36, 3).

The departure of Eporedorix and Viridomarus, Dio tells with an elucidation furnished simply by his own reflexion, creating, as it were, data (40, 38, 2) which fairly can neither be derived nor inferred from the text of Cæsar.

The movement, after the untoward events of Noviodunum, towards the province, towards the Allobroges, Dio (39, 1) presents as due to the initiative of Vercingetorix himself, as though the latter had now been holding Cæsar cheap in consequence of the reverses suffered by the same in this year. Dio, in short, everywhere seems inspired by a certain ambition to present the facts indeed, but in a light, and in a sequence, or dependence, furnished by Dio himself: he is not content with the modest rôle of a mere transcriber. *E.g.*, the defeat suffered by the Keltic generalissimo before he was cooped up at Alesia, was due (Dio, 39, 2) to the excessive numbers, and to the audacity of the same.

This expansion, within the entire range of motive and design, is the earmark of Dio: sometimes this is truly luminous and helpful, but at other times it impresses us as merely arbitrary and fanciful. So too of the starving townspeople of Alesia: that these, having been turned back from the Roman lines, "perished in the most heartrending manner," is merely Dio's inference.

The details of the personal surrender of Vercingetorix reads like some picturesque passage in Livy, and in fact may be due to Livy. A dramatic scene: how the chivalrous Arvernian suddenly appeared without any previous heralding of his coming, while Cæsar was sitting on the *bema* (= *pro suggestu*). The Keltic chieftain was a man of towering size, and at that moment splendidly accoutred in full armor; how he knelt before the proconsul, mutely petitioning with compressed hands. How Cæsar rejoined with words, scorning him as an ingrate, and without the slightest pity immediately had him put in bonds, and later on reserved him for his triumph and subsequent execution (46 B.C.).

Plutarch ("Cæs.," 25 sqq.) deeply feels the momentous importance of the great movement under Vercingetorix, and remarks, acutely enough, that, if the latter had but bided his time until Cæsar was deeply engaged in the Civil War, Italy would have been in the grip of a panic not slighter than that of the Cimbrian times. Plutarch had the curious item of the dagger taken from Cæsar in the battle before the retreat of Vercingetorix to Alesia, and still exhibited by the Arverni.

The summaries in c. 27 greatly exceed Cæsar's own figures. Also there are picturesque passages which probably point to Livy. Such is the detail of the splendid loot captured by the Romans from the relief corps outside (27, 4). The surrender of Vercingetorix is (as in Dio) related with full detail of the personal appearance of the national leader.

The correspondence of Cicero in 52 is slender and insignificant. It seems doubtful whether even by the well-informed at the capital any clear conception was gained or even desired, of the tremendous struggle beyond the Alps. Vercingetorix certainly would have had many well-wishers among the old aristocrats, who now, in the new adjustment of political forces, were looking to Pompey for guidance.]

CHAPTER XV

CÆSAR IN 51 B.C.

SOON after Dec. 10, 52, Cicero prosecuted Munatius Plancus Bursa, a tribune, who, on that date, had completed his official year. Bursa had been conspicuous among the men who, out of the slaying of Clodius, had striven to create still further turbulence and disorder. In this matter Cicero defied—at least he flattered himself that he did—the influence of Pompey. Besides, this Plancus Bursa had a brother Lucius, a legate in the field with Cæsar. — Cato, by the by, was on that jury, but was stricken off, and excused from serving, when he, literally, closed his ears while Pompey's good character of the defendant was read. Still the jury in the end gave their verdict for Cicero.¹ And the great moral prestige of the most righteous and the most fearless man in public life had condemned the culprit not any less effectively, although Cato was not allowed to hear with the others and put his *tessera* into one of the jars. Exile was the penalty. But Bursa did not go into exile. Technically perhaps, but not really and actually. He went, indeed, beyond the political confines of Italy proper, to Ravenna. Cæsar was there, and from him Bursa received a very substantial purse. So the proconsul practically nullified current acts of the same government. Cæsar was a veritable refuge to men of this class, men who as instrumental politicians had done work for some one of the dynasts before, and would do it again. A teeming array of tasks was even then in the lap of the future, in Cæsar's mind.

¹ 'Quod fecissent numquam, nisi iis dolori fuisset meus dolor.' Cic., "Fam.," 7, 2, 3.

The political future of Rome, so he was resolved, in a way, was not merely to be modified, but actually modelled and *made* by him.

These events, straws in the political winds of the hour, occurred, probably, early in 51 B.C. The new consuls were Servius Sulpicius Rufus and M. Claudius Marcellus. Neither of these was a Cæsarian. The noble character of the eminent civilian, Sulpicius Rufus, would have spurned any dependency on Cæsar bound up with place or profit. As for M. Marcellus, a fellow-pupil of Cicero's adolescence, the political aversion which he had entertained for Cæsar was so deep and so freely pronounced, that the very fact of his election must have been like a trumpet signal of warning to Cæsar and to the Cæsarians, both at home and in the field. M. Marcellus had, even before the election, announced as his programme the cutting short of Cæsar's power. And on Jan. 1, 51, Pompey himself looked upon a capital and a home government which, in great measure, he himself had turned against the proconsul of the north-west.

The *lex Pompeia* (of 52) *de provinciis*¹ provided that henceforward five years must elapse before ex-prætors and ex-consuls could begin provincial administration. If events had progressed smoothly, and if Cæsar, after the expiration of his long proconsulate, had peaceably gained a second consulate, he would have found himself somewhat resourceless at the end of his consular year. And still, not long afterward, Pompey had his own proconsulate of all Spain prolonged by a second term of five years. But two dynasts now remained seated at the political game, which latter gained not only in simplicity and definiteness, but also in accelerating intensity.

Not only Spain did Pompey receive for another *quin-*

¹ Lange, 3, 376. This was the S. C. of 53, which Pompey, a year afterward, had ratified by the Comitia. μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν says Dio quite accurately, 40, 56.

quennium, but also a fund of one thousand talents¹ for his military expenditures.

The energies both of the ostensible annual government as well as the schemings and strivings of the parties, were now more and more centering upon this one question: to balance—what? The political and material power and resources of whom? Of two citizens, very powerful citizens. But still citizens. Was this a patriotic struggle? But that was the concern of a very small number of persons. The *misera plebecula* had no genuine conception of so vague and metaphysical things as patriotism and constitutional law. Donatives, feasts, free things generally, concerned them somewhat more. This was made impressively manifest in recent events. For during 52, Cato, himself, had been a candidate for the consulate, and it was² his intention, if not the very avowal of his personal canvass, ‘*at once to deprive Cæsar of his arms*,’ *i.e.*, to have the senate vote to send him a successor *before* the ten years came to an end. Or, at least, he expected to succeed in this: he would prove and demonstrate Cæsar’s design: design for what, Plutarch specifies not; but it is easy for any one familiar with the great stoic to complete the statement. It was the design for a throne, a monarchy, a dictatorship for life. On Feb. 15, 44, but seven years later, Cæsar tried for the emblems, even, of oriental monarchy. As a guardian of the older constitution, Cato was right, and his canvass was in conformity with all His professions as well as all his political conduct. But Cato’s failure, in itself, had been an eloquent commentary on the hopeless chasm which now separated the noble stoic from his own times, may I say from his own commonwealth, such as it actually was. The senate, at his request, had adopted a Resolution particularly intended for that canvass: viz., that the candidates should have no electoral agents, but

¹ Plut. “Pomp.,” 55.

² Plut., “Cat. Min.,” 49, 50. Dio, 4 c., 58. Cæs., “B. C.,” 1, 4.

should seek votes in person. Further, Cato had bribed no one, nor provided for any bribing in his own behalf. This greatly exasperated the *misera plebecula*, and he was defeated. When Cicero wrote his biographical eulogy of this rare man, he censured him in it for not having consented to conduct his canvass along the usual and popular lines, in that crisis which called for just such a head of the state as he would have proved.¹ What *might have been* is by no means without deep concern for the student of human affairs, however indifferent it may be for the practical person, so called. Cicero, then, writing in 46 B.C., entertained a strong belief that a Catonian consulate might have obviated a civil war, by having adopted a S. C. for Cæsar's recall in 51 B.C. Would Cæsar have been obedient to such a Senatus Consultum? Would Pompey have gagged Caesar's tribunes?

Clearly, whatever would have happened afterward, the electors for 51, untoward as they were for Cæsar's interest, would have been vastly *more* threatening to his power and ambition, if Cato had been chosen.

And now we will once more turn to Gaul. The relation of the campaigns of 51-50 was composed after Cæsar's assassination, by one of his staff officers and personal admirers, Aulus Hirtius. With Balbus and Oppius he was of the clover leaf of the innermost circle.—As regards the pen and purpose of Hirtius, it will be presented to the reader later on in the chapter dealing with the Supplementary Accounts. Hence we now at once resume the further story of the Keltic insurrection. It remains impressive and significant that the great catastrophe of Alesia did not at once and forever terminate all resistance among the Kelts.

Leaving Mark Antony in command of the winter quar-

¹ αλτιάται δὲ Κικέρων ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Plut., "Cat. Min.," 50.

ters, Cæsar ("B. G.," 8, 2), on Dec. 31 (really in November), 52, with a detachment of cavalry rode away from Bibracte, the chief town of the *Ædui*. To these, as to the *Arverni*, the two foremost commonwealths among the Gauls, he had restored twenty thousand prisoners of war, an act of politic grace. Evidently, he had re-established his personal hold upon the brothers of the Roman people. Perhaps the noted druid was dead, but no doubt the Romanists had recovered their sway in the councils of that government. Cæsar had determined not to cross the Alps, but to winter at Bibracte. But the risings in various parts of Gaul interfered with this programme. One legion and no more was to be quartered among the *Bituriges*. Now these were not cowed by recalling the terrible fate of Avaricum but eight months before, and so they had begun acts of war against this one legion. One marvels at their persistence. But so unforeseen was Cæsar's cavalry raid, and so effective were his measures of checking any flight to their neighbors, that they were glad to throw themselves upon his mercy.

After promising a splendid bounty to his troops for this winter's work, Cæsar, within forty days, returned to the *Æduan* capital. But eighteen days later he was again summoned forth: the *Bituriges* complained of incursions by their northerly neighbors, the *Carnutes*. Among these Cæsar promptly spread his troops, and the *Carnutes* were scattered to seek shelter among the contiguous states amid the privations of the winter season.

But there was not yet general composure among his unwilling subjects. The *Bellovaci* (Beauvais) were active to annoy the *Suessiones*, who had been made a dependency of the Romanist *Remi*, by Cæsar's shrewd policy. — These were large concerns, and they impressed the proconsul, for the greater part of the *Belgæ* were actually enrolled under the leadership of the *Bellovaci*; steps also had been taken to invite German bands.

As the foe held back, the proconsul built a camp of uncommon strength, he desiring to make them believe that he was cautious and felt unsafe. This sanguine and confident feeling of the natives rose steadily in the minor skirmishes which now daily ensued. The expectant German allies were said to be on the march. The proconsul, in turn, awaited the arrival of three further legions, commanded by Trebonius. The natives, apprehensive, if they remained, of a fate like that of Alesia, began to move away, and for once they outwitted Cæsar by a clever ruse and encamped ten miles further on. From this new base they prepared an ambuscade for Cæsar's foragers, but as Cæsar was fully apprised in advance, they were caught in their own trap, and their leader, Correus himself, head of the whole insurrection, perished in a shower of Roman darts (8, 19). The Bellovaci now offered submission, and the proconsul, although he doubted the solidity of their excuses, determined to accept hostages. Commius, the Atrebatican, second leader in this rising, made good his escape in the end.

The tasks which still remained were apparently of minor importance. Once more Cæsar in person ravaged the territory of the never-captured Ambiorix, to make his name a very curse to those Eburones who still remained. Into the country of the ever-dangerous Treveri Labienus was sent.

Again trouble was reported from those sections of Gaul which later were called Anjou and Poitiers, north and south of the lower Loire. Here, too, the more impetuous and nationalist tribe invaded their neighbors' land for being more submissive.¹

¹ Hirtius (c. 26) more plainly and clearly brings out the fact that a certain community was called the state of such and such a one; thus the Pictones with their capital Lemonum were the *civitas* Duratii.

Caninius, Cæsar's deputy-commander in the south among the Ruteni, advanced north, but was not strong enough to raise the siege of *Lemonum*. When, however, his colleague, Fabius, came nearer, *Domnacus*, the duke of the Andes, abandoned the investment of the town and made haste to escape to the northern bank of the Loire. The Roman cavalry engaged and held the Kelts until the infantry of Fabius came up, when a great rout of the Andes ensued, some twelve thousand being slain and all the baggage taken.

Fabius now promptly marched into the country of the Carnutes, who thought best to make their submission by hostages : their example was followed by the North Atlantic States, called collectively *Aremorica*. There remained a band of marauding Kelts, desperate men, escaped serfs, exiles from different communities, led by a certain Drappes. This irregular corps abandoned their project of invading the Roman province and, as a last resort, flung themselves into the mountain fastness of *Uxelodunum*.¹ This seemed, indeed, an impregnable position, but again Alesia's awful fate loomed up large before the apprehensions of the natives. They therefore took vigorous measures to provision their stronghold abundantly (8, 34). But the Romans surprised one of these trains, and one of the two chief leaders fled abroad. Half of the work seemed to be done, when Fabius arrived with his legions to join in the siege. Meanwhile the proconsul quit the north, leaving Antony, his quæstor, to maintain his principal's power among the Bellovaci. Moving southward, Cæsar halted among the Carnutes, where the great national rising of 52 B.C. had begun. As chief culprit, by general opinion, was named a certain Cotuatus. He was lashed into insensibility and then beheaded. It

¹ Dr. Holmes examines the various conjectures of topographical verification, pp. 493-504, at the end of which survey he is not quite sure himself.

was here that Cæsar heard of the resistance of Uxellodunum. To his larger view it was a grave and disquieting symptom of obstinacy. He computed always the spirit of men. He was eager to make an end there and to impose upon the defenders of Uxellodunum an exemplary penalty. Every one in Gaul knew that Cæsar's proconsulate had not many more summers.

He flew on in advance of his infantry. Promptly he decided to break down the defence by thirst. First missiles and catapults made it impossible for the natives to come down any more to the river's brink. Next the great perennial spring, which was the last resource of the defenders, was tapped by mines. Then it was all over for the hapless garrison. Cæsar gave orders that their hands should be cut off, that they should beg their bread among the Kelts, to their dying day, a living and constant warning against freedom. For the first time Cæsar in person traversed this district. Hostages were readily offered. Thence with a detachment of cavalry he visited the capital of the old province, Narbo. Soon after he assigned winter quarters for the inclement season 51-50; laying his hand this time upon the north and upon the west central portion of his subjects. Two legions were placed among his *Æduans*.

After this the proconsul made a flying visit to his old Cisalpine communities: their devotion and loyalty¹ had been his chief support during the great insurrection which now indeed might be considered as brought to termination. This visit was more to cheer and reward than for the assizes of the ordinary circuit. Soon he was back among his Kelts of the northwest and chose for his winter quarters *Nemetocenna* in the north (Arras).

Turn we now once more to the capital of the Mediterranean world. When we see how great an accession of

¹ *Hirtius*, 46.

real power had come to the ancient oligarchy since Pompey consented to lead them, we feel once more that either of the two dynasts, taken by himself, was weightier than the senatorial and privileged class. The difference between the Optimates and the conqueror of the East was chiefly this, that they always wanted to go much faster than he, and really, he, and he alone, could set the pace. The ultimate aim, indeed, of both was the same: to use the summing up of Professor Tyrrell of Dublin¹: “to secure, that there should be an interval between Cæsar’s surrender of the governorship and his entry on a magistracy in the city, *so that in that interval he might be prosecuted*, for no prosecution could be conducted against any one in office.” Now Cæsar, too, was not inactive there, although from an early part of 52, down to the autumn of 51, he was not even south of the Alps. His acts were eloquent enough. The sweeping and astounding summary² of his gifts, bounties, cancellation of private debts, taking up of bankrupt young men, lies before us: there is never a tinge of rhetoric in Suetonius; declamation is ever absent from his sober pages.—With no smaller industry at this time was he conciliating kings and provinces.

But we will not be carried away by the unmistakable animus of these bitter chapters in Suetonius, but must endeavor, *sine ira et studio*, if that is possible, to weigh and examine the chief acts of parties, partisans, and the few momentous personalities appearing in this year. It will be easier for those in whose interest I originally wrote these lectures, chiefly instructors in American high schools, if I maintain to the end an annalistic arrangement.

Impressive and ever recurrent is Cæsar’s concern for Cisalpine communities. We saw how early in his career

¹ “Correspondence of Cicero,” vol. I, p. lxiii.

² In Suet., 27–28: some of this may have been drawn from Tanusius Geminus.

he became their veritable patronus. It was the latchkey to Italy, the door to Rome itself. It seems that Cæsar promised the Roman citizenship to all those Transpadanes who possessed that grade of partial franchise known as *Latinitas*. We have just seen with what fervor Hirtius spoke of their devotion to Cæsar. Out of this well-known relation came an incident at the capital. It was the junior consul, Marcus Marcellus, who undertook to insult Cæsar indirectly in a peculiar manner. A member of the municipal council of Novum Comum had come to Rome. Marcellus had him flogged because he affected the Roman citizenship.¹ That this happened in itself pointed to the fact that Pompey was no longer Cæsar's political associate: he was not even neutral any longer.

The burning question, at least in the concerns and activities of the junior consul, was that of the succession to the Gallic provinces. The months of consular presidency for him seem to have been February, April, June, August, etc. At this time, vague news arrived in Rome of Cæsar's operations among the Bellovaci, news brought some time in May, told even by Domitius, with bated breath, into the ears of his friends. There were whisperings of reverses.² At the same time, Cælius in Rome writes to Cicero in Cilicia, that Marcellus had not yet had the senate debate '*de successione provinciarum Galliarum*': also that Marcellus himself had told he would do so on the first of June: also, that this was a postponement. The senior consul, the foremost jurist of his day, was a man obviously of a very different temperament. Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the jurist, was a man of large vision, great equipoise, and of a patriotism somewhat rare in that generation. He had warned the senate³ against all hasty

¹ Plut., "Cæs.," 29.

² Cic., "Fam.," 8, 1, 4.

³ "Fam.," 4, 3, 1. His presidency probably came in January, March, May, etc.

action. He saw clearly the contingency, nay, probability, of civil war. In his appeals he surveyed those civil wars through which his senatorial hearers themselves had passed: the men who, such as Marius, Cinna, Sulla, gained autocratic power, had turned out cruel without the justification of any precedent. But whoever, thereafter, would gain control of the government by his troops, would probably be much more intolerable; precedent there would be, and besides he would add to it, as swayed by his own spirit and temperament.

Cicero, in the spring of this year, had gone to his belated proconsulate in the distant province of Cilicia, with contiguous territories. He held that any settlement whatever was better than any form of civil war. Still, in one of those months, it seems, when Marcellus presided, a S. C. demanding Cæsar's retirement from power was passed, *i.e.*, as far as making an official record on the minutes of the senate.¹ There was, then, a positive majority in the division, but a tribune's intercession left the Resolution without effect.

Later in the year Pompey acted as if, at last, he meant to go to Spain. On July 23 the senate held a session in the temple of Apollo² outside of the walls, so that Pompey might attend. The question before the house was the appropriation of funds for Pompey's army in Spain. Keenly there the Optimates watched the lips of Pompey, lips generally sealed or non-compromising. They put to him a leading question: What was the status of the legion which Pompey (early in 53) had loaned to Cæsar? He was to be goaded into some utterance. Pompey did not like this:³ he was strongly averse to being pushed by any extraneous force; his favorite mood was reserve; it was not easy to interpret from his outward demeanor what

¹ Madvig, "Verfassung und Verwaltung d. R. St.," 1, p. 322.

² Report of Cælius in Rome to Cicero in Cilicia, "Fam.," 8, 4.

³ Cælius writes: *coactus est dicere Pompeius.*

he meant to do. He was also asked, as though he were the head of the government, about the succession to Gaius Cæsar. For the present Pompey had some affairs to attend to in connection with some of his forces stationed at Ariminum. A formal vote was had, that Pompey should return to Rome as soon as possible, "in order that in his presence there should be senatorial debate about the succession to the provinces."

We see, plainly, that Pompey alone weighed more than the rest of the senate, and that his view of the situation was expressed in a formal resolution. The crisis had begun. In the course of that discussion, Pompey, somewhat impulsively, had allowed these words to escape him:¹ "that every one ought to be subordinate to the senate!" Formally, indeed, an utterance in exact consonance with the usages of the Roman government, but actually, at that very moment, the Great Council was submitting the chief problems of the hour to the personal arbitrament of a man who spoke so categorically, so speciously, we may say, as though he were the head and front of constitutionalism. The matter was adjourned. The elections for 50 B.C. followed. The consuls chosen were L. Æmilius Paulus and Gaius Claudius Marcellus. Of these the former² had some private understanding with Cæsar, who furnished funds for a splendid public structure to bear the Æmilian name. We may pass over various failures or postponements occurring in this anti-Cæsarian policy. The action of September 29, however, meant something. The concern as to Cæsar's succession fairly paralyzed action on every other matter. The chief question always was: "What is Pompey's view of things?" or more plainly: "What does Pompey want?" And the place of meeting itself eloquently proclaimed this dependency. The sen-

¹ Ib. nam in disputando *coniecit* illam vocem Cn. Pompeius: 'omnes oportere senatui dicto audientes esse. . . .'

² If we may trust the authority followed by Plut., "Cæs.," 29.

ate was summoned to the temple of Apollo in the Flaminian meadows outside of the gates, for Pompey, as an active proconsul, *cum imperio*, was excluded from the civil community proper, under the ancient laws.¹ The S. C., then, of Sept. 29, 51 b.c., directed the consuls of the next year, on and after March 1, 50 b.c., to have the senate debate on the Gallic succession, and that there should be no other business whatsoever, the senate to meet even on the *comitiae* days: that even senators on jury duty should be excused from it without prejudice or without incurring any penalty (*sine fraude sua*). Further, that if out of this S. C. there should result the necessity of having the *Comitia* (electoral assemblies, whether *Centuriata* or *Tri-
buta*) vote on a statute dealing with the matter, then the magistrates available, according to their rank, should present the bill to the electorate.

Among the senators who officially attested the engrossing of this bill,² we observe that the first two names were those of the most bitter and determined enemies of Cæsar, viz., Pompey's new father-in-law, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Pius Scipio (a Metellus by adoption) and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, both afterward prominent in the civil war. Again there was an intercession of tribunes: Cæsar's supporters on this occasion were C. Cælius and C. Pansa.

Pompey let out so much that before March 1 of the next year he could not determine about Cæsar's provinces 'without injury.' Injury to whom? to the state? to Cæsar? to Pompey? "When he was asked³: but if any one (*i.e.*, of Cæsar's tribunes) should intercede?" (What then?) Pompey said it made no difference whether Gaius Cæsar would be insubordinate to the senate '*or whether he*

¹ Report of Cælius, "Fam.," 8, 8, 4. Aliquando tamen, sœpe re dilata et graviter acta et plane perspecta *Cn. Pompei voluntate* in eam partem, ut eum decidere post Kalendas Martias placeret, senatus consultum quod tibi misi factum est et auctoritates perscriptæ.

² 'Qui scribendo adfuerunt.'

³ So Cælius goes on to report ("Fam.," 8, 8, 9).

would provide those (i.e., tribunes) who would not suffer the senate to pass a resolution.' "But what, said another, if he shall wish both to be a consul and have an army, too?" But Pompey, 'with wondrous gentleness,'¹ said: "What, if my son shall wish to bring down his cudgel on me?"² Clearly to Pompey's mind a contingency which even the wildest fancy would exclude, not from the category of probability merely, but of possibility. A result unthinkable.

Now, if Cicero in Cilicia learned every detail here recorded from one of the best-informed men in Rome, would not the proconsul on the Loire or in Belgium be at least as well informed? Would he fold his hands in fatalistic resignation?

And the utterance above was taken by the opinion of the day, in the capital, as the very first admission by Pompey — quotable admission, I mean — that everything was not harmonious between himself and the other dynast. Long then had he been like a sealed oracle. Now it was out. Cæsar must not expect to be clothed with the immunity of a new consulate and, at the same time, to hold on to provinces and legions until January 1 (48 B.C.), when he would be inaugurated once more. As it was, there was a kind of truce for five months. To survey in detail the success or failure of the minor candidates would not be very profitable here. But *one* feature arrests our attention. The tribunes for 50 B.C., almost to a man, were Cæsarians. We must assume that Cæsar's influence and money were a great factor on the Field of Mars. The influence, so called, of politicians generally consists in lively prospects of pelf or jobs. Some of the tribunes chosen were specifically sent from the field in Gaul to get this office.

¹ Cælius speaks with bitter irony.

² Fustem mihi impingere volet. . . . Tyrrell's version ('raise his cudgel against me') is far too mild. Rather: "bring it down upon me with a whack."

One, indeed, of these tribunes "of the people" who took office on Dec. 10, 51, was bitterly hostile to Cæsar.¹ By parts and inherited ability he was by far the most eminent of the new tribunes. This was Gaius Scribonius Curio, of whom Velleius (2, 48) gives this delineation: "a man high-born, a fine orator, audacious, a man who was a squanderer both of his own and other people's fortune and sexual honor, a man who was a veritable genius in his ways of viciousness (*ingeniosissime nequam*), a fluent speaker for the people's evil, whose mood neither any wealth nor appetites could satisfy." As if private demoralization could be coupled with a high-principled public career. Man is *one* in his being, and leads not really two lives. For the 'Good and the Senate' expected much from this champion. Clever and forceful epigrams fell from his lips,² grace and fluency arrested the attention of his hearers when he harangued them from the rostra. His wife was Clodius' widow, the passionate and domineering Fulvia. Curio was her second husband; afterward she took Antony: the herculean and heroic in battle, non-heroic only when the eternally feminine dazzled his vision, which was chronically the case. Curio had long made interest for the tribunate, and we may presume that he scented the oncoming of a political crisis such as this generation had not seen before, a crisis sure to produce a situation in which he could sell himself at a rare price. He calculated correctly.—While all these things were going forward, Cæsar's interests at Rome were guarded mainly by Cornelius Balbus.³ The adroit and diplomatic

¹ Not, however, from any deep convictions. Cæsar had, through his agents or otherwise, treated him with contempt during the canvass. "Fam.," 8, 4, 1: "ut spero et volo et ut se fert ipsi, bonos et senatum malet. Totus, ut nunc est, hoc scaturit. Huius autem voluntatis initium et causa est *quod eum non mediocriter Cæsar qui solet infimorum hominum amicitiam sibi qualibet impensa adiungere, valde contempsit.*" Ib., "Fam.," 8, 4, 1.

² Cic., "Brutus," 280.

³ "Fam.," 8, 9, 5.

Spaniard (naturalized as Roman citizen through Pompey), ever watchful, ever faithful, openly protested, even in senate, against the procedures of Cæsar's enemies, such as Metellus Scipio. The despatches of Balbus must have furnished the most engrossing reading to Cæsar in Belgium or elsewhere in that autumn.

CHAPTER XVI

CÆSAR IN 50 B.C.

IT was to be the proconsul's last summer among the Kelts. All that Hirtius has to report of military operations, or other proconsular acts of that year, are given in the last six chapters of his relation. Still these are full of historical import. Cæsar wished to do those things which, indeed, in a fair way would leave Gaul a settled province, and some resource amid the lowering heavens of the political future. Statesman as he was coming to be, he aimed at the sentiment and conviction of those whom he ruled. He would do nothing to anger them, would equally have nothing done which might hold out any hope of independence. His edicts were couched in kindly form ; with generous courtesy did he treat leading men. No new burdens were imposed. Early in 50 B.C., he crossed the Alps and visited the communities of the Po-country, to make interest for Antony's augurate. Cæsar himself even then canvassed for the consulate. The *Adversarii* of Hirtius' relation, whom Cæsar counteracted in this electioneering, were in Rome. In the Transpadane Cæsar was feted in every way : garlands, sacrifices, banquets, city gates decorated ; everywhere acclaim for the conquering hero.

The rest of Hirtius' account merges completely into a partisan account of the larger movements in Rome, and so we will lay Hirtius aside here.

Cæsar intended making Labienus his vicegerent in the Cisalpine. Why does Hirtius emphasize this ? Obviously to bring out the trust which Cæsar placed in the most competent of his subcommanders, and that at the very

time when the Optimates were winning him away. Or shall we say, the Pompeians? A transaction inspired by the prospect of a great war.

As to the senate, Cæsar's partisans at Rome, of whom many operated behind the scenes, prevented any radical action in the spring. Curio himself kept his hand on the lever of the parliamentary machine, without as yet coming out openly as a Cæsarian. Cicero was still in his province of Cilicia.

In a session of the senate, not fully attended, in April ("Fam.," 8, 11), there was a passage at arms between Cæsar's chief representative in the senate, the ever watchful Balbus, and Curio. The former openly upbraided the tribune, that if he were to act in such and such a manner, he would pursue a course injurious to Cæsar.

At this time, Pompey himself, weary of Curio's skirmishing against him, had retired to the Roman Newport, the gulf of Baiae. It was understood at this time that Pompey, 'with the senate,' had firmly resolved on having Cæsar recalled on Nov. 13, 49 B.C., so that the latter would be a private person at least for forty-eight days. 'Curio has determined to undergo everything rather than suffer that.'¹ If we read further in that letter, we find this luminous passage: "The makeup of the entire political stage is as follows: Pompey, as though he were not making his set against Cæsar, but were determining that which he deemed fair to the latter, says that Curio is seeking dissension. As a matter of fact, he (Pompey) does not wish, and positively fears that Cæsar be made consul elect, before surrendering army and province. He is pretty roughly handled by Curio, and his entire second consulate (55 B.C.) is sharply criticized. As a matter of fact, Curio in the debates of this summer played a very important rôle: as *tribunus plebis* he allowed no anti-

¹ Cælius to Cicero, "Fam.," 8, 11, 3.

Cæsarian resolution to pass in the senate, demanding that any resolution for Cæsar's recall should be amended by the addition that Pompey likewise should give up provinces and legions." The rejoinder of the Pompeians¹ was that Pompey's second *quinquennium* had not run out yet in the same measure as that of Cæsar. It was a fair-seeming motion, this of Curio's; they threw flowers at him on the forum for it.² Cæsar had guaranteed the payment of Curio's private debts, more than a million of our money, but this was not known to the political world at the time. Pompey wrote a diplomatic note from Naples, but nothing was done to remove the cause of the ever-widening fissure in public affairs. In June there was a vote; Pompey had returned. The first motion was that Cæsar should abandon province and army. The second was that *both* should simultaneously retire to private life.³ This was the motion on which Curio particularly insisted. Impressive was the actual division, when three hundred and seventy senators voted for it, against it but twenty-two.

About the middle of June, Cæsar was requested (as was Pompey) to give up *one* legion for the war against the Parthians. Pompey had engineered this motion, and he now further requested that Cæsar return the legion which Pompey had loaned him early in 53 B.C. Pompey's design was obvious, but Cæsar, without flinching, gave up these legions, having given to each man in the Pompeian legion a bounty of one thousand sesterces. For the present, however, the troops were not at all sent to the East, but detained at Capua.

In the consular elections for 49, held in July, 50, the

¹ App., "B. C.," 2, 27.

² Plut. "Cæs.," 30, and App., ib.

³ Plut., "Pomp.," 58. Liv. in 109 seems to have presented the orations of Curio in his dramatic and rhetorical manner. Cf. App., "B. C.," 2, 30.

candidate favored by Cæsar, viz., Servius Galba,¹ was defeated on the Field of Mars. The successful candidates were both, it seems, Optimates, or Pompeians; at all events, they were reputed to be, and indeed were, violent anti-Cæsarians. One was Gaius Claudius Marcellus, brother of the consul of 51, and cousin of the Marcellus of 50. Everywhere a note of triumph was sounded, for now at last two consuls had been chosen, both hostile to the proconsul of Gaul, for the other, L. Cornelius Lentulus, while staggering under enormous debts, was not venal, as time proved. There was, indeed, a rumor current in the city during the autumn, that Lentulus was in Cæsar's interest. ("Att.," 6, 8, 2.) The feeling as to what Cæsar *might* do was decidedly uncomfortable at the capital.—Pompey, whose strong point had been actual campaigning and true touch with the temper and fitness of the rank and file, was badly deceived by some of the officers who had been sent to bring the two legions over the Alps to Capua. These officers told Pompey that these troops were worn out and weary, both of the hardships and their long service.

September and October Cæsar spent in the Transalpine, making his last dispositions of winter quarters and of the quota of taxation of the several commonwealths.

In the parliamentary skirmishes in the city, Cæsar's man, Curio, on the whole had come off better than the consul, Marcellus. The latter's proposal was that to Pompey be assigned the protection of the capital and command of the forces with no limitation of further conscription; virtually, a declaration of war by a single chief magistrate, an act unconstitutional and void; but these checks are apt to disappear when great crises press for solution. Curio did his best, by eloquent and powerful allocutions on the forum, to make odious to the common people the measures of Cæsar's enemies. But he could not stop the conscription actually begun by Pompey.

¹ "B. G.," 8, 50.

As to the latter, victorious on land and sea, triumphant from three continents, wonderful mobilizer and organizer of the past, he was losing, or had actually lost, that quality essential for success, the keen faculty of seizing what was actual and real in a given situation. As Cicero landed in Brundisium ("Att.," 7, 1), he saw the situation clearly enough—even he; more so than Pompey himself: the man of letters wrote to his bosom friend not long before the storm: "About their *private power* men contest at this time, at the risk of the commonwealth." This was in December, 50 (of uncorrected calendar, really much earlier by solar year: "Att.," 7, 3, 4).

CHAPTER XVII

CÆSAR IN 49 B.C.

ON Dec. 10, 50 B.C., Curio's tribunician year expired, and he went north to report to his employer at Ravenna. Before departing he had, on the last days of his office, delivered harangues on the forum, endeavoring, with such talent as he undoubtedly possessed, to inflame the populace against Pompey and the consuls.

On Jan. 1, 49 (= Nov. 13, 50, of solar year), Curio delivered in the senate a letter from Cæsar. The session was on the Capitol, therefore Pompey was not personally present, but his father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, was looked upon as his spokesman. Clearly this was Cæsar's ultimatum. In three days Curio had brought it down from Ravenna. ("App." 2, 32.) Cæsar recounted his achievements from the beginning, and then offered to lay down his power simultaneously with Pompey. If the latter held on, then the writer would with force and speedily safeguard the interests of the capital as well as his own. The new consuls were compelled by two of the new tribunes, Antony and Cassius, to have this missive read in session.

As Dio with his inferential pragmatism reports (41, 1), the ultimatum ended with the statement: "in order that he might not be surrendered to his personal enemies." Even before these Kalends, Hirtius had quietly and suddenly come to Rome from Cæsar, without calling on Pompey: after a very short stay and conference with Balbus, he had returned to the north.

In that death scene of the Roman Republic on the Kalends of January, the consuls declined to have the sen-

ate debate on Cæsar's letter. They laid before the Great Council the *state of the country*, as was the custom.

[Cicero's letters in the crisis have an historical importance somewhat greater than official utterances of the two principals. For to Atticus he discloses with entire candor how things impress him. "We need peace. Out of a victory both many (other) evils and an autocrat will arise." ("Att.," 7, 5, 3.) "I have as yet hardly come across any one who did not think we ought to grant to Cæsar what he demands rather than have a desperate conflict." "That *demand* of his, indeed, is more forceful than *notions* (of others)." Cicero refers to the extension by a second *quinquennium* (which he himself had furthered in 56 B.C.); refers also to the plebiscite which permitted Cæsar to be a candidate in his absence . . . "unless perhaps we gave him these arms at that time, in order that we now might fight a well prepared man." ("Att.," 7, 6, 2.)—Elsewhere: "As to my honor (the Cilician triumph), unless Cæsar has plotted something through *his own tribunes*" (per *suos tribunos*) : his own, indeed; and there were ever so many other persons whom he *owned*, even though less publicly and notoriously.]

But, to return: the only motion of January 1, on which a motion was actually permitted by the consul Lentulus, was that of Pompey's father-in-law, Metellus Scipio. Apart from any distant clanking of the sword, Cæsar's ground seemed fair. It was his maxim to occupy such always, as far as possible, on the forum of public opinion, and in the art of putting his adversaries in the wrong he was an adept.

The vote adopted was that Cæsar must evacuate his provinces before a certain date: otherwise he would be held a public enemy. Probably July 1 was the date signified.¹ Two senators only, Curio and Cælius, voted against this motion; but intercession invalidated the *Senatus Consultum*.

Meanwhile, after adjournment, Pompey, in his park, holds conferences. January 2 the business before the house is the Intercession. Of course Cæsar's own tribunes cannot yield. Resolution for garb of public mourning: Resolution blocked by same pair of tribunes;

¹ Lange, 3, 406.

but garb is donned in spite of that. January 3-4, no senate. Sessions resumed January 5, 6, 7. Cæsar's father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso, offers to go to Ravenna for conciliation. Deadlock continues until the last of these seven days. On January 7 (= Nov. 19, solar year 50) the *S. C. ultimum* is passed against Cæsar's own recalcitrant tribunes: martial law. But martial law at that time in Rome could not mean anything but Pompey for generalissimo, no matter what the phrase or formula. The two tribunes now flee to him who, at Ravenna, was awaiting reply to his "gentle demands." The Roman feeling made much of it, that Antony and Cassius escaped by night in disguise of humble garb, on hired conveyance. We remain somewhat cooler on being confronted with this outrage.

These, and the further acts of the home government, Cæsar in his own book on the Civil War (1, 6-7) presents, as far as possible, as irregular. At this time, Pompey still nursed the precious notion that Cæsar's legions were estranged from him. But at Ravenna,¹ Cæsar learned all, probably not later than January 10 (= Nov. 22, 50 B.C.), and promptly harangued the one legion which he had there. Pompey's estrangement from himself he presented as partly due to the machinations of his own private enemies, and partly to Pompey's own envy and jealousy,² in which, said the proconsul of Gaul, he but ill requited Cæsar's generous attitude towards himself. This address to the troops was held on January 13 (= November 25). A goodly part of it was political, as, that the declaration of martial law at Rome was not justified by any fair precedent, but there was also a powerful appeal to their military pride. They it was

¹ The tribunes, indeed, did not go further than Ariminum. Probably that was the understanding.

² It is, psychologically, wildly improbable that Cæsar composed, e.g., the introductory words of "B. G." 7, 1, *after* this time.

who had subdued all Gaul and *Germany* — this might pass in the emotional energy of such an appeal : — would they not now defend their commander and maintain, for him, his honor and reputation against his foes ? Indeed, as the sequel showed, they were *his* troops. The state had furnished the stipend from the *aerarium* of the moribund Republic, but really they were *his own*, his own with an attachment far surpassing that of mere civic political adherents. Even his adopted son, some five years and eight months later, with splendid success, could appeal to these sentiments of military loyalty and personal affection, in taking the first steps to establish himself as a great power at once, though but nineteen years of age at the time. The Republic, even the fictitious Republic of a corrupt oligarchy, was indeed *in extremis*. Representative government, in our stricter sense of the word, had long ceased to be, long ceased to abide even as an empty shell. There had been two dynasts, long balancing and attitudinizing, but now proceeding to the arbitrament of force. But let us be fair.

If Cæsar, by a supreme effort of civic virtue, had resigned everything and retired to a leisure of study and reflection like that of Rutilius Rufus at Smyrna, would the Oligarchy have permitted him to live out his life without annoyance or danger ? Again, it is psychologically and morally absurd, *not* to see¹ that Cæsar, from early youth up, was swayed by a rare combination of abysmal ambition, coupled with a preternatural sense of actuality, and a faculty of action not predetermined for his mind by the hard and fast lines in which the world lies before the outlook of the mere doctrinaire, but led in every new emergency by an extraordinary grasp of circumstances. Many a situation, too, was actually made, shaped, evoked by his keen intelligence which understood

¹ As *Froude* did not see, or try to see.

and discounted the mental processes of his fellows and contemporaries, and actually predetermined the future itself.

Cæsar was convinced that he would be put upon his trial if he ever became a private citizen once more. In striding among the dead, immediately after his victory at Pharsalos, he spoke to himself in Greek (Asinius Pollio caught the words): “This was their will, to this pitch of necessity they brought me, that I, Gaius Cæsar, the man who has successfully waged the greatest wars, *if I had dismissed my armies, would have been found guilty on trial.*” (Plut. “Cæs.” 46.) Pompey, indeed, had a different interpretation of Cæsar’s motives for beginning the civil war. “Inasmuch,” he was wont to say,¹ “as he was neither able to complete the works which he had begun, nor satisfy the expectations of the people which it had formed of his arrival,² satisfy it by his private resources, *therefore* he willed to cause an uproar and throw everything out of gear.”

Cæsar sent in advance officers (Plut. “Cæs.” 32), without any military display, quickly to seize the town of Ariminum, thus beginning the civil war, even before he himself crossed the bridge over the little Rubicon. This he accomplished after nightfall, with deliberate privacy, attended only by a small number of men deep in his confidence. Even the dinner company which he had left were not informed of his immediate action. He had driven fast,³ but when he came to the rivulet he halted; no reason to doubt in the least what seems to have been

¹ ‘Dictitatbat,’ Suet. “Cæs.” 30.

² Pompey probably means the triumph.

³ The close resemblance of Plutarch, “Cæs.” 32, and Appian, “B. C.” 2, 35, *may* point to Livy: the ultimate source of all, however, I believe to be Asinius Pollio, an eyewitness, nay, an earwitness. See my paper in the Proceedings of the American Philological Association for 1901. The text in Suet., 32, should be changed to ‘*Iacta esto (for est) alea*’—The Greek line: δεδογμένον τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀνερρίφθω κύβος!

remembered and recorded by Asinius Pollio: the phrase that rose to his lips, too, from Menander's "Arrephoros," a commonplace of that culture, ending in the words

'Let the die be cast!'

escaped him, not pompously nor histrionically, but that agony of the soul, that endless weighing and computing, was now at an end. Resolution unfetters the soul. Since the death of Clodius by the wineshop on the Appian Way, and when the visible headship of the Oligarchy, in the person of his fellow-dynast, had become an accomplished fact,—for three years the struggle within his soul had gone on, and risen to ever greater intensity. This critical act occurred on January 12 or 13 (November 24 or 25). At dawn of day Cæsar arrived at Ariminum. Great as was his characteristic and far-famed speed, he was not reckless, for he keenly dealt with the feasible, and with the spirit and mood of his adversaries. The partisans on both sides naturally spun the thread of sentiment or anticipation, largely and naturally enthralled by the precedents of Marius, Cinna, and Sulla. Life and all its boons, or Death; ignoble butchery, destitution, exile, or wealth, triumph and power, the satisfying of long and bitter rancor; revenge, and the settlement of ancient scores, all this, for thousands, lay or seemed to lie, in the scales of Fortune. The deeper and truer Cæsar neither party could as yet know. He had not yet been revealed, perhaps not even to himself.

The measures of Pompey and the Pompeians now began to be determined, not by him or them, but by Cæsar and by their apprehension of Cæsar. The latter, at first, had about him but the XIIIth Legion. Pompey was perturbed and confused: many of his followers were angry at him. "Now stamp your legions from the soil of Italy!" so taunted Favonius, whom they called the ape of Cato. That Stoic would make great concessions to Cæsar rather

than begin civil war.¹ Most Pompeians refused to believe in the good faith of Cæsar's demands. Pompey now admitted that Cato's warnings and predictions had been well founded. At Rome there was panic: people moved away and escaped to the south: at the same time others, abandoning the country towns, poured into Rome. It was the inclement season. Pompey, himself, to whom all looked for counsel and guidance, was buffeted by conflicting counsels, warnings, petitions, urgings. News from the north varied rapidly, and the most sensational was most readily believed. The only definite thing in the capital was a universal panie. On January 17, at dusk (November 29), the Only One left Rome, never to see it again. The next day the consuls followed, all in supreme haste; even the public funds were forgotten.

Mutual offers and counter offers between the principals we may pass over: they were probably not seriously meant on either side. Immediately after the meeting of Cæsar with *his own tribunes*, he had sent orders to Gaul to have his legions march into Italy. Legion XII joined him first. Soon Picenum was in his possession. To Cicero, Pompey appeared as one dazed. Labienus had joined Pompey. The flight of Pompey touched the emotions of men. On January 22 (December 4) they discussed the alternative of making a stand in Apulia, or crossing the Adriatic. They were apprehensive of the levies now made.

Cæsar readily saw that armed forces would not often be required to hold for him the northern towns. In Campania ("Att.," 7, 14, 2) the settlers who had been living there for ten years, under Cæsar's land-laws, were no reliable material for Pompey's conscription.

The first notable resistance Cæsar found in central Italy, at *Corfinium*, on the Aternus. In that town commanded Cæsar's bitter foe, Domitius. At the same time

¹ "Att.," 7, 15, 2.

Sulmo opened its gates to Mark Antony. Here Cæsar began his policy of kindness and forbearance. Attius, a Pompeian local leader, departed freely. While encamped before Corfinium, Cæsar received reinforcements from the north, including his Legion VIII. Pompey was unwilling to relieve the town, and the garrison soon of itself took the military oath to serve under Cæsar's eagles. Domitius was allowed to go, and even to take along funds which he had from Pompey. (Cæs., "B. C." 1, 23.) This important surrender took place about February 19 (January 1-2, 49 B.C.). During these winter days, Cicero, himself ("Fam.", 14, 14, 10), was not sure whether Cæsar would sack the capital or not. Labienus had filled Pompey's ears with absurd stories about the weakness of Cæsar's troops. ("Att.", 7, 16, 2.) Early in February, in a letter to his bosom friend ("Att.", 7, 20), the Arpinate referred to Cæsar as to a tyrant, of whom one could not yet know whether he would turn out a Phalaris or a Pisistratus, cruel or moderate. The conscription in the south generally had been a fizzle or a failure ("Att.", 7, 21, 1); Pompey utterly without spirit or energy.¹ Atticus at Rome, early in February, expected bloodshed by new proscriptions when Cæsar should come.² On February 9, Cicero, in his survey of things, had abandoned Italy to Cæsar. Good news left Cicero incredulous or pessimistic. On February 24 Cicero heard of the surrender of Corfinium. His emotional disgust turned against Pompey. On February 25 the latter was in the port of Brundisium. On March 9 Cæsar arrived before it with six legions. He tried to block Pompey's departure, and still repeatedly sought conferences. ("B. C." 1, 26.) Pompey declined because the consuls were not on hand. *At last*³ Cæsar (if we are to believe him) ceased to hope for conciliation.

¹ Ib., 'totus iacet.'

² 'Tu cædem non sine causa times.' "Att.", 7, 22.

³ Ib., 'aliquando.'

On March 17 Pompey left the soil of Italy forever. 'Ever shameful and disastrous flight' . . . so Cicero felt about Pompey's strategy of retreat.¹ But the conqueror of the East looked forward to facing Cæsar later on, with many provinces and kingdoms at his back, and with a situation vastly improved through command of the sea.

Now began that demeanor of Cæsar, in which there was a curious medley of autocratic and constitutional measures, the former often necessary, the latter often factitious, and, in a measure, sentimental. Sardinia and Sicily were occupied by his appointees with remarkable ease. The senatorial government, its insolence, oppression, and rapacity, had deprived the representatives of that government of all hold on the provincials, even when men like Cato represented that government at this moment.

Cæsar turned from Apulia to Rome, which he had not seen for nine years. Here, in his public allocutions, he represented his course as strictly legitimate. Pompey himself² had allowed the plebiscite to be enacted, which permitted his candidacy while in his province. No ambition had spurred him on: what he experienced had been unfairness, refusal of conferences for conciliation. Cæsar now requested senators to remain at home and do their full share in the current work of the government: whosoever, on the other hand, would abandon Rome, should find Cæsar ready to govern by himself. "With you, conscript fathers, if I may: without you, if I must!" He still was willing to send envoys for pacification.

Political play this, I believe, clever play against Pompey in this comity of granting freedom of movement to senators: the older dynast had declared that as Cæsarians would be held all who would remain at Rome.

¹ "Att.," 8, 1, 3.

² In 52.

The special reserve fund of the state (in the *aerarium sanctius*) Cæsar appropriated, dealing without ceremony with the one last tribune who protested. He had, truly, gained the peninsula without bloodshed.¹ He had, so far, laid no heavy hand on life or property. No new Sulla had arisen, no new Marius had come forward establishing a reign of terror. And still there was no enthusiasm, and the remnants of the Great Council were sullen. Cæsar himself designated the time spent in Rome as virtually *lost* time. ("B. C.," 1, 33, 4.) Pompey's western *imperium* must first be broken down: to the keen man of action, with such tasks before him, parliamentary palavering was, indeed, a waste of precious days.

Dio (41, 16; Livy?) tells us also (Cæsar does not) that to the plebs Cæsar promised a present equal to about eight dollars per man. The grain distribution, also, seems to have fallen into neglect after the departure of the regular government from Rome. The envoys to Pompey were never sent. The populace saw the troops in town,² and felt somewhat incredulous as to Cæsar's smooth words.

In beginning his war in the west, to wrest Spain from the other dynast, Cæsar was greatly incommoded by the defection of *Massilia*. When he told the rulers of that Greek emporium ("B. C.," 1, 35) that they should follow "the lead of all Italy rather than obey the will of a single person," he spoke simply as a politician: the argument might easily have been reversed. Domitius, let go at Corfinium, directed the defence of that port.

Cæsar in person undertook the Iberian campaign. The field of operations was on the river *Sicoris* (Segre), which flows into the lower Ebro from the northeast, the chief town of that district being *Ilerda* (Lerida).

¹ Dio, 41, 8.

² "From Gaul and Germany he worked the war around upon the capital, and that coddler of the plebs, that people's man, placed his camp in the Circus Flaminus, nearer than had been that of Porsena." Seneca, "De Benef.," V, 16, 5.

Among his own troops Cæsar had five thousand Gallic cavalry, and during the campaign he drew further on that province. For awhile, he suffered much from high water and from lack of grain supplies. At Rome, for a time ("B. C.," 1, 53), it was believed that he was losing the campaign. But on the spot, his swift operations overcame the disadvantages of topography, and soon many communities of northeastern Spain, convinced that he would win in the end, supplied his needs. The defection from Pompey spread. His engineers began to divert the river. Afranius and Petreius, the Pompeian commanders, were compelled to abandon their base at Ilerda, and march in an almost southerly direction toward the Ebro. Cæsar, crossing the Sicoris, overtook them in the afternoon. Both sides encamped. Then Cæsar manœuvred in such a way that, if the Pompeians were to reach the Ebro before him, they would have to abandon camp and baggage (1, 70). Finally, Cæsar held Afranius in a position where he could overcome him by thirst (c. 72). Cæsar himself strongly emphasizes his humane and generous motives, refusing to give battle, and maintaining this even against the ardor and impatience, nay petulance, of his own veterans. "He was moved by pity for citizens who, he saw, must needs be slain." He wished to be remembered as kind-hearted. The greater appears the contrast with Petreius. For the end was at hand, and Cæsar's kindness was even then rapidly conciliating the goodwill of the Pompeian rank and file. Petreius, indeed, remained faithful to his distant proconsul, forcing his colleague and his troops to renew their military oath. Desertions to Cæsar were of daily occurrence. So the Pompeian leaders determined to march back on Ilerda. Cæsar hung on their heels. Covering little ground and incessantly harassed, they finally halted and built a stockade where there was no water. Nor could they procure fodder. At this point Cæsar began to surround them with a circumvallation.

On the fourth day the Pompeians asked for a conference. There Afranius offered surrender. Cæsar soundly humbled their pride. Why had they been so obstinate before, when their own troops were ready to abandon the hopeless contest? Cæsar here brushed aside all military considerations and laid stress (1, 85) on the political: the forces in Spain had been maintained, not, indeed, for the control of those provinces, but *against himself*. A novel kind of proconsulate was this, that Pompey at the gates of Rome, should control the administration,¹ and at the same time while absent, hold for so many years two warlike provinces. He, Cæsar, had been the real object of this extraordinary and irregular manipulation. Now they must disband their legions and leave the province. None would be compelled to serve under himself against his will.

Hispania *ulterior* had been under Varro (then sixty-seven years of age), the tried friend of Pompey, and known to us as the greatest expert of Roman antiquities. Cæsar ("B. C.", 2, 17 sqq.), in a sub-ironical way, delineates the elderly author as somewhat of a watcher of the winds, an observer who depended on what news came to hand, a brave disseminator of bad news if they bore against Cæsar.

The latter, after the capitulation in northeastern Spain, hastened to the south, having summoned the leading men to Corduba. Gades (the community of Balbus) refused obedience to Varro (2, 20), who finally submitted to Cæsar at Corduba, and turned over to him the public funds.

Cæsar sailed from Gades to Tarraco, thence travelled by land to Narbo and Massilia, which then made its formal submission. Domitius had fled a few days before. Here Cæsar heard—probably without much surprise—that he had been named dictator by the prætor Lepidus. The consuls were in Macedon. This happened in the latter part of August or early in September.

¹ Præsideat rebus.

Somewhat later, Cæsar's partisan, the orator and politician Curio, lost Africa for his principal, and perished himself. Africa, with Sicily, was an economic necessity for feeding the proletariat of the capital. The Numidian king Juba had a large share in this Pompeian success. Cæsar ("B. C.", 2, 38) speaks with gentle moderation of the catastrophe of Curio; he explains it psychologically. Of the death of Curio personally, he speaks with respect, almost with emotion.

Political rewards there had been: much of the coming monarch's administration consisted of such rewards dealt out to partisans. This assignment of Africa had been a failure. The appointment of Q. Cassius Longinus, as governor of Farther Spain, was likewise a grossly faulty one. But he, with Antony, had done material service early in the year at Rome. Cæsar was dictator then: let us survey his power as it was in that autumn: Spain, Gaul, Cisalpine, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia. His dictatorship,¹ expessededly, was for conducting the elections in default of consuls, and lasted but eleven days.

At last, then, Cæsar got his second consulate. Was it this little civic honor that he had gained vast power for in northwestern Europe? Hardly. But he adds, as though he were a veritable Cato: "For this was the year in which, *under the statutes*,² he could be made consul." *Per leges* indeed. Rome and forum were weighty spheres to bestow the glamor of legality on any new magistrates: at Thessalonica, of course, they were not recognized.

At this time Cæsar refused to send any envoys to Pompey, for he, Cæsar, had now the prestige of regularity, and controlled the capital. Both dynasts used the old forms as long as they could.

During Cæsar's absence in Spain, Mark Antony was

¹ Appian, 2, 48; Plut., "Cæs.," 37.

² 'Per leges,' scil. the *Lex Villia Annalis*.

his viceroy in Italy, and¹ in meeting municipal dignitaries demeaned himself with sovereign whimsicality if not with brutal self-indulgence. Some of the purest patriots of the peninsula, like Servius Sulpicius, dreaded the victory of either dynast ("Att." 10, 14). Either, he was convinced, would in time be driven to resort to confiscation on a large scale.

For delicate and private activities Cæsar had again relied on Balbus.

[In Cicero's eyes and in his emotional susceptibility the events of this critical year, mirrored in his letters to Atticus, books 7, 8, 9, 10, appear to us as endowed with much more life and color than in Cæsar's partisan however politic relation. Things often look essentially different in *his* relation: In January he writes to Tiro² about Cæsar's ultimatum; he calls Cæsar impudent for holding army and province against the will of the senate. Curio goads him on. Antony and Cassius have gone to Cæsar, driven by no force.

Jan. 25. "We are disgracefully unprepared, on the score of soldiers as well as treasure." ("Att." 7, 14.)

Jan. 27. "We thought that he, if he moved close to the city, would fear to lose the provinces of Gaul, both of which are bitterly hostile to him, excepting the Transpadanes." We observe the talk of Labienus, probably. ("Fam." 16, 12.) This sinister influence of Labienus on Pompey is confirmed by "Att." 7, 16, 2: (Pompey) "has Labienus with him, who entertains no doubt as to the weakness of Cæsar's troops."

Feb. 15. ("Att." 8, 11.) "When we were all apprehensive of Cæsar, Pompey himself treated him with distinction: after he himself has begun to fear Cæsar, he thinks all should be the latter's foes."

Feb. 18-19. ("Att." 8, 3, 3.) "I pass over those ancient things, that *he* (Pompey) nourished, advanced, armed Cæsar in public affairs, *he* (in 59 B.C.), as supporter for laws passed by force and against the auspices, *he*, the one who added Farther Gaul, *he*, son-in-law, *he*, augur in the adoption of P. Clodius, *he*, the extender of time for the province, *he*, the helper of the absent one in all things, the same also in his third consulate, after he began to be the defender of the state, exerted himself that the ten tribunes should propose a law that he might be a candidate in his absence, which *he* likewise legalized by a certain statute of his own, and resisted Marcus Marcellus, when the latter was engaged in an effort to limit (the holding of) the Gallic provinces on March first." . . .

¹ "Att." 10, 13.

² "Fam." 16, 11.

In the latter part of February Cæsar endeavored to draw one of the consuls, Lentulus, back to Rome by promising him a province. ("Att.," 8, 9, 4.)

Cicero at first distrusted Cæsar's conciliatory letters and pronouncements. Some of the latter were certainly more politic than sincere, as when he told Cicero, through Balbus, that his choice was simply to live without apprehension, with Pompey the first man in the state. 'I suppose you believe that,' my dear Atticus. Certainly I do not. — Nor do we.

Returning from Brundisium, in the last days of March, Cæsar had a personal conference with Cicero. ("Att.," 9, 18.) The orator found Cæsar positive and unyielding. Their views of the situation were irreconcilable. Cicero stood for the maintenance of parliamentary forces, for the decisive importance of senatorial debates, motions, and divisions. Cicero insisted that if he took his seat in the senate, then his speeches would demand the inhibition of future warfare. Cæsar positively declared that this was impossible. So they parted.

Early in April Cicero begins to call Cæsar *autocrat* (*tyrannus*). Cæsar's brief attempt in Rome to manipulate the parliamentary and constitutional machine, in a quasi-legal manner, had disgusted him. His aversion for the Great Council seems to have been passionately bitter. '*From me, said he, shall everything proceed!*'¹

As he marched towards Massilia he was still furious, as Cælius reported to Cicero from Cæsar's headquarters. "Fam.," 8, 16, 1. "Nihil nisi atrox et sævum cogitat atque etiam loquitur. *Iratus senatui exiit: his intercessionibus plane incitatus est.*" How absurd of Mommsen to attempt to make Cæsar the champion of liberalism! He merely used the latter sometimes, as mask or as tool.

Curio was convinced that Cæsar's rôle as friend of the people was about ended. ("Att.," 10, 7, 3.)

As for Pompey, his military plans are cast in the lines of Themistocles, all for sea-power, and domination there: "for he thinks, that he who controls the sea must needs be master of the general situation." (Sound views, if only he had adhered to them.)

"Cuius omne consilium Themistocleum est. Existimat enim, qui mare tenet, eum necesse (esse, I would insert) rerum potiri. Itaque nunquam id egit, ut Hispaniae per se tenerentur, navalis apparatus ei semper antiquissima cura fuit. Navigabit igitur, cum erit tempus, maximis classibus, et ad Italiam accedet. . . ." "Att.," 10, 8, 1.]

¹ At ille impendio nunc magis odit senatum. 'A me, inquit, omnia proficiscentur.' "Att.," 10, 4, 9.

CHAPTER XVIII

CÆSAR IN 48 B.C.

THE entire East obeyed Pompey, and the great organizer had drawn troops, funds, supplies, ships, from that vast territory which some thirteen years before he had settled with comity towards persons, and with equity towards states. Cicero, too, had left the leisure of his villas and the incessant scrutinizing of the political horizon, and, in spite of Antony's warnings, crossed the sea to join Pompey's headquarters.

When Cæsar was going to Spain, he said to his friends¹ he was going to an army without a leader, and thence he would return to a leader without an army. The levies of the East he certainly did not hold in any estimation. But the sea-power was a grave matter. From the islands of the Ægean, from Coreyra, from the Piræus, from Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phenicia, from Alexandria, had been gathered an armada, of which the chief admiral was Bibulus, the bitterest enemy of Cæsar in public life.

As for Cæsar's ships, they were not even enough to transport his troops at one time. The legions too, were undermanned: the autumn of southern Italy had made ravages in their numbers and impaired the health of others. But even so, Cæsar would not be checked: the very fact that the inclement season had begun made him dare to begin an enterprise which in the time of summer navigation Bibulus might have ruined or delayed.

At Brundisium, however, ("B. C.," 3, 6) before em-

¹ Suet., "Cæs.," 34.

barking, Cæsar addressed his veterans: with equanimity they should leave behind slaves and baggage; the room of passage must be reserved for themselves; soon they would arrive at the end of hardships and dangers. Victory and his own liberality would compensate them for everything. With the first transports, Cæsar landed on the coast of Illyricum on Jan. 5, 48 B.C., but by the solar year it was = Nov. 6, 49 B.C.²

Clearly Pompey was disturbed and troubled. Cæsar's coming over at the beginning of winter was, to him, an unwelcome and unexpected change of affairs. He was on his way to establish his winterquarters by the sea, at Apollonia and Dyrrachium. Let us see. No doubt but that his intention had been to land in Brundisium, at the beginning of navigation, in March–April of the solar year 48 B.C., and from that naval base undertake the recovery of Italy, as Cicero intimated above.

Once more Cæsar's supreme speed and energy in taking an offensive form of initiative startled and disconcerted the elderly strategist.

But as things turned out, the seven months from the early part of November to the beginning of the grain-harvest were to put Cæsar on his mettle. For he controlled neither the sea nor the interior, and the question of supplies became an ever more urgent one. Cæsar repeatedly offered conferences for conciliation and peace even. ("B. C.," 3, 10.) It seems difficult to determine his sincerity. One thing, however, he knew with certainty, viz., that Pompey would refuse, and that thus he himself would score a moral advantage with public opinion. His own conciliatory demeanor was in sharp contrast with the truculent cruelty of Bibulus in dealing with occasional prisoners, or entire crews.

As for Pompey, he refused all parley. This dynast was evidently (as his friend Cicero over and over intimates)

² *Iamque hiems appropinquabat.* Cæs., "B. C.," 3, 9, 8.

consumed with the overwhelming concern for his *dignitas*, his rank before the contemporary world. It was intolerable for him to think he should owe his return to Italy to Cæsar's peaceable disposition. ("B. C.," 3, 18.) Even more radical was Labienus: no peace unless Cæsar's head was brought into Pompey's headquarters. If Pompey just then had boldly crossed over into Italy, if— . . . but he was no Cæsar.

Finally, there came about the famous operations about Dyrrachium. Cæsar, pretty nearly worn out by Pompey's Fabian policy, and seeing his own legions half famished,¹ and passionately desirous of reducing the prestige of the hitherto unbeaten conqueror of the East, had to do something. Pompey, on his own side, had suffered not a little from the taunts of his own partisans as being "a good for nothing commander-in-chief."²

Cæsar explains his own defeat, but he does not cheapen (c. 47) the success of Pompey. Besides, the latter, with unlimited supplies arriving by sea, could neither be starved nor forced into battle against his own will. Cæsar's veterans indeed, could be heartened by recalling Ilerda, Alesia, Avaricum.

As for water supply, Cæsar had done his uttermost to stop or spoil the water courses which supplied the Pompeians, but here was no situation like that of Uxelodunum.

In vain did Cæsar offer battle in the open, on even terms, to Pompey. — Meanwhile, through some of his lieutenants, Cæsar had begun to wrest from Pompey the central western part of the Hellenic towns, to which Phocis and Bœotia were soon added.

I am no expert in strategy, and must not dabble in military science; but the following seems to be clear, even to the lay mind: in marching southeast into the plains of

¹ Plut., "Cæs.," 65.

² Nullius usus imperator. "B. C.," 3, 45.

Thessaly, Cæsar sought to reëstablish his prestige, or to gain a pitched battle on more even terms.

At this juncture Pompey stood before a rare alternative. He could follow Cæsar. Again, he could cross the Ionic Sea into Italy. Having landed at Brundisium, he could march to the capital and take it without shedding a drop of blood. Also with his domination of the sea he could check or prohibit Cæsar's transports.

Now Cæsar has expressed himself about these, or similar, contingencies ("B. C.," 3, 78): "if Pompey were to push in the same direction, he would draw him away from the sea and from those resources which Pompey had organized at Dyrrachium, and compel him to fight a *decisive* battle (*decertare*) with himself on equal strategic terms (*pari condicione belli*); if he (Pompey) were to cross over to Italy,¹ then Cæsar would join his army with Domitius and march through Illyricum for the support of Italy." Meanwhile, however, on the Tiber a profound change of situation might have come about. At this time Pompey's father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, had come over into northern Greece with forces from Syria. These Cæsar had observed and checked through his legate, Cn. Domitius Calvinus. Pompey took the fatal step of following the movement of Cæsar and joining Scipio, instead of sailing to Italy.

The battle of Pharsalos² occurred on August 9, of the uncorrected Roman calendar, then June 6, of solar year.

Cæsar represents Pompey as vaunting and boasting in his camp as of a victory already won: after Scipio came down with his corps from Larissa, his numbers looked formidable enough. And the spirit of the young noblemen at Pompey's headquarters was one of sanguine assurance. "They were openly quarrelling about prizes and sacer-

¹ *I.e.*, by sea, of course: *transiret*.

² Cæs., "B. C.," 3, 85, 99; Suet., "Cæs.," 35; Dio, 41, 55-61; Appian, "B. C.," 2, 65-82; Plut., "Cæs.," 42-47; Plut., "Pomp.," 68-72; Lucan, 7, 45 sqq.

dotal honors and made a programme in advance for the consular honors: others claimed the houses and property of those who were in Cæsar's camp." Labienus, with his counsels and depreciation of the other side, had been the evil genius of Pompey. The battle and the day, however, was chosen by Cæsar, on whose tent the scarlet banner fluttered that June morning.

One of the decisive arrangements on Cæsar's side was this: seeing the enormous advantage which Pompey had in cavalry, he anticipated that Pompey would use it for a flank movement around Cæsar's right wing, which then would be exposed to a smothering assault upon the shieldless side (*latere aperto*): these cavalry masses—so Pompey had made his dispositions—would then work around to Cæsar's rear and produce confusion there, even before the frontal meeting of the infantry had occurred. On Cæsar's right was his Legion X. Now for this very assault of Pompey's cavalry, Cæsar had placed a special reserve, a fourth line of six cohorts. At the critical moment Cæsar let them loose on Pompey's horse (3, 93), which were promptly turned and routed. The archers and slingers, deprived of this support, were put to the sword. The further details need not detain us. Pompey despaired of the day, says Cæsar (c. 94), when the great cavalry charge had failed.

Cæsar's entire account, while free from boasting, is permeated with a glow, may we say, of a kind of technical and strategic satisfaction. Also, he takes pains to bring out his own firmness and perseverance in the policy of conciliation and compromise. To stand well with his troops was one of the great things of his constant concern: almost as strong was his almost modern eagerness to stand well with public opinion, if not with the ages to come. And so, in addressing his veterans before the battle, he called them to witness with what zeal he had sought peace: his parleying with Scipio through Aulus Clodius,

his offers through Libo, through Vatinius. "Nor had he ever wished to wantonly shed the blood of his soldiers, nor desired to deprive the commonwealth of either army." Is this true? For we must not lay down our faculties of observation and judgment when dealing with extraordinary men. Cæsar certainly towards public opinion, on the moral side of valuation, was much more delicately sensitive than Napoleon.

Turning once more to the forces which met in Thessaly on that sunny day in June, 48 B.C., we must put on record two judgments. One, by Labienus, whose turning from Cæsar to Pompey we cannot very well endow with lofty, perhaps not even with reputable motives. "Do not think," he said,¹ "Pompey, that this is the Army which defeated Gaul and Germany. At all the engagements was I present, and am not rashly making a public statement of a thing I know nothing of. A very small part of that army is left over; a great part is dead, which could not but happen with so great a number of actions. Many did the pestilence of autumn in Italy consume, many went home, many were left on the continent. . . . These forces which you see, have had their numbers made good from the conscriptions of these present years, and most of them are from the colonial towns beyond the Po." From this utterance, let us turn to an elderly man, no soldier, indeed (although aided by his military brother he had directed military operations in a distant province a few years before), a man, too, who had known Pompey intimately for some twenty years, a man, for whom the continual study of Pompey had been for some time a vital necessity of being and hope. This was Cicero. He

¹ "B. C.," 3, 87. Such utterances probably reached Cæsar soon enough. Cæsar took pains to learn all he could of the other side, e.g., "castigato Scipione a Favonio, *ut postea confecto bello reperiebamus*, . . ." "B. C.," 3, 57. Cf. the address in "B. G.," 7, 77, ". . . *ut postea cognitum est.*" "B. C.," 3, 86.

had followed, after some half year of irresolution, across the Adriatic, in summer 49. Cæsar's political agents, Balbus and Oppius, had failed to stop him.¹

As for Pompey himself, Cicero had considered his entire course of action ever since Cæsar drove across the Rubicon, *one chain of blunders*. ("Att.," 9, 10, 2.) Cicero felt like a lover who is disillusioned by finding the girl stupid and a slattern. Deeply had sunk into his heart a phrase which often came from Pompey's lips: "*Sulla could: shall I not be able to do it?*"

It would have been a questionable thing, too, for Pompey to bring his Asiatic allies into Italy, let alone to Rome. It was, then, a kind of personal, or civic sentimentalism² which finally made Cicero follow Pompey. His lively and brilliant mind saw the situation closely. The spirit of Sulla was there rampant, he says. The orator himself shuddered at the idea of Pompey's victory. ("Fam.," 7, 3.) Writing a few years after Pharsalos, Cicero held that the success at Dyrrachium was pernicious to Pompey's strategy and military character. "From that time on, that eminent man was no commander at all. He undertook a pitched battle, he, with his army of raw recruits and soldiery hastily scraped together,³ to meet legions of toughest calibre. Most basely whipped, losing even his camp, he alone resorted to flight."

Pompey abandoned all thoughts of Italy and the Tiber. In the East was his prestige and many beneficiaries of his former campaigns. Besides, his consort, the youthful lady Metella, was in Mitylene. It was vain for him to dream of Parthian support. His Greek favorite Theophanes it was whose counsels turned the prow of his

¹ "Att.," 9, 7, A. B.

² 'Pudori tamen malui famaeque cedere quam salutis meæ rationem ducere,' "Fam.," 7, 3, 1.

³ *Tirone et collectio exercitu.*

galleys towards the sands of Pelusium. As he consented to the fatal invitation to descend into the little boat, the last words heard from his lips were two lines of Sophocles:¹

“Whoever wends his way to despot’s throne,
His slave is he, though free man erst he came.”

[On his adventurous way in pursuit of his rival, Cæsar took pains to deal some moral blows to partisans of the former, as when, indeed, he claims to have saved the temple treasures of the Ephesian Artemis² from the spoliation of T. Ampius Balbus, a Pompeian, who could use the pen. Nor did Cæsar hesitate to relate with a sober and serious face a *prodigium* of Elis: how a figure of Victory, in the temple of Athena there, had faced about on the very day of Pharsalos, towards the portals and threshold of the temple. So he sought to work upon the minds of his Eastern subjects as well as upon the broad mass of his contemporaries everywhere. We see that in the next generation Livy (b. 11) copied such *prodigia*, and added some recorded for Pharsalos in Livy’s own birthplace of Patavium.³ Livy himself was about eleven years old at the time.

To speak soberly: it was for a long time virtually impossible for any contemporary of that generation, as well as the next one, to eliminate partisanship from any effort of historical composition. We certainly are not so naïve as to believe that the surviving dynast, Cæsar, wrote without a very strong desire to advance his own interests, and to discredit the other side as much as possible. The Ides of March, 44, did not allay that spirit. The matter in Suetonius reveals how in the mad partisanship of Cæsar’s times, the figure of the foremost man was dragged in the dust by some, while the others were not content with anything short of an apotheosis.]

The arrival of Cæsar in Egypt coincided with a bitter quarrel between the children of the late King Ptolemy Auletes, whose varying fortunes had been such a gold-mine to the Roman politicians, and against whose estate Cæsar himself still held heavy claims. The two older children were two daughters, Cleopatra and Arsinoë, then came King Ptolemy, a schoolboy of thirteen, and the last was a boy too, a child then. The quarrelling heirs partly relied on eunuchs and other unscrupulous men about the court. It seems puzzling that they did not all agree to

¹ Appian, “B. C.,” 2, 35.

² “B. C.,” 3, 105.

³ Plut., “Cæs.,” 47.

accept the settlement of the Roman consul, whose power in the East there was no one to seriously question.

Cleopatra, the oldest, was then about twenty-one years of age. Her father, Ptolemy Auletes, had been restored to his throne by Gabinius in the time of the great pact. In a way, any survivor of the Triumvirate was a guarantor of the testament of that king. Cleopatra was supremely conscious of the possession of those gifts with which she quickly made her play at the sensuality and the erotic susceptibility of Cæsar. The author, indeed, of the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, a *legatus* perhaps of Cæsar's, and certainly of his inner circle, does not in the slightest degree touch upon, nor ever so faintly allude to, this intrigue, which began very soon after Cæsar's arrival in Egypt.

First, Arsinoë began a war with the Roman *imperator*: really, it was her eunuch minister, Ganymedes. Later, the schoolboy king himself, with histrionic tears and quite precocious hypocrisy,¹ succeeded in making his escape from Cæsar's headquarters in the great palace of the dynasty, or better, in gaining permission to go away. Cæsar's generosity was easily wrought upon. This incident, however, masking the designs of older men, was that which really made the rising of Alexandria a formidable matter for Cæsar's military craft and cunning.

¹ "Bell. Alex.," 24.

CHAPTER XIX

CÆSAR IN 47 B.C.

IN the latter part of March, 47 B.C., this Alexandrine war came to an end, when the schoolboy king, in his golden gleaming corselet, perished in the Nile: by the solar year the operations extended from Aug., 48, to about Jan. 15 of the year 47 B.C. As for the conqueror, his own comparative resourcelessness was in the beginning but ill matched against the vast treasures and supplies of that metropolis. It was only when there arrived from Syria the reinforcements summoned by Cæsar and commanded by Mithridates of Pergamos, that the former was in a position to conclude the whole enterprise and settle the kingdom. The decisive victory over the schoolboy king had occurred on March 27 of the uncorrected calendar.¹ The many elements of romance and adventure concerning his sojourn on the Nile need not detain us. We notice, however, a few significant matters in ancient tradition before passing on into the peninsula of Asia Minor.

[According to Dio (42, 7), when head and seal-ring of Pompey were brought to Cæsar upon his landing at Alexandria, he shed tears and was moved to warm words also. Dio says that 'they' (who?) laughed at this performance. The eunuchs of that miserable court? Is this one of the free psychological observations of Dio, or did he follow Livy here? Certainly the partisans of Pompey, when they heard of it, made mockery of this grave and solemn scene.

The hexameters of *Lucan* are even more bitter, 9, 1037:—

Utque fidem videt sceleris tutumque putavit
Iam bonus esse sacer, lacrimas non sponte cadentis
Effudit gemitusque expressit pectore læto
Non aliter manifesta potens abscondere mentis
Gaudia quam lacrimis. . . .

¹ *Fasti Prænestini*, sub March 27: *Hoc die Cæsar Alexand. Recepit.*

As to the latter part of his stay on the Nile, Suetonius ("Cæs.," 52) says that he made a tour with Cleopatra up the Nile to the confines of Ethiopia, on a vessel equipped with elaborate cabins (*nave thalamego*) : perhaps we meet here the trace of Pompeian pens¹ which Suetonius has manifestly followed in certain sections of his important biography.— Dio's account of the Alexandrine war bears hard on Cæsar: "He gave Egypt as a gratuity to Cleopatra, for whose sake also he had waged the war" (42, 44). Besides, Cleopatra bore a son to Cæsar. Appian, whose account in many ways is hurried and inaccurate, confirms Suetonius with detail of his own ("B. C.," 2, 90): "He toured with Cleopatra on the Nile, with four hundred ships, viewing the country." Plutarch ("Cæs.," 48) quotes a twofold tradition: *Some* censured the Alexandrine war of Cæsar as due to his infatuation for Cleopatra ; *others* accused powerful members of the schoolboy king's court, such as Potheinos, who resorted to special wiles to make Cæsar's sojourn in the palace odious to the soldiers of the royal guard : also that Cleopatra gave birth to Cæsario a very short time before Cæsar hurried away to Pontus.]

This was the much-vaunted campaign against *Pharnaces*, son and murderer of the great Mithridates. Like his southeastern neighbors, the Parthians, this despot, in Pompey's last campaign, had withheld all aid from the latter, hoping to make a better conclusion in the inevitable settlement with the ultimate victor. The heir of Pontus was in a measure emboldened to hold out, because he had defeated Cæsar's governor, Domitius Calvinus, left in charge of *Asia*, the Roman province so called. The Pontic tyrant had actually overrun Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia, and was dreaming of repeating his father's conquest of Asia Minor, forty years before. These events occurred late in the autumn of 48 B.C.

Cæsar now, having left Egypt, sailed from Syria to Cilicia. Thence, with extraordinary speed, he pushed across the Taurus and through Cappadocia, for he was impatient once more to reach the imperial capital, whence there were coming despatches relating the almost complete demoralization of the civil government. Also Cæsar

¹ *E.g.*, T. Ampius Balbus, Suet., "Cæs.," 77, whom Cæsar had besmirched in "B. C.," 3, 105.

heard of a mutinous spirit widely prevailing among some of his most valuable veteran legions. ("Bell. Alex.," 65.)

But impatient as he was, he still found time everywhere to ordain a settlement of all internal dissensions and feuds with neighbors in those communities through which he passed. So, too, in Mazaca, the capital of Cappadocia.¹—In penalizing Deiotarus the Galatian, he rejected the latter's defense (for having helped Pompey) in a manner and with arguments of which we will take notice. He, Cæsar (so he made rejoinder to the hapless Gallogrecian), in the campaign of Epirus and Macedon, had truly (*sic*) represented the home government, Rome and Italy, people and senate. The conqueror made good use of the apparatus and terms of constitutional government, whenever that could be conveniently done.

While moving into Pontus to close with that despot, he kept replying to the latter's emissaries without slackening his own movement. He refused to credit Pharnaces with especial loyalty towards himself in having abstained from sending any contingents to Pompey. The king's outrages perpetrated upon provincials and Roman citizens at Amisus, he might condone, but Pharnaces must abandon Pontus, and make reparation to Roman tax-farmers and other injured persons. Clearly, Cæsar designed to keep the tyrant in hope and humor; the latter, in turn, well-informed of the civic disorder at Rome,² knew that Cæsar must needs soon go thither, and so began to procrastinate. Cæsar, in *his* turn, a miser of his time then, was compelled to act both swiftly and decisively. Near Zela, some forty-five miles west-southwest from Comana Pontica, Cæsar grappled with Pharnaces.

The king, with a sanguine confidence often bred in autocrats by their flatterers, actually took the offensive, descending down a valley, one mile from Cæsar's position,

¹ Kiepert, Lehrbuch der Alten Geographie, 1878, p. 93, note 2.

² "Bell. Alex.," 71.

while the latter was still being fortified: the Roman was astounded at the other's boldness. The rout of the Pontic ruler began on the right wing of the Romans, where stood the VIth Legion, the only seasoned body of troops then with Cæsar, which he had brought from Egypt. The advantage of topography rendered Cæsar's success overwhelming. He had not expected to begin and end a campaign of some difficulty by one and the same stroke: a campaign too absolutely necessary to secure the eastern frontier of the empire. The elation which he there felt, found vent in the famous words sent to one of his partisans in Rome in a letter.

[When one compares the exact account of the military relation ("Bell. Alex.," 72-77) with the later historians (such as Dio, 42, 47), we come upon several points worthy of notice. The laconic "*Veni, Vidi, Vici*" (according to Plut., "Cæs.," 50), were first used in a letter to "*Aman-tius*" in Rome: perhaps *Matius*. In his Pontic triumph these words, painted in huge letters on a frame of canvas, were carried in the parade. (Suet., "Cæs.," 37.) We also learn from Suetonius (35) that Cæsar frequently, *after* Zela no doubt, referred to Pompey, and the luck of that commander which had ennobled him through successes over antagonists of so flimsy calibre: truly no *Vercingetorix*, no *Ariovist*.]

All the loot from the king Cæsar awarded to his troops. Their loyalty and personal devotion were more than ever essential, not only to his further plans, but also to his political existence.

Moving westwards towards Ægean and Adriatic, he settled everything on a Cæsarean basis. Pompey, indeed, had attached these districts to his own fortunes. Pompey was no more. But nowhere could the conqueror and conservator of empire tarry long. The disorder at the capital was urgently demanding his personal presence. ("Bell. Alex.," 78.) He passed westward, through Greece, and at length, somewhat unexpectedly after all, landed at Tarentum, about July 1 of solar year.

Not far from this Italo-Grecian city, at or near Brundisium, the most eminent, we may say, of the dictator's

subjects, had spent nine or ten months from September, 48, to July, 47 B.C. (corrected time). These had been for him among the most hopeless and gloomy months in a life which, during the twelve last years, had passed through an uncommon measure of disappointment, discomfiture, disillusionment, sadness, and sorrow. This was Cicero.

A large amount of his correspondence, dated in this grave period of Roman history, has been preserved. It was indeed a political season, in which a merely cunning and diplomatic *ingenium* would perhaps have allowed his pen to lie idle, and merely watch the currents, and the foam and bubbles on the surface of the currents of the political tide. Of those who had followed the fortunes of Pompey in Epirus and Macedon, Cicero and Lælius alone had been permitted by the victor to return to the soil of Italy, where the reckless voluptuary and energetic man of action, Mark Antony, held sway as Cæsar's viceroy. Thenceforward, only after Cæsar himself had tried the particular case, could any Pompeian return to Italy. ("Att.," 11, 7, 2.) His directions, by letter, to Antony, had even been tinctured with bitterness or anger.¹

Cicero, himself, held himself dissolved from any further allegiance to Pompey, first, after Pharsalos, and even more after the tragedy on the sands of Egypt. It is necessary for the larger purpose of these lectures, to repeat and urge still another thing: we need not, must not, endow Cæsar with motives or a consciousness hatched out in Mommsen's brain chiefly, of which the adroit and ambitious politician was ignorant. At the same time, we are dealing with a difficult and elusive period of history. It is tinctured, in the ancient tradition, at almost all points, with the prejudice and the purpose to injure and besmirch, engendered by partisanship in partisans.

¹ *Vehementius scriptum erat, ib.*

These, in their opposition to monarchy, in the course of the civil war, more and more had been forced to stake life itself and all its boons and hopes. Foolish to call them fools or scoundrels for their opposition to Hegel's and Mommsen's World-spirit. — Still, as we now read the times with the invaluable aid of Cicero's correspondence, we are, in our turn, in all fairness, driven to the conclusion that Pompey's victory would have no less established a monarchy, with a monarch inferior at almost all points to Cæsar, and that the bearers of his purple train would have been a famished and desperate oligarchy, ruthless and bent upon a reënactment of the Sullan times.

Before the catastrophe of Pharsalos, the partisans of Pompey had mapped out the coming proscription at Rome, not merely by individuals *but by classes*.¹ Cicero was bitterly hated for not having followed Scipio, Cato, Labienus, and Afranius to Africa. But the orator's estimate of the Numidian king, Juba, was proved quite correct by the events. To 'defend the government' (what government, indeed?) with the aid of the cunning and treacherous Numidian he deemed supremely unwise. ("Att.," 11, 9, 1.)

Early in January, 47, Cicero firmly expected confiscation even of the personal estate of the lady Terentia, his wife. ("Att.," 11, 9, 1.) On his birthday at fifty-nine he wrote (ib., § 3): "Would that I never had been begotten, or that no further child had been born of that same mother!" For even his own brother and nephew were now in Ægean waters, setting the dictator against their own brother and uncle, as though they might gain some favor or profit through the orator's ruin.

To add to the corroding cares of a mind fairly distraught even so, the news from Africa was ever growing better for the enemies of Cæsar, enemies whose actual

Non nominatim, sed generatim. "Att.," 11, 6, 2.

descent upon the coasts of Italy the wretched recluse of Brundisium often expected and dreaded. In April–May, 47, we learn (“Att.,” 11, 14, 1) that all the partisans of Pompey both in Greece and in Ionia, who had failed of a pardon, and moreover, *even those also who had gotten it*, were said to be about to sail for Africa. Cicero calls them *deprecatores*. What hopes he still nourished in that dismal spring—slender hopes—were from Cæsar. Even from Alexandria the news of April (solar year) were gloomy. Spain, too, about this time, seemed virtually lost to Cæsar.

One of the most vicious features in Cæsar’s struggling for the principate was the necessity of giving places and great offices to the men who helped him: his adversaries called him broker of provinces. He was not able to ignore such claims even when he would.

When the victor of Ilerda, Sicoris, and Ebro quit Spain in the waning summer of 49, he left as governor of Farther Spain, the tribune, Q. Cassius Longinus, who, with Antony and the outraged constitution, had fled to Ravenna early in that year. Even as quæstor for Pompey in 54, he had become odious to the provincials for his cruelty and rapacity. The breed of Verres was to be found quite as much among Cæsar’s supporters as those following Pompey.—This extortioner, then, bitterly hated of the provincials, sought security by giving excessive bounties to his troops. His civil administration was an endless chain of oppression and wringing of money out of the Spaniards not only, but of resident Romans also. Neither in his palace nor on the tribunal of jurisdiction, was there omitted anything that might enrich him. Bail bonds or indictments or any form of prosecution and persecution were always ready whenever it became known that a given man had wealth.

Finally at Corduba, an attempt was made upon his life: but it is impossible here further to pursue the utter admin-

istrative failure of this Cæsarean appointee. Hirtius himself, or whoever wrote the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, sketches the acts of Cassius Longinus without any palliation as those of a veritable reprobate. It was this appointee then, who, particularly in the districts which we now call Andalusia and Portugal, rendered futile the genius and wisdom which Cæsar had exhibited in the settlement of Iberian affairs, after his campaign of the Sicoris. This alienation Cicero refers to as the 'performance of Cassius.' ("Att.," 11, 16, 1.)—At the time when this news from Spain reached Cicero, he had no explanation for the 'delay at Alexandria.'¹ He could not then know anything of Cleopatra, whom he met later on in Rome when Cæsar placed her in his Transtiberine villa. Her *hauteur* then nettled his pride.

But to return: About this time in the capital, one of the sensational figures in political and society life was P. Cornelius Dolabella, last husband of poor Tullia, Cicero's beloved child. He was a tribune in 47, and a fair product of that generation of decadence and demoralization. By day he stirred up the rabble of Rome, and, himself hopelessly burdened with debt, he proposed statutes for scaling or cancelling debts or house-rents. Catiline had many successors, and the memories of Clodius were still green; but that of all men his own son-in-law should fairly outdo the pair, this was to the timid and troubled recluse of Brundisium, indeed, the overflowing of his cup brewed for him by the irony of Fortune. To this was added the scandalous chain of Dolabella's intrigues with other men's wives. Cicero's fair name and all his dearest convictions were dragged in the dust by such a son-in-law. ("Att.," 11, 23, 3.)

Among those who opposed the new Clodius was that brilliant and rising talent, young Asinius Pollio, then

¹ Mora Alexandrina causam illorum correxit, meam evertit. "Att.," 11, 16, 2.

tribunus plebis. Finally, Antony with troops restored a semblance of order in the capital.

The legions in Italy destined to go to the African war, treated with contumely and began to stone one of his, Cæsar's, chief lieutenants, Publius Sulla. The general belief in that summer was, that none of these important and indispensable bodies of veterans would stir from the spot.¹

In the attachment of Napoleon's troops there was blended for many years the sentiment of French patriotism; Cromwell's Ironsides were stirred even by loftier motives. The attachment of Cæsar's legionary infantry was purely a military and professional one. Pay, bounties, loot, a provision of land-assignments for their declining years, bound them to his person. After all they were simply splendid mercenaries, in whose range of motives and concerns political convictions or civic aspirations figured but slightly. Even Mommsen and the Mommsenians could not well dub them Roman patriots, however vigorously they bore to the world the evangel of the World-spirit.

Pretty early in September of the civic year (= early July of the sun), then, Cæsar landed at Tarentum, and soon moved on to Brundisium.

Cicero went out to meet him (Plut., "Cic.," 39), not so much in a frame of pessimism as of humiliation in his actual sense of helplessness, while many eyes were looking on. But the generous soul of Cæsar was there: he dismounted and walked with the stricken and homeless man of letters many stadia along the highway. No extant letters of Cicero tell of that conversation,² nor of the consolation and relief then granted his harassed being. Ended

¹ Nullam se putant commoturam. "Att.," 11, 21, 2.

² The epistles from Brundisium to Atticus end with "Att.," 11, 22, written towards the end of August, civil year. This cessation marks also the date of Cæsar's landing at Tarentum.

at last was that long period of fear and gloom. Soon after, Cicero forsook his abode of exile, and his villas as well as his mansion on the Palatine knew him once more.

Cæsar would have gone straight to Africa (Dio, 42, 50) had it not been for the disorders at the capital. But there were other concerns also. He himself needed enormous sums of money in order to go forward in the path in which he could neither stand still nor retreat. At this time, it would seem, he took positive steps to confiscate the property of the obstinate Pompeians. Such sales were quite real, as far as the civil law was concerned. If his own favorites bought and failed to pay, their own sureties were bound to suffer. The public, of course, noted the persons who were conspicuous by their financial operations or as bidders at these auctions. Here P. Sulla seems to have attended more than any other of Cæsar's followers. Amantius, too, became thus notorious to the conservatives.¹ The profligate Antony, of all men in Rome, bid in the great mansion of Pompey in the street called *Carinæ*: a radical change of inmates.² The riotous and disreputable³ gambled and drank in the city palace of the great captain, where beaks of pirates' vessels adorned the splendid vestibule, and where domestic virtues had had an abode and an affirmation rare in the corrupt and decadent aristocracy of that generation. As Cicero thought of him, dead, when spiritual things stand out more clearly, the former proprietor of that mansion had been honest in matters of money, he had been temperate and a faithful husband.

But the dictator was no moral reformer, nor could he, at that particular time, even chide those of his lieutenants

¹ Plut., "Cæs.," 51.

² Cic., "2 Phil."

³ Of both sexes.

whose profligacy made his power odious. Too long had he looked upon men as mere instruments. Not as souls, but as political and military instruments, were they ranged before his vision. And this we may say without adopting the tone of furious bitterness such as Cicero used after Cæsar's death.¹ Neither Antony nor Dolabella was thrown over by the returned dictator. The more desperate their private fortunes, the clearer the necessity of clinging to him in the future, a period which still needed reckless and resolute men for the further tasks of the nascent monarchy. And so Cæsar honored even the new Clodius, viz., Dolabella, and promised him the consular honor for the year 44 B.C. (Dio, 42, 33), although he never had been *prætor*.

As to the wider distress of debtors and tenants (Dio, 42, 51), he furnished partial relief. For, as a genuine statesman, he strove never to make enemies out of a consolidated class. In settling indebtedness, he ordained that creditors must accept the valuation of houses and lands which had prevailed before the Civil War: for the confiscations had at the moment greatly depressed values.

His political partisans he repaid in various ways. He increased the numbers of *pontifices* and augurs. Of *prætors*, says Dio (Livy?) somewhat bluntly, he appointed ten, "in order to requite the greater number."

In dealing with the mutinous veterans he exhibited that psychological tact which puzzled and surprised his contemporaries. He did not beg nor flatter, but maintained a quasi-sovereign control. He did not let them know that they were the indispensable instruments of his ambition and props of his imperial pretension. Some he confronted in person, on the Field of Mars. He knew that they did not sincerely wish to be discharged at all. That this should be promptly revealed he accomplished by ad-

¹ *E.g.*, "Off.," 1, 112; 3, 82.

dressing them as *Quirites*, citizens, civil persons. But in merely civic life and its quiet pursuits they had long ceased to have any stake or serious concern. (Dio, 42, 53.) They realized that there was no other career for them, and that they needed *him* at least as much as he needed *them*.¹ His flattering habit of addressing them as “*Fellow-soldiers*” did not deceive them, although it was wont to warm their hearts. His deliberate manner of making record of individual bravery is a feature of the *Commentarii* to which we shall revert in the proper place. Actually, the shrewd generalissimo (Dio, 42, 55) discerned the malcontents and left them at home. For now there was before him a struggle in every way more serious and severe than the quickly decided combat among the Thessalian grain-fields in June, 48. It was on Dec. 19, 47 (actually, about Oct. 1, 47), that he arrived at Lilybæum, in western Sicily, at once pitching his tent so closely by the sea that it was wetted by the spray. His impatience to be off was remarked by all: it seemed reckless to sail to Africa with the slender forces as yet available, at a time when Metellus Scipio, the father of Pompey's widow, generalissimo of the Constitutionalists, could review ten Roman legions, to which were added many other forces and a fleet greatly exceeding that of the dictator. Juba's Numidian cavalry proved to be important in the impending winter campaign. Cæsar's landing was effected late in December (about October 11) near Hadrumetum. His staff-officers were surprised that no impediment confronted them.² With him at first he had but three thousand infantry and one hundred fifty troopers. To his naval commanders Cæsar had not given any sealed orders as to what port should be made. It was all a matter of circumstance and quick determination, a situation in which great captains always are revealed.

¹ Add also Appian, 2, 94; Suet., “Cæs.” 67.

² “Bellum Africum,” 3.

CHAPTER XX

CÆSAR IN 46 B.C.

ON January 1 (= October 13) he arrived near Leptis on the sea. It was, as I said, an autumn and winter campaign, if measured by the actual physical season. The movements and manœuvres of January, February, March, were indecisive. In the earlier part of this time his forces were too small for any decisive engagements. One marvels that his antagonists did not resolutely undertake to smother and overwhelm him. For they knew well that the dictator's troops¹ were largely new recruits, that many of the old legions in Italy had been mutinous.

Gradually, however, by reinforcements arriving from Sicily, Cæsar's position was improved. For some time he maintained a defensive attitude, foreign to his genius and temperament. There were many hardships. Seaweeds macerated in sweet water and then dried had to pass as fodder for beasts of burden.²

At Rome, meanwhile, anxiety prevailed, and all kinds of news were eagerly believed. Cicero and many of his friends could not look forward with any cheerfulness³ to a decisive victory of either party, no matter what the legality or constitutional pretences put forward by each. Perhaps Sullanian times were to come again after all.

As for the African coast-line, where matters were tapering to an issue, we have reason to believe that procrastinating

¹ "B. Afr.," 16.

² "B. Afr.," 24; Plut., "Cæs.," 53.

³ *Est enim res iam ad eum locum adducta, ut, quamquam multum intersit inter eorum causas qui dimicant, tamen; inter victorias non multum interfuturum putem.* (Cic., "Fam.," 5, 21, 3.)

tion for once was due to Cæsar, whom the passing of time made stronger, both in supplies and in trained troops.

The Pompeian leaders were puzzled. ("B. Afr.," 35.) Still they seem to have acted with ruthless cruelty whenever Cæsareans fell into their hands. Political treason, and following the eagles of Cæsar, in their judgment and practice, were one and the same thing.

Cæsar really used the first four months of this peculiar campaign to drill his men and to season them: "to train them as a drillmaster trains raw gladiators; how many feet they should fall back from the foe and how, while confronting their opponents, and within how small a space they should make their stand, again fall back and threaten assault, and almost in what spot and how they were to discharge their *pila*,—would he teach them." ("B. Afr.," 71.) Then, too, here were not Gauls to fight, men who knew nothing of wiles and ambush, but only open valor, whereas the Numidians were cunning, crafty, resourceful in ambush and in all wiles of warfare. On March 21 (uncorrected), 46, Cæsar held a review of all his troops. Soon after reinforcements arrived by sea. Repeatedly he now offered battle to the Pompeians. Finally, on April 4, he marched on *Thapsus* and began to invest this town, thus compelling Scipio to come to the relief of this community. When Scipio committed the fatal blunder of placing his stockade upon a narrow strip of land, about one and a half miles wide, between the sea and the salt marshes, the keen eye of the great captain saw promptly that the time and the hour were at hand. The Xth Legion, too, was now once more with him. ("B. Afr.," 81.) Personally he hurried from troop to troop, and roused the spirit of his men to the highest pitch of eagerness and confidence.

And still he seems to have personally preferred a defensive attitude on that day, but the enthusiasm of the rank and file finally made him consent to a vigorous advance.

The elephants were soon routed and the stockade taken. Scipio's infantry broke and fled. Cæsar pursued them hotly, so as not to permit them to form once more. In vain they sought refuge in Juba's camp; it had already been taken. Breathless, they halted on a hill and made the signs of surrender.

But Cæsar's veterans were maddened and enraged, actually slaying in their fury those who would stay them, distinguished men on their own side, Romans from the capital. Several senators and equestrian gentlemen of Cæsar's own lines fled to the very person of the dictator, to save themselves from their own infuriated legionaries. So this awful butchery proceeded, while Cæsar himself, for once helpless, looked on, in vain entreating his veterans to spare the foe, who had ceased to fight. ("B. Afr.," 85.) This was the battle of Thapsus. In the nineteen months which had gone by since Pompey sadly rode away from Pharsalos to Tempe and the sea, clearly the entire Civil War had risen to greater intensity in the desperate spirit of the contestants. It seemed to tend towards a recrudescence of Sullanian times. Could the dictator maintain the moderate and statesmanlike policy which he had mapped out for himself?

[The ancient tradition of this momentous battle exhibits some curious divergences. Plutarch (C. 53) himself reports two versions: according to one, fifty thousand were slain, while Cæsar lost but fifty; according to another (perhaps Tanusius or Ampius) Cæsar was not even personally present, but was suffering from an attack of his besetting malady, epilepsy.]

The date was April 6 of the uncorrected calendar. — From Thapsus, by way of various posts now submitting, Cæsar, granting pardon to several Pompeians of note, such as Ligarius and Cæcina, moved on towards Utica, on the outskirts of which he arrived at dusk.¹ But the

¹ "Circiter luminibus accensis," "B. Afr.," 89, one of the many little traits pointing to the fact that the author was much about the person of Cæsar in this campaign.

noblest of his adversaries, Cato, was no more. When the news of the catastrophe reached him, the stern and fearless man at first endeavored to organize a defence of Utica. But when he saw that those whom he meant should be the defenders lacked all spirit and hope, he arranged that as many as possible should embark and seek refuge in Spain, the last resort of the Pompeians. As for himself, he disdained either to flee or to meet the new monarch at all. His speech, his mien, were unchanged, no intimation of fear, no anxiety or despair. He died the consistent Stoic he had lived, his last concern having been with the immortality of the soul. The last book he read was Plato's "Phædo."¹

His death was a bitter disappointment to Cæsar. Of all his antagonists this one had been the purest-minded and the one of longest standing, the most persistent as well as consistent, the one whom neither fear nor gain could move,² the one who had penetrated into the innermost recesses of Cæsar's design and political character long before the beginning of the Civil War. Even at thirty-one, in the great debate of Dec. 5, 63, he had determined the issue by his powerful personality. Postulating an honest enforcement of the constitutional tradition, both in the home government and in the provincial administration, he condemned the acts of all the dynasts and their personal policies, but thinly veiled under the forms of the past, while they granted to each other and accepted from each other what really belonged to the commonwealth. He stood alone. — Cæsar is said to have given vent to his feelings in these words: "O Cato, I envy you your death: for you too begrudged me your preservation."

¹ "Testimonium Animæ," p. 380 sq.

² Perhaps the enigmatic passage in Suet., "Aug.," 87, may now be solved: "et cum hortatur, ferenda esse præsentia qualiacumque sint: contenti simus hoc Catone." That is to say, *Cato* symbolizes a trouble that we cannot rid ourselves of, but must bear somehow. Many lessons did Augustus learn from the career of his adoptive father.

(Plut., "Cato Min.," 72.) Little doubt that the dictator had proposed for himself acts of particularly conspicuous generosity and forbearance. For the purpose of settling the spirits of his generation everywhere, this pardon of Cato would have been for the statesman Cæsar of incalculable value.

Cæsar, after Thapsus, remained about two months longer in Africa. Adding Numidia as a new province to the empire, he appointed as first governor Crispus Sallustius as a reward for his partisan devotion.

The enormous wealth gained there by the later historian, in a very short time, roused the moral irony of sober-minded observers like Varro later on. Sallust himself, writing after the death both of Cæsar and Cato, bestowed upon Cato imperishable praise, he too, Sallust, the very man who owed everything to Cato's antagonist. As to the settlement of the new province, as Dio (43, 9) presents the matter, the dictator gave his officer orders to loot and ravage it under form of organization.

As to Cæsar's policy of magnanimity in dealing with defeated and submissive adversaries, one must admit that his generosity had been again and again abused. When we compare the record of the author of the "Bellum Africum" (c. 89) with Dio's survey (43, 12-13) of what actually happened, then we may conclude that Cæsar, while still, by certain overt acts, using or asserting this policy of leniency, was actually becoming much sterner.

At Rome, when the complete success of Cæsar became known, the dictator's partisans were in ecstasies, and congratulations were the order of the day. Men like Cicero and Varro were almost out of place on streets and forum: they, too, were counted among the vanquished.¹ Cicero thought of going down to the Gulf of Naples, and at Baiae to live for a while in seclusion, 'not to swim, but to lament.' Still, from this time on there is met with, in

¹ 'Quasi victos nos intuentur,' "Fam.," 9, 2, 2.

his correspondence, a new and positive sentiment. Whenever the military work of Cæsar was fully completed, some measure of rehabilitation of constitutional forms, some way of reestablishing an orderly government of courts and laws could not well be deferred. Even in a subsidiary way he would be willing to assist, if the dictator were to call upon him. ("Fam.," 9, 2, 5.)

When Cæsar left Africa, naturally his plans and movements were the foremost object of public concern. Would he go by way of Baiae or of Sardinia? Actually he took the latter course. The provinces of the empire had now virtually become Cæsar's 'farms.' So Cicero in a private letter to Varro expresses the matter ("Fam.," 9, 7, 1): "For that farm of his he has never yet looked over: he has none worse than this one, but still he does not despise it." Bitter words, but luminous with the truth of what was actual and real. Cæsar, at this stage, had come to know all his 'farms' but this one. Spain and Gaul, Africa, Macedon, and Achaia, Asia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Bithynia, Cilicia, Syria, or Sicily: he knew them all, and his own eye and hand could determine what crops they could send to the granaries of the landlord, what taxes and imposts they could bear in war and peace. On June 14 (about April 14 of solar year) Cicero first broached to Atticus ("Att.," 12, 4) the project of writing a memorial monograph on Cato. It was, he said, bound to annoy partisans of the victor, even if Cicero were to limit himself to the character of Cato and avoid all political valuations and judgments. To the man of letters indeed, retired from public life, and not insensible of the dictator's considerate treatment of himself, it was indeed an 'Archimedian problem,' *i.e.*, a very difficult one. But Cicero, the idealist, once more was too much for Cicero, the worldly wise man. The labor of composition gave him keen pleasure. ("Att.," 12, 5, 3.) The reminiscent mood in Cicero ever makes the present bitter to

his soul: 'And now what *am* I doing? I am bearing what must be borne, which is very far from positive approval.' ("Fam.," 9, 6.)

The return of the dictator to the capital occurred about the 26th of July. Almost all the leaders of the other party had perished. Lentulus, Scipio, Afranius, Cato,—all were gone. ("Fam.," 9, 18, 2.) Even the favorites of Cæsar, such as Balbus, are referred to by Cicero sometimes as 'kings,' or 'royal persons.' ("Fam.," 9, 19, 1.) Mere physical survival sometimes appears to him as something in the nature of pure gain, something unearned. ("Fam.," 9, 17, 1.) *The government is dead.* Cæsar himself is too deeply enmeshed in the bonds of political obligation. He could not restore constitutional government if he would. (Ib.) The *chief* (princeps) does not even himself know what is going to be. "*For we are slaves to him, he himself to the times*: so neither he knows what the times are going to demand, nor can we know what the subject-matter of his reflections is." (Ib., § 3.) "We were wont to sit at the helm and hold the rudder, but now there is barely a spot for us down in the hold where the bilge-water is." ("Fam.," 9, 15, 3.) As for *Senatus Consulta*, they are passed as of yore; but they are composed at the house of Balbus. (Ib., § 4.) My own name is officially used in S. C., of the very contents of which I am completely ignorant. I hope that by and by there will be some kind of a government. But whatever it will be, it will be a gift of the dictator.—The omnipotence of Cæsar at all points of the empire he urges in a letter to the school friend of his youth, M. Marcellus (consul of 51) ("Fam.," 4, 8), whom he urges to avail himself of Cæsar's magnanimity and to return from his exile in Greece. For once we are afforded a glimpse of the inward Cæsar: "He feared mainly this, that the exiles would not esteem it a kindness to be allowed to come back."

Even more the complete monarchy of the actual situa-

tion is brought out by Cicero in a notable passage addressed to the same exile ("Fam.," 4, 9): "For all things have been bestowed upon one. As for his using counsel, he does not use even that of his own adherents, but his own alone, which would not be much otherwise, if he held the government whom we followed" (viz., Pompey). Cæsar, says Cicero, would like to attach to his service the real first-class men; his nature is gentle and kindly; he never refers to Pompey but in terms of respect. In September Cicero writes from Rome to the exile Ligarius ("Fam.," 6, 13): "Cæsar is steadily turning more generous, but it comes about more slowly than we desire (viz., your recall from exile). On account of the weighty engagements of him from whom everything is sought, access to him has been more difficult, and at the same time he seems to wish to appear more angry for a greater length of time toward the African cause, to keep those in a state of anxiety by whom he thinks he has been brought into conflict with more lengthy annoyances. . . ."

Luminous words, indeed; but we must now leave this correspondence. Balbus and Oppius were the most influential of Cæsar's intimates now; Antony apparently much less so.—Return we now to the official acts of the period after Thapsus, never forgetting that the decrees of the senate were really those of Cæsar's puppets or creatures: even less sovereign were the *plebiscita* in his honor.

A period of forty days' Thanksgiving was decreed when the news of Thapsus arrived. Cæsar was made *præfectus morum* (virtually Censor) for three years. To him it was given to sit on the *sella curulis* amid the consuls. He was to give the signal in the circus. He was to be dictator for ten years. His statue was to be placed on the capitol opposite to that of Jupiter himself. (Dio, 43, 14.) All this, says Dio, because they still feared a second Sulla. There were proposed also other honors, which, however,

Cæsar declined. These S. C. were all adopted before he himself arrived in Rome. (Dio, 43, 15.) His keen eyes saw that fear, rather than affection, had dictated these honors, and in an address before the senate he sought to assure the assembled fathers. His previous course of moderation, he urged, had been sincere, nor would he now use his power to gratify whim or vindictiveness. His previous career had been determined by his very nature, not by craft or policy. He desired to lead, not to play the autocrat. (Dio, 43, 7.) The private papers of Pompey and Scipio he had burned without reading them. Troops were for security both of empire and of private property, not to be tools of tyranny.

The triumph, long looked for by the masses of the capital, was a fourfold one, being celebrated on four different days, but not successive ones, a necessity quite obvious to us. These gigantic parades and processions¹ occurred in the month of August (really June), in a sequence of historical order. First came the triumph over the Gauls, then that from Egypt, next the one which glorified his swift defeat of Pharnaces, lastly that over Juba. The censure of the appearance of the Egyptian princess Arsinoë, as noted by Dio (43, 19), may have been due to Cæsar's political critics rather than to the general voice of the capital ; this, too, may be said of the displeasure at the great number of lictors. On this occasion Vercingetorix perished in prison, in which he had awaited this exhibition as well as his most shameful and unjust execution for six long years. Most justly does the French nation honor his memory. The curious license of the troops — comparable to that customary at the season of the Saturnalia — on this occasion, taunted him with his passion for Cleopatra, nay, designated his entire gigantic

¹ Suet., "Cæs.," 37 ; Velleius, 2, 56, declamatory and inexact. Dio, 43, 19 ; Plut., "Cæs.," 55 ; Appian, "B. C.," 2, 101-102.

achievement as the success of unrighteousness.¹ This was the first time since Tarquin's days that this term, *king*, was heard in Rome as applied to a sovereign commander.

The *plebs* were feasted at 22,000 tables, at one sitting, no second table for any one. Shows and games were of unheard of splendor. Appian records that the treasure carried in parade amounted to 65,000 talents, while 2822 golden wreaths also were borne along, such as had been given to Cæsar by communities and by princes. Each common legionary also received the equivalent of 5000 drachmas of Attic money (\$900), while the centurions, the very prop of Cæsar's achieved sovereignty, received the twofold amount. A matter of doubtful political wisdom was what Appian relates. There were carried in procession twenty-two large canvasses, with portraits and death scenes of leading Pompeians. Pompey himself alone was exempted. It was brutal, and no worship of genius can gloss it over. Perhaps in this manner the dictator would exhibit to the Mediterranean world his positive victory, and discourage any risings in favor of a cause whose history seemed to be over. Among important legislative acts of the new sovereign were these: The lowest class of the three classes of jurors provided by the Aurelian law of 70 B.C. was discontinued. A special enumeration was taken in Rome, about which there have been various conjectures. Was it to determine the question of the recession of the population? Probably it was due to fiscal necessities, and a more exact determination of the number of those who were recipients of grain from the public granaries, was intended. The facts of the financial administration must have pressed to the forefront of his concerns at a time when the consummation of the parades

¹ Restored by L. Lange, 3, 446, thus, the marching rhythm being quite palpable:

Plécteríſ si récte fácties, sí non fácties, réx eríſ.

and donatives had swallowed enormous sums.¹ Also there was a sumptuary law, dealing with luxury of the table, of which law Cicero makes some light fun. ("Fam.," 7, 62, 2.) There was also limitation in the use of litters (Suet., "C.," 43), purple rugs, pearls; special agents were placed on the public markets to watch for contravention of the sumptuary laws. Cæsar was indeed *præfectus morum*, but about this time the radiant Cleopatra appeared in Rome, and at once took possession of the establishment which Cæsar had provided for her, in his park on the right bank of the Tiber. (Dio, 43, 27.) — Proconsular provinces were now limited to two years, there now being a central sovereign in the empire—and proprætorian to one. (Dio, 43, 25.)

Finally the confusion and disorder of the civil calendar was terminated in this way, that the civil year was brought to conform definitely and perpetually to the solar year. As *Censorinus* ("De Die Natali," c. 20) explains, this often recurrent trouble had been due to the habit of arbitrary actions on the part of the *pontifices*. These, from hatred or from favor, gave to certain magistrates longer or shorter years, or they inflicted loss, or bestowed benefits upon certain financiers who had contracts with the state. Cæsar, as *pontifex maximus*, reformed all this, first, by making an intercalation of twenty-three days at the end of February, and besides, after November was over, inserting an extra period of sixty-seven days before December was to begin. Thus this year, 46 B.C., came to have, in all, four hundred and forty-five days. He also abolished forever the so-called "Mercedonius," the intercalary period, after February, in alternate years, and provided one intercalary day, at the

¹ Appian says (2, 102), that it was a counting of the plebs. Plutarch (c. 55), who evidently does not understand it at all, says that the last census gave 320,000, this one but 150,000. Cicero's phrase of the 'misera plebecula, *hirudo ærarii*,' here becomes more palpable to our comprehension.

end of February, once in four years. Experts say that Cæsar went back to Numa as much as possible.

But the troubles in Spain called the dictator away from these necessary and urgent labors. Once more he took the field, and for the last time, chiefly to regain southern Spain, lost to him through the rapacity and injustice of his henchman, Q. Cassius Longinus. It was probably during the intercalary period that he left Rome and Cleopatra. The matter was notorious and was sharply censured. But he was unconcerned and had even passed a S. C., granting to her the title of 'Friend and Ally of the Roman People.' At one time Cæsar had thought that the operations in Spain might be conducted by one of his lieutenants, but a fuller understanding of the exact situation urged him to take the field in person.

Pompey's oldest son and heir, Gneius, had first gained the Balearic isles, where for a while he had been detained by sickness. Thence Scapula and Aponius, Roman knights of Corduba, summoned the young pretender over to the mainland.

Many of the old Afranians, seasoned men, came to his eagles. (Dio, 43, 30.) Sextus Varus also, and Labienus, having escaped after Thapsus, came over from Africa. The adversaries of Cæsar wisely determined to concentrate themselves in Bætica.

On Nov. 26, 46 b.c., early in the morning, Cicero had called on Cæsar. ("Fam.," 6, 14.) Not so very long afterwards, it seems, Cæsar departed for the seat of war. Both Appian and even Strabo state that the dictator, now in the fourth year of that power, traversed the distance from Rome to *Obulco* (in Bætica) in twenty-seven days. According to Strabo (3, 160) this place was three hundred stadia or thirty-seven English miles from Corduba. For *not all* the communities of Bætica had opened their gates

to the young pretender. Even in Corduba a part of the population still adhered to Cæsar, and evidently many communities were similarly broken up into two factions, although the Pompeians, for the time being, seem to have had control of affairs. Some towns, like *Ulia*, were still holding out for Cæsar. Sextius Pompey himself had command in Corduba, the capital of the province.

At Rome men like Cicero did not know whether Cæsar, before leaving, had nominated candidates, or would do so in Spain. ("Att.," 12, 8.) Balbus and Oppius, not Antony, were his stewards at the seat of government.

CHAPTER XXI

THE LAST YEAR BUT ONE, 45 B.C.

THIS, too, was a winter campaign, as had been that ending with Thapsus. The hardships of the inclement season were thus added to the steadily rising bitterness of the Civil War. Cæsar was deceived in his expectation that young Pompey would be utterly dazed by the dictator's personal appearance on the theatre of war. (Dio, 43, 32.)

The essential point in this last and most desperate campaign of Cæsar was this: his antagonists held, and were justified by the events in their conviction, that, man for man, the legionaries on both sides differed but little from one another. Even at Rome there seems to have prevailed during this winter 46–45 a perfectly clear vision of that critical equilibrium in southern Spain. In January–February, 45, Cicero wrote to A. Torquatus, who then was still in exile ("Fam.", 6, 4, 1): "Now we (here at Rome) merely seem to understand so much, that the war will not last long, but on this very subject others think otherwise. . . . On the one hand, there is the common chance of every war, and the results of battles are always uncertain; on the other hand, at the present time, it is said, so large are the forces on both sides, so well equipped to fight a decisive battle, that, no matter which of the two shall gain the victory, no marvellous result¹ will come about. That idea of the public is gaining more strength from day to day, that, though there be some difference between the causes represented in the field, nevertheless,

¹ Evidently he means no real restoration of the older form of government.

there is not going to be much difference between the victories. One side (*i.e.*, Cæsar's) we almost know by experience. As to the other one (Gneius Pompey), there is no one but reflects how greatly to be feared is an armed victory of his, in his anger." On this latter contingency we have a curious confirmation from C. Cassius, then *prætor designate*, who wrote to Cicero about this time from Brundisium. ("Fam.," 15, 9, 4.) "I will stake my life if I am not anxious, and prefer to have *the old and gentle master*¹ rather than make a test of a new and cruel one. You know how much of an idiot Gneius is, you know how he confounds cruelty with valor; you know how he thinks we always make him a laughing-stock. . . . If Cæsar has won, expect me speedily." So wrote one who, about twelve months later, organized the plot of assassinating the one man whose mastership he was willing, nay, anxious, to live under, when there was a possible alternative of a government controlled by young Pompey.

Cæsar's chief task, in the first part of this campaign, naturally was to capture Corduba. This, however, proved more difficult an enterprise than Cæsar had expected. So Cæsar turned away, and on February 19 captured a minor stronghold, Ateguia. Meanwhile, young Pompey, within the sphere of his own domination, began to winnow Pompeians from Cæsareans, in given town communities ("Bell. Hisp.," 20), and on one occasion gave orders to behead seventy-four persons, non-combatants, who were said to have favored Cæsar. (Ib., 21, 3.) What would the young pretender have done at Rome if he had entered it with a victorious army? How completely correct was the judgment of Cassius! In fact, in the Bætica a reign of terror, here and there, was begun by Pompey's adherents. That young leader in his manifestoes bore himself as one of whom Cæsar was afraid² (ib., 26): Cæsar, he claimed,

¹ *Veterem et clementem dominum.*

² Cf. Appian, "B. C.," 2, 104.

did not dare to give him battle because his troops were raw recruits.

Gradually, whether through Cæsar's initiative or that of Pompey, both armies manœuvred southward towards the foothills of the Sierra Nevada. Pompey now, with the town of *Munda* at his back, offered battle to Cæsar (ib., 29). It was March 17, anniversary of the *Liberalia* at Rome, with a cloudless sky and brilliant sunshine. The lines of Cæsar's foes exhibited thirteen eagles and legions, while Cæsar commanded eight legions, with eight thousand troopers. Legion X held its ancient place of honor, the right wing, and the Pompeians placed an extra legion in reserve against the far-famed *decumani*. The author of the *Bellum Hispaniense* either was too partisan to give a plain and unvarnished account of this formidable struggle (c. 30-31), or his inferior position precluded any clear grasp of the long and bitter contest. Very different is the account which we gain from every other source. Cæsar did not march up the hill, but assumed at first a defensive or waiting attitude. As for the Pompeians, so impatient was their spirit, and so prompt their charge, that Cæsar, as Asinius Pollio attests, did not even have time to utter the wonted appeal to his troops. (Suet., "Cæs.," 55.) Asinius, then, was on that field: his account (*Historiæ*) must have been the most authoritative for the later historians, and the spirit with which he composed his final and deliberate account, as we are acquainted with his keen and brusquely independent character, was far from blind adulation of the man to whom he at first owed his unparalleled advancement. Briefly, this was a struggle without any parallel in Cæsar's military experience.¹ There were auxiliaries on both sides, sent by both the hostile rulers of Mauretania, but the legionaries alone (Dio, 43, 36) determined the day of Munda. The

¹ Florus, 2, 78 sqq., probably gives us the Livian relation. Cf. Plut., "Cæs.," 56.

Cæsarean veterans hoped for a definite rest henceforward. The old Afranian and Varronian cohorts looked for no pardon if Cæsar should win the battle. It was all more stern and desperate than three years before in Thessaly. And there was a curious stillness in all the bloody work. The combatants, apart from the clink and clang of blades on shields, the mere athleticism of many thousands of duels of desperate swordsmanship, maintained a rare silence as to cheering or battle-cry: neither exultation nor groans were heard. They simply stood to it: an occasional shout of 'strike!' 'kill!' a deadlock it seemed to the commanders. As the day wore on, there seemed no palpable impression to be making on either side. According to Livy (Florus, 2, 81), at one time there was actually a recession or a slow falling back of Cæsar's troops. 'They had not yet actually fled,' says the epitomizer of Livy, but it was clear that they were resisting more from a sense of shame than from valor. Cæsar leaped from his horse and ran down from the elevated place whence he had been surveying the battle. In fact, each commander, by a similar impulse, strove to add the weight of his own personal exposure and fighting to the scales in which reposed the issue of that unyielding struggle. Personally, then, Cæsar rushed through the lines,¹ crying out aloud, "Are you not ashamed to deliver me to the young boys?" viz., to the sons of Pompey. At one time he said to the sub-commanders about him, "This will be the end of my life and of your campaigns." (App., "B. C.", 2, 104.) And even Cæsar's personal valor, the last resource of a great commander, might have proved unavailing, the night terminating the grim battle, had not a critical blunder of Labienus presented the decision to the eagles of his commander and lavish friend. Bogud, the Moorish ally of the dictator, got into motion to attack the stockade of

¹ This trait in Plutarch ("Cæs.", 56) probably dates back to Asinius. The close agreement between Dio and Florus (Livy) is impressive.

young Pompey, and when Labienus saw this, he left that line of steel to attack the Mauretanian. Speedily the idea spread that the Pompeian line was yielding at last. Doubt turned to apprehension, apprehension to fear, and fear to panic. Some fled to the stockade, some to Munda. Sally after sally was made from the stockade, until all the defenders had perished. As for Munda, Cæsar immediately ordered a circumvallation, where the bodies of the slain were piled up to furnish a rampart of investment. This is noted by nearly all the ancient historians, from the writer of the *Bellum Hispaniense* downward. The dictator's great-nephew came to Spain about this time; this youth, Octavius by name, was then in his eighteenth year. Cæsar was thinking of a successor in his dynasty. (Dio, 43, 41.) Soon afterwards the heads of the leaders were brought in.

The official news reached Rome rather slowly, viz., in thirty-four days, so that April 20 (ordinarily the anniversary of the founding of Rome, the *Parilia*), was the day on which began the fifty days' *supplicatio*. The Civil War had thus lasted somewhat more than four years.

Cicero had had pleasant relations to Cæsar's private stewards and agents, Balbus and Oppius. He had interceded for a number of exiles. It was praiseworthy in him to cheer them and seek their rehabilitation of name and fortune. In these tasks he was earnest and generous, for he could not well look forward to any material or worldly reward. But his underlying view of things was melancholy: "When most blessed are those who have begotten no children, and less miserable those who lost children in these times, than if they had lost them under a good government, or, to come down to actual facts, under some kind of government at all." ("Fam.," 5, 16, 3.)

In Cicero's vision the very *organic parts*¹ of the state had been ruined. After Munda he declared himself indifferent as to the fate of Pompey's sons. ("Att.," 12, 37, 4.)

¹ *Membra rei publicae* ("Fam.," 5, 13, 3).

In these months of spring, 45 b.c., he was somewhat concerned as to the manner of Cæsar's rejoinder to himself, the *Anticato*. So busy was Cæsar, that Hirtius for him gathered some outline of data which entered into Cæsar's work. ("Att.," 12, 41, 4.)

Long before Cæsar in person returned to Rome, the rapid production of S. C. in his honor was resumed. A curious and puzzling process: for it seems that the deepest and bitterest enemies of Cæsar had some hand in more than one of these, in order to render the autocrat odious by the very process of ever new accumulation.

Balbus we may call his minister for home affairs, and we may say confidently that in Cæsar's absence no important S. C. was, or could be, passed without him. Some positive measure of responsibility must rest upon the Spaniard, responsibility too for the catastrophe of the Ides of March.

About a Parthian campaign Cæsar wrote even from Spain. This was a bitter legacy of his fellow dynast Crassus, and one of the results of the conference at Luca eleven years before, but a task not to be ignored, if the eastern provinces once more were to be made permanently secure. The next great enterprise, then, a foreign war of grave importance and great cost, was held out and named for public opinion, even before the autocrat returned from Corduba and Gades. But, he added, there must first be a settlement of the government. Clearly he had taken to heart the wretched condition of the capital such as it was during his sojourn at Alexandria and beyond. Otherwise, it seems, he would hardly have stopped even at Rome on his way to the East.

But we must turn once more to the further *Honors, senatus consulta* antedating Cæsar's return. Not long before July 20-21, 45 b.c., there was passed a S. C. or plebiscitum, providing¹ that at the opening of Circensian

¹ Dio, 43, 45.

games, among the figures of the gods of the commonwealth conveyed in solemn procession¹ in chariots, the figure of Cæsar also should be so driven along in a separate chariot.

Even then, too, there was a rumored proposal of Cotta's, that in deference to a certain Sibylline oracle, Cæsar should be formally invested with the title of king before setting out for the Parthian War. (Cf. Cic., "De Divinatione," 2, 110.) Cicero notes all this as rife in the capital even before Cæsar's return from Spain.

Cæsar's intimate political supporters, such as Lepidus, looked for Cæsar to appear in the senate by August 1. But he did not then. For the first time it seems in all his correspondence the orator cites the ominous, and to the Roman feeling intolerable, word *Rex* in referring to Cæsar. Cicero's blackguard nephew Quintus had done his best to poison Cæsar's mind against his uncle. The youth's talk ran in this manner: Cæsar would have to be on his guard against Cicero, "did not *the king* know that Cicero was utterly devoid of spirit." ("Att.," 13, 37, 2.) Plots, then, or the possibility of plots directed against the life of the dictator, were mentioned at least, in this summer, in the environment of the latter, and, no doubt too, often by persons who thus sought to curry favor with the great man. — The aureole of a certain majesty steadily began to illuminate the laurel wreath of the nascent emperor, and Cicero preferred in that summer to submit first to Oppius and Balbus, a letter which he was about to sent to Cæsar. It was indeed, in a way, very much of a political letter, for it contained Cicero's opinion of Cæsar's *Anticato*. (Aug. 22, "Att.," 13, 50.)

On Sept. 13 Cæsar at last arrived at a villa of his at Lobicum (not far from Præneste). On the same day he made his will, which document, for safe-keeping, was entrusted to the foremost of the Vestal Virgins. (Suet.,

¹ *Pompa* (Cic., "Att.," 13, 44, 1).

“Caes.,” 83.) It was a political mistake for Cæsar to hold a triumph on account of his Spanish campaign. This, indeed, had been a civil war pure and simple. But while this was censured at Rome, Cæsar was dangerously indifferent to these judgments. He had forged a kind of monarchy; at least he was the monarch. In the enormous expansion of what we may call his world-wide power, the aristocracy of Rome, once his peers, had, to his political vision, shrunk to such pigmy stature, that he did not hesitate to put Gauls into the senate. The greater part of his active life had been spent away from Rome. His will was as potent on the banks of the Nile or Rhine or Seine as on the Tiber. Rome to him, to his volition and initiative, was no longer an authority or source of authority. It was this permeation of his very consciousness with the feeling of monarchy which caused him to decline, in this last autumn of his life, the bestowal of the consular office for ten years, a bauble rather for him, with which to gratify his dependents.

Was it the accumulation of honors exceeding all precedent, or was it the outraged feeling of those who once were his peers, or again, was it really a reassertion of a purer and better republicanism which proved the moving force and factor of the plot which felled him before he could complete his work and his life? But first we must enumerate these honors. (Dio, 43, 43.)

A S. C. decreed that at all games Cæsar was to be distinguished by the triumphal garb. The laurel wreath he was to wear always and everywhere.

With this honor he was particularly gratified (Suet., 45), and his baldness was thus less conspicuous. He was at this particular time — for Cleopatra still resided in his park — by no means indifferent to these little amenities of embellishing his outward person. The high shoes of red leather were considered a tradition from the old kings of Alba, from whom he claimed descent through Iulus.

Also on account of Munda he was called *Liberator*.¹ This was recorded in the minutes of the senate, and a temple of *Freedom* was to be built with public money. As other Romans had their *prænomen* of Gaius, Lucius, Titus, Marcus, etc., so he henceforward, as by a kind of proper noun,² was to be called *Imperator*, — the victorious commander of the forces, — it became thus a public character or quality merged with his person and destined to descend to his offspring or succession. It certainly made and constituted the first emperor and all later emperors. He acquired thus, too, a mansion on the Palatine, it seems, so that Atticus became his neighbor. Cicero congratulates the latter on the rise in value. Cicero, indeed, intimated to his bosom friend that he would rather see Cæsar occupying the same temple-sanctuary with Romulus — who according to one tradition was torn in pieces by the enraged senators — than with the Goddess of Salvation (*Salus*). (“Att.,” 12, 45, 3.) It is an ominous note ; of the value of a curse and deepest hatred : the more so as Cicero was not admitted to the councils of Brutus and Cassius.

Actually much of what was offered to him was excessive :³ that is to say, it was too abrupt and radical a breach with the constitutional and social habits of the past. Suetonius calls the following honors *excessive* (‘*nimii*’) : the continual consulate, perpetual dictatorship, supervisorship of morals, the *prænomen* *Imperator*, the cognomen *Pater Patriæ*, the statue among the kings of Rome, the raised platform in the orchestra. “But he suffered even greater honors than human elevation to be decreed to himself : the golden chair in the senate house

¹ Lange does not see why : but clearly terrible times would have burst over Rome, if the young pretender had won the Spanish campaign.

² ὡσπερ τι κύριον (Dio, 43, 44).

³ ὑπέρογκα (Dio, 43, 45). He, as Suetonius (76), going on with the record of honors, does it in an equal spirit of sharp censure and condemnation.

and on the tribunal, the image in the special chariot in the parade in the Circensian games, temples, altars, the images for worship (*simulacra*) among the gods, the *pulvinar*, or sacred couch, for spreading a feast before a god, the *flamen*, or special priest, the designation of his natal month by his own name, *July*."

There are scholars, such as L. Lange, who suggest that there was at this time a certain insidious failing of Cæsar's nerves. It is known that Cæsar was subject to fainting fits at this time, apart from occasional attacks of epilepsy.

It is, indeed, quite apart from such weakness, entirely probable, that his own experiences with his generation had filled him with a certain contempt, first for the average Roman in public life, whether of the popular party which he had so long used or controlled, or for the oligarchy, which he had consistently, from first to last, opposed, defied, humiliated and defeated; and further on this contempt, in his powerful and creative mind, extended to the constitutional fabric, of which, indeed, his own achievements and career had left but a mere shadow. In the mind of the new monarch, indeed, the monarchy was an accomplished fact and a mighty reality. This would explain utterances recorded by hostile historiographers such as T. Ampius Balbus, recorded probably soon after the Ides of March: "The government was nothing, a phrase merely, without body or form. Sulla did not know his A B C's for resigning the dictatorship. Men ought to speak more deliberately with him now and treat as statutes what he said." Perhaps malice. Sheer invention? There is here a great deal of what I might call psychological concinnity. In this last year of his life there is not a little in his visible acts, of the meaning of the French phrase of absolutism: "Tel est mon plaisir," and "The king can do no wrong." So he constrained the Roman knight¹ and author of popular comedy to act himself — a

¹ Laberius.

matter of keen social humiliation to the Roman spirit — at the Games of that last autumn, act in his own comedies of the lower life (Mimus). The noted author himself had penned, and in the prologue himself uttered, these grave words :¹

“For he to whom the gods themselves could nought refuse,
To him who could endure that I, mere man, should aught deny?”

After this, an imperial purse and social public rehabilitation was no adequate compensation for an elderly gentleman of sixty. Cicero witnessed this practical indulgence of an imperial whim, but he recorded this novel experience as one, for the very enduring of which a veritable *hardening* of one’s sentiments and habits was necessary. (“Fam.,” 12, 18, 2.)

In the last December of the dictator’s life, we catch a rare glimpse of the living Cæsar’s person and movements. Cicero recorded this in a letter to Atticus, of date December 19. (“Att.,” 13, 52.) It was on the northwest fringe of the Gulf of Naples, near Puteoli. Cæsar had paid a visit to Philippus, the stepfather of young Octavius whom he had now adopted, and whom he had sent to Apollonia to complete his education under the noted rhetor Apollodorus. Cæsar was attended by a veritable host, a body of two thousand troops, whose encampment was little suited to the parks and grassplots of that Newport. It was on December 18 that Cæsar sojourned on the estate of Philippus, but gave audience to nobody. Cicero thinks he went over financial accounts with Balbus. Then he took a turn on the beach. After 2 P.M. a bath; then he heard of the decease of his former chief engineer, Mamurra²: he did not change his mien in the slightest degree. Later he anointed himself, and

¹ Macrobius, “Saturn.,” 2, 7, 3.

² V. Catullus, 29, with Munro’s commentary.

went to dinner. While at this, Cæsar, under a medical regimen of periodical emetics, ate and drank quite freely, from a rather choice *menu*. His immediate retinue consisted of nine persons. This dinner was at Cicero's *Puteolanum*. There was nothing serious in the conversation, *i.e.*, nothing of state, but merely literary criticism and problems of scholarship. For the host of that dinner was, indeed, the scholar *out of politics*. — The soldiers Cicero naturally felt to be a nuisance.

During that autumn, Cæsar had provided for the election of sixteen prætors and forty quæstors: ever more places for his supporters.

CHAPTER XXII

44 B.C.

THE LAST MONTHS OF CÆSAR'S LIFE

OF the sixteen prætors inaugurated on January 1 on the Capitoline hill, the most notable were two men who had made their peace with Cæsar, one very soon, the other not very long after Pharsalos, viz., M. Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus. Brutus and Cassius really were the foremost men in the portentous conspiracy. The former was born in 85 B.C.¹ His father had been an adherent of the Marian party, in that civil war, and after Sulla's death supported Lepidus in the fatuous rising of 77 B.C., perishing at Rhegium Cisalpine by the orders of young Pompey. A sober estimate of time and years renders it very improbable that Cæsar might have been the father of Brutus.

Servilia, however, marrying Silanus (consul of 62 B.C.), was in the critical year 63 B.C., when her son was already twenty-two years old, in a relation to Cæsar which was scandalous and notorious.² Now this corrupt mother cannot have had much influence on her son, who patterned rather, and with great perseverance, after his mother's half-brother, the great Cato. When the latter, in 58 B.C., to remove him from the senate for awhile, was sent to Cyprus, to settle that island for the Roman government, and make an inventory of the treasure of King Ptolemy, Brutus, then twenty-seven years old, accompanied his famous uncle. We cannot pursue, in detail, the entire

¹ Drumann, 4, p. 18, sqq. ; W. Teuffel in old Pauly.

² Cf. also Cic., "Att.," 2, 24.

career of Brutus. But in that island, one deep trait of his character was revealed: he was very hard, hard as granite or steel; particularly was he a very hard and relentless creditor. Later he attended his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, in the provincial administration of Cilicia with Cyprus. He had put out loans there, and when Cicero succeeded in 51 B.C. was very importunate about collections. Brutus, it seems, had heavy demands against the town of Salamis in Cyprus; and his particular strain of Stoicism had not made him squeamish about using some troops of cavalry to coerce the Salaminians in some way to pay.¹ His collecting agent was a certain Scaptius. The terms of the contract, it seems, called for interest payments at the rate of forty-eight per cent per annum. Cicero, as provincial governor, discovered also that Brutus had hidden himself behind puppets, and took practical steps to curb both the cupidity and the ruthless harshness of Brutus. Cæsar, after Pharsalos, had treated him with almost paternal generosity. The term of ideo-logue has been applied to him. When once set in an idea or purpose, expediency or circumstances could not move him. Hence the famous utterance of Cæsar about this trait: "It depends a great deal what he wills: but whatever he wills, he wills it strongly." ("Att.," 14, 1, 2.) When he had resolved to marry Porcia, Cato's daughter, he put away his first wife with cruel abruptness.

His literary occupations seem to have been handmaids to his prevailing drift or purpose. He delved deeply into the best authorities of the older republic, such as Polybius or some of the annalists: clearly, he strove to gain a clearer vision. We have reason to assume that his temporary conformity to Cæsar's imperial government was a matter of income, without any cordial acceptance of the new order.

C. Cassius Longinus had acted with consummate cool-

¹ Appius noster turmas aliquot equitum dederat huic Scaptio.

ness in the disastrous campaign of Crassus in Mesopotamia, and brought the remnant of the Roman forces safely to Syria, which he maintained for the Roman Empire. *Tri-bunus plebis* in 49, probably then less than thirty-five years of age. After Pharsalos, in the Hellespont, although in command of a powerful fleet, he surrendered to Cæsar. He was dazed, as it were, by Cæsar's preternatural and (as the classic world was fond of conceiving such things) divine fortune. (App., 2, 88.)

To his mind, in the spring of 45 B.C., Cæsar was, indeed, a gentle master, and Cassius shuddered with despair at the idea of the young pretender gaining a decisive victory in Spain. It was a bitter disappointment to him that Cæsar, in allotting the places for 44 B.C., had given the *prætorship* of the civil jurisdiction (*prætura urbana*) to Brutus, and not to himself. In exploiting the provincials he, too, had simply been a typical member of the Roman oligarchy. Thus in Rhodes he had carried away all the images of the gods but that of Helios, which, indeed, was too colossal. (Val. Max. 1, 5, 8.) To him republicanism—if we should strain terms and use this good word—was not, indeed, any return to the times of Scipio *Æ*milianus, but merely the unlimited exploitation by an oligarchy in whose councils he had good reason to expect a certain initiative and leadership. As for the particular followers of Cæsar who were persuaded to enter the plot against his life, they were probably, in the main, place-men, whose loyalty to the first emperor was determined by their measure of material rewards. Most of them were ingrates. Furthermore, the prospect of being subjects always was galling to their social pride. Perhaps, while most of them were, indeed, creatures of Cæsar, and raised by him, such as Trebonius and Brutus Albinus, they had come to look upon Cæsar and the fabric of his fortunes, to a very great extent, as their own achievement and creation. Cæsar's clear and penetrating intellect could not fail to

recognize the fact, that his tremendous social and personal elevation must breed him enemies among those who had once been merely his *peers*: not at all, of course, among his professional soldiery, or his veterans, or the populace at large.

In those imperial days and months, when even Cicero, waiting in an antechamber, had to sit patiently until he was summoned into the Presence—in those imperial and last times of Cæsar's life, the latter himself uttered these remarkable words: “Can I doubt but that I am profoundly hated, when a Cicero sits and cannot meet me at his ease? But if any one is *easy*,¹ he is the man. Still, I have no doubt but that he hates me bitterly.” And Cæsar was right. But the older and prouder aristocracy, no matter that they took an official part in the apotheosis of the divine fortune of the great Iulius, they, indeed, were *not easy* in the innermost recesses of their ancestral pride. When, on the very last day of 45 B.C., one of the consuls had died, and Cæsar had appointed Caninius consul (*suffectus*) for a fraction of twenty-four hours, it was felt as an act of wanton mockery.² Nobody, indeed, ate luncheon in that consulate. A jestful phrase of Cicero's: he says so. But he adds that tears, bitter tears, are much nearer to his prevailing mood. And this, too, with all the substantial aid of incessant philosophical reading and production, when he deliberately trained himself to forget himself, the mere individual, among larger and nobler vistas directed and leading to the greater and more imperishable concerns of mankind. How deep and bitter, then, was the prevailing discontent of the others whose *summum bonum* was placed on a level so much lower?

The dictator, I say, who read characters and moods beyond any man of his time, was certainly aware of these psychological and moral facts, and still he dispensed with

¹ *Facilis*: readily won by kindness (“Att.,” 14, 1, 2).

² Cicero, “Fam.,” 7, 39.

anything that could be called a bodyguard. The temple to *Clemency*, reared in his honor (Plut., "C.", 57), was not an unmeaning thing. He would not be a new tyrant of Syracuse, always awaiting the assassin. "Better to die once for all," he said at a dinner, in the last times, in the house of Lepidus, "than always to expect" (scil., the assassin, Plut., "Cæs.", 57).

Cæsar's achieved power was, indeed, *sui generis*; he was, indeed, Cæsar, not king. On Jan. 26, 44 B.C., some forty-eight days before his death, he rode into the city from the ritual of the *Feriæ Latinæ*, in a formal manner, as prescribed. Some in the crowd acclaimed him as 'king' . . . but he said quite truly: "I am Cæsar, not king," *i.e.*, I have myself organized and achieved a power and a sum of functions centred in my will, such as has no genuine parallel in that trite and ancient term.

Some one placed regal emblems on a public statue of the dictator. His censure first, and ruthless severity later, in dealing with two tribunes who tried to inhibit this monarchial cult, was a powerful element for the plotters against his life. The alternative of motive for this dangerous action of Cæsar, as Suetonius relates it, is memorable with all its brevity: "Grieving (or bitterly disappointed) either that the mention of kingship had been started rather unluckily, or, as his utterances went, that the glory of declining had been wrested from him."

Dio (44, 9) here sees the deep plotting of Cæsar's enemies: "But Cæsar was made an object of calumny for this also, because, when he should have hated the men who applied to him the appellation of *king*, he let them go, but made charges against the tribunes."

The other incident, of which very much was made at the time, was this (Dio, 44, 8): He was sitting in the fore-court of the temple of Venus¹ (Genetrix?). A large

¹ Livy, 116, gives this locality, also; but Appian, 2, 107 and Plut., 60, place the scene of this affront on the *Rostra*.

body of senators approached him there to report to him some decree in his honor: for, says Dio, "they were wont to transact such business in his absence, so as not to appear to do it under constraint, but of their own free will." Now Cæsar did not rise when they came into his presence. This roused their anger, and proved to be one of the strongest outward causes for the forming of the plot against his life. His clever friends afterwards excused him on the score of some momentary indisposition. He himself, later, alleged his proneness to epilepsy. But that was not the truth, but, when he wished to rise, Balbus restrained him with audible utterance — Balbus, ordinarily so tactful and diplomatic. Whoever first penned this specific incident concerning him whom we may call the first emperor's most intimate confidant loved not Balbus. Perhaps Pollio recorded it. Or was it Tanusius, or Ampius?

In these last months and weeks there is at least *one* occurrence, which is fixed with absolute certainty and definiteness. This is the curious incident of February 15, which was deliberately set, we may say, in connection with the ancient holiday of the *Lupercalia*. It was a test of popular feeling as to Cæsar's assumption of the diadem. Of this event we have a record written in the same year, viz. : Cicero's 2d Philippic, 84, composed in the autumn, after September 18. Cæsar sat at the Rostra on his gilded armehair, garbed in purple toga, with his laurel wreath. When Antony, with hardly decorous appearance, almost stripped, as chief of that ritual brotherhood, held out the diadem to Cæsar, there was a groan among the assembled myriads. Whenever Antony went through the dumb show of crowning Cæsar with it, there was positive wailing. Antony even prostrated himself before Cæsar to make him withdraw his refusal, whereas Cæsar's repeated and ultimate rejection was attended with thunders of applause.

But Cicero wrote as the bitterest of partisans, and not least so *because* he was an immeasurably interested contemporary and political witness of these events.

In the next extant writer, *Nicolaus of Damascus*,¹ who flourished with the younger Augustus, with Antony and Cleopatra, and was pretty closely related to all of them, we have a somewhat different account. It was Licinius who first approached with a diadem around which laurel had been wound. A tribune? He was carried "by his fellow-magistrates." He lays the diadem at Cæsar's feet. Encouraged by the loud shouts of the populace, he puts it on Cæsar's head. The latter beckons to Lepidus, his Master of the Horse, to put Licinius away. Lepidus hesitates (very naturally so, indeed). At this point, C. Cassius Longinus suddenly comes forward and lays the diadem on Cæsar's knees. With him was P. Casca. When Cæsar pushed it away and the people shouted, *then* Antony, anointed and in the slender garb of the *Luperci*, quickly, as though by a sudden impulse, left his place in the line of the fraternity and put the diadem on Cæsar's head. The dictator flung it among the crowd. When Antony put it on again, the populace shouted: "Salve Rex!" But Cæsar refused, and in the end ordered this diadem to be deposited in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. The sentiments of the spectators were divided, nor was there any unanimity in the interpretation of motives and significance. So far Nicolaus.

[*Livy*, 116, recorded it as one of the causes of Cæsar's assassination. *Florus*, 2, 91: dubium an ipso volente. *Velleius* (2, 56) makes Antony alone responsible, but intimates that Cæsar rather gently had rejected it *before* Antony acted. *Plutarch* (c. 61) says that Antony brought the diadem upon the forum. *Plutarch* considers it an experiment with negative results. *Suetonius* is almost heated when writing about it. He, a *grammaticus* of long service, seems to have yielded himself to the animus of Cicero (c. 79). *Appian* (2, 109) regards the diadem incident

¹ Born about 64; one year older than Augustus. Müller, "Fragm. Historicorum Græcorum," 3, p. 441.

merely as one, following a number of previous tests. Otherwise his relation corresponds to Cicero, and, we may assume, to Livy. Similar is Dio's account (44, 11), who probes for motives, as always, with relentless assertion.]

As for the assassination itself, it was set four days before Cæsar's proposed departure for the East and the Parthian campaign. The latter project impresses me as too much neglected by historical writers. This, as I intimated before, was a legacy of Crassus. Neither the empire and its eastern frontier nor the emperor could ignore this discomfiture and disgrace of the Roman name. Even in the Munda campaign this had been firmly set down on the programme of the immediate future. The incessant efforts to establish the diadem somehow, these tentative efforts had for their scope this important campaign. For any considerable sojourn in Mesopotamia the diadem would be eminently fit, nay, almost a requisite. It was this campaign which offered food for the gossips who strove to create trouble for Cæsar from all his acts and from all his projects. A new capital did the towering Julius plan: some said it was Alexandria in Egypt, which admirably permitted the introduction, ever odious, of Cleopatra's name. She was still sojourning in Cæsar's park beyond the Tiber. Others said it was Ilium, for Æneas came from Troy. Such projects saddled on Cæsar were meant to undermine his popularity with the humbler folk of the forum and of the shops. The senate, too, was to meet on March 15, four days only, let us repeat it, before Cæsar's planned departure for Mesopotamia. The meeting in the main was to deal with Parthian concerns.

Calpurnia's visions and apprehensions, the monitions of the Etruscan *haruspex* Spurinna, and so many other things deeply interesting to Livy and to Livy's readers, *prodigia* and *ostenta*, we will put them aside. For most of us are not pagans, none of us are Romans. The accomplices had waited long for him there in the portico connected

with Pompey's theatre. Finally they sent one of his old-time lieutenants, Brutus Albinus, to urge him to come to the session which, after all, he himself had appointed, to come indeed, and not be swayed by the futilities of dreams and Etruscan lore. It had been discussed, also, that in Rome and Italy, Cæsar should bear the power and title of dictator, but in all the provinces he was to be *king*.

The senators in the plot had been in that portico from daybreak, but it was eleven o'clock before Cæsar finally resolved to go. He was carried the short distance from the pontifical palace to Pompey's theatre in a litter. Before he began the session—for he was both dictator and consul—the customary sacrifices were unfavorable for doing public business on that day. Suetonius (Livy?) says that he entered the senatorial assembly as one who had spurned the Roman ritual. That which was then uppermost in his mind¹ was the Parthian campaign. As to that which followed, there is more or less detail in the various writers, of whom *Nicolaus of Damascus* was the nearest to the events of those historians whose account of the tragedy we possess with fair completeness: nor does Suetonius, Plutarch, Appian, Dio, contradict one another in any substantial detail whatsoever, except in the one thing, that Nicolaus has him *walk* to the meeting. As he entered, all rose in his honor. Mark Antony, whose herculean strength and physical courage were known to all, was detained outside in conversation with his old fellow-campaigner, Trebonius.² Some of the more practical among the plotters had suggested that Lepidus, too, as well as Antony, be stricken down at the same time; but Brutus, the ideologue, had vigorously opposed this. "If we simply remove the tyrant alone," said he, "our act will gain universal acceptance. The mechanism of the repub-

¹ Says Florus, 2, 94, the epitomizer of Livy.

² Cicero's efforts in his 2d "Phil.," to charge Antony with disloyalty to Cæsar, are very small business.

lican government will automatically resume its ancient movement. But if we slay any of Cæsar's followers, then we will appear, not as patriots, but merely as partisans of the Pompeian party."—Lepidus was at that time in his suburban villa. The golden throne was not there on that day ; as they had waited so long in vain, an attendant had removed it on that forenoon. Also there were some gladiators close at hand, subject to the call of some of the conspirators. Of these the highest number given is some eighty. It is said that Cassius, otherwise a follower of Epicurus, glanced up at the statue of Pompey and invoked his spirit. The plotters began to group themselves for their detestable and perfidious task. Brutus and certain others moved toward the rear of Cæsar's chair. At the same time, Tillius Cimber approached Cæsar directly ; his quest was a petition that his brother might be permitted to return from exile. Him accompanied other senators under guise of supporting his petition, all gradually moving up quite closely to Cæsar's chair. They had been very anxious, for Cæsar on entering had, for a long time, conversed privately with Popilius Lænas, an accomplice in the plot. They had brought with them small poniards (Dio, 44, 16) concealed in the little oblong boxes in which they were wont to carry the *stilus* for taking notes in their *pugillaria*, or wax tablets. There was no guard at all. Now Cæsar, on this important day, would not discuss personal matters, affable and gracious as he ordinarily was. Therefore Cimber, as though urging his suit, took hold of Cæsar's purple. This was the signal agreed upon to begin the dastardly deed. The first blow was a downward stroke by Casca, dealt from behind, proving not serious. Cæsar grasped Casca's arm and stabbed it with his own *stilus*. At the same time Cæsar said in Latin (Plut., "Cæs.", 66): "You villain, Casca, what are you doing ?" At this moment another one of these splendid heroes stabbed him in the side ; Cassius

found his face, Brutus his thigh. It is said that when he saw that Brutus, whom he had loaded with generosity, was among those who sought his life, he abandoned all further resistance, wrapped himself in his purple, and died, sinking at the foot of Pompey's statue. The physician, Antistius, counted twenty-three punctures and slashes, only one of which, he thought, was fatal.

Cicero had not been admitted into this plot, because they distrusted his firmness and composure. And for this fault we may cite his own testimony from a letter written on Nov. 26, 46 B.C. ("Fam.," 6, 14): "For if any one is apprehensive in great and dangerous affairs, and always more fearful of untoward results than hoping for prosperous outcome, I am that man." The closer our vision of the actual state and substratum of the Roman government of that time, the less may we applaud the deed.

They had slain the monarch, also had they removed the foremost statesman from the helm of affairs, but they had not slain monarchy. Besides, a city-republic cannot long have and hold a great empire when the military arm has passed to professional soldiers, mercenaries, not citizens in arms.

Cicero, indeed, as soon as he heard of the tremendous event ("Fam.," 6, 15), was in an ecstasy of elation, but not for many days. Not long, and it was clear that the populace of Rome was eager to rend any of the slayers they might meet on the streets of Rome. The soldiers, of course, were even more aroused. The slayers simply were backed by no physical force or armed support at all. Cicero himself was anxious to go abroad on a roving commission. He anticipated the possibility of banishment less than forty-eight hours after the deed. ("Fam.," 11, 1, 2.) The oligarchy had done the deed; really several cliques within the oligarchy. How utterly they had failed to measure public opinion was soon manifest when the two most conspicuous accomplices, for sheer self-pres-

ervation, forsook the very sight of forum and Palatine Hill, and withdrew under guise of special appointments, never to see Rome more. Other leaders, men like Decimus and Trebonius, soon departed for their provinces. They were, with the exception perhaps of the stiffnecked doctrinaire Brutus, all merely self-seekers, with but slight claims to the noble name of patriot.

On April 7 even Cicero admitted that the confusion and disorganization of public affairs was complete. ("Att.," 14, 1.) Who, indeed, could accomplish that which Cæsar's genius as yet had failed to accomplish? There were those who expected a rising of Gaul within twenty days. Cicero was dumfounded to find that, whereas what he called *freedom* had been recovered, there was no sort of restoration of the old governmental machinery and political order. ("Att.," 14, 4.)

CHAPTER XXIII

THE WRITINGS OF CÆSAR

OF his erotic verse, fortunately for his genuine admirers, nothing is left.¹ As a boy or youth he wrote "Praises of Hercules"; a tragedy, "Œdipus": versification which simply marked scholastic proficiency of his early youth. His adopted son, Augustus Cæsar, for good reasons, as I noted before, forbade his librarian permitting any one to make copies of Cæsar's verse. Evidently Augustus felt that such would not add to Cæsar's reputation. (Suet., 6, 56.)

Next we must take up once more his published speeches in the case against Dolabella, the very year of which has been a subject of controversy.²

The crabbed interests of Gellius (4, 16, 7) have preserved a mere shred of phrase. It was, however, a great case, in which young Cæsar measured himself with the protagonists of the Sullanian aristocracy, his uncle Gaius Aurelius Cotta and the brilliant Hortensius. Though he did not gain the verdict of the jury, his work, which he caused to be published, made an excellent impression. Suetonius, an expert in literature, said that young Cæsar, with this case, had gained a place in the front rank of pleaders. And a desire to excel in composition of good letters was a part of his being. Cæsar's interest in his own Latin tongue was rooted probably in his appreciation of the potency of debate and pleading in public life. When Cicero in 46, before Thapsus, wrote his rapid sur-

¹ Cf. Plin., "Ep.," 5, 3, 5.

² Lange, "R. A.," 3, 184; Nipperdey, "Opuscula," 315; Plut., "Cæs.," 4; Westermann, "Gesch. der Beredsamkeit," 2, 301.

vey of Roman oratory, we must not make too much of the eulogy of the dictator's faculty of public eloquence which we now read in "*Brutus*," 252, 258, 261, because even here Cicero was somewhat under pressure and dependency. Not a little of Cicero's commendation, by the bye, refers to enunciation and purity of delivery by which Roman aristocrats were sometimes, particularly in certain families, distinguished. There were many gradations in the Latinity of 63-46 B.C.

Two things further impressed the Arpinate critic in Cæsar's oratory. One was a certain negative excellence, a certain flawlessness of correct Latin, and a certain true taste in the choice of phrase and diction. Cicero also intimates that Cæsar was a painstaking student of niceties; but of Cæsar's *De Analogia* we will speak by and by. Further, Cicero says ("*Brutus*," 261), Cæsar had that peculiar faculty of moving his themes and points into the proper light, as good paintings are judiciously placed to produce their full effect. Also there was something luminous and generous in his oratorical manner, entirely free from foxiness and trickiness.¹ To Cæsar's published speeches, Cicero, in 46 B.C., referred as to "quite a number" (*complures*). Even more stress may we lay upon a passage from a letter, now lost, of Cicero to Cornelius Nepos. (Suet., "Cæs.," 55.) We learn that in the Dolabella speeches young Cæsar still was a student of the published orations of his kinsman Cæsar Strabo (who perished in the restoration of Marius): in easy grace and much wit: absence of passionate fervor was remarked in the latter. ("*Brut.*," 177.)

Here, too, we see with what impressive advantages, both social and cultural, the young aristocrat began, as an orator, that career which was to destroy the political preëminence of the very class from which he himself was sprung.

¹ Veteratoria ratio.

Quintilian says that if Cæsar had devoted himself to the forum alone (10, 1, 114), no other Roman could have been named to vie with Cicero's fame. Quintilian, like Cicero, lays stress on the pure taste of Cæsar's Latinity.

If we had his published speeches, we could, indeed, fill out the image of this extraordinary man in many material ways. What he could do at thirty-seven as a debater, we saw above in our survey of the session of the senate on Dec. 5, 63 B.C., when the penalty of the Catilinarians was to be determined.—In the time of Suetonius (110-120 A.D.) there were extant orations bearing Cæsar's name, which were merely what professional scribes took down (Suet., 55) at the very delivery, and subsequently multiplied for publication and profit. The more do we feel as an obvious matter that we should infer that when Cæsar himself published, he was sure of his point and convinced of the general importance of his theme.

But we must now leave his oratory and turn to his "*Commentarii de Bello Gallico*." And first we may observe that at no time these relations became a school-book for Roman youth. Test of this can easily be made. The Indices of Keil's *Grammatici* contain, roughly, some 6000 references to Vergil, Cicero is cited about 1000 times, Horace 700, Sallust 400; but *Cæsar's Gallic War* is mentioned but twice. We may confidently say that this work was unknown and unused as a text-book of the grammaticus, whether in the capital or in the provinces.

Now while we desire not to duplicate any introduction to any edition of these relations, it is urgent that we should know approximately when and why the proconsul of Gaul decided upon such a publication. No settlement of the general question can be called absolute or conclusive. The evidence belongs to the elusive category called internal evidence: here, indeed, we might adopt the term

of circumstantial evidence.¹ Not much has been added to the fundamental computations of Schneider. Long is alone in his opinion that Cæsar issued one *Commentarius* at a time, at the conclusion of each of the seven campaigns.

Cæsar did, indeed, from time to time, send official despatches to the senate, which often resulted in formal S. C. of recognition, decrees of thanksgiving, and the substance must, with other action of the senate, have found its way to the published *Acta Senatus*. It is definitely known that Cæsar had his spokesmen—always *some* tribunes—on the floor of the senate. The overwhelming majority of these dignitaries from 58 to 49 B.C., were indeed “his own tribunes.” Up to the Clodius-Milo episode in January, 52, no S. C. had been legally adopted in Rome to deprive him of his *imperium* before it should terminate by the expiration of the second *quinquennium*, which must mean about March–April, 48. We have seen how patient and tenacious Cæsar was, not to snap asunder, on his part, the slender bond or thread that still connected him with Pompey after the Milo-Clodius encounter, when Pompey, as “consul without colleague,” consented to resume power as leader of the oligarchy.

Now, on Sept. 29, 51 B.C., Pompey at last so far yielded to the importunity of the Optimates as to declare himself on the problem of Cæsar’s succession—as to pronounce plainly that Cæsar must obey the senate, and that any technicality of tribunician intercession in the premises must no longer be endured; the aim being to have Cæsar

¹ The critics enumerated by Dr. Holmes, pp. 166 sqq., are Schneider (1786–1856), Nipperdey (1821–1875), Fabia (1889), Mezger (1874–1875), E. G. Sihler (1890), George Long, Belloquet. To these names there should now be added that of Francis W. Kelsey: “The Title of Cæsar’s Work on the Gallic and Civil Wars,” Am. Philol. Association, 1905. I disagree with that critic as to the purely literary valuation of the books. Cicero was not a free agent when he wrote his “*Brutus*,” in the strictest sense of the word.

in Rome as a private person in order to destroy him in a politico-criminal trial, perhaps with the legal indictments both of *maiestas* and of *repetundarum*. This trial might have called in question his consular legislation of 59, but the data, in the main, were expected to be drawn from his proconsulate in Gaul. Perhaps, indeed, Cæsar might have been made a victim of his own *Lex Iulia Repetundarum*.¹ I have referred to it in the proper place, but must needs return to it here. That law was exceedingly strict in the financial responsibility of a provincial governor. As for giving any judicial verdict for money, we will not believe that of Cæsar. Nor will we assume that remission from any service-obligation could be compounded for, in his provinces, with money. But there was another side to this law (Kübler, p. 173). There was the final financial account. Three copies, identical as to form, must be left in two different cities in the province, while one must be deposited in the treasury at Rome. The most difficult, after the accounting for the millions of Gallic gold, would have been, I believe, that chapter in this *Lex Iulia* which forbade the following acts: “*To leave the province (i.e., in person) to lead an army out of it, to wage war on one's own initiative, to approach a kingdom (let alone enter it) without the direction of the Roman people and of the senate.*”² One may object to this by pleading the perpetual policy of conquest held by the Roman commonwealth. But the partisan bitterness now was engaged in a struggle involving questions of “to be or not to be.” Cæsar’s utterance on the field of Pharsalos furnishes luminous exegesis to these considerations.

¹ Kübler, “*Fragmenta*,” p. 172.

² Cic., “*Pison.*,” 50: “*exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum iniussu populi Romani aut senatus accedere.*” With all my admiration of the wonderful industry of Dr. T. Rice Holmes, I am inclined to believe that he overlooked this important issue. The trial of Cæsar never *was* held, but there is not the slightest doubt as to the *intention* of his enemies.

Further, we have in ancient tradition a distinct expression — truly a partisan expression — of a review or valuation of all of Cæsar's military acts in Gaul, a view intended to be overwhelming in the force of its condemnation: "Nor did he thereafter refrain from any opportunity of warfare, not even unjustifiable and dangerous warfare, provoking without warrant both races with whom there were treaty relations as well as those which were embittered and savage, to such a degree that the senate once voted (*sic*) to send envoys to investigate the condition of the provinces of Gaul and some (Cato) moved to surrender him to the enemy. But as his affairs passed off prosperously, he obtained official (religious) thanksgiving both more frequently and for more days than any one else ever did." (Suet. 24.)

If hostile historians like Tanusius (Suet. 9) endeavored to incriminate Cæsar with Catiline, where the data were somewhat elusive and obscure, it stands to reason that so rich a field as the long *imperium* of northwestern Europe was not neglected by them. After Pompey, at the end of September, 51 B.C., had at last thrown down the glove, Cæsar could not very well have written of him, without the imputation of imbecility, in so gracious and courteous terms as he does in "B. G.," 7, 6. I believe that the *Commentarii* were dictated at some point of time within that period which began with the fall of Alesia, in the latter summer of 52, and ended with Pompey's declaration, September, 51. The capture of Vercingetorix, indeed, was among the last great events which preceded both the conception and the composition of that military relation: a report probably determined upon when the election of Marcus Marcellus had been achieved by Cæsar's political antagonists.

[The long, elaborate, and direct speech of Critognatus ("B. G.," 7, 77), is the only marked exception to the usage of the *Commentarii* to give merely a summary report of discourse. I will briefly reply to Dr. Holmes

at this point. Cæsar, indeed, had no special reporter or *notarius* in the besieged town: Thucydides, Sallust, Tacitus did not in similar cases. The practice of elaborate reproduction of set oratory in ancient historiography is somewhat familiar to classicists. Rarely was it based on the possession of documentary evidence. Still, Cæsar uniformly, after great events, ascertained the drift of utterance and sentiment. It was necessary. So of a certain utterance of Pompey: "after the conclusion of the war, Cæsar learned these facts from those who were present at the discourse."¹ Or in the Civil War books again, 3, 60: *ut postea bello confecto cognitum est*;—86, 1, *ut postea cognitum est*, of Pompey, where a considerable passage is reproduced with dramatic directness. Of this incisive difference in the literary manner of the books of the Civil War we will hear later on.]

But to return to the "*Commentarii de Bello Gallico*." Why not simply *Libri*? *Commentarii* is a term of deliberate modesty, disarming literary criticism in advance. The relation does not even claim to be literature. The word *commentarius* means rather a draft, record, paper, minute, syllabus, notes (as *commentari* is to devise, draft, design); it is often close to *chirographus*, manuscript. Cæsar's private papers after his death were often called *Commentarii*² by Cicero (as in the *Philippics*, *passim*). When Cæsar, therefore, probably soon after the catastrophe of Alesia, and after the consulate of M. Marcellus (for 51 B.C.) was a certainty, and its chief aim, to recall Cæsar, was getting under way—I say, when Cæsar then determined to publish his own account of his own proconsulate, it was probably not so much to influence the *miserable* *plebecula*, chronic leech of the treasury; they were influenced by coarser arguments, in which Cæsar was an expert: but to set forth, with great simplicity and with a minimum of literary apparatus, and to the end that his friends and partisans should have proper data, his own military acts in *their apparent intrinsic necessity*. Of his non-military

¹ *Bello perfecto ab eis Cæsar haec facta cognovit, qui sermoni interfuerunt.* ("B. C.", 3, 18.)

² 'Ephemerides' in Plutarch and Appian, as well as in Symmachus and Servius, in the last part of the fourth century A.D., are probably to be taken merely as a variant of *ὑπομνήματα*.

and administrative acts, or of the singular attachment which he seems to have had from his older provincials, especially between Alps and Po, the *Commentarii* say little or nothing. Among the buttresses of the structure of his ambition this was among the most important. Hirtius, indeed, in his supplement speaks freely of this weighty matter. Hirtius wrote his preface to this supplement some time after Cæsar's death and before Jan. 1, 43 B.C. He there, too, refers to Cæsar's "Commentarii," meaning, I believe, both Gallic and Civil War;¹ they were published, he wrote, that historians should not lack the proper possession of materials: they were, indeed, a collection of reliable material. When Livy, long after Actium indeed, read these words of the fervid Cæsarean, they must have impressed him as a veritable challenge. Now the story of the literary Cato-controversy (of which more by and by) shows that Hirtius was called upon to assist Cæsar in literary matters. Even the composition of the *Commentarii Hirtius* in a manner witnessed: "*The others know how well and faultlessly, but I, how easily and swiftly he completed them.*" Now Hirtius did not attend Cæsar seven distinct times, at the end of the several distinct campaigns from 58 to 52 B.C. Clearly, he speaks of *one* task, of *one* continuous execution. By "elegantia scribundi" Hirtius meant something widely different from *our* 'elegance': nay, it is the faculty of choosing not at all uncommon or overrefined words, but the ones best adapted to the matter involved, words strictly of current diction and usage.

In his proconsular chancellery Cæsar could indeed use trained jurists, such as Trebatius Testa at Samarobriva. Much more, however, he must have used a class of scribes then greatly coming into vogue, a kind of shorthand experts called *notarii*. Such, I believe, were the amanuenses to whom Cæsar, with much speed, dictated his *Commentarii*. Plutarch (17), clearly after Oppius, says that

¹ *Qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset.*

Cæsar dictated even when moving along on horseback: that he could thus employ two scribes at the same time, or, "as Oppius said," even more.¹

The tremendous crowding of matter is the most salient feature of these memoirs; but it would seem very absurd to call this crowding a normal feature of Latin prose style. The *figures*, or data with numerical specification, with which these relations abound, were, of course, from official records of the headquarters, such as those of the *quaestor*.² The necessity of limitation, however, is before me. There are two features in this famous piece of literature which are particularly prominent. One is the presentation of all wars as quite necessary and unavoidable. Such passages are particularly found at the beginning of most wars. The British expeditions, *e.g.*, were considered, at Rome, in a very different light from the point of view put forward by Cæsar himself. As between his general officers on the one side and the centurions and common legionaries on the other, he pays far more interest to the latter. *Legati*, to his eagle-like ambition, were more or less dispensable: their reward was largely in the form of enormous donations or political preferment: so with Labienus, whose wealth derived from Gaul was the talk of the day, with Antony, Caninius, Trebonius, Hirtius, Decimus Brutus, and, of the Civil Wars, Asinius Pollio.³ Far different was the place of his legionaries, and the flower of them who always rose from the ranks — the centurions. It was for Cæsar's sake that these wonderfully efficient mercenaries fought, lived, and died. As year followed year, their civic and political ties became fainter, and finally disappeared: no family ties, in most

¹ Add Plin., "N. H.," 7, 25: *scribere aut legere, simul dictare et audire solitum accepimus, epistulas vero tantularum rerum quaternas librariis dictare, aut si nihil aliud ageret, septenas.*

² Cf. *litteræ publicæ*, 5, 47, 2, then (54 B.C.) kept at Samarobriva.

³ Once more I must refer also to Mamurra, in Catullus, 29, with the rich commentary of Munro.

cases, intervened. For Cæsar alone did they exist. In both classes of *Commentarii* does he bestow particular praise upon them. Specifically does he make veritable episodes in recording extraordinary acts of bravery, as of Pulio and Vorenus ("B. G.", 5, 44), or of another centurion at Pharsalos. Legion X became a kind of imperial guard. Its very name was a mighty power, as at Munda, even before the conflict began.

More important to the modern student are the numerous references to his own designs, plans, motives. Thus are stated the causes of his Belgian campaign (2, 2, 1); the cause of the (unexpected) war of the Veneti (3, 7, 2); his decapitation of the 'senators' of the Veneti (3, 16, 4); why he moved against the Menapii and Morini (3, 28, 1); a certain feature of Keltic habit and temperament (4, 5); why he disguised his sentiments to the Keltic chieftains (4, 6, 5); his dealing with the Usipetes and Tencteri (4, 13 sqq.); his motives for crossing the Rhine (4, 20).

Throughout we gain the impression that the public opinion and the body of principles to which he appeals is by no means that of humanity at large,—it is, after all, a limited one; it is that of Rome, whose sovereignty of the Mediterranean world was held by the Romans as a law of history and as a finality of human civilization.

[The *Commentarii*, not long before Thapsus, were praised by the foremost master of Latin prose: an intrusion almost, due to diplomatic courtesy, in Cicero's general survey of Roman oratory. The passage is in § 262. The *Commentarii* there referred to are probably those of the Keltic campaigns alone. On the whole, the passage closely resembles the later commendation of Hirtius, a pupil of Cicero after Cæsar's death in the domain of oratory. The *Commentarii* by Cicero are called *nudi*, bare. This indeed is quite obvious; *recti*, straight to the point, and straightforward, too; we may subscribe to that; *Venusti*, charming; yes, if our attention is set on the subject-matter alone: 'all fine writing of stylistic purpose being doffed, like a garment.' The body and substance stands revealed. The artificial pulchritude, Cicero goes on to say, of coming historiography, in the case of foolish authors, will have a great

field here. Wise historians, however, will let the matter entirely alone. Cicero felt in these writings, too, a luminous brevity (*illustris brevitas*) which differs much from obscure brevity. By itself brevity is often obscure. But Cicero in this somewhat forced digression, in a way, repaid a literary compliment. (V. *Brut.*, 253.)]

Cæsar had, some time before the conclusion of the Celtic campaigns, written a treatise dealing with problems of language and grammar, two books, *De Analogia*, written, as Suetonius the *grammaticus* asserts ("Cæs.", 56), in some spring season, when returning from the Po country to his Transalpine domain. Fronto, the scholar of Hadrian's time, called these books *scrupulosissimi*; they did, indeed, deal with the *minutiae* of language, such as spelling and inflection. Also he endeavored therein to settle many controversial points which a Roman purist would like to have defined or established. Varro was attacked. This treatise was much cited by later *grammatici*, such as Priscian and Charisius. It is impressive for the teacher of Latin to learn how unsettled many things still were. Cæsar declined from *panis*, bread, the genitive plural, as *panium*, whereas Verrius Flaccus, the teacher of Augustus' grandsons, demanded *panum*. The identity in form of dative and ablative in words like *mare*, *calcar*, *animal*, was laid down, while from *iubar* the ablative was *iubare*. Also Cæsar was inclined to drop *i* in the dative singular of what we now call the fourth declension. The normative influence of the *Iota subscript* of Greek analogy seems to have been potent to his grammatical vision. Such, too, probably, were the topics discussed in that last dinner which Cæsar took at Cicero's villa near Puteoli, in the Saturnalia vacation, December, 45 b.c. Cæsar called this work which was inscribed to Cicero, *De Analogia*,¹ i.e., on

¹ Similarly Varro dedicated of his compendious work "De Lingua Latina," the books from V to XXV to Cicero. Cf. J. E. Sandys, "History of Classical Scholarship," Vol. 1 (2d edition), p. 180. Steinthal, "Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern," 1863, p. 490. Varro de LL. 10, 1 (on *similitudo* and *dissimilitudo declina-*

Rule and Conformity as a principle of grammar; whereas, by *Anomalia*, the Greek grammarians meant actual usage (*συνήθεια, consuetudo*) as a principle of correctness, even when it ran counter to a rule or paradigm.

The delicacy of this rare and versatile mind was curiously manifested in that book. Still more are we impressed with a power which could utilize any given leisure at will, and turn the intellect in any direction whatsoever.

Cæsar's other work is that called *Commentarii de Bello Civili*, in three books. These do not complete their great theme, but deal with the first two years only, viz., with 49 and 48 B.C. A *torso*, in consequence of the Ides of March, 44 B.C., which Cæsar began to compose when the Civil War was at an end. The passage: "as we afterwards found after the completion of the war" (3, 57, 5; 60, 4), shows that Cæsar could not very well have written so until after the campaign of Munda.

As a matter of literary composition, there is far less crowding and hurry in this relation, also less monotony, with the great variety of themes and situations: in Italy, at the capital, on the Adriatic, the catastrophe of Curio in Africa; Dyrrachium, Thessaly, the beginning of the operations in Alexandria. Scholars, wrapt in the cloak of their prevailing concerns, have censured the great captain for not adverting to the destruction (3, 111) of the *Sera-peion* there, and with it, of the renowned library.—But the main thing about these Civil War books is this, after all, that these *commentarii* are the personal presentation of the dictator, who had determined, *ab initio*, not to be a second Sulla. His action at Corfinium had revealed to his own generation, surprised, amazed, incredulous though it was, a politician entirely *sui generis* and without par-

tionis) in books 8, 9, 10. Also on *consuetudo* versus *ratio*. The original antagonists were Aristarchos of Alexandria, and Krates of Mallos.

allel in the decline and dissolution of the Republic. About this time, in midwinter (50-49), he had written to Balbus and Oppius ("Att.," 9, 7, C) . . . "which *I* had determined to do on my own account: viz., to assume an attitude of the greatest possible gentleness; and as for Pompey, to endeavor to win him back. Let us try if in this way we may recover the good-will of all, and enjoy a victory which will be enduring; since the others could not escape hatred on account of their cruelty, nor maintain their victorious position for any length of time, except *L. Sulla* only, whom *I* am not going to imitate." This letter, like a modern proclamation, Cæsar caused to be widely copied and disseminated. This relation of these *Commentarii* is found to be in substantial harmony with this nobler political wisdom.

In the larger view which *we* desire to take, we may profitably limit our attention to but a few features. Most precious and weighty are the elucidations of his own designs and motives. These concern largely strategy and the military history of these two years, and partly they deal with the political and moral aspect of the mighty struggle.

Thus we learn in the first Spanish campaign (summer, 49) that his aim was (1, 68; 72) to cut off the enemy from the Ebro and from grain supply. Further on we hear of the importance of the moral factors in strategy: "to seem to have avoided an engagement in opposition to the opinion of the soldiers and against universal reputation, produced great injury."—Before setting out to cross to Epirus, he told the soldiers that they should expect everything from his liberality (3, 6, 2): the point was to keep them in good humor, as they were packed very closely together in the two relays of successive transportation.

With great frankness Cæsar points out his difficult situation before Dyrrachium (3, 42, 3), due to the fact that the sea-power was largely in the hands of the Pompeians.

Further on he shows the *moral* necessity of inflicting some palpable blow on Pompey, after the panic and discomfiture at Dyrrachium: his military pride is positively nettled, he categorically denies that *valor* determined the result. (3, 72, 5.) His psychological adroitness in dealing with his troops after that reverse, and his wise change of plans, impress the reader not a little. (3, 73-74.) All together, the design and motive of these Civil War delineations are revealed in those passages where his own clemency, generosity, magnanimity, are brought to our attention, while the stubbornness, cruelty, and perfidy of his adversaries are strongly revealed. Thus, when Petreius puts to the sword in the tent of his own headquarters some of Cæsar's legionaries who had fraternized with the former's soldiers. (1, 76, 4.) But when at last the same stiffnecked Pompeian was compelled to submit at discretion, the dictator treated him with exquisite forbearance, though he chided him with straightforward candor (1, 95): his own policy, indeed, had been to cause but a minimum of physical loss everywhere, so as to make a civil settlement and peace so much easier of accomplishment.

His judgment of the scholarly Pompeian, Terentius Varro (2, 17), is, as I noted before, gently ironical. His old adversaries, Bibulus and Cato, fare badly at his hands. As for Bibulus, we marvel not so very much. As for Cato, it is a more serious matter. But even before Cæsar composed these Memoirs of the Civil War, his own in more ways than one, had he written his reply to Cicero's eulogy of Cato, to wit, his *Anticato*. (Plut., "Cæs.", 54.) In April, 46 (solar year), Cicero, deeply moved by the passing of the one man who had been to him a civic ideal incarnate, planned to write his *Laus Catonis*, to him indeed, as we noted before, a problem of the 'Archimedian' order. Why?

Because every man in public life knew of the deep resentment which the dictator had long entertained for

the unyielding and fearless Stoic. Cicero knew that he would never succeed in writing in such a way that Cæsar and Cæsar's coterie would read the book with unruffled feelings. ("Att.," 12, 4, 2.) Such a book (as we noted before) he knew would be odious to them, even if Cicero were to shun scrupulously all political matters, and limit himself to the moral qualities and to the character of that rare man. While Cato's death had been a severe blow to Cæsar, Cicero's book added immensely to the provocation.—In the summer after Cæsar's death,¹ when, indeed, the orator's personal and political feelings were still at white heat, he penned a valuation of Cæsar's book. Cæsar then, in his "*Anticato*," denied the facts which Cicero had brought forward to Cato's glory; or, when the facts were, indeed, beyond controversy, he denied the right of Cicero to present them as laudable, or finally insisted that acts which could not be defended upon plain ethical nor legal grounds, were at all worthy of praise. Cæsar, by the bye, read Cicero's "*Cato*" a great many times (*sæpiissime*) and admitted that he gained much for his own faculty of presentation from this frequent perusal. ("Att.," 13, 46, 2.) Hirtius was appointed by Cæsar to collect all possibly gatherable faults and shortcomings of Cato. ("Att.," 12, 40, 1.) It was only in 45 B.C. that Cæsar's reply was issued.² There were *two* books, to reply to Cicero's *one*. Cæsar said he knew that as a mere soldier he could not compete in literary power with a brilliant orator who had enjoyed abundant leisure for his task. The dictator, I say, had been stung to the quick, for, as with a fine comb, he had reviewed and censured and belittled every act and every little thing in the private life of his dead adversary³ in a manner which even the most devoted and desperate admirer of Cæsar would

¹ Cic., "*Topica*," 94.

² Kübler, "*Fragm.*," 145.

³ E.g., Plut., "*Cat. Min.*," 11; 36; 52; 54.

find impossible to justify. One cannot avoid, in all fairness, turning to Plutarch in these premises. After relating the deep regret with which the victor of Thapsus had received the news of Cato's death, the Greek essayist goes on to say: "The discourse written by him (Cæsar) *after* these things, directed against dead Cato, does *not* seem the symptom of one gently disposed, nor prone to a reconciliation."

But it is my conviction that Cato's granite will would have spurred the living Cato to a direct denial of Cæsar's right, perhaps of Cæsar's honor, nay, to some form of fearless defiance, which would enormously have embarrassed the dynast who had so firmly resolved *not* to imitate Sulla. Cæsar¹ wrote this treatise about the time of the campaign of Mūnda. Perhaps, in taking leave, as we now do, of so uncommon a man, we must say that it was the smallest act of his entire career.

¹ According to Suet., 56.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE SUPPLEMENTARY ACCOUNTS

HIRTIUS' CONCLUSION OF GALlic WAR¹

Not all the partisans of Cæsar were place-men, though most of them appeared so to those on the other side. Many were absolutely new men, descended from unknown fathers. In this respect, too, the Civil War of Cæsar reminds us of Napoleon and his times. Men of positive talent came to the front much faster than in ordinary times, for as the crises of political history produce a much greater strain, they call for more uncommon men, and there results an acceleration of promotion entirely unknown to the piping times of peace.

Aulus Hirtius was a native of the *municipium* of *Ferentinum*, a part of central Italy where the oak begins to replace the fig tree, in the ancient canton of the *Hernici*, and like Cicero he was a *new man*. In the "Gallic War" Cæsar named him not once; and still, before Rubicon and Corfinium, there were few men of Cæsar's innermost coterie in whom he placed a confidence as complete as in Hirtius, using him for delicate political missions. We may say that with Balbus and Oppius he formed a veritable clover leaf of Cæsarians, devoted and faithful also to their chief's memory after his death. Quintus Cicero knew Hirtius during the Gallic wars. In December, 44 b.c., a short time before the consular inauguration of Hirtius, Quintus wrote a letter to —, his brother's literary secretary, full of bitter invectives against Hirtius ("Fam.," 16, 27, 1), charging him with loafing and self-indulgence during a certain summer campaign in Gaul: a character so flabby and contemptible that Quintus would not intrust Hirtius with the management of an obscure little country town, let alone the administration of Rome. But the passionate and somewhat petty soul of Quintus is too well known to us, as it was revealed in the tribulations of his domestic affairs and those of the Civil War; we hear the voice of spite and envy, which must not prevail as over against Cæsar's trust and his deliberate and lasting attachment.

It was, then, the incessant urging of Balbus (preface to "B. G.," 8) which finally prevailed upon Cæsar's old confidant and literary helper (as in the Cato matter) to undertake to fill out the *lacunæ* in Cæsar's extant works. Balbus and the men like him did not, after the Ides of March, clamor for an apology or for a new eulogy of Cæsar's political and military career. What they deplored was the cleft in the record of Cæsar's

¹ O. Hirschfeld, "Hermes," 24, p. 101 sq.

own composition. There was 'no coherence of his former and subsequent writings,' and these latter, too, closed abruptly with the beginning of the Alexandrine war. Hirtius, then, consented first to complete the account of the Gallic campaigns, *i.e.*, the work of the years 51-50 B.C., and further, to carry the narrative of the Civil War from the events at Alexandria, say roughly from January, 47 B.C., to the 15th of March, 44 B.C. This preface itself breathes the unrest and the actual confusion of the political day in which it was written, the era subsequent to the death of Cæsar. Whatever Hirtius did compose was all done before Jan. 1, 43 B.C. He, too, found the autocratic insolence of Antony insufferable, and even before May 1 withdrew to the watering-places northwest of Naples, where he availed himself of Cicero's proximity to train himself in oratory. Cicero tried in vain to make an Optimat of him. Hirtius, in turn, desired to avail himself later on (as *consul*) of Cicero's eminent talent against Antony. Cæsar's admirers were not anxious to have the new autocrat rule as Cæsar II.

Now Hirtius, in his letter or preface to Balbus, says indeed of all the matter to fill out the lacunæ of the years 51, 50 . . . 47, 46, 45, 44 . . . to March 15—"Confeci." But he undertook it all only after Cæsar's death. It is incredible to assume that he achieved it all in so short a time.¹ *Confeci*, then, is purely an anticipatory formula, meaning what his scope and plan was.

He was not in Egypt nor in the African campaign of Thapsus,² and he says that he realized deeply the difference of literary effect between those things which we relate out of our own experience and those that come to us through the description of another. The substance of Book VIII has been presented above, in its proper chronological place. Antony (c. 50) is mentioned in a courteous phrase: he was, after all, still the most powerful man in Italy while Hirtius wrote. The whole chapter 50 breathes defiance to Cæsar's political enemies, a sentiment not at all assuaged or cowed by the Ides of March. Cæsar's generous and conciliatory nature (that element of the rare man's character which even then more than ever was admired by his mourning friends) is repeatedly emphasized by Hirtius (8, 21, 2; 8, 38, 5); so, too, Cæsar's devotion to Labienus (8, 52), his acumen (8, 41, 2), his earnest desire during a great part of 50 B.C. to conform to constitutional provisions (8, 52). Cæsar's adversaries are put in the wrong. The bitter partisanship of six years ago still seems to throb in this phrase (where Hirtius describes the appeals of Curio): "If the fear of Cæsar's military power caused pain to any one, since Pompey's autocratic sway (*dominatio*) and arms caused to the forum no less fear. . . ." Hirtius even recapitulates important events of 51 B.C. from a record of the senate: a partisan here writes, who, after

¹ So, too, Nipperdey, "Quæst. Cæsarianæ," p. 16; *Jahresbericht*, 37, p. 137.

² But he was in the Pharnaces campaign and that of Mündia.

Cæsar's death, justifies Cæsar's entry upon the Civil War as completely as the dictator would have done with his own pen.

THE "BELLUM ALEXANDRINUM"

That Aulus Hirtius wrote this book can neither be conclusively proved nor disproved.¹ Suetonius, a critical and well-trained *grammaticus* ("Cæs.", 56), was uncertain. If Cæsar's conversations, in that innermost circle of which Hirtius was one, were so full and so detailed that the mere reminiscence thereof would furnish to Hirtius the account which we now read in the first thirty-two chapters, then either Cæsar talked veritable diaries to his friends, or Hirtius had a most wonderful memory, or he had made notes of Cæsar's talk. But at all events, "*Alexandrine War*" is somewhat of a misnomer. It has been, and quite properly, suggested to call it the "Fourth Book of the Civil War." The dynastic squabble among the children of Ptolemy Auletes is referred to (c. 4) with the words: "as has been shown above," but this reference carries back to Cæsar's own "Civil War," 3, 112, 10. Thus the "Bellum Alexandrinum" is a continuation of the most closely dovetailed order, as though it were part and parcel of the foregoing.

The exactness of many points of detail is noticeable. Thus the item that legion XXXVII was carried to the beaches of Africa (c. 9) two days after Cæsar secured sweet water. Such, too, are the data of hours in a given day; the exact contingents of Rhodian, Pontic, Cilician, and other ships which Cæsar had (c. 12); the arrangements of the Alexandrines, as though by a direct observer (c. 14); the gallantry of the Rhodian naval commander, Euphranor (15), and his heroic death (35); the struggle for the capture of the isle of Pharos; the description of the mole and bridge with one arch of masonry under which a vessel could pass; the panic at the mole, and how Cæsar left his own craft by swimming (21), with enough detail to show that his audacity was not merely excusable, but an act of self-preservation; the departure of the schoolboy king from Cæsar's headquarters in the palace, with the lively delineation both of the youth's remarkable histrionic powers, as well as of Cæsar's impressionable and generous nature: all these and many more data create

¹ Eduard Fischer, "das achte Buch vom Gallischen Krieg und das Bellum Alexandrinum," Passau, 1880. Nipperdey, "Quest. Cæs." ; cf. "Att.," 15, 6. Vielhaber proposed a new title: "De Bello Civili Commentarius Quartus." Add *Jahresber.*, vol. 37, p. 136 sqq. — I have noted the occurrence of some very idiomatic turns of phrase in both "B. G.," VIII and in "B. Alex." Thus *Frustra: nam*, etc., 8, 5, 3; *nequiquam: nam*, 8, 19, 6; and in "B. Alex.," 29, 5, sed *id frustra: namque*, 29, 5; *quo fors tulerat*, "B. G.," 8, 19, 7; *fors*, "B. Al.," 22, 2. — *Equitatum procedere . . . imperat*, "B. G.," 8, 27, 4; cf. *imperat pontem proe- vallari*, "B. Al.," 19, 4.

in us a very strong feeling that we are dealing with a very reliable authority, if not with an eye-witness.

There are two points in these accounts which betray the Cæsarian partisan. *What* we learn is assuredly true, but the *whole* truth is not told. And this holds, first, as to the absence of certain statements of *time*. It was, as we have noted in the proper place, on January 14 of solar year 47 B.C., or March 27 by the uncorrected Roman calendar, that Cæsar gained complete control. What, then, did he do in February, March, April, and certainly the earlier part of May?

Chapter 33 briefly relates the dynastic settlement made by Cæsar. Here, and here only, the author mentions the name of Cleopatra, as co-heir with her little brother: she was actually twenty-one to twenty-two, while the child was under thirteen. Also the writer justifies the removal out of the kingdom of the princess Arsinoë, who had withdrawn from Cæsar's control. From this account, too, one would gain the impression that Cæsar set out for Syria immediately after the dynastic settlement, whereas he remained from January 14 (solar time) to some time in May.

Cæsar's friends were positively interested in hushing up or ignoring the Cleopatra matter as much as possible, for we know that Oppius wrote a special monograph, in which he denied that the child of Cleopatra was Cæsar's. (Suet., "Cæs.", 52.)

Further on, the "Bellum Alexandrinum" explains the reverses of Cæsar's side in the province of Illyricum, after Pharsalos (42-47). Next are taken up the evil records of the man whom Cæsar, after the Ilerda campaign, left in the peninsula as *proprætor* of Further Spain, thus rewarded for the flight to Ravenna, viz., Q. Cassius Longinus. Both he and Cæsar were dead when this account was made up. Cassius is treated with uncompromising severity by the Cæsarian author, although Cassius, too, had been a Cæsarian. In fact, so dark is the record of that governor that the political sins of those communities, which in sheer desperation turned to the Pompeian side, appear almost as venial in this partisan account (48-64).

Next follow the settlement of the East and particularly the whirlwind campaign across the breadth of eastern Asia Minor, from Tarsus to Zela. The treatment which Cæsar dealt to the Galatian dynast Deiotarus is justified by the author in the employment of Cæsar's own arguments. These in a curious way maintain the attitude not of autocratic power, but of constitutional considerations: viz., that, *after* the consulate of Marcellus and Lentulus (49 B.C.), *he*, Cæsar, had been the legitimate consul of the subsequent year (48), so that those potentates who succored Pompey in the Macedonian campaign had antagonized the regular and only legitimate administration of Rome, of Italy, and of the empire itself.

The contact and conflict with King Pharnaces (69-77) is told in such a manner as to create the impression that the author lived through all he describes.

The disorders and dissensions in the capital in which Dolabella figured

so conspicuously, are summarized (65) without, however, naming any one. Between March 15, 44, and Jan. 1, 43 b.c., it was not wise for any Cæsarian to provoke the Cæsarians Dolabella or Antony, who held the consular purple after Cæsar's death.

THE "BELLUM AFRICUM"

The writer of this admirable account presents a narration of Cæsar's African campaign from his leaving Libybæum in Sicily in the latter part of December, 47, b.c. (uncorrected), really early in October of that year, until he landed at Caralis (Sardinia) on April 17, 46 (solar year), arriving in Rome on May 26, 46 b.c. It is unwise to weigh this military writer in the scales of the *grammaticus*. The efforts made by two German Latinists, *Landgraf* (in 1888) and *Woelflin* (in 1889), to make Asinius Pollio the author,¹ and by phraseological parallels with the slender remnants of his pen to make a plausible demonstration out of a mere conjecture, have not impressed scholars at large as cogent or conclusive.

Asinius was in the camp. Also, at Rome, and from the latitude of Italy, Pollio loomed up pretty large. During the campaign a rumor reached Rome that Asinius had somehow *fallen into*² the hands — not of the enemy, but — of 'the soldiers,' *alive*: what soldiers? In the "B. Africum" itself Pollio is not mentioned at all by name, and still Cæsar entertained so high an opinion of him that he had designated him governor of Further Spain for 43 b.c. In the "B. Afr.," there are mentioned of Cæsar's lieutenants L. Munatius Plancus (c. 4), C. Sallustius Crispus (34), C. Messius (33), Oppius (68), Caninius (93). We may suppose that the author would not have composed his account, if Hirtius had lived to go on with his own general programme of supplementation. Perhaps Oppius invited him to do so, for he, as we abundantly know, was not any less concerned in the posthumous fame of Cæsar than Balbus himself. Returning once more to the brilliant Pollio, we may say that he would have accepted commissions from Cæsar himself willingly enough, but so intense was the *amour-propre* which his maturer career revealed, that I consider it wildly improbable that Pollio should have written such an account without having his own name appear even once. It is more plausible then, I think, to assume that Oppius selected some military person who was not only well versed in knowledge of the actual operations of war and well qualified to relate them in a clear and definite manner, but also had been near the person of the *imperator* himself, perhaps an inmate of the *prætorium*. But even if not so, there are details which betray at least an intense desire to lose nothing of importance from the

¹ "Jahresbericht," vol. 68.

² *Delatus* . . . ("Att.," 12, 2, 1). Tyrrell does not attempt to elucidate the passage any further (vol. 4, p. 289): but cf. "B. Afr.," c. 85.

beginning. Thus, at the very start the characteristic eagerness and impatience of the great captain who pitched his tent so close to the sea that it was actually wetted by the spray (c. 1). A delicate psychological observation the author makes in c. 26 : when Cæsar had sent orders to Sicily that there be sent to him a further convoy of reinforcements, he was in such a frame of eager impatience that on the very day after he had despatched these orders, he said, “army and fleet were tarrying, and day and night he kept his eyes and his mind set and fixed on the sea.”

At another time (c. 31), while sitting in the *prætorium*, without going out nor looking abroad from the ramparts of the stockade, he gave directions for the movements of foragers, pickets, and other cavalry. The author was still wrapt in admiration when he set down these things. He records the concealed pointed stakes used by Cæsar in defence of a position (31, 7), without, however, citing Alesia, where exactly the same devices had been employed.

This writer was by no means a mere subaltern who would recite merely the outward events as they happened from day to day, but with all his affection and admiration for Cæsar — all the more sincere because it was directed at one who was dead — with all this, I say, there is a certain luminosity in his setting forth of Cæsar’s underlying designs, and of the deeper necessities which determined certain lines of action.

The enemy had hopes, with the clouds of myriads of Numidian horsemen, to smother the recruits of Cæsar by sheer numbers (c. 28). This was the hope of Labienus. That partisan leader cuts a large figure in this narrative. Our author often assumes an almost dramatic liveliness in presenting Cæsar’s old lieutenant, who had even succeeded in enlisting and bringing over a goodly number of the stalwart blond Kelts of northwest Europe (28, 3). Our author defends Cæsar’s cautious measures (31, 8) such as marked the earlier stages of this supremely difficult campaign, when the mighty imperator could not call more than a slender strip of six miles in all the province his own. In some of these apologetic passages the writer clearly overshoots the mark (e.g., 31, 9): “It was not on this account that he did not lead out his forces into line of battle because he had no faith in their gaining a victory, but he thought it was a matter of moment what kind the victory was to be ; for he deemed it disgraceful to himself after so many achievements and after the defeat of so great armies to have the reputation of having gained a victory that was a bloody one, over the remnant forces of his adversaries, forces gathered together from the rout (i.e., of Pharsalos). Therefore he had determined to endure their boastful exultation until some portion of his veteran legions should have joined him by the second convoy of transportation.” Such, no doubt, had been the drift of talk among Cæsar’s older officers, of whom the author was one : perhaps a *tribunus militum*.

And when, even after the arrival of the second and third convoys, Cæsar, while offering battle, did not force an engagement, the author actually excuses him (73). Cæsar’s veterans had been accustomed in

Gaul to wage war on level surfaces and against Gauls, men without guile and not at all given to employing ambuscades, accustomed to do their fighting by sheer gallantry, not with the employment of cunning, such as the Numidians employed on African soil. Clearly a veteran of the Keltic campaigns.

The Roman spirit and pride of the author is revealed, when he describes how Scipio, the generalissimo of the adversaries, consented to humiliate himself in his dealings with the barbarian king Juba, promising the latter to discontinue wearing the scarlet cloak of the Roman commander-in-chief (57).

The ruthless and cruel treatment which Scipio inflicted upon certain of Cæsar's veterans who had fallen into his hands is elaborated with dramatic vividness of speech and counterspeech (44-46) when a centurion of more than thirty-six years of service defied the stubborn representative of the oligarchy to his face, and was slain on the spot. Such, we may assume, was the general spirit of Cæsar's veterans, who, two years later, were enraged, but not cowed, by the Ides of March, and whose enmity drove Brutus and Cassius from the soil of Italy, long before the grain turned golden in that fateful year.

Quite different, however, is the spirit in which the author deals with Cato. First (c. 22) we are told how, at Utica, that fearless man chided Cn. Pompey, the younger, and goaded him into activity by citing the elder Pompey's youthful labors and tireless enterprise. Cato's end is told with a respectfulness and a moral regard which is without qualification or any spirit of belittling. His resolution and his perfect self-command, so completely in harmony with the best traditions of Roman character and ideals, are related in c. 88.

In the great victory of Thapsus, in a measure extorted from Cæsar by the angry passion of his seasoned veterans (82 sqq.), it is clear that the author deplores and keenly regrets the butchery of their countrymen, perpetrated by Cæsar's own legions, and strives so to delineate Cæsar's own efforts to check them, as to maintain unimpaired the latter's personal fame and policy of generosity, mercy, and forbearance. *

THE "BELLUM HISPANIENSE"

The writer reveals himself to us, as all writers do, though we know neither his name nor official position; we would be but slightly aided in our task if we did. He is a military man, and he served in this war, from the beginning, sometime in December, 46, or the intercalary period immediately preceding, to April 12, 45 and beyond, when it seems military operations came to an end.

We cannot well assume that Balbus or Oppius would have requested so unpolished, so uncouth a writer to describe Cæsar's last and most desperate campaign, that there might be rounded out or completed the accounts of his military achievements.

Cæsar, he says, came to Spain¹ "to bring the war to conclusion." What war? The recrudescence of the Pompeian faction in a number of towns of the Bætis-country? Or is it not rather the entire Civil War that he means?

The Latin written by the author—for I must not lug in here the artistic reproduction of the *sermo vulgaris* by Petronius—his Latin, I say, both in style and grammar, is so unique, so defiant of the norms and usages of the greater contemporaries such as Cicero, Cæsar, Sallust, Hir-tius, or the "Bellum Africum" even, that the task of emendation becomes doubly hazardous, if not positively impossible.

The author twice cites Ennius (then the Roman school author *par excellence*) for the illumining of battle scenes (23, 3; 31, 7). Once, also, he brings forward as a parallel the meeting of Achilles and Memnon: the particular poem referred to probably was the "Aithiopis" of Arktinos, an heroic poem of the Epic Cycle of Greek letters. Are those somewhat mechanical adornments from the Grammaticus and from the earliest drill always begun with this section of poetry, both Greek and Latin? There are a number of Grecisms² in his grammar, which I must not discuss in this place: it is clear that he had Greek training, too, and that this relation, perhaps his first serious effort at composition since his schooldays, exhibits this characteristic intrusion here and there of Greek into Latin.

A *tiro*, clearly, in letters. This is particularly palpable in the extremely narrow range of phrase and expression and from the awkward and unpleasant iteration of turns of speech at very short intervals, such as we would not tolerate in a pupil of an American high school or English grammar school. My belief is that the man was a centurion, no more. I cannot conceive a military tribune, who was at least of the equestrian class, and an aspirant for quæstorship and so for the senate, to have written an account of so elementary a quality. The end is truncated, though much cannot have been lost.

The causes of this war in southern Spain are taken for granted as known. What the account lacks, and woefully so (as a military narrative), is perspective and proportion. There is no sense of proportion, of relative weight, or of incisive events. The writer lives from hand to mouth. Like a man who has merely risen from the ranks, he recites incidents and events as they happened from day to day, and as they interested the rank and file. In this respect the "Bell. Hispan." ranks painfully below the "Bell. Africum." Like the writer of the latter, he refers to the Pompeians more frequently by the term *adversarii* than *hostes*. The names of towns and posts occurring are *Corduba*, *Ulia*,

¹ With great speed. The twenty-seven days in the general tradition are probably derived from Cæsar's poem *Iter*. The author (2) writes: 'cum celeri festinatione ad bellum conficiendum cum venisset.'

² Inclusive of the Genitive Absolute: *Eius praeteriti temporis*, 14, 1; to which add 28, 5.

Ategua, Ucubis (*Saguntum*, c. 10), *Ursao, Soricaria, Hispalis, Ventipo, Carruca, Mündia, Carteia, Gades*. That Scapula of Corduba, a Roman knight, perhaps a banker, was the head of the entire rising (*totius seditionis caput*, c. 33) in southern Spain, we learn, and this tallies perfectly with an expression in Cicero's letters.¹ It is reasonably sure that the account was compiled very soon after the conclusion of the campaign, if not during the course of the same. *Mündia* certainly would loom up or stand out much better and clearer than is now the case. The author seems to have served in the campaign of Thapsus (8, 3); he notes that fortified places in Spain are more impregnable; it is difficult to pitch a camp near them; their supply of water is good (8, 2): this was well urged by one who had served in the Ilerda campaign of 49, or in Gaul.

We have before us in the main, a chronicle or diary of that which happened from day to day. The very notation of time is uniform or monotonous: "the next night," "the next morning," "next day," "in the second watch," "in the following time," "when this time had gone by," "on the following day." — As for the detail of this relation, we everywhere gain the impression that we are dealing with an eye-witness or an ear-witness. Thus we are told, that Cæsar, when he found the Bætis too deep to ford, made a bridge (5, 1) by sinking in the river baskets filled with stones and laying his beams upon these; also he describes the density of the fog at Pompey's approach (6, 3). Arguëtius arrives from Italy, by way of Saguntum, with five standards captured from the people of that town (10, 1). *That* night Pompey set his camp on fire and withdrew towards Corduba. — The cases of desertion from Pompey to Cæsar are noted (c. 11) with such precision that one is driven to conclude that the author drew on some current record made at the time. Two legionaries were captured who once were enrolled under Trebonius: as deserters they were executed (12, 1-2). Despatch bearers of Pompey who came from Corduba were captured. They had blundered into Cæsar's camp. Their hands were cut off and they were let go (12, 3). On a certain day three horsemen who had been on picket service were slain by the Pompeians (13, 1). On the same day A. Valgius, the son of a senator, abandoned all his baggage, mounted his horse, and fled. A spy of Pompey's Legion II was captured and put to death. A leaden bullet fell into Cæsar's camp with such and such an inscription. . . . So the account runs on as though a centurion were composing a list of events from a diary.

The great battle of Mündia (31 sqq.), as we intimated before, is very inadequately told. Evidently, the military pride of the writer is in sore straits. The invincible *imperator* had been always extolled by his men: to admit that he was or could be in a critical situation full of anxiety, comes very hard to the writer, but is somewhat softened by emphasizing the topographical advantage of the Pompeians. — Our writer's account

¹ *Quod bellum commotum a Scapula* ("Fam.," 9, 18, 1).

does not go beyond the narrow limitation of his own service and vision on that field.

The last part of this account gives Cæsar's address at Gades, which begins and is carried on for a while in indirect discourse, but passes over into dramatic directness. Cæsar seems to have chided the provincials with great severity for their fickleness and tergiversation. He upbraided them for the attack in broad daylight upon the life of Cassius, their governor. This address is presented with a vigor and with forceful antitheses of the rhetorical art which were simply beyond the poor literary powers of this writer. The angry pride of Cæsar breathes from every sentence, with the living pulse-beat of truth and psychological concinnity. Four years of sweeping with his victorious eagles the battlefields of the Mediterranean world, from the foothills of Armenia, and from the mouth of the Nile to where the tides of the Atlantic surge near the pillars of Hercules — this dazzling chain of successes had clearly affected the sanity and the equipoise of the dictator: “In what did you prove yourselves victors? Or, if I *had* been destroyed, did you not observe that the Roman people had ten legions, which could not only stop *you*, but even demolish the *very* *firmament of heaven?*” The Civil War had lasted longer than Cæsar had reckoned. This Spanish rising, however, at the end of all, due, too, to Cæsar's appointment of the wretched and rapacious Cassius, had come desperately near dashing from his very lips the cup of ambition and the fruition of designs entertained by the towering Julius, from the very beginning of his political career.

CHAPTER XXV

THE OTHER SOURCES

CICERO

CICERO presents to us the fullest and most vivid, though by no means the fairest or truest reflection of the most important events or of entire periods in Cæsar's career, always excepting the Gallic wars, of which there are but glimpses. The earliest allusion to Cæsar probably occurred in Cicero's oration *In Toga Candida* (in 64 B.C.), where, as Asconius thought, he, without naming him outright, alluded to Cæsar as one of several (two?) powerful politicians who did their best to defeat Cicero's consular aspirations.

On Dec. 5, 63 B.C., in Cicero's consular year, in the debate about the Catilinarians, Cæsar, who then spoke in the pratorian place, is directly recognized as leader of the *popularis* party, as a consistent politician of that order. Cæsar is treated there with consummate courtesy and respect (cf. "Att.," 12, 21).

But the orations, with their publicity and with the constraint bound up with manifold official considerations, are incomparably inferior to the letters. These, again, must be used with a certain caution. Those to his *alter ego* Atticus are the most valuable. But *true* these, too, are merely in so far as they faithfully mirror or reflect the actual movement on the surface of Cicero's feelings, whether of joy or sadness, of triumph or apprehension, of hatred or despair; for Cicero was altogether an emotional character.

The period beginning with Cicero's return from exile and extending to the breach between the two dynasts (*i.e.*, from September, 57 B.C., to September, 51 B.C.), is one where Cicero was really a dependent of Pompey, and of Cæsar, from whom he even borrowed money, when the brilliant Arpinate so painfully realized both the impotence and the indifference of the aristocracy whose lives and fortunes he believed to have saved. Cicero is keenly alive to this new dependency, although somewhat euphemistically he calls it his *alliance* with Cæsar (*nova coniunctio*, "Att.," 4, 5).

The famous speech *De Provinciis Consularibus* of 56 B.C. is one of the political results, as we saw heretofore, of the conference of Luca. The true commentary of his outward acts we found in his frank confession to Atticus (4, 5).

The letters to *Trebatius Testa* ("Fam.," book 7), 54 B.C., mainly,

evidently were to Cicero in Rome, a welcome and semi-politic means of maintaining pleasant relation with Cæsar far away, while the legateship of brother Quintus, under Cæsar, shows us with what practical shrewdness the great manipulator of men held Cicero, at the very least, in such dependence that the latter's eloquence in these years was never directly turned to Cæsar's disadvantage.

In a certain way, indeed, Cicero tried to persuade both himself and public opinion in Rome, that he was really independent. To this deeper aspiration we may ascribe certain speeches of the years 56-55: viz., the *Sestiana*, with its appendix, *In P. Vatinium Testem Interrogatio*, and the *Pisoniana* of 55 B.C. In these, Cicero satisfied to the full his spirit of hatred and revenge, sparing in no wise certain politicians, no matter how close they were to Cæsar himself, such as the latter's father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso, and A. Gabinius, tool of Pompey's ambition. Cicero knew, with all this, that his relations to the dynasts were such that he need fear no second exile. ("Quint. Fratr.," 2, 15, B. 2.)

It is from the letters of *Cælius* to Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) that we learn ("Fam.," 8, 1 sqq.) to observe and estimate the growing tension and approaching crisis (of 51 B.C.) in the relations of the two dynasts: also the essence of Pompey's political personality is curiously illuminated.

After Rubicon, Corfinium, and Brundisium (49 B.C.), almost the entire Civil War is fully marked and marshalled in the letters to Atticus, from book 7 onward, down to the visit of Cæsar in the Saturnalia vacation December, 45, at Cicero's Puteolanum, so that no other source permits so delicate an insight into the drift and trend of events, as well as into the body of sentiments and judgments evoked by the former in a soul as impressionable and mobile as was that of Cicero. These letters, moreover, particularly those written after Pharsalos, make a contribution to history which is impressive, nay, overwhelming, in fixing or determining the task of impartial historiography. Cicero, who had risked all for a purely sentimental attachment to Pompey, convinced himself in the camps of Dyrrachium and Pharsalos, that the victory of Pompey and the oligarchy would have resulted in a catastrophe more awful and sweeping than had been the proscriptions of Sulla himself.

Further, these letters reveal for a long time a profound distrust on Cicero's part towards Cæsar himself. We see that, in spite of a long series of generous and kindly acts, Cicero, from November, 48, to September, 47, B.C., was in a chronic dread that Cæsar, after all, would reveal himself a new Sulla.—On the whole, we see Cicero deeply distraught, on the one hand by his affection for pristine things and men, objects which, during Cæsar's dictatorship, he loved to idealize,—and on the other hand, by a racking pain and sorrow in his ever renewed attempts to find some way to adjust himself to the *fait accompli* of a monarchy.

His monograph on Cato was written in such a way as to excite Cæsar's admiration of its literary power, but also to provoke the dictator to a literary rejoinder.

Cicero was not without hopes that a new order of political forms would be devised in the end (e.g., "Fam." 4, 8), which would vouchsafe some measure of constitutional freedom. He was convinced that when the final victory of the Civil War once was won, some such settlement must be taken in hand by the victor himself. Again and again ("Fam." 9, 17, 1) he views the old order as not merely moribund, but defunct. — We should not charge the Arpinate with hypocrisy for his effusive discourse on Cæsar's political generosity (autumn 46 B.C., "Fam." 4, 4) in permitting the return of M. Marcellus. Cicero, was, as it were, carried off his feet by the dictator's magnanimity and, by a sudden impulse of his emotional temperament, broke his resolution of maintaining silence in the senate.

On the other hand, after the Ides of March, Cicero was too deeply enraged against monarchy as such, to be fair to the person of the slain monarch. ("Off." 2, 23; 84; 3, 82; 1, 26; 112; "Divinat." 2, 23.)

In the brilliant survey (2 "Phil." 116) there is one note of churlish unfairness: "He had attached to himself his political opponents *by the guise of clemency.*"¹ It is true he had failed to truly gain many of them; but the insincerity, indeed, was not in the dictator: it was in the timid and disconsolate orator no less than in the selfish and petty placemen, who, on the fatal morning, slunk into the portico of Pompey with their poniards concealed in their pencil boxes.

SALLUST² (86-84)

In his "Historiæ," Sallust dealt with contemporary history, as covered by the years 78-67 B.C. Here Cæsar could not yet have figured. All of his literary work was, in a manner, a result, I am convinced, of his turning his back definitely upon political life, as well as upon his own past, after the Ides of March. A tribune in 52 B.C., he made himself obnoxious to the aristocracy by his attempts to further the cause of unrest and disorder after the homicide on the Appian Way. As his private life had been tainted with scandalous incidents, it was easy for the Censor Appius Claudius to strike Sallust's name from the list of the senate in 50 B.C. So placed and so discredited, he owed to Cæsar both his political rehabilitation and military employment, and after Thapsus (spring, 46 B.C.), Cæsar made him the first governor of Juba's old kingdom, now become the new province of Numidia. ("Bell. Afr." 97.) Dio says (43, 8), "and (Cæsar) turned it over to Sallust to rule, formally and expressly so, actually, however, to loot and ravage."³

The inconsistency of this process of accumulating enormous riches,

¹ *Adversarios clementiæ specie devinxerat.*

² H. Jordan ("Hermes," 6, 210), an eminent critic of Sallust, claimed that Sallust should be read not as a historian but as an orator. Cf. also A. Schaefer, "Quellenkunde," § 32.

³ Cf. Varro in "Gell." 17, 18.

when measured by the lofty morality of the historian, particularly of his introductions, made a strong and sometimes an odd impression upon his own generation. Our point, however, is the positive balance¹ and sanity of his judgments, especially in contrasting Cato and Cæsar (*de Coniuratione Catilinæ*, 50 sqq.), quite in the manner of Thucydides. In Cæsar's oration the most salient feature is *equilibrium*, cool and perfect self-possession, diplomatic and statesmanlike appreciation of the situation as it was on December 5, 63; diplomatic, too, in crediting his political adversaries with good motives. He can take large views, and fortify his points with well-chosen parallels from the past history of Rome. He also frankly disowns (51, 2) any belief in aught beyond dissolution; death rather a soothing termination of all troubles. He was an Epicurean. I have referred to this speech in the proper place. His entire discourse, leading up to a motion which even Cicero, nineteen years later, called severe ("Att.," 12, 21), characterizes the statesman no less than a certain humanity in Cæsar. Nor is there the slightest trace in Sallust of endeavoring to belittle the forceful consistency of Cæsar's greatest political antagonist, Cato. To Sallust's own historical retrospect (53, 5-6), these two men approached most closely to the great men of that Rome which lay before the period of that decadence which was still on. In ch. 54 he enters upon the literary task of precise delineation in which he is so admirable.

These rare lines were written when both men were dead. Cæsar excelled (to Sallust's retrospection) in all those qualities through which a rising statesman gains ever new and wider support. Among these qualities were the faculties exerted in comity, kindness, generosity, sympathy, affability; to the advancement of his friends he was so devoted as to neglect his own interests. His munificence was boundless, and he was an asylum for those who were in distress.

To the element of ambition his beneficiary, Sallust, refers in a somewhat guarded manner: "He chose for himself (*exoptabat*) a great command — clearly that beginning, in 58 b.c. — an army, *a novum bellum*,² where his eminence might brilliantly reveal itself." Here, then, is the virtual or implied admission, that the Keltic war was no imperial or political necessity, but rather an arena for Cæsar's ambition. Also we have from Sallust's pen the insinuation that Cæsar was an adept in trumping wealth with wealth, an adept in confronting political cliques with cliques organized by himself. Also we read, and that not merely between the lines, that when we ascend from the lower levels of achievements and success to the higher, of moral excellence and fearless consistency, and of disdain for expediency and for aught but deep conviction, — there Cato dwelt, and dwelt alone. Such a *testimonium animæ* by an eminent Cæsarian is doubly impressive.

¹ Mommsen is wide of the mark in conceiving Sallust's "Catiline" as an apology of Cæsar.

² Perhaps *novum bellum* is here rather a *war of novel features*.

NIKOLAOS OF DAMASCUS¹

This Syro-Grecian scholar was a courtier, an educator, an historian, and, above all, a man who curiously came in touch, in the course of his life, both with Octavian Augustus Cæsar and with the court at Alexandria: he is said to have taught the children of Antony and Cleopatra (*after Actium?*). He was much also at the court of Herod the Great, and as late as 4 B.C., accompanied the latter's son Archelaos to Rome. Beside a general history in 144 books dedicated to Herod, he wrote a work on the education of Augustus, whose age was almost the same as his own, for Nikolaos was born in 64 B.C. From the "Education of Augustus," then, we may select data found in ch. 7 sqq. We learn that young Octavian habitually after his adoption, still called Cæsar 'uncle,' that, when his health was restored, he followed the latter into the Munda campaign in Spain (c. 10), and that he reported at headquarters when the dictator had already completed the seven months' campaign. The fact of adoption, however, was revealed to the youth only *after* the Ides of March, when the will was opened. The story of the conspiracy and of the assassination is told in chs. 19-24. He blunders in setting down Decimus Brutus as one of the former Pompeians. He emphasizes Cæsar's conciliatory temperament as an element of his character.

The motives of the accomplices are specifically elucidated, some individually, some by entire classes (c. 19). We may readily assume that here we meet the current views as held in the circles of Augustus himself, and this exposition is not surpassed by any other presentation within the entire range of the classical tradition now extant. To be the *Cæsaris ulti*² was the first great task of Cæsar's heir, and the greatest and fullest possible knowledge of the subject must, in the generation after the Ides of March, have been in the possession of Augustus, whose beneficiary the Syrohellenic philosopher seems to have been. The *Excessive Honors* were a part of the conspirators' design (20). Cæsar's paternity of Cleopatra's child is presented as a mere malevolent rumor and aspersion. The relation of the Lupercalia matter differs greatly from that of Cicero's "Second Philippic." The detail almost everywhere is most impressive. The discontinuance of any bodyguard (22) is ascribed to the hypocritical appeals of the accomplices. The details of strokes, blows, and position are not excelled for their precision. May we not assume that in the archives of Augustus there was some official record, taken down even before the expiration of 43 B.C., a protocol indeed prepared as a corollary

¹ O. E. Schmidt, "Die letzten Kämpfe der römischen Republik," 1884. A. Schaefer, "Quellenkunde," § 48. Müller, "Fragm. Hist. Graecorum," vol. 3. — The article in Suidas has been revised, "Rh. Mus.," 35, 63, where Daub suggests: *τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ Καλσαπός ἀγωγή*. — Nikolaos is not over-familiar with Roman antiquities: *v. in ch. 5 his references to the Feriae Latinæ.*

² Horace, "Carm.," I., 2.

or sequence of the *Lex Pedia de Interfectoribus Cæsaris*.¹ Clearly there was a trial, although most of the defendants did not heed the summons, being beyond Italy. In the indictment many of the details were probably incorporated.

ASINIUS POLLIO

This noted man of affairs, military commander, provincial governor, author, critic, and patron of letters, was born in 76 B.C. and died in 5 A.D., an octogenarian. His ancestors probably were of the noted Asinii of *Teate*, in the district of the Marrucini, in central Italy. His principles and temperament seem to have been the very antithesis to that corruption in which the gilded youth (Catiline, later Clodius, Cælius, Curio, Antony, Dolabella, etc.) excelled. Educated in Rome and later a student in Athens, he gained notice in 54 B.C. as an orator. He attacked a political servitor of Pompey, and later on the keen judgment of Cæsar, who recognized and strove to utilize every genuine talent, afforded him employment and swift promotion. Pollio deplored the outbreak of the Civil War. He himself says that temperament and inclination drew him toward a literary life ("Fam.," 10, 31). He had personal enemies in both parties. His choice of Cæsar's party was determined by expediency. In a short time his intimacy with Cæsar was as great as that of Cæsar's oldest friends. His subsequent (and consequent) loyalty to Cæsar was deep and true. As a younger man he considered association with Cicero bliss; later, as his own powers grew, he assumed a hypercritical and haughty attitude in every direction. Even in practical problems of political adaptation he maintained a striking measure of self-respect. His style was rough and abrupt; the polished cadences of Cicero appealed not to his temperament.²

In the maturity of his powers, certainly not before Actium, perhaps, as A. Kiessling suggests, not long before the publication of Horace's first three books of Odes, in 23 B.C., did Asinius publish his work on the Civil War, specimens of which probably in public readings ("recitationes") reached the public. These probably prompted Horace to write Ode II, 1, and place it first in the Second Scroll.

I will briefly state my conclusions as regards the seventeen books (Suidas) of his "Historiæ," i.e., History of his own Time. This contemporary history, however, beginning with the consulate of Afranius and Metellus (60 B.C.), clearly dealt with the Civil War chiefly. This year he chose as the initial point. His reason for so doing doubtlessly was the fact that in this year the great pact of Pompey, Crassus, and Cæsar was

¹ Vell., 2, 69. Liv., 120: Cæsar (more exactly *Pedius*) legem tulit de quæstione habenda in eos, quorum opera pater occisus esset, postulatique ea lege M. Brutus, C. Cassius, D. Brutus absentes damnati sunt.

² Senec., "Ep.," 100, 7; Quintil., 10, 1, 113; Tacit., "Dial.," 21.

formed: the genetic point of the Civil War. When Horace wrote Ode II, 1, Pollio perhaps had published his work up to the death of Cato (46 B.C.). The parallel of Plutarch, "Cæs.," 32, and Appian, B.C. 2, 35, postulates Pollio as the common *ultimate* original source, even if not directly so. It was the Rubicon incident where Pollio (no small mark of Cæsar's trust) was present.¹ Plutarch cites Asinius outright for certain details of figures (Pharsalos) and recorded utterance ("Pomp.," 72; "Cæs.," 46). The latter is especially significant. Suetonius confirms the citation of Cæsar's utterance as the latter moved among the dead and dying within Pompey's stockade at Pharsalos. The inference seems to be that the young staff officer (soon to be among Cæsar's lieutenants), not long after his appointment, conceived the plan of close observation of Cæsar's acts and utterances. In a young man of strong literary aspirations nothing is more natural. An incident of a desperate situation in the Thapsus campaign, in which Pollio supported Cæsar, is related by Plutarch ("Cæs.," 52). The incident also of Cæsar's turning the *aquilifer* around (ib.) is probably from the same source. Cato's quitting Sicily in 49 B.C., and yielding to Pollio is related by Plutarch, "Cato Min.," 53. The onset of young Pompey's legions at Munda, said Pollio (Suet., "Cæs.," 55), was so sharp and quick, that Cæsar had no time to make his customary appeal to his own troops.

Appian presents the Cato-Pollo-Sicily matter (2, 40) with specific utterances. He notes also Asinius' escape from the catastrophe of Curio in 49 B.C., and the further acts and efforts of Asinius to save the remnants of Cæsar's forces (2, 46). The number of the slain at Pharsalos is given after Pollio (2, 82). Whether Appian knew him through Livy, or directly, for the further history of the Civil War to Cæsar's death, cannot now be conclusively determined. The last citation of his name by Appian is in connection with the famous conference of Brundisium. ("B.C.," 5, 64.)

How far did Pollio go down? We are not sure. Was it to *Philippi*, 42 B.C.? It is puzzling to learn from an utterance of the historian Cremitius Cordus, 25 A.D., in the reign of Tiberius that Asinius Pollio was candid enough to speak with positive respect of Brutus and Cassius. (Tac., "Annal.," 4, 34.) If this was in connection with the Ides of March, it would, indeed, be a moral and a psychological riddle. Perhaps it was in connection with the campaign of Philippi.

Pollio wrote of the Rhine (Strabo, C, 4, p. 249, a), *i.e.*, he traversed Cæsar's Gallic wars. The judgment cited by Suetonius ("Cæs.," 56) is severe: he said the composition of the *Commentarii* was defective in two ways: there was a lack of exactness, and further, there were flaws on the score of truth, because Cæsar uncritically (*temere*) believed most

¹ Froude's objections are based not on any critical study of the sources, which he has not made, but rather on Froude's general notion of Cæsar's character, which is Froude's own. Cæsar was not taciturn among his friends.

things, both those carried out through others and those by himself, or set them down faultily or even by lapse of memory, and he (Pollio) thought that Cæsar intended to recast and to correct them.

Clearly Pollio, who was great enough to decline to accompany Octavian into the campaign of Actium, Pollio, who had been *consul* and *triumphator*, and who, as an orator and master of Latin, hesitated not to measure himself even against a Cicero, was a very different man when he wrote his "*Historiæ*," a very different critic from the young staff-officer of Rubicon and Pharsalos, and that not only in his own estimation.

[Drumann has a special biography of Pollio. There is a special monograph by Kornemann, v. also Sihler, Am. Philol. Association. Proceedings for 1901. O. E. Schmidt, "Der Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges im Jahre 49 vor Chr.," Rh. Mus., 47, p. 241. Cf. also G. Thouret: "De Cicerone, Asinio Pollione, C. Oppio Rerum Cæsarianarum Scriptoribus." This is of the most industrious type of a German Seminararbeit (Leipziger Studien, vol. 1, 1878). There is much reading, much matter, but the logic of Thouret is often far from convincing. H. Peter in his "Fragmēta," while he, e.g., makes enormous citations from Dionysius of Halicarnassus to establish "fragments" of Fabius Pictor, is over-critical in the admission of matter *derivable*, at least, from the pen of Asinius Pollio. — Further we may cite Schanz, "Röm. Lit. Gesch.," § 216-217. Gardthausen, "Augustus I.," p. 109. Cic., "Fam.," 10, 31: March 16, from Corduba. "Fam.," 10, 33. end of May. "Fam.," 19, 33, Corduba, June 8, 43 B.C.: Pollio wrote plays even in Spain. That Pollio was in Spain in the Munda campaign is evident from Cic., "Att.," 12, 38; 13, 21.]

LIVY

Titus Livius was born in Patavium (Padua) in Venetia, in the memorable year 59, the year of Cæsar and Bibulus, being four years younger than Augustus and sixteen years younger than Pollio.

The first book of this great national history seems to have been composed sometime between 29 and 25 B.C. Perhaps he had been *grammaticus* or *rhetor* before he began to write history. His extreme devotion to Cicero¹ ("Quintil.," 10, 1, 39) makes this probable: the orations in his work no less.

If, then, the Paduan began his comprehensive work on the entire history of Rome after 29 B.C., i.e., after his thirtieth year, and wrote his one hundred and forty-second book after 9 A.D., i.e., after his sixtieth year, we are confronted by a work which in an exceptional way

¹ His son-in-law, L. Magius, was a *rhetor*: Seneca, "Controv.," 10, præf. 2. The "Fragmēta," edited by Weissenborn, B. G. Teubner, 1892, are really passages from Orosius, Plutarch, Seneca rhet. and various scholiasts and *grammatici*, with but a slender total of actual citation of Livy's text. "T. Livii Periochæ," with Iulius Obsequens, ed. Otto Jahn 1853. Cf. pp. 134-136, which confirm Plutarch as transcriber of Livy.

constituted the achievement of a lifetime. He was *ten* when Cæsar drove across the Rubicon. *Eight* books were devoted to the period covering Cæsar's Civil War and ending with the Ides of March: eight books devoted to the events of a little more than five years.

A rough estimate, then, of the whole, would permit us to say that Livy composed about three and a half books each year, and that when he had reached what we may call the history of his own time, viz., the beginning of the Civil War, he was probably not less than sixty years old. The better past had naturally become a part of his very life. Too young to be an active partisan, and by his very choice of life given to observation and reflection, without the courtier's protestation of a new felicity such as we meet in Vergil and Horace, he is not an enthusiast for the political outcome of it all. As for the lost books (and of these also are the Eight books of the Civil War) specialists in Livy, like Professor *Henry A. Sanders*¹ of Ann Arbor, conclude that the present Summaries are themselves abstracts of a fuller *Epitome Liviana*, which latter perhaps was composed as early as the reign of Tiberius, or in the generation after the death of the author himself.

Mommsen once wrote:² "The Annals of Livy, in the epoch of the decline, were rated not as *a* history, but as *the* history of the Roman Republic. Even in the better imperial period (*i.e.*, of historiography) Livy was the main source for Greeks and Romans."

So deeply did the Paduan grieve at the disruption, both moral and political, of the Civil War, so gladly did he turn away from the mournful present, that the narrative of the Older Rome was to him an anodyne, at least for a while.

As for Livy's own time, *i.e.*, the golden age of Augustus Cæsar (as the pensionaries of that emperor would have their times believe), this idealist dissents. In fact, he was singularly independent of that monarch as far as the glorification of the dictator was concerned. In the broken tradition available, we observe, first, that Livy extolled Pompey and that he was unfriendly to Cæsar. It is Livy's fearlessness and candor as an historian under Augustus which the senator and historian Cremutius Cordus extolled: extolled under Tiberius (*Tacit.*, "Annals," 4, 34). Evidently Augustus was not pleased, and charged the national historian with bias and partisanship. (We must briefly return to this point.) Somewhere in his work, perhaps under the year 100 B.C., perhaps under 60 B.C., he stopped to return to the much mooted question, whether it would have been more to the advantage of Rome, if Cæsar had never lived, or the opposite. (*Seneca*, "Nat. Quæst.," 5, 18, 4.) This may

¹ Cf. also his paper: "The Oxyrhynchus Epitome of Livy and Reinhold's *Chronicon*," Amer. Philol. Association, 1905; also: "The Lost Epitome of Livy," in "Roman Historical Sources and Institutions," edited by *Henry A. Sanders*, Macmillan, 1904. *Our* present *Periochæ* bear earmarks, certainly, of the Silver Latinity. (E. G. S.)

² (*Philologus*, 1886, p. 510) in a treatise of 1861.

have been a theme for debate in the *controversiae* of the rhetorical schools. Livy's description of Cicero's death (preserved by the elder Seneca, "Suas," 6, 17, sqq.) betokens a devotion on Livy's part not excelled by Quintilian himself. A Ciceronian, indeed, must we call our historian. And when one yields oneself to the bitterness of the Arpinate, one cannot but become unfriendly to the dictator.

In Hadrian's time probably, *Florus*, a rhetor, wrote: "Epitomæ de Tito Livio bellorum omnium, Annorum DCC," of which 2, 13, presents the Civil War of Cæsar and Pompey, and not a little of Livy's general spirit and treatment seems to have been transcribed. The Civil War was intrinsically wrong. It was due to the insanity (*furor*) of Cæsar and Pompey. The madness of Marius and Sulla had been a prelude, Sulla's withering storm, at least, had not exceeded the confines of Italy. Livy (109) seems to have begun with a moralizing analysis of the underlying causes: chief among these was excessive prosperity. Livy, too, considered 60 B.C. as the genetic point: he analyzed the motives of each member of the Great Pact. The year 51, with the consulate of M. Marcellus, was conceived as that year in which the actual breach between the two dynasts was consummated. The question of special privilege for Cæsar, the *plebiscitum* of the ten tribunes, Pompey at first allowing the enactment, and later opposing it, all was told pretty much in the same manner as we, mainly from the letters of Cælius to Cicero, presented it. We have no desire to go over the whole matter once more, but again and again we feel inclined to say that Cæsar is treated somewhat bluntly, nay, brusquely, as one as to whose deeper motives Livy had no illusions whatever. If Pompey only (*Florus*, 2, 13, 42-43) had remained in his dominant position after Dyrrachium! The beauty of Cleopatra was noted. This, under Augustus, probably was a theme impossible to pursue very far. Cæsar's purple *paludamentum* in the Nile (ib., § 59), as well as the schoolboy king's *golden corselet*, crop up in later transcriptions from Livy, such as Eutropius and Orosius. The *Lupercalia* incident is left open. On the whole, we may be quite sure that the elements of *severe treatment* of Cæsar, or the placing of emphasis upon such data as bore against his fame, were quite plentiful in Livy; they crop up in Plutarch, Appian, and Dio. The rhetorician Valerius Maximus (reign of Tiberius) drew much from Livy, but personally was prostrate before Julius as founder of the dynasty.

VELLEIUS PATERCULUS¹

This historian was a military officer under Tiberius and was advanced to the praetorship by the latter in 15 A.D. He published his two books of *Historiae Romanae* in 30 A.D., before the fall of Seianus. His culture, on

¹ Cf. edition by *Robinson Ellis*, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Article by *E. G. Sihler* in "Proceedings of American Philol. Association for 1894."

the formal side, was largely that attainable by the study of oratory and other letters. He stands in awe before the Julian dynasty as such. His faculty of characterization, in spite of a certain effusiveness of manner, is no mean one. He seems to have transcribed from Oppius in relating, *e.g.*, the adventure of the earlier Cæsar with the pirates. He, too (2, 44), makes the Triumvirate the genetic point of the Civil War. He gives summaries of figures, as, *e.g.*, of one million slain in the Gallic wars (2, 47), placing this to Cæsar's credit. The sole consulate of Pompey (52 B.C.), is taken as the point of estrangement from Cæsar. Frequently Velleius seems to check his pen, so as not to make a point against Cæsar, as when, *e.g.*, he leaves it undecided whether Curio received a certain enormous sum from Cæsar (2, 48). In telling striking incidents Velleius honors Cæsar's motives. He blunders as to date of the earlier four triumphs, placing these, also, after Munda (2, 50). The *Lupercalia* matter he considers unwise. The conspiracy is related very briefly, but temperately.

LUCAN¹

M. Annæus Lucanus (39-65 A.D.), a nephew of Seneca, wrote under Nero. It is quite obvious that the fulminations of so young a person against Cæsar as destroyer of the (so-called) republic, must, after all, be taken seriously when we consider the fervor of the young stoic and that he actually wrote under Nero, in fact dedicates this epic to that imperial versifier. Rhetorical declamation, however, has here, albeit clothed in pompous hexameters, run riot, and the young Homer has borrowed pigments from many sources. The entire Civil War for him, too (as to Livy), is due to insanity (*furor*, 1, 8). Apart from the personal motives of the Three, there was, also, the underlying cause of luxury and decadence (1, 160 sqq.). Livy again. But in many details there is a gorgeous imagery painted with entire artistic freedom not any more restrained than that of Æschylus: such is the ethnological and geographical parade of sonant nomenclature. This, together with Greek mythology, Etruscan superstition and Stoic ethics is brewed in a veritable cauldron filled with incongruous ingredients. All his lore and learning are worked into this declamation, which is sustained at a pitch of tiresome intensity. While the poet, in a manner, would have Pompey impersonate the Republic and Freedom, Cæsar is really the central figure. When the precocious youth perished in the Pisonian conspiracy, he had published but three books of his Epic. These reached the naval victory of Decimus Brutus at Massilia. The tenth book now ends with the Alexandrine episode left incomplete.

¹ v. *Heitland's* edition, London, 1887. *Bernadotte Perrin* in *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. VI, 1884, compares Lucan, 7, 326-333, with Appian, B.C., 2, 74. *Hosius* on Lucan's sources, *Rh. Mus.*, 48, 380 sqq., claims that the poet used chiefly Livy, though for battle scenery he freely availed himself even of Curtius.

It seems from the dedication to Nero (1, 38 sqq.), that the plan of the work included everything up to Actium. To separate the historical narrative from traditional stuff or ballast of epic art alluded to above, is no slight task. Lucan's personal and psychological analysis of Cæsar's sincerity is very unfavorable throughout. Cæsar, *e.g.*, when confronted with the head of Pompey, is presented as a hypocrite.—If young Lucan had lived to carry on his work to Actium, it would probably have reached a bulk exceeding that of *Iliad plus Odyssey*. That this became impossible through the catastrophe of 65 A.D., is at least one bright feature in that dark record.

C. SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS¹

This Roman antiquarian and author, who wrote under Trajan and Hadrian, had a school in Rome about 100 A.D. He was a schoolmaster (*dominus scholasticus*, Pliny, "Ep.", 1, 24), who sought recreation from his arduous professional labors by buying a little place a few miles out. His pleading in courts would seem to have been a rarer incident (ib., 1, 8). His chief activities then clustered about his being a *grammaticus*: *i.e.*, they were a combination of being an instructor in language, in literary forms and literary biographies, with almost everything that might be called antiquities. He wrote about the games (children's games) of the Greeks; about Roman spectacles and public games, on the Roman Year, on Cicero's Republic, a rejoinder to Didymos, on personal names, on forms of curses; *de viris illustribus* (this included, also, literary biographies as well as the extant books *De Grammaticis* and *De Rhetoribus*). He ranks, therefore, with the elder Pliny and Varro,² as an antiquarian and exact collector of less familiar data. In his biographies of the "Twelve Cæsars," we are rejoiced to find, for once, an utter absence of rhetoric and all kindred artificiality. These features, too, are patent in his biography of Cæsar, and stamp it as a very notable production. When we have made allowance for his extraordinary condensation of matter, we will grant him a very good place in ancient historiography. The "Cæsars" were published in 120 A.D.

He is no philosopher, no statesman nor judge of statesmen, not even a political writer, but, be it spoken with all due humility,³ he is at least a scholar. His biography of the first emperor is constructed thus (the initial portion is lost). His youth, first marriage, behavior in Sulla's Proscriptions, first military service, first forensic and political orations, renewal of rhetorical training, second return to Rome, military tribuneship,

¹ Article in Suidas, s. v., Τράγκυλλος; cf. Roth, Introduction (pp. ix-xvi).

² "Der bedeutendste Philolog und Antiquar seiner Zeit, ein würdiger Nachfolger Varros." . . . C. Wachsmuth, Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte, 1895.

³ For in our land the eyes of youth are almost feverishly fixed on the two types of eminence, the financier and the politician.

quaestorship, aedileship, prætorship, provincial *imperium* in Further Spain, consulship, Gallic proconsulate, the gathering crisis during the consular year of M. Marcellus, 51 B.C. (c. 28), and of the next one (c. 29), outbreak of Civil War (31), the whole of which is related in six brief chapters. Then (37 sqq.) follow triumphs, gifts, bounties, various administrative acts and reforms (40-44). Next are set down his physical person, habits of dress and domestic luxury, morality and amatory intrigues, convivial habits, financial integrity, or rather corruption; then follow (55 sq.) his rhetorical training and literary production; his endurance and physical energy; his disregard (59) of current superstitions, his character as commander and disciplinarian (60-70), his nobler qualities and temperamental virtues (72-75). At this point the historical narrative proper is resumed. The acts of the last part of his life are related as acts *justifying the conspiracy and the assassination* (82), followed by the funeral and related matters. While Suetonius has read the writings of Cæsar's admirers, such as Hirtius (56), Oppius (52, 72), and Balbus (81), he evidently is swayed, and, indeed, very strongly swayed, by political and historical writers of the opposite party. Such were *Tanusius Geminus* (9; cf. Plut., "Cæs.", 22), *M. Actorius Naso* (9, 52), and *T. Ampius Balbus* (77). All three writers were not content to gather evil reports and evil facts, but seem to have done their uttermost to give an unfavorable interpretation of all acts which were open to more than one interpretation. The summaries of the Gallic war, e.g., were conceived in an odious and belittling spirit. So, too, are described his private morality and his enormous appropriation of funds (49-54), with the propelling motive of avarice. (Dio teems with similar data.)

As for T. Ampius Balbus, he was a partisan of Pompey, and owed all his political preferment to that dynast. In 46, between the Thapsus campaign and that of Munda, when Cicero ("Fam.", 6, 12, 5) endeavored to gain for him a pardon and return from exile, he seems to have been engaged in historical study. Cæsar spared him not in his own account of the Civil War, telling how Ampius (during 48) had made preparation to loot the treasure in the temple of the Ephesian Artemis. ("B. C.", 3, 105.) Suetonius, 54, seems to contain the rejoinder of Ampius.

In conclusion, we must not overlook the fact that this very feature in Suetonius, viz., this enormous condensation, betokens very positive reflection.

PLUTARCH OF CHÆRONEA

He lived from about 45 A.D. to 127. All of his Roman Lives were written during the reign of Trajan (98-117). Some of them were dedicated to *Sosius Senecio*,¹ who was consul four times under that emperor. It

¹ R. Volkmann, Leben u. Schriften des Plut. von Chæronea, Berlin, 1869, p. 35 sqq.

was in Rome only when he was well advanced in life, that he studied Latin (Demosth. 2). He did not dare to weigh the technical and literary side of Cicero's eloquence. Evidently he never acquired such a mastery of Latin idiom as to feel it with direct force and truth. Plutarch had been in Rome, also, in the last years of Vespasian. His general view of the transition (Pomp. 75) of the Roman government into a monarchy was one of approval. That transition he considered providential. Not with malice or prejudice did he write a biography of Cæsar. While he presented Cæsar in parallel with Alexander, he seems to have abstained from any comparative survey (*σύγκρισις*) : which, indeed, would have been quite difficult and somewhat pointless. There are various confusions in Plutarch's relation of Cæsar's youth, *e.g.*, of Sulla's granting him pardon, of his capture by the pirates (1-2), of his study under Molo at Rhodes (3), and of the orations against Dolabella and Antony (4). He is in error in pointing to Cicero as the one who was first to penetrate into the deeper ambition of Cæsar (4, 4); further on he himself assigns this credit to Cato (13, 2 ; 14, 5). The question of Cæsar's complicity with Catiline he leaves undecided (7, 4). The Bona Dea scandal is given with impressive detail (9-10). In going to Spain (61 b.c.) Cæsar certainly did *not* cross the Alps (11). The view held by most people, that the breach of Cæsar and Pompey (13, 3) caused the Civil War, Plutarch calls erroneous. That cause was the Triumvirate, an achievement of Cæsar's. (Pollio and Livy took the same view.) Cato, alone, penetrated the import of this pact. So far the biography deals gently with Cæsar; but the consulate (14) is treated quite severely. Probably Oppius was no longer at his elbow. Besides Oppius, Plutarch positively knew, or at least inspected, Pollio, Cæsar's "Anticato," Cicero's "Cato," Cicero "de Consulatu suo" (8, 3), the *Commentarii* both of Gallic and Civil War, Tiro's "Witty Sayings of Cicero," the "Bellum Africum." I shall not attempt to establish in detail conjectures which, at all events, cannot be raised to the point of conclusiveness, let alone exclusiveness. Plutarch's fundamental erudition and reading up to middle life were Greek. This particular biography, I believe, was composed with considerable expedition. In the great libraries of Rome he could easily and promptly gain a survey of incidental bibliography without reading every scroll through. We must not forget, also, that he wrote other biographies of this very period, *viz.*, Brutus (done before), Crassus, Cato, Pompey, Cicero, Lucullus. There is lacking in Plutarch a firm and thoroughly consistent grasp of Cæsar's political personality. On the other hand, there is discoverable no bias of excessive partisanship, whether for praise or blame. At the same time, we cannot very well say that Plutarch strove to emancipate himself from his sources in such a way as to use them critically. He confuses various data as to sequence: in addition to the errors noted before, we observe the following: he seems to confound the consuls of 51 and 50 (29, 1); he omits the Gallic triumph (55, 1); he blunders as to the reason why Thapsus was chosen for the decisive battle (53, 1); he makes the incident of the pro-

testing tribunes, *Marullus* and *Caesetius*, consequent upon the Lupercalia incident of Feb. 15, 44 B.C. (61, 4); in the story of the assassination (the incident of Antony's detention outside), he confounds *Decimus Brutus* with *Trebonius* (66, 3). These are signs of haste, I believe. A certain haste, too, seems to be revealed by Plutarch's faulty spelling of some proper nouns: such as *Usipai* and *Tencteritai* for *Usipetes* and *Tencteri*; of *Carnutini* for *Carnutes*; of (the centurion at Pharsalos) *Crassinius* for *Crastinus*. In Pomp., 71, he (or the copyist?) even wrote *Crassianus*. Such being the case, viz., that he could not take time to thoroughly master specific writings, it would seem the more natural to assume Plutarch made good and full use of the great national history of Livy, really a book quite indispensable for his purpose. Not only did he use Livy where he names him outright (38, 3; 44, 5-6; 47, 1, 2; 56, 3; 63, 6), but we may ascribe to Livy's influence the critical judgments of Cæsar's policies and politics. Such are the almost abusive sketch of Cæsar's consular year (14 sq.) already mentioned; the wealth which Cæsar gained from Further Spain as proprætor (12, 2); the setting of Clodius against Cicero (14, 1); how he deceived Pompey (20, 2); the almost cynical report of the Conference of Luca, and how he reimbursed himself for his corruption of senators (21-22); Cæsar's long-established purpose of overthrowing Pompey (28, 1); the fool friends of Pompey at the outbreak of the Civil War (29, 3-4); Cæsar's specious claims as over against Pompey (30, 1); the manner in which Cæsar helped himself to the treasure in the *ærarium sanctius* at Rome, with the vain opposition of the tribune Metellus (35, 3); the excess of honors as leading up to his fall (57, 2; 5).

The personal manner of Plutarch comes before us when he stops for psychological digression in which he is so admirable: as when he weighs Cæsar's generous utterance concerning Cato's death, against the bitter and truculent spirit of Cæsar's own *Anticato*, or when Cassius, the Epicurean, turns to Pompey's spirit in a kind of aspiration or prayer (66, 2).

If we were compelled to choose between Suetonius and Plutarch, if we were condemned to lose one of these biographies, as a student of Roman Institutions and Roman History, I would unhesitatingly vote to save Suetonius.

APPIAN OF ALEXANDRIA¹

Appian was a native of Alexandria, and came to Rome during the reign of Hadrian, i.e., before 138 A.D. In the capital he was a pleader in

¹ An excellent translation in the Bohn series by Mr. Horace White of New York, with an introduction. The German specialist, Professor Schwartz in Pauly-Wissowa s.v. Appian, especially columns 226, 227, 228. L. Mendelssohn in "Rh. Mus.," 31, 201 sqq. Wachsmuth, Einleitung, etc., pp. 601 sqq.

the Roman courts. At once it is obvious that when later on he took up Roman historiography he would not shrink from free use of Latin books as such. Through *Fronto* he received the post of *procurator*, i.e., imperial financial administrator in a province. This was the latter and the more leisurely part of his career. During this time, it seems, he composed his *Πωμακά*, a work of twenty-four books, much less detailed than *Livy*, or the later *Dio*. So as to maintain a certain unity in the periods, he determined upon a series of special monographs, each dealing with one definite nationality or state, as it came into contact, or into war, with the Roman government. Book 1 dealt with the regal period. Then followed the war with the "Italians" (Latins), with the Samnites, Gauls, Sicily and other islands, with Spain, with Hannibal, with Africa (Αιβυκή), with Macedon and Illyria, with Greece, with Syria, with Mithridates. These were the first twelve books. The next five (really 13–17) dealt with the Civil Wars, no less, indeed, with the domestic movements of disintegration, so that here the reforms of the Gracchi, no less than the Catilinarian movements, had their place also.

That four entire books were set apart for the Egyptian part of Roman history seems excessive: but this was undoubtedly due to the author's nativity. One was to learn how each nation or state had passed under Roman sovereignty. In the main it is a military history. And such is never very luminous unless told by a military author who is himself no mean expert in war. Appian deliberately avoided, or made it no part of his design ("Proœm.," 13), to be exact in chronological matters. To his perception, the period of the Civil Wars was marked off by the personalities of the military leaders, viz. ("Proœm.," 14), Marius and Sulla, Pompey and Cæsar, Antony and Octavianus Cæsar. Even more indifferent as to chronological precision is Appian in giving clews to the authors transcribed or used in the Civil Wars. Like *Dio*, he is a monarchist by conviction and not an admirer of the so-called Republicans of Cæsar's time. Still, when we come to his actual delineation of this period, he is by no means a Cæsarian. His judgments often have a refreshing directness, they are vigorous and clear-cut. Cæsar was an adept in assuming a rôle (2, 11).

There is often revealed what I might call psychological pragmatism. Plutarch never gained so close a vision. But to return: if we cannot, as a rule, lay our hand upon Appian's sources, we are confronted again and again by a spirit censorious and severe in the valuation of Cæsar's acts, but even more of Cæsar's motives and the underlying elements of his soul and conscience. This cannot possibly be due to Pollio. Thus Cæsar (2, 10) was insincere in breaking with the senate about his agrarian law. That the senate, during the rest of Cæsar's consular year, was put out of function, is a curious and certainly an unfriendly exaggeration.

The Gallic wars were really reserved for the Keltic book; there are mere shreds left, but even these show exactly, in a certain place, the un-

friendly bias such as we meet in Plutarch (22) and in Suetonius. He speaks also, specifically, of the wealth which Cæsar derived from his Gallic *imperium* (2, 17) : great sums went to Rome. Appian (like Dio) drifts upon the Luca settlements without naming Luca: his treatment resembles in spirit that of Plutarch ("Cæs.", 22; "Crass.", 14). He blunders in saying that Cæsar requested of the senate *some small extension* of his proconsulate (2, 25). As for the consuls of 51, Cæsar could not buy M. Marcellus, but he did buy Æmilius Paulus for fifteen hundred talents to be neutral, and the tribune *Curio* for a much greater sum to coöperate with him actively.

The recording of *prodigia* at critical points perhaps points to Livy, who was particularly explicit in copying the official records of such matters (2, 36).

The close resemblance of Appian to Plutarch in the Epirote and in the Thessalian campaign is impressive. But I am more inclined to believe that citation of Asinius Pollio by both was at second hand. Livy's splendid national work was classic and victorious (like Pheidias's statuary) on its first appearance. Why should it not have pushed into a certain obscurity the crabbed style of Pollio?

The regretful censure of Pompey for not crossing to Italy after the events of Dyrrachium may point to Livy.¹ The *prodigia*, again, in Pompey's camp, before Pharsalos (2, 68), identical with Plutarch's report, definitely point to Livy as the common source. For the forces in that battle Appian presents three versions, but names no single authority. On the whole I am convinced that Livy, who cited Pollio for certain specific detail, was the main base both of Appian and Plutarch: at the conclusion of Pharsalos the essential identity of these two, even down to verbal concordance, is remarkable. The details of the assassination are precisely the same in Appian (2, 84) as in Plutarch. The reflection on his tragic death and the survey of his extraordinary career, from his twenty-third to his fifty-sixth year, points to Livy, who is fond of making such valuations when taking leave of the greater figures. Now Appian personally, as Wachsmuth observes, was a man of little personal reflection, a man of positive paucity of ideas: these passages then, of valuation and retrospect, even more strongly than the relation of facts, point to his authority: again probably to Livy. The epigrammatic turn, above all, in the final sentence (2, 86) cannot possibly be credited to Appian personally and directly. The surrender of Cassius to Cæsar in the Hellespont is called *base* (2, 88): Livy again, never Asinius. To this we may add the noble characterization of Cato (2, 59). Certain gross blunders in Appian show that no matter how excellent and substantial his sources, he worked and wrote in a hurry. Thus in the Mündia campaign, culminating in the great battle of March 17, 45 B.C., he places it by the walls of Corduba, without even naming Mündia. Neither is Thapsus mentioned in the de-

¹ Compare Florus, 2, 13, 42-43.

scription (2, 97) of that great contest. In the conspiracy Brutus, about 41 years old, is called a youth (*νεανίας*) (2, 112).

CASSIUS DIO COCCEIANUS (ABOUT 155-235 A.D.)

[The most elaborate study of Dio and parallels, with the constant endeavor to reestablish Livy's lost presentation thereby, is found in the Wissowa article by *Schwartz*. The industry of this scholar is great, but of course one does not get much beyond the possible, sometimes into the probable or plausible. There is too little left traceable in the department of verbal and phraseological resemblance, too little that has the force of the palpable. *Schwartz* in col. 1707 makes a very interesting observation: no agreement of Cæsar and Dio as *against Livy* has as yet been pointed out, but many agreements of Dio and Livy as *against Cæsar*. *Schwartz* is convinced that Livy sharply characterized the Gallic campaigns as purely a war of conquest.]

Dio was born at Nikaia (Nice) in Bithynia about 155 A.D., in the reign of Antoninus Pius. His knowledge of Rome and its government was a part of his own life, a large part indeed. His father, Cassius Apronianus, was imperial governor of Dalmatia and of Cilicia. Dio came to Rome in 180 and entered the senate. He was designated *prætor* by the emperor Pertinax in 193. The favorable notice of Septimius Severus he gained by his first historical and political composition, and so in time conceived the idea, as though Livy never had been, of writing the entire history of Rome from Æneas down to his own times. He firmly believes that the deity (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) reveals himself to men through *prodigia*, dreams, and signs. In the reign of Alexander Severus he became proconsul of Africa and imperial legate of Dalmatia and Upper Pannonia. In 229 he became *consul ordinarius*, jointly with the emperor Alexander Severus, and died in Nikaia in 235. The complete work was of 80 books. Of these, 37-44 deal with the nineteen years from the Catilinarian movement to Cæsar's death. Most of Dio's composition was done when he was an elderly or an old man. In Italy his favorite abode was Capua on account of the peace and leisure there to be had. As to style, he is as much under the influence of Thucydides, as Pausanias, about 40 years before him, is under that of Herodotus.

For ten years he had gathered material (72, 23): twelve further years were spent in elaboration and composition. Of Dio's recital of Cæsar's Gallic War I have dealt before with some care, under the years 58-52 B.C.

Dio is an historian in a stronger and truer sense than either Plutarch or Appian. An active life in the larger tasks of government and in eminent positions certainly enabled him to take a larger view of things: here there was not only experience in the routine of provincial government, but also contact with a wide range of actual humanity, the dispensation of civil and criminal law, command of troops, management of taxes and imposts: this, indeed, was no mean preparation for a historian of Rome.

In this respect he was superior to almost all of his predecessors, perhaps even to Sallust and Tacitus. To designate him as a "Bithynian" is about as apt as to call Alexander Hamilton a West Indian or a Britisher. When Dio deals with motives and designs, his favorite themes, we may rest assured that we are studying not a mere chronicler, but a political thinker; above all, a keen psychologist and one who is not at all given to the idealization of human character. His perpetual inclination is to supply design and motive for acts whose mere actuality is well known and long established. He is therefore removed as far as possible from a mere chronicler or annalist, and we are made to feel that here is a man almost morbid in his unwillingness to be content with the mere surface of things, or to accept the acts of political persons at their own valuation.

So, while Plutarch and Appian appear to us more in the rôle of transcribers or excerptors, the elusive pursuit of sources is somewhat less urgent in his case, and, as we become more acquainted with his character and personality, we feel that we have to do with a judge of motive and with a psychological critic of rather keen vision and very positive maturity. Livy in many ways was personally too near the events and personalities of the Civil War to write without bias for neither side. *Here* we feel that the greater remoteness of Dio was to him a positive advantage.

Whatever facts and data of tradition, the delineations of character in Dio are in the main his own. As for Cæsar, Dio waits not to the Ides of March, nor does he append his valuation to some of the great crises in Cæsar's career, but enters into such a sketch much earlier, near the end of Cæsar's consular administration, in connection with the events and schemes leading to Cicero's exile (38, 11). First, Cicero's provocation; next, Cæsar's constitutional determination not to respond in kind. At this point Dio launches into an admirable delineation of some of the most salient features of Cæsar's character. Cæsar, he says, was not dislodged by abuse, he was not captivated by flattery. The essence of his nature was comity and reasonableness, he was not easily moved to anger. "In the vast total of affairs in his public life he sat in judgment (*έδικαλον*) on very many men, but not so as to be swayed by anger or to act hastily. He granted no favors to temper, but examined profoundly the given emergency, and the majority of those whom he pursued were not even allowed to become aware of it. His action was guided, not by the purpose of seeming to beat back certain antagonists, but by the aim of managing everything in such a way as to rouse the least envy, and with an eye single to advantage. And on this account, too, he was wont to inflict his penalties in a private way and where one would least have expected it; partly on account of public reputation, that he might not seem to be wrathful, and also in order that (the person involved) should not perceive it in advance and so be on his guard, nor attempt to inflict some injury upon him before being stricken himself. . . . And on this account also he forgave many of those who had caused him great trouble, or he persecuted them but a little, because he trusted they would not do him

any injury any more. Many also he punished more than was due ($\pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omega\kappa\alpha\theta\eta\kappa\omega\tau\omega$) with a view to his own security. . . .” Clearly then here we have a cool and statesmanlike valuation of the man Cæsar, as one not readily moved by enthusiasm, nor partisanship, nor rancor. There is a keen and objective acerbity over it all, as the atmosphere is over a landscape. Dio has few illusions as to the so-called great men of history. Nor is there the slightest idealization of Pompey, either, whose secretive manner saved him not from Dio’s keen computation of motives.

As to the factors of power (Dio 42, 49, 4) *Cæsar was keenly alive to the fact that these were treasure and soldiers: funds furnished the means of supporting legions, and the latter were the means of filling the coffers afresh, one being essential to the other.* This is given as one of Cæsar’s sayings.

While he was the ‘humanest of men’ (42, 55, 3), he treated mutiny with inexorable rigor. Speed and the moral results of sudden and surprising initiative were the most effective means of his strategy (42, 56).

Dio takes particular pains (Livy?) to enumerate Cæsar’s incessant levying of contributions in the provinces. Particularly does he cite cases where Cæsar laid his hands on temple-treasure, as on the Capitol even (41, 39), or where he took treasure from the temple of Hercules at Tyre (42, 49), or from the temple of the same in Phenician Gades (43, 39). — His adroitness in dealing with certain troops that had been mutinous: he used them up in Africa, ridding himself of them on the battlefields, and, at the same time, defeating the enemy with them (42, 55).

Cæsar’s ignoring of the constitution ($\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\tau\alpha\pi\alpha\tau\rho\alpha$) is noted freely and never defended, and still the conspiracy is designated as an unholy act of mad infatuation as of men possessed (44, 1).

A remarkable blunder of Dio’s must conclude this sketch. Entirely like Appian (but quite unlike Plutarch), he has no clear grasp of the conference of Luca, in the spring of 56 B.C. (Dio, 38, 25 sq.), and later on falls into the curious mistake of saying that the formal extension of Cæsar’s imperium was for three years only (40, 59).

APPENDIX

τὶ χρὴ σιωπᾶν; — EURIPIDES.

MOMMSEN AND FROUDE

MOMMSEN'S "History of Rome" tapers into, ends with, an apotheosis. The idol in that shrine is Cæsar. The book has been a veritable incubus. Alongside of it, and after it, were written sober and objective works, like that of Ludwig Lange: a constitutional, or, better, a political history of the Roman commonwealth. But Lange's book was written for the few, for the student working in the closet. Mommsen wrote with a verve, a fervor, above all, with a sovereign cocksureness which is apt to inthrall youth, and by which the liberal Philistine will swear. Let us see. In the gifted pastor's son of Schleswig, born under Danish sovereignty, and unfolding at Kiel a profound predilection for Roman Law, there came to reside, together with penetration and a tremendous industry rarely seen before, a glow of political conviction unique in connection with erudition. At the same time the soul of young Mommsen was powerfully swayed by the philosophy of Hegel: all is in a flux, and the strongest is — at least for the zenith of his strength — the manifestation of the *World-spirit*. The right of the *World-spirit* is the highest, it is absolute. What transpires, what is realized into domination and control, is at the same time the judgment of the world, a secular doomsday ever moving forward. Hegel coined that catchy phrase: 'Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht:' he had a *legerdemain* trick of borrowing phrases from the system of Christian faith. What is, is rational. It is at bottom the right of might, and there is no tyrant, autocrat, or conqueror of human annals who cannot cloak his achievements with this so-called dialectic. In 1806, when at Jena Napoleon set his foot on the Prussian monarchy, the Suabian metaphysician, Hegel, was filled with awe at this incarnation of the *World-spirit*.¹ — In 1846–47, when 29–30 years old, Mommsen, in the enjoyment of a classical scholarship, was in Italy, largely in the old Bourbon kingdom of Naples, the inscriptions of which he gathered with rare exactness and industry.

Returning to Denmark in the revolutionary parturition period of France and Germany, he was, for a year or so, editor of a political journal. His hatred for the conservatives and for the orthodox was deep and passionate. When things calmed down, he gained an academic post at

¹ So was Goethe.

Leipsic, but in the reaction he was branded as a democrat and moved on to Zürich. From here he was called to Breslau. In 1858 he was called to Berlin, where he taught to his death in 1903. His Roman history was completed by 1857, if I am not mistaken, *i.e.*, in his fortieth year. If Mommsen had lived long in England, if he had been, indeed, a native of Great Britain, or of the United States, he probably would not have written such a book. But his political education consisted largely in protest and dissent, merely. Bismarck eventually united Germany with instrumentalities infinitely more noble and incomparably more patriotic than the mercenary veterans of Cæsar. A free parliament was intrusted with a large share of the national government: the historical rights of the past were preserved or wisely adjusted. Here was a political creation incomparably better than Cæsar's: '*A me omnia proficiscentur!*'

Still Mommsen and the other politicizing professors formed a consistent and stubborn opposition (1862-66): some of them thought they were playing the rôle of little Hampdens against the new Strafford. All very curious. Most curious in the case of Mommsen. When we stopped Spanish misrule in Cuba, he glowered and growled (1897). Or did he hold that a republic should have no empire? There is sound wisdom in that lesson of Roman history, at least.

But to return: let us look at Mommsen's political judgments and political philosophy a little more closely. My references are to Mommsen's third volume, the sixth reprint of the German original 1875. Apart from one footnote caused by the Civil War of the United States, the plates of the original edition were never changed. There is something impressive, almost dogmatic, in that.

Thus we read (p. 93): "But when a government cannot govern, it ceases to be legitimate, and whoever has the *power* has also the *right* to overthrow it." Pretty philosophy. A constitution or any constitutional law is quite dispensable here, and you might have a revolution once a decade. Our Spanish friends in Central America would subscribe to that.

His political judgment is swayed — how could it be otherwise? — by the history and successes of the great, as well as the other, Napoleon: "Demokratie und Monarchie stehen in enger Wahlverwandschaft" (Democracy and Monarchy have a relation of close affinity): Aristotle puts it not quite that way. To be concise: Mommsen's political ideals, judgments, notions, convictions, sympathies, and antipathies, were formed in the period between the two Napoleons, when the dull repristination policy of Metternich and the Holy Alliance had made the very idea of conservatism hateful to most of the eager and vigorous minds of central Europe. Out of this environment and such influences, Mommsen has forged for himself a set of phrases, which jingle and clank with an almost metallic resonance in his lively pages. Such a trump card, one of them, is "*Die Demokratie.*" He operates with it as though it were a genuine and palpable political something. There *was*, indeed, a "*popularis*" party, so called. Tribunes were, indeed, created, ten per annum. But this "*de-*

mocracy" rarely polled its ballots unless it was paid. Cato refused, and they were angry. In Paris, indeed, there was a democracy, and in the German Palatinate, and up and down the Rhine: it was represented at Frankfurt, 1848. But Mommsen's incessant operating with the Roman "Demokratie," is rather empty jingle. Cicero's one phrase of the "*misera plebecula hirudo ærarii*," i.e., 'the wretched and contemptible Plebs, leech of the treasury,' is more significant and more luminous than all of Mommsen's political ejaculations.

The central point, is, however, that *monarchy* was the decree of the *World-spirit* just then. So all those who struggle for the old order are belabored by Mommsen for fools or scoundrels. Mommsen's vocabulary of abuse is extensive and racy, largely, in its idiomatic vigor, defying translation. "Cato, nach Rabulisten Art" (p. 190), "von dem bocksteifen und halbnärrischen Cato" (202), "Cato's gewissenhafte Thorheit" (206), "der standhafte Principiennarr Cato" (213), "der Don Quixote der Aristokratie," "Marcus Favonius, Cato's Sancho" (327), "Eine Opposition, die wohl ehrenwerth, aber leider doch auch zugleich lächerlich war" (327).¹ The last time I read this, I thought of the professorial opposition to Bismarck (1862-65), when Mommsen's friends, Gneist, Virchow, etc., stood in the way of the great statesman and tried to stop his work. There is much irony in the contrast between men's judging of others and their own living.

Much of Mommsen's third volume is as though Mommsen were living in Cæsar's time, or, better yet, as if Cæsar were living in Mommsen's time, say at Paris in 1849-51, and Mommsen were writing editorials in the future monarch's favor. The artificial modernity achieved by clothing those remoter figures with the political dress of yesterday is exceedingly attractive, particularly to those who have no access to, nor desire to examine, the sources for themselves.² It does much for the literary and commercial success of a book, but it is not enduring historiography. But it comes close to the reader and makes of him a partisan without much labor. Now it is somewhat absurd to inject the sympathies or antipathies of 1854-57 into the politics, nay, into the *religion!* of the Rome of 54-44 B.C. Is it not? Mommsen does it without reserve. . . . When, in the course of Pompey's campaigns Mommsen arrives at Jerusalem, he falls in with Pharisees and Sadducees. Can he restrain his *ego* there? No. His hatred of orthodoxy *per se* must out. He calls the Pharisees with the party-phrase of his own day: "Jene Orthodoxen." Of the struggle between the two factions in the Jewish commonwealth he speaks thus: "Those representatives of orthodoxy fought against the wicked heretics with all the ruthless spirit of non-reconciliation, with which the Pious are

¹ "An opposition which, indeed, was honorable, but ridiculous also, at the same time."

² The much heralded Ferrero is master of this vicious historiography: he gives us a "Tammany Hall" of Rome. These parallels glibly established are simply performances of literary audacity.

wont to battle for the possession of earthly blessings" (p. 141), *i.e.*, they are constitutionally hypocrites. In his heat he drifts on to Hohenstaufen and Papacy.

In dealing with the senatorial class of Rome he must vent his dislike for the *Junker* of Prussia. The word even will crop out: "weisen Beschluss des verschollenen *Junkertums*," p. 338. Now the *Junkers* of Prussia were in the main convinced royalists, and no less worthy of our historical regard than the venal creatures who helped the brilliant usurper at Rome to his golden chair. In the field and in the cabinet, living in the main with Spartan simplicity, they made Prussia. — And Mommsen, perhaps unconsciously, puts *Junker* and senators in one basket: "sich laecherlich machen, wie Legitimisten es pflegen" (p. 173); "die hochgeborenen Herren" (212); "der Mensch soll kein Ritter sein, und am wenigsten der Staatsmann" (292). Add to this the other *bête noire*: "Inspirationsglaube der Localtopographen" (269). Of a Sibylline saying: "die himmlische Offenbarung" (318); "dass der Volkstribun Gaius Ateius Capito den Crassus bei seinem Abzug nach Syrien in allen Formen damaliger Theologie den bösen Geistern überantwortete" (327).

One of the moral and political problems in Cæsar's career is the advancement of the dictator from ostensible democracy to autocratic power. So, on a smaller scale, did Peisistratos at Athens, Cosmo dei Medici at Florence. Now Mommsen, who is more of a passionate panegyrist of his hero than apologist of the same, coolly undertakes to endow him, by his own *fiat* and in the face of the whole evidence of ancient historiography, with complete consistency and even with glorious statesmanship and patriotism in this tortuous evolution. You may call it the audacity of the panegyrist, or the sophistry of the special pleader: the facts remain the same. It is not so. About Cæsar's own *Lex Julia Repetundarum*, as far as I can perceive, Mommsen preserves a curious silence or preterition. In the Hegelian *Phenomenology of the World-spirit* moral law is an impertinent intrusion. There is a consistent paralysis of the faculty of moral judgment, that elemental endowment of genuine humanity, whenever he comes upon the graver things in Cæsar's career. The crown was only a mere incident in Cæsar's lofty ambition (322). If ever the aim and end justified and sanctified the means, it is in Mommsen's delineation of Cæsar's elevation. Thus of the Keltic gold: "That, besides this, the masses of gold accumulated in the temples of the gods and in the treasure chambers of the nobles in consequence of the war found their way to Rome, is a matter of course; when Cæsar in all the Roman Empire offered his Gallic gold, and brought such masses of it into the financial market that gold lost 25 per cent of its value compared with silver, one may surmise what sums Gaul lost through his victory" (p. 296).¹

The rough total of the lives taken by Cæsar in his northwestern con-

¹ Compare also Munro's excellent "Commentary on Catullus," 29.

quests (inclusive of the never-to-be-forgotten shambles of the *Usipetes* and *Tencteri*) is said to have amounted roughly to the astounding and appalling grand total of one million. Once more the Hegelian *World-spirit* is invoked by Cæsar's panegyrist. It is all for culture, *i.e.*, for Greco-Roman culture: "It is more than an error, it is a wanton crime against the Holy Ghost" (that is *his* religion: Hegel *loquitur*) "potent in history, if one considers Gaul solely as the training or drill space in which Cæsar trained himself and his legions for the impending Civil War." What bathos! But the *World-spirit* must be sovereign. What of it that the Gallic *grammaticus* Ausonius, some centuries later, could perform acrobatic feats in any given metre, and versify stuff from the Greek anthology into Latin: what of it, indeed! — I have written of this matter elsewhere:¹ "As for the 'World-spirit' called in . . . to sanctify the conquests of the great captain, that *World-spirit*, unfortunately, like flea or locust, hopped soon away and lighted on the brawny chest of Antony, on the languorous eyelashes of Cleopatra. . . . What a pity! Odd dialectic of world movement."

Writing in 1857 (p. 478) that for the slaveholding aristocracy of our own southern states an emperor some day would prove a solution: there, too, the idea of such a settlement would be justified before the Spirit of History. That Christianity had an infinitely greater power, a power enduring and ever potent, to rejuvenate that aging and corrupt world, of this patent fact of history one could not find the slightest intimation in this historian. There are many ecstatic passages about Cæsar: like all overstatements they must collapse into themselves, and have or are going to collapse.

His treatment of Cæsar's relations to women is painful (463). — As for Cleopatra, his intrigue with her was "a merry prelude" (*ein lustiges Vorspiel*). It was nothing. But when Cicero and Cato caused the execution of the Catilinarians, in a somewhat summary fashion indeed, but for crimes which certainly were high treason of the most palpable order, this was "an atrocious deed" (p. 191: *eine grauenvolle Tat*), a "historical tragedy," a "brutal Justizmord!" This special pleading and heated partisanship is simply painful and intolerable. — Cæsar as a champion of *freedom*: the passage of p. 372, where Cæsar receives the tribunes Antony and Cassius (his puppets, whose fleeing from Rome was probably determined and provided for in advance), Cæsar, I say, as the paladin of freedom, who for years and years had bought his majority of annual tribunes at so much per tribune — Cæsar in this lofty rôle, and in Mommsen's ecstatic, almost dithyrambic phrase, is simply grotesque.

But Cæsar did indeed impose a military monarchy upon the Mediterranean world. Caligula, Nero, Otho, Vitellius, Commodus, Caracalla,

¹ 'Testimonium Animæ,' 1908, p. 380.

Elagabal, and other blessings of ancient history must be credited in a measure to his account.

I close this note of a dissent ever growing with advancing years, with a citation from Madvig,¹ a passage of sound and trenchant truth which I believe has never been done into English. "In the most recent time I do not know whether by following Mommsen or the imperial author of the *Vie de César*, it has come to be the fashion in a lofty manner to extol Cæsar's grand and lucid ideas and plans for reorganizing the Roman state and empire, from which (plans and ideas) quite a different creation would have issued than the Augustan. With all the measure of recognition which one may give to Cæsar's strategic genius, to his clear political vision and his energetic will, it must still be pronounced, that we do not know the slightest of these plans and ideas, that in actual history no Cæsar can be found at all, whose point of issue and the aim striven for from the beginning was a newly organized and better state, but merely a man convinced of his sound ability, ambitious and intolerant of any rival; and finally, that it is exceedingly problematical whether Cæsar, with the premises presented to his mind by the entire political development of past history, would have found a much better solution of the gigantic task proposed, a task to be solved but very slowly and imperfectly, — would have found a much better solution than Augustus. Cæsar did leave behind him a great but non-political system, viz., the improvement of the calendar; but the preparations for a Parthian war² in the last period of Cæsar's life do not make plausible the idea that he pursued grand plans of organization. Genius, too, is one-sided and subject to the conditions of its own times." This judgment of the great Danish scholar will add value to this page. It is not wise, if one desires true vision, to approach a figure, no matter how great, on all fours.

FROUDE (1818-1894)

The main data of Froude's literary biography are familiar to most readers. A close contemporary of Mommsen, and like him, the son of a clergyman, he received at Oxford, in 1840, at twenty-two, a second class in *literæ humaniores*. In 1844, so as not to lose his fellowship in Exeter Hall, he took orders. Carlyle, and later Spinoza, impressed him strongly. In 1849 his "Nemesis of Faith" (a story) was officially burned at Exeter Hall. On the same day he resigned his Fellowship: his breach with clericalism was complete. Carlyle began to patronize him, and Matthew Arnold became his friend. His "History of England in the Sixteenth Century," came out from 1856 to 1870. Its literary value is probably surer than its historical rating. A man who can glorify

¹ "Verfassung und Verw. des R. St.," I, p. 525, n. 1881.

² Urged in this work *sub anno 44*, and even in the recital of the Mündia campaign. E. G. S.

Henry VIII can do anything. He was bitterly averse to Gladstone's Irish conciliation policy (1870); he had also a deep aversion for Bright. In 1874 his "English in Ireland" was completed. Between him and E. A. Freeman there was an irreconcilable antagonism of historical vision and method. In 1879 appeared his "*Cæsar: a Sketch.*" The "sketch" was probably added to disarm expectations of critical scholarship: if so, it was wisely added. Thirty years ago, or, to be exact, thirty-one years ago, when the book was recently out, I read it for the first time: "then," says Macrobius, "when we admired, but did not yet practice judgment." This year, immediately after my critical study of the classic sources of our knowledge of Cæsar was completed, I perused the doughty Liberalist once more, and made generous annotations, — copious, I mean.

I cannot say that I read *con amore*. The edition before me is a reprint by Scribners', New York, 1880. What I shall set down here is noted as of that edition. Many data will be of smaller detail, but a historian has no more warrant to be inexact or ignorant than a mere classical philologist.

For an Oxford man to write *Caius* instead of *Gaius* is odd.

Sylla (after Plutarch) is an absurdity of spelling.

To compare Sulla (p. 95) with Graham of Claverhouse is a feat.

P. 121. "No doubt (*sic*) at Pompey's instance he was sent into Spain to complete Pompey's work" (nine years after?) "and settle the finances of that distracted country." Really he settled the finances chiefly of his distracted private purse.

The respect of Cicero for Marius (p. 121, n.) was simply due to the fact that Marius, too, was a native of Arpinum. Is it possible that F. did not realize this?

P. 122. Heavy blunder on the organization of Juries under the *lex Aurelia* of 70 B.C.

P. 123. Pirates "led by highborn adventurers": whence this? — P. 124. "The natural course would have been to make Pompey dictator," *i.e.*, to deal with the pirates. Hardly. — P. 125. "The noble lords": this is a Mommsenian trick to make the senators odious. — P. 126. "Pompey" (*i.e.*, through *lex Gabinia*) "was for three years sovereign of the Roman world." Nonsense. — Ib. "He was content to scatter them among inland colonies": *Soloi* for one was neither a colony nor inland. —

P. 127. Cicero's motives for supporting the Manilian law are stated quite fancifully. — Ib. Lucullus is quite unfairly judged. — Ib. Cicero in 66 B.C. cannot be called "by far the most gifted person in the conservative party": he had at that time never made a general political speech as yet at all. — P. 130. Chronology or sequence of Pompey's eastern campaign is confused. — P. 131. Pompey did not return poor. His mansion in the Carinæ was then built. Also the huge stone theatre inaugurated in 55. — P. 133. Cæsar and Crassus *were*, indeed, accomplices of the plot of Autronius and P. Sulla. There is no doubt of it. — P. 134. That Cicero undertook the defence of Catiline after the latter's misgovernment of Africa, has never been proved. The opposite is demonstrable. —

P. 136. Absurd of Fr. to call the anti-senatorial "party" "reformers," or the "reforming party." To call Cæsar at 37 the "strongest intellect," is running ahead of events.—Ib. To call the army "democratic" is fanciful. The legionaries were all mercenaries, without any strong civic convictions at all.—P. 137. Cæsar as ædile "built a temple to the Dioscuri": but cf. Dio, 37, 8, 2.—P. 138. Cæsar "had not aspired to the tribuneship"; simply because it was too insignificant for him.—Ib. "Abstinence from the coarse debauchery." What authority?—P. 139. Cæsar *iudex quæstionis*: Froude's notions of this function are hazy. Labienus, afterwards "so infamous." Cæsar was no sovereign when L. turned to the other side (in 49).—P. 140. Again that fanciful spook of "democratic reformers." Rabirius was *not* acquitted.—Ib. If Froude were not solidly ignorant of the State ritual of Roman religion, he could not pen as absurd a phrase as "the once sincerely believed Roman religion."—Ib. Fr. confounds pontifical nomination with election.—Ib. "Pope of Rome": absurd phrase.—Ib. "Disbelief in the legends": there were substantially *none* connected with the body of Roman ritual, loose transfer by Froude from the Greeks.—P. 141. "Liberal party": Anglican phrase. There was none in Rome properly to be so named.—P. 142. Froude's notion of the sequence of political and other events of 63 B.C. is painfully confused. On Jan. 1, 63, Pompey's victories had *not yet* filled the public treasury.—Ib. Cicero's friendship for Atticus: similarity of *temperament*? Certainly not.—P. 143. Fr. is not aware, evidently, that it was Cæsar who engineered the Agrarian Law of Rullus.—P. 146. Here Fr. begins trotting at Mommsen's heels to contribute his dole in belittling Cato: "acrid tongue and narrow republican fanaticism": tush, tush.—Ib. More "noble lords."—P. 147. Cato did *not* "affect" to be shocked at Cicero's defence of Murena.—P. 151. Sad stuff about veterans of Sulla in the Catil. conspiracy: "were now trying to bring him (Sulla) back from the dead."—P. 152. *Autronius* was not among the leading Catilinarians in November, 63.—P. 154. More "young lords."—P. 155. Cæsar spoke not immediately after Nero. He spoke "prætorio loco" (Cic., "Att.", 12, 21).

P. 156. Fr. the liberalist, on death, Cæsar's view and Lucretius. The very fervor of Lucretius implies that the majority still feared something beyond death. Cicero aspired incessantly for a repose of his soul beyond mere annihilation. Fr. had forgotten to refresh himself from Tusculan Disp., etc.—P. 158. The *billet* from Servilia to Cæsar a myth—enough to say Froude said so. Naïve how he argues from English usages and parliament, naïve to the point of childishness.—P. 160. 'Cæsar attempted to reply' to Cato. Whence has Fr. this detail? Supremely absurd to make Cæsar a kind of (noble) freethinker, to speak of Cæsar's "infidelity." Fr. really means, Cæsar's appearing an *infidel*. What is odious to Froude in 1879, he injects into the senate chamber of 63 B.C.—P. 161. Poor *Autronius*, too, strangled—by Froude. Went into exile later on, and died in exile.—P. 163. More "noble lords." Pompey sent . . . Me-

tellus Nepos to . . . "demand the consulship for him."—Where did Fr. find that? Really it was for Afranius.—Ib. Metellus did not "commence his tribunate" on December 31, but on December 10.—P. 166. "Prevent a union between (Pompey) and Cæsar (in 62): nonsense! nobody thought of it then, least of all Pompey, who, upon arriving, sought to enter into closer relationship to *Cato*, by marriage, but was rejected.—P. 166. Cæsar an object of "adoration" of the wives and daughters of the "noble lords": hardly so distant. The intrigues of Cæsar were one and all plain immoralities.—P. 167. Servilia matter: whitewashed out of Froude's fancy, who promptly turns into legends anything unpleasant. So even Cleopatra and Cæsarion; because, perhaps, Oppius wrote a book against that view. Nothing, however, was proven. This page is quite Froudesque in its bastard criticism.—P. 169. There were no "innocent intimacies" in Roman society.—P. 170. *Bona Dea* recently (?) introduced in Rome.—P. 171. Poor Clodius. . . . Cicero ready to help him: whence is this stuff?—Ib. *Unfortunate Pompeia*; why? She committed adultery.—P. 174. Fr. knows nothing of the distinctly popular third of the then juries: *the tribuni aerarii*. For 'judges' Fr. should say jurors.—P. 177. Fr. seems to confound 'Asia' and Asia Minor. 'Asia' and Bithynia had been Roman before Pompey's campaigns.—P. 181. 'Popularis' is not well rendered by 'popular.'—P. 182. More ignorant talk about Cato. Why did not Fr. study the sources instead of echoing Mommsen?

P. 183. Cæsar and Crassus *per se* belonged to the patrician circle, too.—P. 184. 'Inevitable revolution': what revolution?—Ib. Were the consular provinces not determined even before the election, under the Sempronian laws? Cf. Suet., "C." 19.

The summary of Cæsar's political exertions, as before 59 B.C., is simply fanciful.—P. 186. The senate, through the reforms of 70, *had lost* the exclusive initiative of legislation.—P. 189. 'Eternal order of nature': Carlylesque.—P. 195. Froude badly confuses the *Leges Juliae* of Cæsar and the *Leges Juliae* of Augustus: positively so.

P. 196. Cæsar working *against* revolution . . . indeed.—P. 197. Cæsar's wish for an imperium: Fr. is childlike in speaking about Cæsar's motives. Of the *anti-republican* bearing of the whole Triumvirate design—not one word.—P. 199. Cæsar's Gallic command: Fr. is purblind about it, as if there was no ancient historiography.—P. 200. A gross blunder: Fr. confounds Gallia comata and the independent Kelts.—P. 202. Bibulus, "hero of patrician saloons." Fancy.—P. 205. Cicero's "total want of political principles": echo of Mommsen.—P. 206. Cicero had "perhaps an intimacy with Clodius' sister." Nonsense!—P. 214. "In every line that he wrote, Cicero was attitudinizing for posterity." Nonsense!—P. 215. Allobroges annexed "lately": really in 121 B.C., seventy years before.—P. 218. Inquisition lugged into relation of Druids: also Smithfield.—P. 220. Ariovistus, a "Bavarian" prince.—P. 225. The Roman senate was no legislature.—P. 226. Labienus was *not* any alter-

nate for Cicero.—P. 226. Party feeling had nothing to do with service in Gaul.—P. 227. Defences on Rhone: ‘*valla*’ are not *muri*.—P. 228. “at Turin”: but cf. “B. G.” 1, 10.—P. 229. “Retribution” on Tigrinii, as though Fr. were in Cæsar’s headquarters.—Ib. Absurd to call anti-Romanist *Ædui* “secret traitors.”—P. 230. Divitiacus was not “the reigning chief of the *Ædui*.”—Ib. Absurd to call the Helvetii “Swiss.”—P. 231. Rhone for Rhine: probably a misprint.—P. 237. “Treacherous senate”: naïve partisanship of Fr.—P. 241. “No general was ever so careful of his soldiers’ lives”: but why?—P. 241. Of Belgæ: “His intention was apparently not to annex any of these tribes to Rome.” Fr. does not know what the ten *legati* of 56 B.C. were for.

P. 242. “Usually a *single* legion went in advance,” etc.: elementary blunder in misreading the Latin text.—P. 243. *Legati* had not “companies,” but legions.—Ib. The “thick hedges” were not on the Roman side of the Sabis.—P. 246. More “noble lords.”

P. 251. Cato and Cyprus: “He was well pleased with his mission, though he wished it to appear to be forced upon him.” What silly stuff will men write when *animus* holds their pen for them. A “historian,” too.—P. 257. Of Cicero: “The senate, which was his own dunghill”; . . . *i.e.*, he merely a crowing cock.—P. 261. Cicero was attached to the triumvirate.—P. 265. The Ptolemy matter is truly an Egyptian darkness for Froude. He has dipped into Cicero’s letters here and there, but he has in no wise mastered them.—P. 267. “Cato, a virtuous fanatic, passionate, with a vein of vanity.”—P. 268. *Sestius*, not *Sextius*.

P. 272. The senators at Luca had no eagerness for “reforms”; they simply had itching palms. How so was “the army” to remodel “the state”?—P. 276. The acme of absurdity: if Cicero and Cæsar had united, “the Republic . . . might have survived for many generations.”—P. 278. Cato “foamed on the Rostra.”—P. 281. Writes about the Veneti, not like an historian, but a mere echo of Cæsar.—P. 286. “Ex equitibus nostris,” “B. G.” 4, 12, 3. “Roman knights” !!—P. 288. “Cæsar had undertaken the conquest of Gaul for the defense of Italy.” Indeed!—P. 302. “Induciomarus.”—P. 310. “A letter to Cæsar inclosed in the shaft of his javelin.” But Cæsar (5, 45, 4) wrote *illigatas*.—P. 312. (Cæsar) “and the two Ciceros had been friends and companions in youth.” Where is the authority for that?—P. 316. “Ambiorix had added treachery to insurrection.” Absurdly put, unless one is a Roman.—P. 320. Cicero accepted a *loan* from Cæsar, not a gift.—P. 323. Cicero’s *De Provinciis Consularibus* is certainly not the finest of his speeches.—P. 325. For “acted” say *pleaded*.—P. 362. Alesia investment: “the most daring feat in the military annals of mankind;” voice of panegyrist.—P. 363. Fanatical as to Cæsar’s cosmopolitan designs.—P. 365. “He wished to hand over his conquests to his successor.” No comment necessary.—P. 369. “His wars had paid their own expenses.” Not true. After Luca Cæsar was reimbursed from the public treasury for the illegal increase or doub-

ling of his own legions.—P. 370. “Cæsar was a reformer.” Nonsense ! P. 371. A tissue of fancy about Cæsar as a “reformer.”

But to go on to the end would be like counting the pustules on a small-pox patient.

To improve Froude's Cæsar, one would first have to destroy it, and then write a new book. It is a partisan and flimsy performance, partly an echo of Mommsen, and partly a semi-novelistic congeries of notions and judgments bred in Froude's fancy. You might as well take a Napoleon and dress him up to look like a combination of Cromwell, Gladstone, Bright, and a champion of free thought besides. One cannot, however, smooth one's periods, at sixty, become a classical scholar over night, and occasionally dip into a very considerable mass of classical historiography, whose critical value and relative weight, even with consummate and exhaustive industry, cannot, very often, be conclusively established.

UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, N.Y., *Oct. 26, 1910.*

INDEX

Cæsar is abbreviated C.; Pompey, P. Important references are emphasized in the printing.

A

Actorius, M. Naso, 34, 268.
Aduatuca, 145 *sqq.*
Ædui, 89, 140, 160, 161, 173.
Æmilius Paulus, cons. 50 B.C., 180.
Afranius, 200 *sqq.*
Africa, 220.
Agrarian troubles, 8 *sqq.*
Alban families, 2.
Alemanni, 96.
Alesia, 164 *sqq.*, 172, 174, 268.
Alexandria, 213 *sqq.*, 221.
Allobroges, 88.
Amantius, 217, 223.
Ambiani, 103.
Ambiorix, 135, 145 *sqq.*, 174.
Ampius, T. Balbus, 34, 215, 228, 248, 301.
Analoggia, de, Cæsar's, 264, 273.
Anarchy, 133, 149, 153.
Anjou and Poitiers, 174 *sqq.*
Anticæsarian historians, 34, 91, 215, 228, 248, 301.
Anticato, Cæsar's, 276 *sqq.*
Antonius, C., 65.
Antonius, M., the orator, 25.
Antony, Mark, 172, 175, 183, 185, 190, 192, 218, 222, 223, 256 *sqq.*, 259, 293.
Apellikon, library of, 27.
Apollonius of Rhodes, 39.
Appian, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18; gross error, 20, 23, 27; differs fr. Plut., 28; confused, 30; puzzled about Sulla's retiring, 36, 46; authorities differ, 48, 50, 56, 57; on Catilinarian debate, 70, 76; on triumvirate, 81; ignorance, 81; use of Livy probable, 123, 149, 152, 187; on Rubicon matter: strong resemblance to Plut., 195, 202, 208, 212, 215, 225, 234, 236,

237, 240, 242, 253, 255, 257, 259, 269, 295, 303 *sqq.*
Appius Claudius, 252.
Appuleius Saturninus, 14 *sqq.*
Apulia, 16.
Aquitania, 115, 116 *sqq.*
Aremorica, 175.
Ariovistus, 89 *sqq.*, 97 *sqq.*, 141.
Aristocracy, 13, 15.
Arsinoë, 212, 234.
Arverni, 155.
Asconius, 16, 39, 65, 152.
Asculum Picenum, 19.
Asellio, 11.
Asia, province, 27, 86, 215.
Asinius, v. Pollio.
Athens, 5.
Atticus, fears C., 197.
Augustus (Octavianus Cæsar), 3, 257; 'Cæsar is ultor,' 293; golden age of, 297; censured Livy as partisan, *ib.*
Aurelia, 3, 7.
Aurelius Cotta (uncle of C.), 42, 263.
Aurelius Cotta, legate, 135.
Avaricum, 159, 173.

B

Bætica, 240.
Balbus, agent of C., 44, 82, 131, 147, 172, 183, 203, 232 *sqq.*, 238, 243, 244, 245, 279, 285.
Belgæ, 100 *sqq.*; in Britain, 129.
Bellovaci, 102, 173 *sqq.*
Bellum Africum, 225 *sqq.*, 228, 230, 283.
Bellum Alexandrinum, 213, 216, 217, 281.
Bellum Hispaniense, 240, 241, 243, 285 *sqq.*
Bellum Sociale (Marsicum, Italicum), 16.

Bibracte, 96, 173.
Bibrax, 102.
Bibulus, 80, 85, 88, 152, 205, 276.
Biography, dangers of, 1.
Bismarck, 310 sq.
Bogud, 242.
Boisford, 13, 21, 23, 34, 51, 84.
Bratuspantium, 102.
Britain, first expedition to, 124; second, 126 sqq.; no conquest of, 131; authority on Druidism, 142.
Bruttium, 16.
Brutus, Albinus Decimus, 115, 156, 253, 262.
Brutus, M. Junius, son of Servilia, 251, 252, 261.
Bursa, 169.

C

Cadvallon, leader of British coalition, 130 sqq.
Cæcilia Metella, 117, 153.
Cælius, 178, 181, 183, 290.
Cæsar, meaning of word, 3.
Cæsar, Gaius Julius, philhellenism of, 4; hexameters on Terence, 5; death of his father, ib.; never under *tutela*, 6; *toga virilis*, ib.; marries Cinna's daughter, ib.; entered into inheritance of the Gracchi, 10; eulogy of aunt Julia, 15; his father, 25, 26; refuses to abandon Cornelia, 32; mulcted by Sulla, ib.; intercession for C. before Sulla, 33; serves in Asia Minor, 34; relations to Nikomedes of Bithynia, 34 sq.; gains *corona civica*, 36; under Servilius (Isauricus), ib.; declines to support revolution of Lepidus, 38; his prosecution of Dolabella, ib.; several *actiones* published, 39; prosecutes C. Antonius, ib.; to Rhodes for further training in oratory, ib.; adventure with corsairs, 40 sq.; pontifex, 42; policy of lavish hospitality, ib.; avoids tribunate, 44; active for *rogatio Plotia*, 53; *quaestor*, 54; rehabilitates name of Marius, ib.; marries Pompeia, ib.; in Spain, 55; anecdotes reviewed, 55 sq.; interested in Transpadanes, 56; lavish

entertainer, 59; *ædile-elect*, ib.; supports P.'s eastern command, 60; in plot of Autronius and Sulla, 60 sq.; associated with Catiline, 61; *ædileship*: further rehabilitation of Marius, 62; hostile to Cicero's consular promotion, 65; notorious as an organizer of bribery, ib.; *iudex quæstionis*, ib.; favors Catiline, ib.; tries to invalidate the *S. C. ultimum*, 67 sq.; elected over Catulus as *pontifex maximus*: by money, 68; share in Catilinarian debate, 69 sq.; *billet* from Servilia, 70; attempts to humiliate old Catulus, 72; *prætor*, ib.; supports revolutionary *plebiscitum* of a servitor of P., ib.; attempts to implicate C. in Catilinarian inquiry, 73; his punishment of Novius, ib.; in *Bona Dea* scandal, 74; shelters his wife's seducer, 75; in his Spanish province, 76 sq.; anecdotes, 77; *consulate*, 79 sq.; organizes *Triumvirate*, 80; *Agrarian bill*, 83; publication of *acta senatus*, ib.; abandons senate, 85; *Lex Iulia Repetundarum*, 86 sq.; Egyptian job, 87; insulted by senate, 88; choice of province, ib.; temporizing with Arioistus, 90; planning for political security while away, 91; creates identity for legions, 94; increases forces without authority, ib.; *Helvetian campaign*, 94 sqq.; campaign against Arioistus, 97 sqq.; panic at Vesontio, 97 sq.; attacks political opponents through *commentarii* (later), 98; adds to forces, 101; battle with Nervii, 103 sq.; *Gallia pacata*, 105, 114; attack on C.'s Campanian land-law, 108; view of Cicero, 110; conference of Luca, 110 sq.; Cicero supports second *quinquennium*, 112; reasons for extension of C.'s *proconsulate*, 113; 'surprised' by resistance of maritime cantons, 114; attitudinizing, ib.; ruthless treatment of Veneti, 116; *massacre of Usipetes and Tencteri*, 119-123; first crossing of Rhine, 123; first expedi-

tion to Britain, 124 *sq.*; political judgment on P., 126; second expedition to Britain, 127; curiously ill-informed of Atlantic tides, 128; palliates failure in Britain, 131; exploitation chief idea of Roman public, 132; council at Samarobriva, 134; on Sabinus and Cotta, 135; hastens to relief of Quintus Cicero, 136; honors troops, 137; cryptogram, 138; reinforcements, 139; invades district of Nervii, *ib.*; second crossing of Rhine, 141; policy of preferences among Gauls, 142; vain efforts to capture Ambiorix, 144; commands eleven legions in 53 B.C., 145; saves Quintus Cicero's post, 146; council among Remi, 147; P.'s new power threatening, 152; vain proposals to P., 153; *question of termination of second quinquennium*, *ib.*; to be candidate for consulate while away from Rome, *ib.*; fearing the being a private citizen, *ib.*; lavish bounties in capital and in the field, 154; ferment in Gaul, 155; begins to meet the national insurrection, 156 *sq.*; unites his legions, 157; destroys Genabum: liberality to troops, *ib.*; fall of Avaricum, 159; siege of Gergovia, 160; defection of the *Ædui*, 161; C. abandons siege of Gergovia, 162; apparent collapse of his hold on Gaul, 163; defeats Vercingetorix in an open battle, 164; surrender of Alesia and Vercingetorix, 166; preferential treatment of *Ædui* and *Arverni*, *ib.*; supports politician banished from Rome, 169; *a hostile consul chosen*, 170; C.'s minor operations from base of Bibracte, 173; takes Uxellodunum, cutting off the hands of the defenders, 176; astounding summaries of political bounties, 177; concern for Cisalpine, 178; hostile acts of consul M. Marcellus, 178, 179 *sq.*; understanding with cons. *Æmilius*, 180; hostile S. C., 181; control of tribunes, 182; Curio, 183 *sq.*; last summer in Gaul,

185 *sq.*; Curio slowly unmasking as political servitor of C., 186; his clever motions in senate, 187; C. gives up two legions, *ib.*; C.'s consular candidate defeated, 188; C.'s ultimatum from Ravenna, 190; *his own tribunes*, 191; political crisis in senate, Jan. 1-7, 49 B.C., 191 *sqq.*; tribunes 'flee' to C., 192; C. harangues troops, *ib.*; COULD C. SAFELY RETIRE TO PRIVATE LIFE? 193; significant utterance of June, 48 B.C., 194; drives across Rubicon, 195; Corfinium and Sulmo taken, 196 *sq.*; before Brundisium, 197; to Rome: constitutional forms, 198; *aerarium sanctius*, 199; stay in Rome lost time, *ib.*; Massilia, *ib.*; Ilerda campaign in Spain, 199 *sqq.*; seeks to avoid bloodshed, 200 *sq.*; sharply condemns P., 201; named dictator, *ib.*; *bad appointments* by C., 202; second consulate at last, *ib.*; *consciousness of autocrat revealed*, 204; offensive strategy, 206; defeat at Dyrrachium, 207; on alternative of plan of campaign, 208; *Pharsalos*, 208 *sqq.*; discredits a Pompeian partisan, 212; in Egypt, *ib.*; Cleopatra, 213, 215; ends Alexandrine war, 214; campaign against Pharnaces, 215 *sq.*; Zela, 216; belittles P., 217; lands at Tarentum, *ib.*; southern Spain lost to C., 220; non-civic spirit of his troops, 222; restores order at capital, 223; tolerates corrupt partisans, 224; deals with mutinous legions, 225; sails for Africa, *ib.*; operations there, 226 *sq.*; Thapsus, 227; disappointed by Cato's death, 229; deep hatred of C. for Cato, 230; Sardinia one of his "farms," 231; C. in Rome, his power unbounded, 232; sore against Pompeians, 233; 'honors' voted him, 233 *sqq.*; the four triumphs, 234 *sq.*; feasts, games, bounties; the new sovereign, 235; reform of calendar, 236; Spanish campaign of Munda: critical equilibrium, 239; contest of Munda, 241 *sq.*; composes his *Anticato*, 244;

honors after Munda, *ib.*; Parthian campaign, *ib.*; referred to as *king*, 245; his testament, *ib.*; indifferent to censure at capital, 246; more 'honors,' *ib.*; sovereign whims, 248; guest at Cicero's Puteolanum, 249; his elevation galling to aristocracy, 254; his judgment on Cicero, *ib.*; temple to Clemency, 255; regal emblems, *ib.*; the plot, *ib.*; diadem incident and Lupercalia, 256 *sqq.*; plans of Parthian campaign, 258; *assassination*, 259 *sqq.*; *writings* of C., 263 *sqq.*; trial of C. proposed, 267; would not imitate Sulla, 274 *sqq.*; *Anticato*, 276 *sqq.*; his poem, 'Iter,' 286; address at Gades, 288; angry pride, *ib.*; paternity of Cleopatra's child, 293; was his birth a curse or blessing? 297; *excellent delineation of character by Dio*, 307 *sqq.*

Calpurnia, 258.

Campus Stellas, 84.

Caninius, 254.

Cantium, 129.

Capite censi, 14.

Cappadocia, 216.

Capua, 84.

Carbo, 29.

Carnutes, 156.

Cassius Longinus, Gaius, 148, 240, 252 *sqq.*, 257, 260.

Cassius Longinus, Quintus, 190, 192, 202, 220, 237.

Cassius Dio, v. *Dio*.

Cassivellaunus, v. *Cadvallon*.

Catiline, 61, 64, 73.

Cato, 71; opposes C. and Metellus, 73; opposed to extraordinary powers, *ib.*; contributes to election fund, 80; against C.'s Agrarian law, 84; placed under arrest by C., 85; sent to Cyprus, 100; penetrates C.'s designs, *ib.*; to deprive C. of his armies, 110; to surrender C. to Germans, 123; why he dispensed with a province, 149; supports naval power for P., 153; defies P. in a trial, 169; defeated for consulate, 171; guardian of the old constitution, *ib.*; willing to compromise with C., 195; destroys himself at Utica, 229; Sal-lust on Cato, 230; Cicero's literary memorial, 231 *sqq.*, 251, 285.

Catullus, 123, 249.

Censors, 22, 53.

Census lists, 22.

Centurions, 271.

Cicero, M. Tullius, 3, 4, 12, 14, 15, 17, 21, 25, 40; on Apollonius, *ib.*, 48, 51; Verres, 52, 57;—Greekling, 44; supports P.'s eastern command, 59 *sqq.*; on plot of Autronius, 61; consular candidate, 64; *oratio in toga candida*, 65; defends old Rabirius, 67; his estimate of C.'s motion in Catilinarian debate, 74, 75; on "leech of the treasury," 75; on acquittal of Clodius, 75, 81; on C.'s Agrarian law, 82 *sqq.*; his depression, 83; calls his Agrarian law "bribery," 84, 85; declines legateship, 86; on Gallic situation, 89, 91; returns from exile, 106; supports C. in senate, 107; Campanian land, 108, 109; ill at ease as supporter of C., 111; 'de Provinciis Consularibus,' 112; scholar in politics, *ib.*, 126; belated interest in C.'s northwest campaigns, 131; correspondence with C.'s headquarters, 132; pessimistic view of actual government, 133, 134; nothing of Quintus's dire peril, 147; on Crassus, 148; executing commissions of the dynasts, *ib.*; *how he dates the beginning of his own proconsulate*, 153; self-repression, 149; meets C. at Ravenna, 154; had no clear conception of importance of Gallic campaigns, 168; antagonizes C. and P., 169; censured Cato for declining electoral bribery, 172; as proconsul of Cilicia, 179; hears from Cælius about breach between the dynasts, 179 *sqq.*; on oratory of Curio, 183; returns from Cilicia on eve of Civil War, 189; clear vision, 191; not sure whether C. will be cruel or not, 197; angry at P., 198; on events of 49 B.C., 203 *sqq.*; on Pharsalos, 210 *sqq.*; gloomy ten months at

Brundisium, 218 *sqq.*; on Cleopatra, 221; returns to his own, 223; furious hatred of C., 224; anxious about African campaign, 226; cowed by C.'s success, 230; on C. as owner of provinces, 231; *Laus Catonis*, 231 *sqq.*; on C.'s omnipotence, 232; ignorant as to where C. would name candidates, 238; view of Spanish campaign, 239; intercedes for exiles, 243; gloom after Munda, *ib.*; refers to C. as *rex*, 245; his treacherous nephew, *ib.*; C.'s *Anticato*, *ib.*; covert malediction of the autocrat, 247; on C.'s sovereign whims, 249; entertains C., *ib.*; opposes Brutus's usurious practices in Cyprus, 252; Cicero 'easy' in C.'s estimation, 254; on diadem incident, 256; on Antony's demeanor on Ides of March, 259; on the assassination, 261; on C.'s oratory, 264; his 'Brutus,' 266; on *Lex Iulia Repetundorum*, 267; *Laus Catonis*, 277; on African War, 283; *Cicero's writings as sources*, 289 *sqq.*; churlishness in judgment on C., 291.

Cicero, Quintus, 64, 128, 131, 132, 135, 145, 149, 279.

Cicero, Quintus, the younger, 245.

Cimber, Tillius, 260.

Cinna, 7, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28.

Civil War, genetic point, 80.

Cleopatra, 212 *sq.*, 221, 236, 246, 293, 313.

Collegium Poetarum, 5.

Comitia, 23, 181, v. *Botsford*.

Commentarii, date of, 105; arrangement of matter of, 108 (bulletins from the seat of war, 112); *cp. Suet.*, 56; self-defence: probably a reply to Cato, 121; why is the incident of the *Pirustæ* included? 127; loose geographical notions, 128; later than Cicero's letters of 54 B.C., 131; dwell on prowess of soldiers, especially of centurions, 136; 'Ephemerides,' 138; appreciative tone towards P., 139; sketch of Gauls and Germans, 141; attempt to besmirch Vercingetorix, 156; date of compo-

sition, *ib.*; courteous reference to P., *ib.*; faculty of putting adversaries in the wrong, 161; obvious hastening to conclusion with fall of Alesia, 166, 265 *sqq.*; probable date of, 268; why not *Libri?* called *Ephemerides*, 269; omitting data of provincial administration, 270; Hirius on *Commentarii*, 270; regard for soldiers, 271; Cicero on, 272; *c. de Bello Civili*, 274 *sqq.*; Pollio on, 295.—Add data on p. 73.

Corduba, 201, 220, 237, 240.

Corfinium, 2.

Cornelia, 6.

Cossutia, 6.

Crassus, the orator, 17.

Crassus, M. Licinius, the capitalist, 28; slave war, 46; in plot of Autronius, 61; further association with C., 65; helps C., 77; second consulate, 119; perishes, 127, 147, 148.

Crassus, P., young, 113, 115, 116.

Cremutius Cordus, 295, 297.

Critognatus, 268.

Cromwell, 222.

Crucifixion at end of slave war, 49.

Cryptogram of C., 138.

Culinary joys, 43.

Curio the Younger, 183, 186 *sqq.*, 188, 190, 202.

Curius, informer, 73.

Cyprus, 252.

D

Deiotarus, 216.

Dio (Cassius Dio Cocceianus), 5; on intercession for young C., 33; anecdotes, 55, 58; available from 66 B.C. on, 59; superiority to Appian and Plutarch, *ib.*; not friendly to Cicero, 60; seems to have used Suetonius, too, 62; on Catilinarian debate, 71, 72; on P.'s return from East, 76; points out pretext, 77; on triumvirate, 82, 88; closer to text of C. than Livy, 98; imitates Thucydides, 98; on Nervii, 105; relation of C.'s third *commentarius*, 47 *sq.*; haste, 118; condemns C., 123; does not believe C. quite fully, 126; discriminat-

ing on C.'s invasion of Britain, 132; blunders, 133; dramatizes and pragmatizes, 138; C.'s cryptogram, 138; manner of relation, 147; not exact, ib.; censures C., ib., 150, 152; on Vercingetorix campaign, 167; some detail not in C., ib., 170, 171, 208, 214, 217, 224, 225, 230, 234, 236, 237, 239, 241, 242 (close agreement with Livy), 244, 247, 255, 256, 258, 259, 306 *sqq.*

Diodorus, 17.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 2.

Divitiacus, 89, 95, 142.

Dolabella, 221.

Domitius Ahenobarbus, 91, 110, 127, 133, 181, 197, 201.

Druids, 142 *sqq.*

Drumann, 52, 54, 141, 251, 296.

Dumnorix, 92, 95, 128.

Dyrrachium, 207.

E

Eburones, 135, 146.

Education, 4, v. *Greek Culture*.

Egyptian job, 109.

Electoral corruption, 150.

Ellis, Robinson, 298.

Emendation of texts, 16, 73, 89, 194.

Ennius, 143.

Ephemerides, 269.

Epicurus, 260.

Eratosthenes, 141.

Esquiline quarter, 23.

F

Fabius, legate, 175.

Fenestella, 48.

Ferrero, 311.

Festus, 143.

Feudal character of Keltic institutions, 92, 142 *sqq.*

Fischer, 54.

Florus, 26, 241, 257, 259, 298.

Froude, 71, 116, 193; special critique of, 314 *sqq.*

Fufius Calenus, 5.

Fulvius Flaccus, 16.

Fundum fieri, 21.

G

Gabinius, servitor of P., 58, 99, 148, 213.

Gades, 55, 201.

Galba, 107.

Gardthausen, 296.

Gauls, their institutions, 142 *sqq.*; rank of states, 165; v. *Keltic*.

Gellius, 21, 36, 39, 263.

Genabum, vendetta at, 155.

Geneva, 93.

Gergovia, 160.

Germanic superstition, 99; superiority to Kelts, 144; institutions, ib.

Gniphō, Antonius, 5.

Goeler, 92.

Goethe, 309.

Gorgobina, 157.

Gracchian jurors, 12.

Gracchus, Tib. Sempronius, 9; Gaius, 10, 12, 13, 15.

Greek culture, in Roman education, 4, 13, 39, 195, 212, 229.

Greek script among Gauls, 96, 142.

Greeks in Persian Wars, 165.

H

Hadrumetum, 255.

Hegel, 106, 219, 309, 313.

Heitland, 299.

Hesiod, 82.

Hirrus, tr. pl. of P., 133.

Hirschfeld, O., 279.

Hirtius, A., 172, 174, 185, 221, 244, 270, 277, 279 *sqq.*

Historians, Anticæsarian, 34.

Historicorum Græcorum Fragmenta, 257.

Holder, 101, 143.

Holmes, T. Rice, 89, 92, 116, 128, 129, 143, 161, 164, 175, 266, 267, 268.

Horace, 293, 297.

Hortensius, 263.

Hosius, 299.

Humanists, 4.

I

Jahn, Otto, 296.

Iberians, 116.

Jerome, 22.

Ihm, 143.
Jordan, H., 291.
'Italica' (Corfinium), 19.
Ityraei, 64.
Juba, 202, 225.
Iudex Quæstionis, 65.
Jugurtha, 12.
Julia (aunt of C.), 3, 15, 25.
Julia (daughter of C.), 85, 133.
Iulia Lex Repetundarum, 86 *sqq.*, 105, 115, 148, 267.
Iulii, 2 *sqq.*, 15.
Julius Cæsar *Strabo*, 25.
Julius Cæsar, cons. 90 b.c., 19.
July, 3, 248.
Jury system, 52, 74.

K

Keil's 'Grammatici', 265.
Kelsey, Fr. W., 266.
Keltic *ingenium*, 131, cf. 142 *sqq.*, 158; inferiority to Germans, 144; enthusiasm of self-sacrifice, 159; mighty movement, 163; national diet, ib.; desperation, 166.
Kelts, in Thapsus campaign, 284.
Kiepert, 216.
Kornemann, 296.
Kratippos, 1.
Kübler, 'Fragmenta Cæsaris,' 84, 86, 267, 277.

L

Laberius, 248.
Labienus, 115, 128, 129, 131, 137, 140, 145, 160, 162, 163, 174, 185, 196, 210, 243, 284.
Landgraf, 283.
Landlords, 10.
Lange, Ludwig, 17, 21, 83, 110, 148, 170, 191, 235, 247, 248, 263, 309.
Latifundia, 8.
Legati, of C., 271, 283.
Lentulus, cons. of 49 b.c., 188, 191, 204.
Lepidus, 245, 257, 259, 260.
Lex, *Villia Annalis*, 13, 202; *Thoria*, 14; *Licinia Mucia*, 16; *Leges Liviæ*, 18; *Lex Iulia* (on allies), 21; *Plautia et Papiria*, 21, 24; *Scantinia de Nefanda Venere*, 35; *Aurelia*, re-forms jury system, 52; *Iulia Agraria*, 83; *Iulia Repetundarum*, 86 *sqq.*, 105, 115, 148, 267; *Trebonia*, 148; *Pompeia de vi* and *de ambitu*, 156; *Pompeia de Provinciis*, 170; *Pedia de Interfectoribus Cæsaris*, 294.
Licinius, 257.
Lilybæum, 225.
Litteræ publicæ, 271.
Livius, M. L. Drusus, tr. pl., 91 b.c., 14; aims at a greater Rome, 18; assassinated, ib., 38.
Livy, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 35, 36, 48, 53; on moral decline, 35, 74; partisan attitude, 80, 85; on Nervii, 105 *sqq.*; on Britain, 132, 133; cited, 152, 167, 187, 212; account of Munda, 241 *sqq.*; cited, 120, 255, 257, 258, 296 *sqq.*
Long, George, 21.
Luca, conference at, 110.
Lucan, 208, 214, 299.
Luceius, 79.
Lucullus, L., 45.
Lupercalia, 256 *sqq.*
Lutatius Catulus, leader of senate, 63.
Lutetia Parisiorum, 140.

M

Macrobius, 249.
Madvig, 53, 65, 179, 314.
Mamurra, 123, 249, 277.
Manilius, servitor of Pompey, 59.
Marcellus, Gaius Claudius, consul 50 b.c., 180, 188.
Marcellus, Gaius Claudius (cousin of preceding, brother of *Marcus Marcellus*), cons. 49 b.c., 188.
Marcellus, M. Claudius, cons. 51 b.c., 170, 178, 179, 232, 268.
Marcius, L. M. Philippus, cons. 91 b.c., 14, 17, 22.
Marcius Rex, 15.
Marius, Gaius, 3, 7, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24; filled with social hatred, 25; death, 26; ashes scattered in Anio, 32; name rehabilitated by C., 62.
Marius, Jr., 29, 30.
Marquardt, 6.
Massilia, 201.
Matius, 134, 217.
Memmius, 15.

Menander, 5, 194 *sqq.*
Menapii, 117.
Mendelssohn, 303.
Metellus Numidicus, 15.
Metellus Pius, 24, 28.
Mithridates, 26.
Mithridates of Pergamos, 214.
Mithridatic War, 22.
Mommsen, 2, 13, 17, 19, 65, 76, 97, 106, 116, 122, 218 *sqq.*, 222, 292, 297; special critique of M., 309 *sqq.*
Morini, 117, 124.
Munda, 241 *sqq.*, 287.
Munro, 249, 271 (on Catullus, 29).
Mutilus, 19.

N

Naples and Heraclea, 21.
Napoleon, 310 *sqq.*
Napoleon III, 92.
Narbo, 156.
Nervii, 103, 139.
Nikolaos of Damascus, 257, 259, 293.
Nikomedes of Bithynia, 34, 35.
Nipperdey, 263, 280, 281.
Notarii, 270.
Noviodunum, 102.
Nutting, H. C., 60.

O

Obulco, 237.
Octavius (cons. 87 B.C.), 24.
Octavius, Young, 249; v. *Augustus*.
Octodurus, 107.
Opimius, 12.
Oppius (book on C. by him), 32, 38, 41, 44 (anecdotes, 56), 78, 172, 233, 238, 243, 245, 270, 271, 283, 285.
Orgetorix, 92.

P

Paganism, sexual corruption in, 35.
Pansa, 181.
Parilia, 243.
Pausanias, 129.
Pedia, Lex, 294.
Pelusium, 212.
Perperna, 45.
Perrin, Bernadotte, 299.
Peter, Hermann, 11, 296.
Petreius, 200 *sqq.*

Pharnaces, 215 *sqq.*
Pharsalos, 208 *sqq.*
Philhellenism, 4.
Pirates, 40 *sqq.*, 57 *sqq.*
Plato, 229.
Plebs, leech of the treasury, 171; corrupt at elections, ib.; defeats Cato, ib.
Pliny the Elder, 5, 8, 35, 86, 271.
Pliny the Younger, 263.
Pompeius (Strabo), father of P., 20, 56.
Pollio, Asinius, 80, 194, 195, 221, 241, 242, 283, 294 *sqq.*, 305.
Plutarch of Chæronea, cites Poseidônios, 26; differs from Appian, 28; condemns Sulla, ib.; influenced by Sulla's memoirs, 28; censures Sulla, 30; probably uses Oppius, 32; confused, 33; literal version of a Latin idiom, 37; on prosecution by C. of Antonius, 39; confused as to C.'s adventure with pirates, 41; cited, 42, 44, 45; hurried transcription, 49; cited, 50, 51, 54; on Catilinarian debate, 70; cited, 71, 73, 74; remarkable fulness in *Bona Dea* scandal, 77, 78; on triumvirate, 81; error, ib.; bitter toward C., 85, 87; cited, 100; on Belgian campaigns, 106; bitter against C., ib.; on conference of Luca, 110; 111; contemptuous tone toward C., 118; on butchery of Usipetes and Tencteri, 123; hurry in transcription, ib.; translation of Latin, ib.; on first British expedition, 125; calls invasion a failure, 132; blunder, 133; odd tense, ib.; seems to have used *Commentarii*, 138; brief on events of, 53 B.C., 116; cited, 117, 152; on Vercingetorix, 167; cited, 171, 172, 180, 187; on Rubicon matter, impressive resemblance to Appian, 195; cited, 202, 207, 208, 212, 215, 223, 226, 228, 230, 234, 236, 241, 242, 255, 257, 259, 263, 269; after Oppius, 270; refers to C.'s *Anticato*, 277, 301 *sqq.*
Pompey, Cn. P. Magnus, supports Sulla, 29; sent to Sicily and Africa, 30; mandatary in Spain of an un-

willing senate, 45; no politician at all, 49; enormous power of P. in 70 B.C.; consul with Crassus, 50; his *dignitas*, 51; restores power of tribunes, 51; war with corsairs, 57 *sq.*; vast imperium, *ib.*; moves southward, 63; romantic strain, 64; divorces Mucia, 74; returns to Rome, 75; his civic continence praised by Dio, 76; supports C.'s agrarian law, 85; marries Julia, *ib.*; ratification of acts of Eastern command, 86; consciousness of his *dignitas*, *ib.*; Ptolemy Auletes, 87; balance of power, 106; new power for P., *ib.*; indirect mode of intimating his will, 109; pestered by Clodius, *ib.*; second consulate, 119; Luca settlements executed, *ib.*; does not go to Spain, 126; taciturn, 148; supine amid the political disintegration in the capital, 149; 'consul without a colleague,' 152; saviour of law and order, *ib.*; declines C.'s proposals for new marriage pact, 152; his laws *de vi* and *de ambitu*, 156; favors Bursa, 169; for reform of provincial government, 170; leader of Optimates, 177; declaration against C. forced from P., 179 *sq.*; alone weighs more than senate, 180; action of Sept. 29, 51 B.C., 181; reserved manner, *ib.*; self-deception, 182; sealed oracle, *ib.*; Curio against him, 187; errs as to temper of troops, 188; false notions of C.'s legions, 192; P. on C.'s motives for Civil War, 194; P. confused, *ib.*; leaves Rome, 196; helpless, 197; sails from Italy, 198; Eastern resources, 205; refuses parley, 206; taunts of his own partisans, 207; alternative of strategy, 208; flight, 211 *sq.*; death, 212.

Pompey, Cn., the Younger, 237 *sqq.*, 240.

Pompey, Sextius, 238.

Pompeians, 219, 220, 227.

Pompey's stone theatre, 259.

Populares, 15.

Porcia, 252.

Poseidonios, 26.

Potheinos, 215.

Præneste, 30; *Fasti Prænestini*, 214.

Prætor urbanus, 20.

Proletarian, 14.

Proscription, 31.

Provincial government, when it begins to run, 153.

Ptolemy Auletes, job of his restoration, 109, 148, 212 *sq.*

Ptolemy, of Cyprus, 251.

Ptolemy, schoolboy king, 212.

Q

Quintilian, 39, 294, 296.

R

Rabirius, 12, 67.

Ranke, 1, Preface vii.

Remi, 101.

Rheinbund, 102.

Rhetoricians' schools, 4.

Rhine, C.'s first crossing, 123; second crossing, 141.

Rhodes, 253.

Rome, no genuine democracy, 8.

Rutenei, 156.

Rutilius Rufus, 17.

S

Saga sumere, 19.

Sallust, 13, 15; 'Historiæ' began with death of Sulla, 36; governor of Numidia, 230, 291 *sq.*; fair as between C. and Cato, 292.

Sanders, Henry A., 297.

Sandys, J. E., 273.

Scapula, 287.

Schanz, 296.

Schmidt, O. E., 293, 296.

Schneider, on date of composition of *commentarii*, 266.

Schwartz, 303, 306 (student of Appian and Dio).

Scipio Æmilianus, 11.

Scipio, Metellus, father-in-law of P., 181, 191, 225, 285.

Sempronius Asellio, 20.

Senatus Consultum Ultimum, 12, 192.

Seneca, sharp censure of C.'s democratic pretensions, 199.

Senones, 140.
Sequani, 89.
Sertorius, 45.
Servilia, 70, 251.
Servilius (Isauricus), 36.
Servius, 269.
Sicoris, river, 200.
Sihler, E. G., 'Collegium Poetarum', 5; 'Testimonium Animæ', 8; emendation of texts, 16, 73, 89, 194; aim of this work, 177; on Rubicon matter, 195; exegesis of enigmatic passage in Suetonius, 229; on *commentarii*, 266, 298, 313.
Sophocles, 212.
Spanish campaign, Last, 237 *sqq.*
Spartacus and Crixus, 46.
Spurinna, 258.
Steinthal, 273.
Strabo, 116, 143, 237, 295.
Suebi, 97, 119-120, 140.
Suessiones, 102.
Suetonius, 2, 4, 5, 6, 15, 32, 38, 39, 41, 44; anecdotes reviewed, 55 *sqq.*, 56, 57; critical, 61, 71, 72, 73, 79; on triumvirate, 81, 83, 87, 91, 94, 111, 112, 123, 132, 152; antiquarian precision, 154, 157, 177, 194, 205, 208, 215, 217, 225, 229, 234, 241, 246, 247, 255, 257, 259, 263, 268, 273, 278, 300 *sqq.*
Sugambri, 124, 146.
Suidas, 293.
Sulla (dictator), 6, 7, 18, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36, 37, 290, 298.
Sulla, P., 222.
Sulpicius, tr. pl. of 88 B.C., 23.
Sulpicius, Servius S. Rufus (cons. 51 B.C.), 170; warns against civil war, 179, 203.
Symmachus, 269.

T

Tacitus, 294, 295, 297.
Tanusius Geminus, anticæsarian historian, 34, 123, 177, 228, 268.
Terentia, 219.
' *Testimonium Animæ*', 313.
Teuffel, W., 251.
Texts, emendation of, 16, 73, 89, 194.
Thames, 129.
Thapsus, 227 *sqq.*, 283 *sqq.*

Thorius, 14.
Thouret, 296.
Titurius Sabinus, 116, 135.
Topographical verification, 128; v. *Holmes*.
Trebatus Testa, 132, 134, 270.
Trebonius, 145, 174, 253, 259, 262.
Treveri, 134, 138, 139, 140, 174.
Tribunus Plebis, 12, 44, 51.
Τρικάρανος, 81.
Triumphs, 234 *sqq.*
Triumvirate, ancient tradition concerning, 80 *sqq.*; not omnipotent, 108, 127; *Luca*, 110.
Trojan Families, 2.
Tutela, 6.
Tyrrell, editor of Cicero's letters, 82, 89, 126, 177, 182, 283.

U

Utica, 228.
Uxellodunum, 175.

V

Valerius Maximus, 253, 298.
Varro, 2, 58, 81, 201, 230, 273, 276.
Velleius Paterculus, 6, 11, 30, 32, 41, 234, 257, 294, 298.
Veneti, 114 *sqq.*
Veni, Vidi, Vici, 217.
Venus Genetrix, 2, 15, 255.
Vercingetorix, 155, 156, 157, 158, 163, 164, 268.
Vergil, 2, 297.
Vergobret, 95, 160, 161.
Verrius Flaccus, 3, 273.
Vestals, 245.
Vettius, informer, 73; cf. *Curius*.
Volkmann, 301.

W

Wachsmuth, 303.
Westermann, 263.
White, Horace, translator of *Appian*, 303.
Wissowa, 74, 143.
World-spirit, 219, 309, 311, 313; cf. *Hegel* and *Mommsen*.
Writings of C., 263 *sqq.*

Z

Zela, 206 *sqq.*
Zonaras, 50.

Date Due

MAR 27

OCT 27 '80

JAN 29 '82

JAN 18 '88

JAN 27 1987



SCHEELE MEMORIAL LIBRARY



3 6655 00024173 7

DG262 .S5

Sihler, Ernest Gott/Annals of

DG
262
.S5

3356

The Walter A. Maier Library
Concordia Collegiate Institute
Bronxville 8, New York



10-51

